Pakistan in the shadow of war against terrorism

Independent-Bangladesh ^ | 1/24/02 | Brig Gen (retd) M Sakhawat Hussain

[Ranger]

All along from Peshawar to Karachi it was perhaps the largest troop mobilisation that I witnessed in Pakistan. The movements were visible on all the major highways close to the international border. Highly placed Pakistani officials told me that the situation was almost similar on the Indian side of the border too. The tension between the two nuclear weapon possessing neighbours was quite high that I witnessed in my ten-day whirlwind visit to Pakistan. I managed to return by the last flight of PIA (Pakistan International Airlines) that India allowed till the overflight by Pak carrier was embargoed, which in Indian terms is some sort of economic sanction. This was a stern measure taken by India against Pakistan after 1971. India also asked the Pakistani mission in Delhi to reduce its strength to half. Pakistan retaliated. The incident of December 13, 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian parliament worsened the Indo-Pak stand-off.

The two nuclear rivals are face to face with near possibility of war that has the potentiality of turning into nuclear exchange. India has blamed the involvement of Pakistan and its intelligence organisation in the planning and execution of the terrorist act, a serious charge that Pakistan dismisses without any reservation. But some Pakistanis do not rule out involvement of religious terrorist organisations that are Pakistani-based. This could be in concert with Al-Qaida sympathiser in India. The prominent political commentators in Pakistan that I met in Islamabad and elsewhere would like to believe that India is trying to pressurise Pakistan to disassociate from supporting the Kashmiri militants. These commentators, however, remain skeptical of Indian aim behind the rhetoric and ceaseless "war cry". The tension between two countries even relegated the ongoing hunt for Osama-bin Laden and his Al-Qaida network in Afghanistan. Pakistanis on the street dismisses Indian allegation as a stage-managed affair to malign Pakistan as the Indians earlier tried with an abortive hijacking drama of Indian Airline plane a couple of months ago. As of today India and Pakistan are one shot away of a war that may prove to be devastating for the region in particular and the world in general. But none of the parties wants to initiate the war. Though there seems to be a rare chance of all out war between the two, accidental skirmishes cannot be ruled out. The recently concluded SAARC summit in Kathmandu may ease tension to some extent.

The present military government in Pakistan is in enormous pressure from within and across the border. It is perhaps for the first time in Pakistan’s history that the Armed Forces have to take constant care of two fronts i.e. in the East with India and in the West with Afghanistan. Internally the administration is faced with the ever-increasing threat from the religious extremist parties; those who have both clandestinely or as proxy, supported the Taliban movement in Afghanistan. Musharraf is caught in between the legacies of the past Afghan policy and pressure from international coalition led by the USA. Pakistan found itself in the quagmire of international terrorism.

Most of the intelligentsia in Pakistan believe that Kashmiri fighter organisation systematically tarnished the image of Kashmiris that Pakistanis feel obliged to support "diplomatically" and ‘morally". It is time now to leave the struggle to Kashmiris themselves. Though the resolution of Kashmir problem remains the key issue in Indo-Pak relations but no one in Pakistan believes that the problem can be resolved by the application of force from either side. The same views are found in the cross-section of populace. Most of the intellectuals talk of alternatives that must be worked out but every one seems to be short of suggested methodology. One suggestion that may come forward is making Kashmir as a whole an autonomous region but that also would need long drawn negotiation between the two contending powers of the sub-continent. The war or near war hysteria at this juncture of Pakistan’s chances of economic recovery puts recovery plans in doldrums. The mobilisation would inflate defence budget for sure.

Economically, Pakistan has suffered as the Afghan imbroglio continued. The much talked about Central Asian trade route got disrupted since UN embargo was placed upon Afghanistan in 1999. The embargo saw the fall of revenue in one hand and rise to black marketing and smuggling on the other. Apart from military and diplomatic reversal, Pakistan has suffered economically by pursuing a faulty Afghan policy initiated by late president Gen Zia-ul-Haque and doggedly indoctrinated by Ms. Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif regime.

Gen Zia-ul-Haque was one of the architects of Jihad in Afghanistan on behalf of USA and fully supported by Muslim countries against "infidel" Soviet Russian occupation of a Muslim country in neighbouring Pakistan (1979-89). The situation then suited Gen Zia-ul-Haque to hold on to the power as well as implement his concept of Islamisation in "liberal Pakistan". Gen Zia-ul-Haque , in presence of us who visited in a delegation in 1988, boastfully said that he had attempted to impose Sharia law in what was once known to be a moderate country. Gen Zia-ul-Haque ’s Afghan policy was also driven by Kabul’s historical animosity with Pakistan on Pakhtunistan issue. Since the partition of the subcontinent governments in Kabul have been in favour of Badsha Khan (Gaffar Khan) in support of his demand for Pakhtunistan. Only recently one of the Pakhtun leaders confided with me and clarified that their demand is to rename the province of NWFP as Pakhtunistan.

Gen Zia-ul-Haque ’s love affair with Islamisation well suited USA at that time. The then Pak president found in Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, a Pushtun, known to be Islamist out of other Mujahideen groups, a willing horse to jockey Gen Zia-ul-Haque ’s dream to install a friendly Islamic government in Kabul. USA fully supported Gen Zia-ul-Haque ’s persuasion towards his goal. In his eleven years of iron-fisted rule Gen Zia-ul-Haque radicalised both armed forces and the country’s politics to a great extent. He hand-picked the ISI field level operatives who would further his cause. Gen Zia-ul-Haque ’s regime saw politicising the religion and rise of Islamist parties likes of JUI (Jamait-i-Ulema-i-Islam), Jamait-i-Islami. His sad demise, a year before Soviet withdrawal, thwarted his plan in the region. Gen Zia-ul-Haque ’s parochial approach to formulate the Afghan policy during and after the Jihad did not go well with other Mujahideen leaders both in Peshawar and in Iran.

The other parties who despised Gen Zia-ul-Haque ’s policy included moderates like Moulvi Younus Kahlis, Sibgatullah Mujaddidi and minority tribal organisation headed by Borhanuddin Rabbani and his legendary commander Ahmed Shah Masood. The organisations in Iran known as Tehran Eight, that included Hizbe Wahdad party, had reservation of Gen Zia-ul-Haque ’s policy. Iran, that did not maintain so good a relation with Pakistan after Shah’s fall, could not take Pakistan’s parochialism kindly. This fact had cast long shadow in post-Soviet relations between Iran-Pakistan and Taliban administered Afghanistan.

Ms. Benazir Bhutto succeeded Gen Zia-ul-Haque as an elected head of the government in the wake of revival of democracy but in her brief tenure she could hardly rein in the Islamist element that Gen Zia-ul-Haque implanted in the society, ISI and in the politics. She continued Gen Zia-ul-Haque ’s Afghan policy without any alteration. The policy of pursuing Islam and a Pushtun leader in Kabul got impetus by Benazir Bhutto’s successor Mr. Nawaz Sharif, a proselyte of Gen Zia-ul-Haque . Nawaz Sharif landed in Kabul in 1992 soon after Rabbani was installed in power to boost the power-sharing claim by Gulbuddin. By then Soviet Russia collapsed. Soon after Soviet Union’s demise and with the emergence of Central Asian Muslim republics a renewed "great game" started putting Afghanistan in the geo-strategic centre stage. Nawaz Sharif did not last long to be the witness to Gulbuddin’s failure to put himself in Kabul. By then the power struggle in Kabul took the shape of worst possible civil war in a triangular fight for domination of the capital. The civil war that took Afghanistan back to rubble was worst in contemporary Afghan history. In its one end was Pakistani-backed Pushtun leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, opposing him was Rabbani’s Defence Minister Ahamed Shah Masood, backed by Russia and India. On the other side of both were Iran-supported party Hizbe Wadat. Kabul was continuously rocketed by Gulbuddin’s forces from south; Hizb fighters were holding Karta Se district southeast. In between 1992 and 1994 larger portion of Kabul was reduced to rubble.

Amidst Afghan imbroglio, Benazir Bhutto came to power for the second time in Pakistan. This time she was an experienced hand in Pakistan’s politics that was so much dominated by the armed forces and the ISI. By then emergence of various semi-independent republics of ex-Soviet Russia, that included the central Asian Muslim republics, opened new markets for Pakistani merchants specially the cotton importers. The other possibility was the vast opening for Pakistani investors in gas and oil. But the cheapest trade route that could give easy access to Central Asia via Turkmenistan needed opening up alternative route than Kabul-Salang tunnel. The route via Kabul was closed because of continued civil war. Bhutto never abandoned Pakistan’s Afghan policy but time was ripe to abandon Gulbuddin as he failed to deliver the goods. The Taliban led by Mullah Omar was emerging from an obscure village of Kandahar. Benazir Bhutto’s ebullient Pushtun General turned interior minister Nasirullah Babar organised Taliban movement with the help of spirited Moulana Samiul Haq and Moulana Fazlur Rahman who were holding cabinet posts in Benazir Bhutto’s cabinet. These two religious zealots proved to be useful in strengthening Taliban by augmenting forces from Pakistan’s two western provinces Baluchistan and NWFP.

Rabbani and Masood, aiming to counter Gulbuddin’s forces, also provided the initial impetus to the rise of Taliban. Rest is part of the painful history. Pakistan could never come out of Taliban jinx until September 11, 2001.

Pakistan today, finds itself stranded in the Afghan quagmire. In one hand Islamabad is a partner of the coalition and allowed its soil to be used as staging logistical base for US troops, on the other hand the government had to withstand uproar from religious clerics particularly from the NWFP and Baluchistan, the main support bases for Taliban movement. Apparently, Musharraf played coolly and efficiently. He has so far been successful in silencing the fundamentalist parties that were posing a threat to his government ever since he took over in October 1999. No doubt Pakistan has gained both in terms of economic assistance from the West, especially from USA and in terms of recognition of Musharraf’s effort to keep extremism at bay, yet the majority of the Pakistanis are skeptical of the durability and reliability of US support.

Islamabad’s experience of Pak-US relations has not been rosy in the past particularly in the context of its relations with archrival India. The present impasse between India and Pakistan is thought to be an early indication of policy shifts of the Western powers. Many Pakistanis believe that the US has done little to restrain India from accusing Islamabad of its perceived complicity in December 13, 2001 terrorist attack even after Musharraf has emphatically condemned the heinous crime.

There are question marks on Pakistan’s nuclear safety after the September 11,2001 attack on USA by terrorists but Pakistanis voiced their solidarity with Musharraf to protect and safeguard the strategic assets that Islamabad has acquired after sacrificing their economic well being. Many experts, that include top military officials, believe that it is Pakistan’s nuclear capability that has so far acted as deterrent to prevent a full scale attack from India.

Pakistan, as of now, seems to be much confident in handling the duel crisis that emerged for Islamabad under gruelling circumstances. Never before in the history of Pakistan the government of any description had faced such multi-dimensional crisis. Musharraf seems to have handled well with the help of the military oligarchy, but for how long? The pertinent question that seems to loom large is, after Musharraf who? Pakistanis feel that they need to install a political system in their country before the goodwill runs out.

[Ranger]

This is a very insightful commentary. It helps explain the course of conduct by Pakistan that might otherwise be viewed as contradictory.

Also, if India doesn't want war, perhaps they want to financially bleed the Pakistani defense budget by forcing a widescale military mobilization which Pakistan cannot afford to sustain?