Emergency: California’s Oroville Dam Spillway Near Failure, Evacuations Ordered

Breitbart ^ | Feb 12, 2017 | Joel B. Pollak1

[janetjanet998]

I wonder if Professor Bea is taking note of the seepage on the Dam itself pointed out here also

I haven’t see it mentioned any where else but here

[Repeal The 17th]

Not really sure what it means based on what it says at the website:
"Outflow" from Oroville includes all releases from
the Oroville Dam (i.e.: Hyatt, spillway, low flow outlet), while
"River Release" (RIV REL) pertains to the Oroville Complex as a whole
which includes any releases from the Diversion Dam gates and Thermalito Afterbay River Outlet.

So, does "River Release" include the spillway and the power plant, or not?

[janetjanet998]

drone video from the 18th just released..

although around 0:14 there is a few seconds of a side view of the damaged spillway(”step slopes” on north side still look ok)this is the first drone video that doesn’t show most of the upper damaged part

to sum up....drone video is mostly just water flowing into the river and construction equipment

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q9DeFopsMGg&index=1&list=PLeod6x87Tu6eVFnSyEtQeOVbxvSWywPlx

[janetjanet998]

I don’t think so.....I think RIV REL is the water flowing out of the Diversion dam and after bay .......it can hold back some water but not huge amounts so if 35,000 is coming out of the spillway and power plant around that much has to be released downstream out of the “Oroville complex”....

[Repeal The 17th]

This link captures the data from the 8 hour period when
the power plant was shut down and the gates were opened.
Compare the “OUTFLOW” and “RIV REL” before and after.
http://cdec.water.ca.gov/cgi-progs/queryF?s=ORO&d=14-Apr-2017+14:33&span=12hours
The values make no sense to me.

[janetjanet998]

they can hold back some water at the diversion DAM just downstream of the spillway....this is to even the flow out down stream and to release water when the spillway and power plant both have ZERO outflow so the feather river wont dry up

the diversion DAM and the smaller after bay branch is the last part “Oroville complex” ....if the diversion DAM is low it can hold back some of the outflows from just upstream and release them later if or when the outflows from the spillway and power plant slow to stop

so total outflows from the spillway and power plan don’t always equal the releases from the diversion DAM and after bay (aka Oroville complex)

If you look on google Earth you can see this complex on the extreme north side of the city of Oroville

[Repeal The 17th]

OK, thanks.

[janetjanet998]

so basically the water from the diversion DAM at the city of Oroville all the way back to the main DAM is technically a mini lake called the “Thermalito diversion pool” the water released from this is the RIV REL value

[EarthResearcher333]

Yes, many people on FR contributed, sometimes from simple discussion, triggering others to further investigation. However, as far as my perspective, I feel that the beneficiaries are the public, now that Prof Robert Bea & the CCRA performed an independent detailed study & analysis (of all data available), compiled the report, and then elevated it to the forefront.

btw- Another article reveals that Prof Robert Bea was rebuffed by DWR when he went to them early on to get original design information. He noted that they said to him, with a smile, "You might be a Terrorist". Good Grief.. Why would they treat someone like that face to face?.

So he was showing persistence and motivation to obtain all that he could research in spite of the lack of cooperation from DWR.

Fortunately, the engineering forums accelerated the compilation of information. Prof Robert, as an esteemed and highly respected Failure Analysis Specialist, performed his own critical analysis and came to his very strongly worded report. His conclusions stand on its own & are correct.

I do believe Prof Robert/CCRA would have had the ability to come to the same conclusions from digging for info, but the current resulting overwhelming report, with the quality of forensic photographic evidence available from the public forums, was critical in swiftly assembling an "overwhelming evidential" report that now stands on its own against the wall of persistent FUD, deflect, secret, obfuscate, PR memes, etc. that has been the case with DWR.

[Jim W N]

Kiewit made the lowest bid

"Lowest bid" - sounds like that may have been the problem in the first place (?) I'm picturing inside the Kiewit HQ little signs that say, "Kiewit; Good Enough for Government Work."

I'm being cynical and sarcastic. For all I know Kiewit is the best thing since sliced bread. But I have to question the due diligence of DWR in this process of finding the right company to repair Oroville Dam’s two damaged spillways since it appears to have been so severely lacking elsewhere.

[Jim W N]

Ditto.

It looks like the UC Berkeley study had some of the same pictures and data that EarthResearcher333 has been using. I feel like we’re getting first-hand info before anyone else.

It also makes me wonder if some of these folks are following what is being posted here on FR.

[Jim W N]

Deny, Deflect, FUD

That's how coaches and organizations build losing sports franchises. Here it could be the key to catastrophe.

[abb]

http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/This-is-Not-Good-Oroville-Dam-Managers-Made-Missteps-in-Handling-Crisis-419840334.html#ixzz4ejgJaqcm

‘This is Not Good’: Oroville Dam Managers Made Missteps in Handling Crisis

By Ellen Knickmeyer and Michael R. Blood

Late in the afternoon of Feb. 12, Sheriff Kory Honea was at the emergency operations center for the tallest dam in America when he overheard someone say something that stopped him in his tracks: “This is not good.”

Over six straight days, the operators of the Oroville Dam had been saying there was no immediate danger after water surging down the main spillway gouged a hole the size of a football field in the concrete chute. But now suddenly they realized that the dam’s emergency backup spillway — essentially an unpaved hillside — was falling apart, too, and could unleash a deadly torrent of water.

snip

[tubebender]

They had better pray the weather doesn’t warm too rapidly and melt the snow in the river drainage...

[Ray76]

Early designs had the MS flowing down the hillside like the current ES. The design was discarded because designers knew the spillway hill was problematic.

It seems to me the new design should have some redundancy for the MS (perhaps an armored channel for the ES, perhaps an independent secondary gated spillway) or protection for the power plant (if there is a flood situation forgo the electric generation and protect the plant, perhaps with gates). Hindsight is 20/20, unless the lesson is ignored. Rebuilding the existing design doesn't mitigate the MS being a critical point of failure. But I'm not a dam engineer.

In the past week or two someone posted "do it while the money is flowing". I agree 100%. Now is the time. Coming back in 5 or 10 years for more money ain't gonna fly.

 

 

 

 

 

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Source: California State Water Project, Bulletin 200, Vol 3, page 93 (1974)

[EarthResearcher333]

Hi Ray76, (& others getting up to speed).. That "clip" section of the archives was the result of the original design findings in the HYD-510 analysis. That section revealed a series of "engineering judgement" chain of events that started this hillside erosion consequence "hot potato" (Emergency Spillway ES).

Even though the "cash is flowing" - (FR KC Burke quote) - the new proposed concept design Emergency Spillway with RCC buttressing and a partial downhill "apron" still has a serious design flaw of repeating the whole crisis chain of events. DWR is making the same "engineering judgement" shortcoming as in the early "Politics of Engineering" back in the 1960's. The links below, (first one has the clip you noted), provide a series of clickable reads to cover past postings of these discussions (& graphics).

FRpost links: (volumes of photos, diagrams, discussion):

Politics of Engineering Judgement: How Failure is introduced…

DWR's 1960's Split spillway "engineering political solution" coming back to haunt the future? (new Failure mode of the entire dam)

How can the spillway be brought to modern design standards based on spillway design history and other dam failure knowledge gained?

Modern Spillway Design vs Oroville Design - 2 Dam Failures, Drain Pipe, Rebar, "Hydraulic Jacking", "Void" Finding by Radar

More:

The panel report also said that while touring the spillway, consultants spotted “extraordinarily large” amounts of water gushing out of drains...

Expert Board of Consultants swizzled flow number specifications for the New Main Spillway and the New Emergency Spillway. Why?

3D Model simulations of a "flip bucket" & how a spillway flow could "jump a distance".. Concerns in the force vector stresses in anchoring such a design

Citing potential security risks, state and federal officials have blocked the public’s ability to review the latest report from an independent panel of experts brought in to guide state officials’ repairs at the crippled Oroville Dam.

THIS is the DWR letter that triggered the response in a block of the public's ability to review the latest report from the independent panel of experts (functional "security" weakness)

How can the spillway be brought to modern design standards based on spillway design history and other dam failure knowledge gained?

DWR's Project Safety Compliance Report strategy will come back to haunt them

[EarthResearcher333]

Target Reveals Broken Section Spillway Shift? - Up to 1.16 inches movement downslope

New DWR photo has a high resolution capture of the upper main spillway Optical B/W Stripe "Shift" Target. The Target is observable on the far spillway sidewall. A special High Resolution zoom of the target reveals a "shift" of the damaged section of the spillway downslope from up to 1.16 inches (0.87 inches mean). DWR has not said anything to the public regarding this substantial "broken section shift". THIS SHIFTING damaged section of the full width of the spillway chute does NOT have ANY ROCKBOLT ANCHORS. The rockbolt anchors start immediately above this optical target location. Thus, the "shifted" section is over 52 feet in length and is anchored on the orange/red highly weathered rock. note: Image processing is required to determine the Black & White stripe shift distance as the original 25+ MegaByte image is protected by DWR from download of their gallery in photoshelter. note: all camera angle curvatures were compensated for in the analysis.

"First Sighting" - On the April 14 restart of the spillway, a DWR "drone" view of the Target was not "edited", thus a snip capture (couple of seconds) Target image became available for the first time. This also revealed the presence of the same downslope shift, but only at a 1024 HD resolution. However, I was waiting for confirmation from a higher resolution image. This image was posted to DWR's photo gallery April 19. note: As the April 14 "Drone" footage was taken during the recent restart of the spillway, the "shift" would have occurred in the prior spillway release started on March 17, 2017. At that time, DWR ran the spillway up to 50,000 cfs on March 17th (total outflow data) but by March 21st the flow was reduced to 40,000 cfs. It may be possible that the damaged section downslope "movement" was detected at the higher cfs rate and then was slowed due to this detected movement. Now DWR is operating the spillway flow at 35,000 cfs, perhaps for good reason.

DWR Photo Metadata: "A mist cloud rises from the Lake Oroville flood control spillway, as the California Department of Water Resources continues to discharge 35,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) of water from the spillway to continually manage lake levels. Photo taken April 19, 2017."

Note the camera mounted on the near spillway sidewall where the chain link fencing is cut away. There is a second camera mounted near the end of the damaged section at the water fall.

Optical Target panels Bolted onto Damaged Sidewall to detect downslope "shifting". This section is approx 54 feet upslope from the plunge pool where concerns were that this part of the upper spillway (slabs & sidewall) would fail and break away.

New April 19 DWR photo captures a view of the Optical Target Panel. Hi Resolution zoom of the target reveals a "downslope shift" of up to a max of 1.16 inches with a 0.87 inches mean avg. note: EXACT value not released or noted to public by DWR.

[EarthResearcher333]

Reference image of the Target shift - lower resolution from April 19 DWR photo

New April 19 DWR photo captures a view of the Optical Target Panel. Hi Resolution zoom of the target reveals a "downslope shift" of up to a max of 1.16 inches with a 0.87 inches mean avg. note: EXACT value not released or noted to public by DWR.

[EarthResearcher333]

SacBee Article: Groups demand transparency on Oroville Dam spillway repairs - Wants Emergency Spillway concreted to Feather River

Article excerpt: (emphasis mine):

"A coalition of environmental groups that had warned Oroville Dam’s emergency spillway was fatally flawed long before it nearly washed away this winter is demanding that federal regulators open up dam repair plans for public vetting.….. In a filing Wednesday with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, a coalition of environmental groups led by Sacramento-based Friends of the River also said it was concerned that the state Department of Water Resources is only going part way in repairing the emergency spillway. DWR’s repair plan calls for replacing the dam’s main spillway, which cracked in two in early February, and partially lining the emergency spillway with concrete. Ron Stork, a policy analyst at Friends of the River, said the plan for the emergency spillway makes sense but only as an interim measure. He said the ultimate goal should be to line the emergency structure from top to bottom. “You want a spillway all the way down the hillside,” he said in an interview.

= = end excerpt

This re-creation graphic is what the groups are concerned about. A new design failure mode from a mandated rated 369,000 cfs flow capacity "maximum flood specification" down the 80-90% unprotected hillside. Massive erosion will clog the Feather River & send silt downstream. Damming of the River could force any Main Spillway usage flow to backflow & via eddy swirl currents that could erode the toe of the main Earth Fill dam, risking total dam embankment stability (collapse sequence). Preventing this new potential "failure mode" requires a significant cost investment to concrete the entire hillside down to the Feather River. The current "New Concept Emergency Spillway design is devoid of any full hillside protection".

Groups demand transparency on Oroville Dam spillway repairs

Another Design Failure in waiting? Board of Consultants required DWR's new design spec to meet 369,000 cfs for the New Emergency Spillway. This is what it would look like - with massive hillside erosion as there is no plans for concrete armoring for hillside erosion protection down to the Feather River.

[abb]

Very troubling that the last section of “intact” spillway has moved. They’ll probably have to demo that part during the rebuild. I can’t imagine any technology that could “shove” the entire section back into place.

Wonder if the anchor bolts sheared, or the rock beneath the slab moved?