Americans `conned' into backing war, ex-general asserts

Chicago Tribune ^ | Dec. 31, 2003 | Thomas Ricks

[Spok]

This is why, in their inestimable wisdom, our founding fathers made an elected civilian commander-in-chief of all of our armed forces.

[CaptRon]

I don't care what happens to my career."

Over the past year, the retired Marine Corps general...

Especially now that it's over.

[aynrandfreak]

This does reveal a weakness in the administration. Why do they keep putting Clintonites like Zinni or Wilson in a position to embarass them? This is almost as bad as putting Souter on the Supreme Court.

[SolutionsOnly]

Having three AK-47 slugs in you (Zinni), driving a riverboat in Vietnam (Kerry) or Being held as a POW (McCain) have absolutely no relevance at the geopolitical level. I continues to amaze me that the media thinks that this somehow gives additional credibility to an opinion on strategic matters. In fact they may even be detrimental in that they inject emotion into the debate such that the overall good is jeopradized for the sake of the few.

[roses of sharon]

Containment in Iraq was an immoral policy that consigned millions to tyranny for decades.

Zinni's policy depended entirely on the predictability of a madman with WMD, programs, a history of using them, open support of terrorists, support of the Islamic suicide cultists who have repeatedly threatened the US, Israel, the West, Christians and Jews.

These cultists and their State supporters have been murdering innocents over the globe for decades, with impunity.

Was Zinni prepared to "contain" Saddams wacko sons also? For how many more "no-fly" zone decades? Would the sons have let the UN inspect Iraq?

Zinni is an imprudent man, and a simple contrarian.

[Conspiracy Guy]

My only General Poem right now is about someone else but fit's Zinni the Winni too.

The Gen’ral

I‘d say that you’re invalid,
Even though you served.
The Clintons really like you,
That’s why I am unnerved.
You seem to be a sissy,
Too light in your old loafers.
I’d say it seems for Bill and Hill,
You’re just one of their gofers.
Retired your stars and that is best,
For you’ve not got a clue.
I’d vote for Sharpton, Gen’ral Clark,
Before I’d vote for you.

Conspiracy Guy 12/17/03

[Blue_Ridge_Mtn_Geek]

I suspect Zinni has a good deal more foreign affairs acumen than the authors of these various cheap shots aimed at him. Collin Powell, our current Sec State, and former Chairman JCS, is not the only military leader with a fairly thick foreign affairs section in his resume.

The remark about Pentagon planners' unfamiliarity with the contingency plan from 1999 is a bit startling; if true it suggests another truly FUBAR situation, with tragic potential for much unecessary spilling of GI blood.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

The military's silent takeover of U.S. diplomacy
By MARGO HAMMOND, Times Books Editor
© St. Petersburg Times, published April 6, 2003
http://www.sptimes.com/2003/04/06/news_pf/Perspective/The_military_s_silent.shtml

---

For the past decade, the U.S. military has been the tail that wags the country's foreign policy dog, argues a recently published book by journalist Dana Priest. The title of the book is The Mission, but it might as well be The Mission Creep.

Fighting narcotics in Latin America. Keeping peace in the Balkans. Bringing aid to Africa and democracy to Iraq. Are these jobs for a soldier?

"U.S. leaders have been turning more and more to the military to solve problems that are often, at their root, political and economic," writes Priest, who covered the Pentagon for the Washington Post before taking an 18-month leave to write The Mission. Filling a vacuum left by "an indecisive White House, an atrophied State Department, and a distracted Congress," civilian authorities in the past decade have repeatedly called on U.S. armed forces to help manage world affairs.

The result? The top military brass -- particularly the commanders of the regional focused unified commands, or CinCs -- have grown more and more sophisticated in their international dealings while civilian decisionmakers have become less and less knowledgeable about their military.

"At a minimum, Americans should understand the consequences of substituting generals and Green Berets for diplomats, and 19-year-old paratroopers for police and aid workers on nationbuilding missions," writes Priest.

The latest resort to a military solution, the U.S. invasion of Iraq, is, of course, a more traditional use of armed troops. But when the bombs stop falling over Baghdad and Saddam Hussein's regime is toppled, will the American military be again asked to step in and perform such nonmilitary tasks as the distribution of humanitarian aid and policing a war-torn and faction-ridden state? Will a military proconsul be asked to rule an occupied Iraq?

Will mission creep set in again?

Judging by the U.S. experience in the Balkans and Afghanistan, it's an inevitable -- and daunting -- likelihood.

"Although the war against al-Qaida in Afghanistan was clear in purpose, we are now seeing that the hardest, longest, and most important work comes after the bombing stops, when rebuilding replaces destroying and consensus-building replaces precision strikes," explains Priest, whose book was published before U.S. and British troops began fighting in Iraq. "As the U.S. Army's experience in Kosovo shows, the mind-set, decisionmaking, and training of infantry soldiers rarely mixes well with the disorder inherent in civil society. The mismatch of culture and mission can distort the goal of rebuilding a country. In the hands of poorly formed, misguided troops, it can create disaster."

Priest's chronicles of those disasters -- the story of a GI's murder of an 11-year-old Serbian girl in Kosovo is particularly horrifying -- are not an indictment of military leadership, however. Quite the contrary. Her criticism is leveled against "civilian leaders in Congress, the White House, and the State Department" who have to develop a more nuanced foreign policy, and against Pentagon leaders who do not "fully consider the context" in which American troops are sent to operate.

According to Priest, diplomacy began giving way to military options in the 1970s and 198Os when Congress slashed the State Department's operations budget by 20 percent. Nearly a quarter of the department's employees were cut from the payroll. More than 30 embassies and consulates were closed. Meanwhile, as military budgets grew, military personnel stepped in to fill the diplomatic void. As post-Vietnam civilian leaders grew more isolated and less comfortable with the military world, their military counterparts learned how to operate in the civilian sphere. Each branch of the military, for example, has a Capitol Hill staff of its own, and while government agencies are not allowed by law to lobby Congress, they can assert enormous influence.

Even more influential are the regional "CinCs" (pronounced "sinks") who rule their fiefdoms like proconsuls to the Roman Empire. Priest profiles four of them, all now retired: Gen. Anthony Zinni, who headed up Central Command in Tampa before Tommy Franks; Gen. Wesley Clark, CinC of the U.S. European Command and SACEUR (NATO's Supreme Allied Commander) during the Kosovo war; Adm. Dennis Blair, CinC of the Pacific Command during the Indonesian militia violence in East Timor; and Gen. Charles Wilhelm, head of U.S. Southern Command whose main area of battle was the war on drugs.

In The Mission, these commanders-in-chief who lead the U.S. military's regionally focused unified commands come across as visionaries who "pushed, not always successfully" to make their government "live up to its responsibility to make the world a more peaceful place." The special operations forces (including the Army Green Berets and the Navy SEALs), the favorite tool of the CinCs when diplomacy has failed, are portrayed as superbly trained fighters whose dangerous missions are often undertaken "below the radar," as in Nigeria, where they were sent after Sept. 11 to train local Muslims, or in Afghanistan, where they grew beards to fight discreetly at the side of the Northern Alliance.

With a combined budget of $380-million a year, the CinCs and their institutions have far more resources than the civilian agencies that by law and tradition are supposed to manage U.S. foreign relations. Each CinC also has a huge staff (the smallest, dealing with Latin America, employs over 1,000), an around-the-clock intelligence center, a long-distance aircraft and a fleet of helicopters at his disposal, and an entourage of up to 35 officers and senior noncommissioned officers (by contrast only the secretary of state has his own aircraft and entourage; all other diplomats fly on regularly scheduled commercial airlines or hop military planes).

With all these resources at their disposal, the CinCs have developed a remarkably nuanced view of the world, far more nuanced than many of their civilian counterparts. In the earlier months of the Bush presidency, the worldwide influence of the CinCs, in fact, rankled some members of the administration, in particular Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who was hell bent on reducing their role abroad.

Then came Sept. 11. After terrorist planes crashed into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Congress approved $375-billion in defense money, twice the increase the Pentagon had requested. Troops were sent to Afghanistan and into a murky war on terrorism involving an increased emphasis on intelligence gathering and clandestine operations.

Not that the turf wars between civilian and military leaders disappeared completely. Just last week, in response to the Pentagon's plans to oversee the distribution of aid in Iraq, a task traditionally controlled by civilians, Rumsfeld received a letter from Secretary of State Colin Powell stating that he wanted to retain control of the assistance programs. State Department officials are worried that distribution of aid by the military would fan the perception that Americans are an occupying force. They also fear that military involvement in aid distribution might discourage foreign governments and international aid agencies from participating.

Still, as the ambiguous war on terrorism continues and without the proper civilian agencies in place, the tendency to call on the military for answers in foreign policy will most likely continue. And no one is more dismayed at this prospect of mission creep than the military itself. As Gen. George Joulwan, a former Southern Command CinC, chillingly put it as he watched Colombia implode after the United States failed to follow up its war on the drug cartels with social, political and economic programs:

"We know how to begin something. We don't know how to end it."

[TPartyType]

exactly my thoughts. Sour grapes from an old warhorse whose little report was ignored. Boohoo!

(I think he's ignoring the best justification for our occupation of Iraq: it draws out the nuts who are willing to attack our troops. Better to fight them there than here.)

[Welsh Rabbit]

Anthony Zinni's opposition to U.S. policy on Iraq began on the monsoon-ridden afternoon of Nov. 3, 1970.

That is about the cheesiest lead sentence I have read in a while. Trying to slip in a "another Vietnam" message this late into game is just sad. Didn't Ricks get the memo? All the other quagmire! criers are officially in retreat mode now from their former position.

[clintonh8r]

Hate to say it about a brother Marine, but Zinni has been starstruck by his association with the clintons. He's become another Weasley Clark....a Perfumed Prince of the Pentagon.

[HamiltonJay]

Yes, and he's obviously forgotten a bit about the chain of command....

[jocko12]

SOUNDS LIKE HE GOT FRAGED.

[beaversmom]

have absolutely no relevance at the geopolitical level

Medved gets this all the time on his show. People call him up all the time furious that he continues to call Weasley Clark, Weasley Clark--"You should show him some respect. He served in the military. Have you ever served in the military?" Weasley is a dumbbell. I don't care how smart the media says he is. There's also something about the man's looks and manner that makes me not trust him not even to mention the lies and weird stuff that comes from his mouth.

[kabar]

Excuse me General, with all due respect Sir, you were trained as a miltary man. It's obvious you don't know sh#t about foreign affairs.

As someone who has spent nearly 30 years as a Foreign Service Officer, I agree with you. Zinni is not a Middle East expert. He views foreign affairs through the prism of the military, which is only one narrow perspective. Unfortunately, the CINCs have become inflated with their own self-importance and see themselves as proconsuls. The State Department has assigned political advisors (POLADS) to the CINCs to provide them with foreign affairs expertise, but their impact has largely been ineffective.

Zinni has his own personal agenda fueled by a colossal ego.

[ravingnutter]

In my time at CENTCOM, I watched the intelligence, and never--not once--did it say, `He has WMD.'"

OOPS...

GEN. ZINNI: Senator, you hit on our biggest concern in our region. There is obviously a proliferation of missile systems. The technology is advancing. The accuracy and range is increasing, not only the potential for Iraq, but obviously Iran and others in the region that have that, and some are very close or already possess weapons of mass destruction capability and it's a matter of weaponizing.

Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee - January 28, 1999

Operation DESERT FOX

Our objectives for this operation were: reduce Iraq's capability to produce WMD; degrade strategic and tactical command and control facilities, damage industrial infrastructure used for the smuggling of gas and oil; and the overall reduction of Iraq's capability to threaten its neighbors in the region. Primary targets struck during Operation DESERT FOX were installations associated with development of WMD, units providing security to WMD programs, and Iraq's national command and control network.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GENERAL ANTHONY C. ZINNI, Commmader in Chief, U.S. Central Command Senate Armed Services Committee January 28, 1999

Perhaps these guys said it best:

If international security could be assured by waiting until we find evidence that Saddam- has developed weapons of mass destruction and responding to the threat at that time, there would have been no need for Operation Desert Fox.

Letter to President Clinton - Aug 1999

[Blue_Ridge_Mtn_Geek]

And, in their wisdom, the presidential electors have repeatedly chosen former generals to be president.

Someone with a finer memory for history may correct me, but I can't recall a US war that began while a former general was in the White House (unless you count the start of the Vietnam War sometime during the Eisenhower Admin, rather than with Kennedy's commitment of "advisors" to the SVN army).

[Loc123]

IIRC, while an officer in the USMC, you cannot speak out against the President. That would explain why he didn't speak out against Kosovo, OP Desert Fox.

I might be wrong about that USMJ Code, however

[SunStar]

Former Central Command chief Anthony Zinni denounces `ideologues' in Bush administration

I knew it was Zinni before I even opened the thread. LOL! What a moron.

[ravingnutter]

The origins of the Desert Fox target list go back to October, when high-level discussions in Washington led to the conclusion that military action was not only inevitable, but that it might actually achieve something. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), headquartered in Tampa, began to articulate the military mission of "degrading" and "diminishing" Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Gen. Anthony Zinni, the CENTCOM commander, insisted that the United States only bomb Iraqi sites that had been identified with a high degree of certainty, according to officers involved in the process.

Given the UNSCOM data flowing in, there was no end of choices. Seven broad target categories were created, including two--"WMD security" and "command and control"--that would accommodate the new intelligence reports and cover an effort to shake the Iraqi regime to its core.

By November, a plan was in place. WMD targets themselves were small in number, given Zinni's directive. The main emphasis would be on Iraq's short-range missile program. The Bush administration had acceded to a Soviet proposal in 1991 to allow Iraq to have missiles with a range under 150 kilometers. U.S. intelligence had concluded that Iraq was using the short-range facilities as a cover for redeveloping long-range missiles.

All of the suspected facilities--Ibn al Haytham, Karama, Al Kindi in Mosul, Shahiyat, Taji and Zaafaraniyah--were under UNSCOM camera monitoring. In fact, UNSCOM had cataloged specific pieces of irreplaceable equipment that, if destroyed, would set back any conversion effort.

There were non-missile WMD targets as well: the Biological Research Center at Baghdad University, which UNSCOM concluded was the office of the head of Iraq's biological weapons program ("Doctor Germ," they dubbed her), and two airfields--Al Sahra near Tikrit and Tallil in the south--which were believed to house drone aircraft that could deliver a biological cloud in an attack.

Source