Skip to comments.Why the Holy Father chose the name "Benedict"...?
Posted on 04/19/2005 11:56:55 AM PDT by MadIvan
Cardinal Ratzinger on the Banishment of God From Public Life
Receives St. Benedict Award for Promotion of Life and Family
SUBIACO, Italy, APRIL 12, 2005 (Zenit.org).- Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger says that believers are faced with the tendency to banish God from public life and confine him to the "subjective realm of past residual cultures."
On April 1, when receiving the St. Benedict Award for the Promotion of Life and the Family in Europe, conferred by the Subiaco Foundation for Life and the Family, the dean of the College of Cardinals delivered an address on the present crisis of culture and identity, especially in the Old World.
After stating that "moral force has not grown apace with the development of science but, on the contrary, has diminished," Cardinal Ratzinger explained that "the most serious danger at this time is precisely the imbalance between technical possibilities and moral energy."
He gave two examples: the threat of terrorism and the possibility to manipulate the origin of human life.
The then prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faithalmost all heads of Vatican dicasteries lost their posts when John Paul II died pointed out that "Europe has developed a culture that, in a way previously unknown to humanity, excludes God from the public consciousness, either by denying him altogether or by judging that his existence cannot be demonstrated, is uncertain and, therefore, somewhat irrelevant to public life."
An attempt is being made "to build the human community absolutely without God," the cardinal stressed.
"The rejection of reference to God is not an expression of tolerance which wishes to protect non-theist religions and the dignity of atheists and agnostics, but rather an expression of the desire to see God banished definitively from humanity's public life, and driven into the subjective realm of residual cultures of the past," he warned.
For the cardinal, the starting point of this view is "relativism," which has become "a dogmatism that believes it is in possession of the definitive knowledge of reason, and with the right to regard all the rest as a stage of humanity, which has basically been surpassed, and which can be suitably relativized."
At this rate, Cardinal Ratzinger added, we will no longer "be able to affirm that homosexuality, as the Catholic Church teaches, is an objective disorder of the structure of human existence."
"The fact that the Church is convinced of not having the right to confer priestly ordination on women, is now considered by some as irreconcilable with the European Constitution," he added.
In the final part of his address, Cardinal Ratzinger explained that "we need roots to survive and we must not lose them from sight if we do not want human dignity to disappear."
"Only creative reason, which has been manifested in the crucified God as love, can really show us the way," he said. "We need men who will keep their sight on God, learning there" what "true humanity" is, as "only through men touched by God, can God again be close to men." ZE05041102
So there's this little country, and it sponsors terrorists. But because it has big tough friends, it figures that it can get away with this.
Seems I've heard this story somewhere before . . .
How does Serbia's support and protection of the Black Hand differ qualitatively from Afganistan's support for al Qaeda?
Didn't a recent American president launch missiles against a sovereign state (without a declaration of war) because of its ALLEGED involvement in a plot to assassinate one of our ex-presidents.
How about that whole U.S.S. Maine deal?
And why is Pershing's incursion into (or invasion of) Mexico in pursuit of Pancho Villa justified?
Or is it that one set of laws applies to the U.S. and another set to Austria-Hungary?
This pissing match is going nowhere.
It's not just that Keegan lies above, but that it is such a preposterous lie.
To wit: if Serbia wanted to be beligerant, say, to rely upon Russia to back Austria down, then it would have simply rejected Austria's ultimatum.
There was no need for Serbia to capitulate on 3 of Austria's four main demands, after all, if Serbia intended to be defiant.
So Keegan's lie doesn't even pass the most rudimentary of smell tests. It stinks.
What Serbia did was to capitulate on all of Austria's demands, save to *suggest* that the Hague arbitrate Austria's demand of having Austrians enter Serbia to be involved in all phases of the apprehension of anti-Austrians and the shutting down of all anti-Austrian publications.
This capitulation was so complete, and the diplomacy involved so well done, that Germany's Kaiser William II himself read it and said that there was now "no excuse for war."
That's directly from the source. Germany was Austria's key ally. Kaiser William II was the absolute, uncontested ruler of Germany, and *his* authoritative response to the Serbian capitulation was that now there would be no war.
Austria invaded Serbia anyway. There were no further "negotiations." Not even an attempt.
Serbia rounded up and arrested the assassins, as well as agreed to turn them over to Austria. Many were executed, others died in Austrian prisons, one survived and became a history professor.
Well, I got an eminent British war historian, author of many acclaimed, highly researched books, on my side. What have you got?
Keegan, in the quote I gave you, explains with precision how and to what extent, the Serbian stance evolved following the signals from the Russian Tsar.
You wonder why Serbia did not reject the ultimatum in toto. Obviously, it needed to appear reasonable enough to provide cover for the Russians' saber rattling.
Nonsense. You are engaging in historical revisionism.
There were only two options: War or Peace.
If Serbia wanted war, then it would have rejected Austria's ridiculuous 48 hour ultimatum (made after doing nothing for 2 full months).
If Serbia wanted peace, then it needed to capitulate to Austria's demands, which it did.
For its part, Austria didn't even negotiate. The Austrians had bet, badly, that Serbia would reject the ultimatum, and they had no Plan B if Serbia capitulated (which it did).
So Austria invaded anyway, even though Serbia's capitulation was so complete and well done that Germany's Kaiser William II said after reading Serbia's response that there was now "no excuse for war."
NO EXCUSE FOR WAR!
And that's from Austria's ally, not a neutral or opposed power.
What revisionism? I am quoting from a well-researched book by someone sympathetic to the Entente, which you do not address directly.
Of course Serbia did not want a war, being a small country. Neither Keegan or I say it did. Serbia wanted to get away with as much as possible diplomatically, and the Tsar, as well as the disposition of the previous crises in the Balkans, lead it to think it could respond with a certain degree of defiance. That was a fatal miscalculation.
This history is complex and no one is immune from blame. However, Austria was injured first, and so remains the only party for whom the war was entirely just.
our struggle will always continue....like the oldest profession......liberals will always be with us...:)
But you both did. You both claimed, bizarrely, that Serbia was somehow beligerant in its reply to Austria's ultimatum in order to enable Russian saber rattling (something that offered utterly no benefit to Serbia).
The truth is precisely the opposite: Serbia caved to Austria's ultimatum.
Don't be obtuse.
Not only did I address that "book," but I quoted the most authoritative figure of the Central Powers who was physically THERE AT THE TIME, Germany's Kaiser William II, to refute it.
"No excuse for war."
Nonsense. Lots of people were immune from blame from that war (e.g. Pope Benedict XV), for one thing, and for another thing, Austria forfeited its right to invade when it presented its ultimatum.
Capitulate to an ultimatum and your enemy no longer has the right to invade you.
What you are doing, in perhaps a Freudian slip, is admitting that Austria's ultimatum to Serbia was merely an excuse for war; that whatever Serbia did or said that Austria was still going to invade (which it did).
But invading under false pretenses is by definition not justified...and that's what Austria did.
But the ultimatum was not accepted. Read the Keegan quote. Attaching conditions and rejecting clauses is not what one does with ultimata.
In the Keegan excerpt I point out the moment when it might have appeared to the Kaiser that diplomacy won. It was not a sustainable position militarily, and he was ultimately convinced otherwise.
Keegan gets that point entirely wrong. Austria's ultimatum *was* accepted. Serbia caved on 3 of the 4 major points outright, and merely *suggested* that the 4th major demand be submitted to the Hague for arbitration.
Austria didn't even respond to that suggestion, save to say that they were going to consider it a rejection of their ultimatum. There were no other negotiations. Austria invaded, purportedly because a mere Serbian *suggestion* offended them.
Such rubbish. Here above you attempt to soft-pedal the most authoritative comment by the most authoritative source. Yeah, Kaiser William II said that there was now "no excuse for war" after reading Serbia's capitulation to Austria's ultimatum, but somehow he must not have meant it, you attempt to infer *and* imply.
...And what's this "unsustainable position militarily" nonsense?! The Great Powers had already avoided a major war during the last Balkan War in 1912...it was hardly out of the question that it could have been avoided again 2 years later (save for some hot heads).
Keegan gets that point entirely wrong
How do you know that? Generally, historians have been biased toward Serbia and the Entente. So is Keegan. Yet, he paints a picture of essential rejection. And indeed, mobilizing the army, attaching conditions and rejecting the major demand amounts to a rejection.
You are probably right that Austria would have preferred a local war so that it could eliminate future threats from insurgents (a global war would have required Austria to fight on two fronts, north and south, and was not in Austrian interest). Buth this is a fault of intent only. Austria was injured, presented an ultimatum, and was within its rights to ignore a dithered response.
somehow [the Kaiser] must not have meant it, you attempt to infer *and* imply.
He must not have meant it, as evidenced by the fact that he declared war a few days later.
I explained what constituted the military imperative for war in #238.
You've never been in a fun house? ;-)
Some mirrors are cracked or dirty or losing the back finish.
All of this "who did what to who and when" is merely clouding what is a very simple issue.
The Serbian government sponsored a terrorist group and harbored a militant anti-Austrian streak in their efforts to rebuild a "Greater Serbia". Austria was fully justified in retaliation.
Responsibility for whether or not the war was localized is entirely on Russia for becoming involved, at the urging of the revenge-mad French.
Did the Central Powers provoke war? That is totally absurd, you don't provoke a war in which you will be outnumbered and surrounded at the very outset. Even Hitler wasn't that crazy.
But on the 7th day, God looked down and said it was good.
I know it because:
1. It's a fact,
2. It makes logical sense, and
3. The most authoritative source WHO WAS THERE said that, specificly.
Keegan is a historical revisionist, as are you. Neither of you were there. We don't get to write the History that we want, we write what the past players said and did.
"No excuse for war."
That's Austria's ally speaking after seeing Serbia's capitulation.
That Austria invaded anyway shocked the world, and Germany's "Blank Check" to Austria for war was soon realized as an enormous mistake.
Nonsense. First of all, Austria didn't even *know* of the existence of the Black Hand until far into World War 1.
Second, there appears to be no evidence (and you will fail if you even try to find such) linking the Black Hand with Serbia's in-office government. Moreover, there was a power-struggle going on inside Serbia's government that would have precluded such state sponsorship.
The assasins themselves were mostly high school students with a history of anarchism of random violence for the sake of "making statements."
Serbia rounded up at least 7 of the 9 assassins, possibly more, and turned them all over to Austria. That hardly amounts to protecting them from Austria. I'm aware of only one of those assasins even surviving eventual Austrian justice.
That's poor logic. Of course Austria provoked a war. Austria didn't even negotiate after it decided that Serbia's capitulation wasn't good enough. Austria invaded Serbia, knowing full well that Russia would enter the war.
This was a cold and calculated political decision to provoke a war. It took Austria two months to write up their demands, and their demands against Serbia were so severe as to make it clear that Austria wanted war at all costs. Moreover, Austria was provocative by giving the Serbs a mere 48 hours in which to respond.
Furthermore, the writings of the day indicate that Austria's biggest concern was how to drum up their own public support for such a war prior to invading.
The great mistake was Germany's "Blank Check" promise to support Austria in a war; Germany had underestimated the Austrian desire for war at all costs.
According to U.S. military historian Brig. General S.L.A. Marshall, "Originally that secret society [the Black Hand] had been linked to, and encouraged by, the War Ministry in Belgrade. When friction later developed between the two, the Government still remained well informed of Black Hand operations."
He further states that the man who armed the assassins, with weapons from Serbia, one Milan Ciganovic, was acting for Colonel Dragutin Dimitrievic, who was the SITTING CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE for the Serbian Army and member no.6 of the Black Hand. Furthermore, Prime Minister Nikola Pasic knew of the plot as early as June 1, and though he tried to stop them from leaving the country (how hard he tried we can only imagine) he said absolutely NOTHING to the Austrian government about the extent and seriousness of this plot he knew all about.
If you think they were just mindless fanatics, perhaps you should look into their actions BEFORE the assassination, where they met and what they did, what date was chosen as significant and you will see clearly what they were all about.
The thing I most hate about the modern world is its phenomenal lack of memory about things moral and of ancient roots.
Some people of conscience avoided serving in the Hitler Youth, and many avoided their subsequent service in Hitler's army. Ratzinger did not, and he did not desert the Hitler army until it was quite clear that the Allies were going to overrun Germany, much like his carefully morally ambiguous Pope--and apparent mentor--, at the time, Pius the Silent.
And the basic concern is the same then as in the last 25 years--when Ratzinger's job has been to prevent the church from having to defend itself in an open market of ideas, as the head of the inquisition.
I like my Popes to take more seriously their moral duty to be the Voice of Peter in defense of the wretched and poor and dissident, the natural victims of war and persecutions, and less seriously their duties to cover their own, or their churches, asses, than has been Ratzinger's history. The head of the inquisition--, whose opinions of other religions, older than his, has been openly derogatory and dismissive, whose opinions of nazi anti-semitism were, in interpretation of his actions, sort of neutral--is hardly a promising choice for a church that just managed a strained and strangled apology for its nasty behavior and remarks toward jews for 1400 years, acknowledging its own guilt in securing the intellectual environment Hitler's genocides of the Jews thrived on--said which, apparently, filled Ratzinger only with a mild distaste--rather like any number of Popes one might name who vigorously flailed on jews whenever opportunities arose.
The selection of Ratzinger is giving the finger to the rest of the world whose religeous predelictions vary from the Throne of Peter, and who have enough of a moral memory to remember what religeon invented crusades and thumbscrews as a form of evangelism.
"There is no evidence to suggest that Pasic planned the crime. It is unlikely that the Black Hand officers were acting on behalf of the government, because the military and the Radical Party in fact were engaged in a bitter competition to control the state. After the Balkan Wars, both military and civilian figures claimed the right to administer the newly liberated lands (the so-called Priority Question). After 1903, Pasic knew that Apis' clique would kill to get their way.
Pasic's responsibility revolves around reports that he was warned of the intended crime, and took inadequate steps to warn Austrian authorities. Despite Pasic's denials, there is substantial testimony that someone alerted him to the plot, and that Pasic ordered the Serbian ambassador in Vienna to tell the Austrians that an attempt would be made on the life of the heir during his visit to Bosnia.
However, when the Serbian ambassador passed on the warning, he appears to have been too discreet. Instead of saying that he knew of an actual plot, he spoke in terms of a hypothetical assassination attempt, and suggested that a state visit by Franz Ferdinand on the day of Kosovo (June 28) was too provocative.
Austrian diplomats failed to read between the lines of this vague comment. By the time the warning reached the Habsburg joint finance minister (the man in charge of Bosnian affairs), any sense of urgency had been lost, and he did nothing to increase security or cancel the heir's planned visit. After the murders, the Serbian government was even more reluctant to compromise itself by admitting any knowledge, hence Pasic's later denials."
"However, when the Serbian ambassador passed on the warning, he appears to have been too discreet. Instead of saying that he knew of an actual plot, he spoke in terms of a hypothetical assassination attempt, and suggested that a state visit by Franz Ferdinand on the day of Kosovo (June 28) was too provocative"
Thanks for proving my point.
Your "point" was that Pasic had said or done "nothing."
He clearly did something, though apparently the message was ill-recieved.
Funny how you conveniently left out the rest of my statement:
"...about the extent and seriousness of this plot he knew all about."
Just forgetful I'm sure
1. It's a fact,
2. It makes logical sense, and [...]
We get facts from books. I quoted mine. You did not, -- you reflect the common belief that the Axis were wrong in everything. I explained the logic of events amply.
3. The most authoritative source WHO WAS THERE [Kaiser Wilhelm] said that, specificly.
I explained that about four times. The Kaiser said that diplomacy succeeded in preventing the war, then, after his generals explained their war doctrine, changed his mind, as he should have. When your military tells you that they cannot defend the country unless the country mobilizes right away, you listen. All that you quote shows is that the Kaiser was trying to find a peaceful resolution till the very end.
Keegan is a historical revisionist, as are you.
A job of a historian is to examine evidence afresh and make his own conclusions. A good historian is a revisionist. Now, the term is sometimes used to identify someone with a preconceived, usually ethnic, bias, who makes the facts fit the bias. None of that here: Keegan is English. I am just quoting him, but I have no attachment of any kind to Austria; ethnically, I am Russian.
No. A good historian reports what people said and did. Revisionists publish something else entirely.
You've explained nothing save for your own misunderstanding.
To wit: Mobilization for the Balkan War of 1912 did *not* lead to a Great Power conflict. Two years later, mobilization did not have to mean world war, either.
That you claim otherwise shows how far off-track you've gotten.
You got your "facts" from a revisionist book writer who wasn't even there at the time.
In contrast, I quoted the ACTUAL PEOPLE INVOLVED.
That is what Keegan did. You don't like it, -- prove the facts were different.
Mobilization for the Balkan War of 1912 did *not* lead to a Great Power conflict
Russia did not mobilize in 1912. The conflict was contained to the Balkans, of which no one ever cared.
I quoted the ACTUAL PEOPLE INVOLVED
Need a fifth time? The Kaiser was convinced to change his mind. And by the way, what was the context and the time when the pronouncement you quote was made?
Austria delivered an ultimatum to Serbia on 23rd July. Its harsh terms were intended to be unacceptable, for, in effect, they demanded that Austria be given control over Serbian internal affairs.
Next day, Germany caused consternation in Russia, Great Britain, and France when it delivered notes to each, stating that the Austrian demands were fair and which also warned these Countries not to interfere in Austro-Serbian affairs.
Unexpectedly, Serbia acceded to most of the Austrian demands, and, on hearing this, the Kaiser, thinking that threats had been enough, was satisfied.
Too late! Momentum now controlled reason and the destinies of young men moved inexorably from the light into the shadow of death. A range of threats, proposals, understandings, notes, and reports all jumbled together and produced no solution.
At 11 a.m. on 28th July Austria pre-empted further negotiation and declared war on Serbia.
The generals of all the rival Continental nations had their war plans, and military necessity and the mobilisation of armies now took precedence over the last hopes of politicians. On 31st both the Emperors of Russia and Austria ordered a mobilisation of all their respective armies. Germany started mobilising on 1st August.
Unexpectedly, Serbia acceded to most of the Austrian demands, and, on hearing this, the Kaiser, thinking that threats had been enough, was satisfied.He glosses over the part about rejection of the central demand, and attaching conditions to others, thus perpetuating the myth of Serbian compliance with the ultimatum. He also does not mention the fact that Serbia mobilized and Russia formally entered the state of preparation for war, before Serbian response was delivered.
Russia didn't mobilize until July 31st. You haven't really grasped the timeline, have you?!
As for Serbia mobilizing, that was Austria's intention when it placed the 48 hour time limit on its ultimatum. Of course Serbia mobilized after recieving such harsh demands, as they could only be viewed as an Austrian excuse for war due to their undiplomatic nature. Well, Austria got what it wanted. Serbia did indeed mobilize.
But Austria got two things for which it *didn't* want or expect, as well. The first was that Serbia caved to 3 of Austria's 4 main demands, and suggested that the 4th Austrian demand be submitted to the Hague for arbitration. This acceptance of Austria's harsh terms (no term was outright rejected per Austria's plan) was unexpected.
Austria's second surprise was that after it invaded tiny Serbia, that the Serb Army roundly beat the Austrian invasion force. It took another full year, and the combined might of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Bulgaria to finally conquer Serbia.
I did not say anything about Russia's mobilization. I said, "Russia formally entered the state of preparation for war", which it did.
On the morning of 25 July [...] [t]he Tsar, though not yet ready to proclaim mobilisation, had announced the preliminary "Period Preparatory to War" at eleven o'clock.
Sure you have. You've just been caught being disingenious about it.
You claimed, for instance, that it was the mobilization that led to war.
Then you'll point to Russia's announcement of preparations, clearly implying that Russia was mobilizing.
But Russia didn't mobilize (not yet); that's an inconvenient fact in both yours and Keegan's absurd historical revisionism...a fact that is easy to expose when viewed next to the timeline for war.
If anyone along with you is having trouble reading what I post, he can complain to me.