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The Donald Rumsfeld I know isn't the one you know
St. Paul Pioneer Press ^ | Nov. 12, 2006 | Douglas J. Feith

Posted on 11/12/2006 8:01:47 AM PST by rhema

Much of what you know about Donald Rumsfeld is wrong.

I know, because I worked intimately with him for four years, from the summer of 2001 until I left the Pentagon in August 2005. Through countless meetings and private conversations, I came to learn his traits, frame of mind and principles — characteristics wholly at odds with the standard public depiction of Rumsfeld, particularly now that he has stepped down after a long, turbulent tenure as defense secretary, a casualty of our toxic political climate.

I want to set the record straight: Don Rumsfeld is not an ideologue. He did not refuse to have his views challenged. He did not ignore the advice of his military advisers. And he did not push single-mindedly for war in Iraq. He was motivated to serve the national interest by transforming the military, though it irritated people throughout the Pentagon. Rumsfeld's drive to modernize created a revealing contrast between his Pentagon and the State Department — where Colin Powell was highly popular among the staff. After four years of Powell's tenure at State, the organization chart there would hardly tip anyone off that 9/11 had occurred — or even that the Cold War was over.

Rumsfeld is a bundle of paradoxes, like a fascinating character in a work of epic literature. And as my high school teachers drummed into my head, the best literature reveals that humans are complex. They are not the all-good or all-bad, all-brilliant or all-dumb figures that inhabit trashy novels and news stories. Fine literature teaches us the difference between appearance and reality.

Because of his complexity, Rumsfeld is often misread. His politics are deeply conservative, but he was radical in his drive to force change in every area he oversaw. He is strong-willed and hard-driving, but he built his defense strategies and Quadrennial Defense Reviews on calls for intellectual humility.

Those of us in his inner circle heard him say, over and over again: Our intelligence, in all senses of the term, is limited. We cannot predict the future. We must continually question our preconceptions and theories. If events contradict them, don't suppress the bad news; rather, change your preconceptions and theories.

If an ideologue is someone to whom the facts don't matter, then Rumsfeld is the opposite of an ideologue. He insists that briefings for him be full of facts, thoughtfully organized and rigorously sourced. He demands that facts at odds with his key policy assumptions be brought to his attention immediately. "Bad news never gets better with time," he says, and berates any subordinate who fails to rush forward to him with such news. He does not suppress bad news; he acts on it.

In late 2002, Pentagon lawyers told Rumsfeld the detainee interrogation techniques in the old Army field manual were well within the bounds of the Geneva Conventions and U.S. statutes. Detainee information could help us prevent another terrorist attack, and al-Qaida personnel were trained to resist standard interrogations. So, with the advice of counsel, military officers at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, asked Rumsfeld to authorize additional techniques thought to fall within the bounds of the law. He did so.

Less than a month later, in December 2002, Jim Haynes, the Defense Department's general counsel, brought him the disturbing news that some lawyers in the military departments questioned the legality of the additional techniques. Rumsfeld did not brush off the questions or become defensive. In short order, he directed Haynes to revoke the authority for the new techniques. He told him to gather all the relevant lawyers in the department and review the matter — and he would not approve any new techniques until that review was completed. It took almost four months.

I was impressed by how quickly Haynes brought the information to Rumsfeld and how Rumsfeld changed course upon receiving it. It seemed to me if the country's leading civil libertarians had been in on the meetings with us, they would have approved of the way Rumsfeld handled the service lawyers' dissent. This story bears telling because when the cruel and sexually bizarre behavior at Abu Ghraib occurred many months later, critics inaccurately depicted Rumsfeld as disrespectful of laws on detainee treatment.

Rumsfeld's drive to overhaul the Pentagon — to drop outdated practices, programs and ideas — antagonized many senior military officers and civilian officials in the department. He pushed for doing more with less. He pushed for reorganizing offices and relationships to adapt to a changing world. After 9/11, he created the Northern Command (the first combatant command that included the U.S. homeland among its areas of responsibility), a new undersecretary job for intelligence and a new assistant secretary job for homeland defense. Seeking to improve civil-military cooperation, Rumsfeld devised new institutions for the Pentagon's top civilian and military officials to work face to face on strategic matters and new venues for all of them to gather a few times a year with the combatant commanders. He also conceived and pushed through a thorough revision of how U.S. military forces are based, store equipment, move and train with partners around the world — something that was never done before in U.S. history.

When he told organizations to take on new missions, their instinct — typical of bureaucracies — was to say they needed more people and more money. Rumsfeld responded: If changes in the world require us to do new things, those changes must also allow us to curtail or end old missions that we continue for no good reason. He made numerous major changes in the Defense Department at the cost of goring a lot of oxen.

On Iraq, Rumsfeld helped President Bush analyze the dangers posed by Saddam Hussein's regime. Given Saddam's history — starting wars; using chemical weapons against foreign and domestic enemies; and training, financing and otherwise supporting various terrorists — Rumsfeld helped make the case that leaving him in power entailed significant risks. But in October 2002, Rumsfeld also wrote a list of the risks involved in removing Saddam from power. (I called the list his "parade of horribles" memo.) He reviewed it in detail with the president and the National Security Council. Rumsfeld's warnings about the dangers of war — including the perils of a post-Saddam power vacuum — were more comprehensive than anything I saw from the CIA, State or elsewhere.

Though we knew that the risks involved in ousting Saddam were high, it hardly means that Bush made the wrong decision to invade. I believe he made the correct call; we had grounds to worry about the threats Saddam posed, especially after 9/11 reduced our tolerance for security risks. But Rumsfeld continually reminded the president that he had no risk-free option for dealing with the dangers Saddam posed.

Rumsfeld has been attacked for insisting that troop levels for the Iraq operation be kept low, supposedly out of ideology and contrary to the advice of the military. What I saw, however, was that Rumsfeld questioned standard military recommendations for "overwhelming force." He asked if such force was necessary for the mission. And he asked what the consequences might be of having a large footprint in Iraq and playing into propaganda about the United States wanting to take over the country.

But Rumsfeld never told Gen. John Abizaid or Gen. Tommy Franks that U.S. Central Command could not have the number of troops that the commanders deemed necessary. Rumsfeld is more politically sensitive than that — he would never expose himself to the risk of a commander later saying that he had denied him the forces needed. If other generals are unhappy with the troop levels in Iraq, the problem is not that they failed to persuade Rumsfeld, but that they failed to persuade Abizaid or Franks.

Historians will sort out whether Rumsfeld was too pushy with his military, or not pushy enough; whether he micromanaged Ambassador L. Paul Bremer and the Coalition Provisional Authority, or gave them too much slack. I know more about these issues than most people, yet I don't have all the information for a full analysis. I do know, however, that the common view of Rumsfeld as a close-minded man, ideologically wedded to the virtues of a small force, is wrong.

Rumsfeld had to resign, I suppose, because our bitter and noxious political debate of recent years has turned him into a symbol. His effectiveness was damaged.

For many in Congress and the public, the Rumsfeld caricature dominated their view of the Iraq war and the administration's ability to prosecute it successfully. Even if nominee Robert Gates pursues essentially the same strategies, he may garner more public confidence.

What Rumsfeld believed, said and did differs from the caricature. The public picture of him today is drawn from news accounts reflecting the views of people who disapproved of his policies or disliked him. Rumsfeld, after all, can be brutally demanding and tough. But I believe history will be more appreciative of him than the first draft has been. What will last is serious history, which, like serious literature, can distinguish appearance from reality.

Douglas J. Feith, a professor at Georgetown University, served as undersecretary of defense for policy from 2001 to 2005.

TOPICS: Editorial; Government; News/Current Events; US: Minnesota
KEYWORDS: dod; dougfeith; douglasjfeith; iraq; military; msm; rummie; rummy; rumsfeld; waronterror
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To: rhema
If events contradict them, don't suppress the bad news; rather, change your preconceptions and theories.

Then why has the current static situation been allowed to continue for so long?

121 posted on 11/12/2006 6:23:02 PM PST by edsheppa
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To: Beth528

Maybe someone should send it to Rush or Sean. Either of them have the means to get this broadcast to the country asap.... great article.

122 posted on 11/12/2006 6:28:03 PM PST by pollywog (Joshua 1:9 Have not I commanded thee? Be strong and of a good courage; be not afraid,)
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To: potlatch


123 posted on 11/12/2006 6:42:35 PM PST by devolve ( _note_the_Green/Libertarian_candidates?)
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To: devolve

An ENTHUSIASTIC bump, right??

124 posted on 11/12/2006 6:45:17 PM PST by potlatch (Does a clean house indicate that there is a broken computer in it?)
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To: Cheburashka

Yes China, North Korea, Iran and Iraq. The Army has to be ready to fight any of these armies. In its current condition it can fight none of them effectively. We only have the nuclear option left because of the errosion of the force(s) by a poor maintenance of the Army by Congress and previous degradation from prior administrations and a reluctance of the current administration to face the facts.

125 posted on 11/12/2006 6:48:55 PM PST by ArtyFO (I love to smoke cigars when I adjust artillery fire at the moonbat loonery.)
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To: potlatch

Not really

Lots of posts here remind me of fired General Pansy Clark

126 posted on 11/12/2006 6:58:43 PM PST by devolve ( _note_the_Green/Libertarian_candidates?)
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To: devolve

You just need a beer and some nachos!!

127 posted on 11/12/2006 7:03:54 PM PST by potlatch (Does a clean house indicate that there is a broken computer in it?)
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To: ArtyFO
The enterprize should never have been undertaken without a draft or an increase in forces and a force sufficient to complete the mission. Shenseki was right. Trying to fight a war on the cheap is the problem. If the resources can't be raised politically or economically, then just don't invade.

The "invasion" of Iraq was one of the most stunning military success stories of all time, with the smallest number of troops on the ground, completed in record time. Shinseki, was NOT right.

Period 1: March 20, 2003 through through May 1, 2003: (the end of major combat)
Total US Hostile Casualties = 108

May 2, 2003 through October 31, 2003: (6 months following end of major combat)
Total US Hostile Casualties = 121

See hostile breakdown here
See monthly breakdown here.

Just what the heck were 400,000 additional troops supposed to do? The first real sign of trouble came a year later, in April 2004.

The problem began when another Rumsfeld critic, retired Army General Major General Paul Eaton, failed at his 2003-2004 tour as chief of the U.S. training mission in Iraq... His tenure was characterized by uneven training efforts and some embarassing moments--notably, Iraqi units breaking under fire. Eaton was eventually replaced by Lieutenant General David Paetraeus, who turned the program around, and oversaw the training of more than 80 Iraqi battalions during his tenure. Read more here.

The plan was to quickly train a new Iraqi Army, to join with our foces, as they have now. Eaton blew it then had the unmitigated gall to call for Rummy's head as did Shinseki.

Shinseki, Riggs ... virtually all of these officers were in senior positions in the mid-to-late 1990s, when the Clinton Administration cut four divisions from the active Army. Did any of these generals oppose that move, realizing that it would mean "fewer boots on the ground" in a future conflict? Ironically, some of these generals--including Shinseki and Riggs--seemed willing to trade troops for the next generation of super weapons,

128 posted on 11/12/2006 7:04:40 PM PST by Just A Nobody (I - LOVE - my attitude problem! NEVER AGAIN...Support our Troops! Beware the ENEMEDIA)
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To: rhema; bitt

What a wonderful article!
Nothing will ever change my opinion of him.
He's served his country far better than most.

Thank you for the post and ping!

129 posted on 11/12/2006 7:41:42 PM PST by dixiechick2000 (There ought to be one day-- just one-- when there is open season on senators. ~~ Will Rogers)
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To: Pukin Dog
Rumsfeld did not want to spend the next two years under oath to a Democratic Senate, so he left immediately and took the headlines away from the Dems victory. He would have left at the end of the year anyway.

Dog: Do you know that for a fact or is that an opinion?

Very interesting.

130 posted on 11/12/2006 8:31:45 PM PST by evad
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To: rhema

My nephew was in Iraq and he said everyone liked Rummy, including the Iraqis.

131 posted on 11/12/2006 8:38:55 PM PST by beckysueb
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To: bitt

Most excellent Rummy pic, bitt.

132 posted on 11/12/2006 8:40:50 PM PST by ntnychik
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To: rhema

May the force be with you
133 posted on 11/12/2006 9:02:53 PM PST by John Lenin (The most dangerous place for a child in America is indeed in its mother's womb)
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To: Howlin

I don't know if you've spotted this, but you might want to add it to your bookmarks.

134 posted on 11/12/2006 9:20:03 PM PST by McGavin999 (Republicans take out our trash, Democrats re-elect theirs)
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To: Just A Nobody

With 400,000 troops you can disarm the entire country. With 400,000 troops you have a big footprint. You can man every intersection in the country. With 400,000 troops you can encircle Baghdad and search every building in the city. With 400,000 troops you can collect all the ammunition in the country and round up all ex Iraqi military. With 400,000 troops Faluja doesn't happen. With 400,000 troops you can seal the borders. With 400,000 troops......Bla, Bla Bla

135 posted on 11/12/2006 9:22:56 PM PST by ArtyFO (I love to smoke cigars when I adjust artillery fire at the moonbat loonery.)
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To: mulligan
And now we go from a great "Rummy" to an old re-tread dummy. So sad and so bad for this nation.

If you think for a minute that Rummy would leave the stage and allow the military to be put into the hands of a dummy, then you never understood Rumsfeld (or GW for that matter).

136 posted on 11/12/2006 9:26:30 PM PST by McGavin999 (Republicans take out our trash, Democrats re-elect theirs)
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To: bitt

Thanks for the ping!

137 posted on 11/12/2006 9:28:35 PM PST by Alamo-Girl
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To: rhema


138 posted on 11/12/2006 10:03:53 PM PST by Tunehead54 (Nothing funny here ;-)
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To: Gondring

I don't think I articulated my question well. What changes in the conditions did he fail to recognize and get beyond?

139 posted on 11/13/2006 12:12:47 AM PST by James Ewell Brown Stuart (Sorry, we don't want to stick around to see if we win; we'd rather vote ourselves off the island.)
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To: rhema

marked to read later

140 posted on 11/13/2006 12:34:46 AM PST by Irish Eyes
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