Patton - War as he knew it.

The lions in their dens tremble on hearing his approach. - From a citation from the Moroccan govt. to General George S. Patton.

One cannot but ponder the question: what if the Arabs had been Christians? To me it seems certain that the fatalistic teachings of Mohammed and the utter degradation of women is the outstanding cause for the arrested development of the Arab. He is exactly what he was around the year 700, while we have kept on developing. Here, I think, is a text for some eloquent sermon on the virtues of Christianity. - General George S. Patton, diary, June 9, 1943.

The trouble with the Airborne Army is that it is too ponderous in its methods. At the present stage in airborne development, it is my belief that one airborne regiment per army, available on twelve hours notice, would be more useful than several airborne divisions which usually take several weeks to get moving. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

Anyone, in any walk of life, who is content with mediocrity is untrue to himself and to American tradition. - General George S. Patton, War As I Knew It. 1947.

The Americans, as a race, are the foremost mechanics in the world. America, as a nation, has the greatest ability for mass production of machines. It therefore behooves us to devise methods of war which exploit our inherent superiority. We must fight the war by machines on the ground, and in the air, to the maximum of our ability, particularly in view of the fact that the two races left which we may have to fight are both poor mechanics but have ample manpower. While we have ample manpower, it is to valuable to be thrown away. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It, 1947.

When the American Army had once put its hand once put its hand to the plow, it should not let go. - General George S. Patton, War As I Knew It, 1947.

No one man can conduct an army... the success of any army depends on the harmonious working of its staff and the magnificent fighting ability of the combat officers and enlisted men. Without this teamwork, war cannot be successfully fought. - General George S. Patton, War As I Knew It, 1947.

The primary mission of armoured units is the attacking of infantry and artillery. The enemy’s rear is the happy hunting ground for armour. Use every means to get it there. - General George S. Patton, Letter of Instruction. 3 April, 1944.

Our mortars and our artillery are superb weapons when they are firing. When silent they are junk — see that they keep firing! - General George S. Patton. Letter of Instruction. 3 April, 1944.

When caught under fire, particularly of artillery, advance out of it; never retreat from it. Artillery very seldom shortens it’s range. - General George S. Patton. Letter of Instruction. 3 April, 1944.

When soldiers are caught in a barrage, either from mortars, rockets, or artillery, the surest way to get out of it is to go forward fast, because it is almost the invariable practice of the enemy to increase rather than decrease his range. - General George S. Patton. War As I Knew It. 1947.

The larger the force and the more violence you use in the attack, whether it be men, tanks, or ammunition, the smaller will be your proportional losses. - General George S. Patton. Letter of Instruction. 3 April 1944.

Take plenty of time to set up an attack. It takes at least two hours to prepare an infantry battalion to execute a properly coordinated attack. Shoving them in too soon produces useless losses.- General George S. Patton. Letter of Instruction. 3 April 1944.

Never attack where the enemy expects you to come. It is much better to go over difficult ground where you are not expected than it is over good ground where you are expected. - General George S. Patton. War As I Knew It. 1947.

When we are attacking, the enemy has to parry, while, when we are defending or preparing to attack, he can attack us. - General George S. Patton. War As I Knew It. 1947.

Throughout history, many campaigns have been lost by stopping on the wrong side of a river. - General George S. Patton. War As I Knew It. 1947.

The moral effect of discontinuing an attack is very bad for the troops. - General George S. Patton. War As I Knew It. 1947.

If in a unit the size of a division, the attack is not going well four hours after it starts, it is necessary to make a careful personal reconnaissance and see if it may not be necessary to change the emphasis; because four hours of fighting should produce substantial effects. This does not mean that a man should be wobbly about continuing in the face of uncertain victory, but it does mean that, after four hours, one should know whether the thing is going to be a go or not, and if it is not, he should slow up his attack on the old line while implementing it in a new direction. - General George S. Patton. War As I Knew It. 1947.

Almighty and most merciful Father, we humbly beseech thee, of Thy great goodness, to restrain these immoderate rains with which we have had to contend. Grant us fair weather for battle. Graciously hearken to us soldiers who call upon Thee that, armed with Thy power, we may advance from victory to victory, and crush the oppression and wickedness of our enemies, and establish Thy justice among men and nations. Amen. - O’Niel, 3rd Army chaplain. When asked to write a prayer by General Patton, O’Niel replied, “May I say, General, that it usually isn’t a customary thing among men of my profession to pray for clear weather to kill fellow men.” The next day the weather cleared.

In forty hours I shall be in battle, with little information, and on the spur of the moment will have to make most momentous decisions, but I believe that one’s spirit enlarges with responsibility and that, with God’s help, I shall make them and make them right. It seems my whole life has been leading up to this moment. - General George S. Patton, Jr., diary entry, November 6, 1942.

In battle, small forces — platoons, companies, and even battalions — can do one of three things; go forward, halt, or run. If they halt or run, they will be an even easier target. Therefore, they must go forward. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, April 3, 1944.

Battles are won by frightening the enemy. Fear is induced by inflicting death and wounds. Death and wounds are produced by fire. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, April 3, 1944.

To halt under fire and not fire back is suicide. Move forward out of fire. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, April 3, 1944.

The acid test of battle brings out the pure metal. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It. 1947.

I think, if we should say “Fire is the Queen of Battle,” we should avoid arm arguments and come nearer telling the truth. Battles are won by fire and movement. The purpose of the movement is to get the fire in a more advantageous place to play on the enemy. This is from the rear or flank. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It. 1947.

There can never be too many projectiles in a battle. Whether they are thrown by cannon, rockets, or recoilless devices is immaterial. The purpose of all these instruments is identical — namely, to deluge the enemy with fire, nor is it necessary that these projectiles be discharged on the ground. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It. 1947.

Untutored courage [is] useless in the face of educated bullets. - George S. Patton, Jr.

If we take the generally accepted definition of bravery as a quality which knows not fear, I have never seen a brave man. All men are frightened. The more intelligent they are, the more they are frightened. The courageous man is the man who forces himself, in spite of his fear, to carry on. Discipline, pride, self-respect, self-confidence, and the love of glory are attributed which make a man courageous even when he is afraid. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

In battle, casualties vary directly with the time you are exposed to effective fire. Your own fire reduces the effectiveness and volume of the enemy’s fire, while rapidity of attack shortens the time of exposure. A pint of sweat will save a gallon of blood. - General George S. Patton, Jr., Letter of Instruction, April 3, 1944.

Every soldier should realize that casualties in battle are the result of two factors: first, effective enemy fire, and, second, the time during which the soldier is exposed to that fire. The enemy’s effectiveness in fire is reduced by your fire or by night attack. The time you are exposed is reduced by the rapidity of your advance. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

During battle, it is very important to visit frequently hospitals containing newly wounded men. Before starting such an inspection, the officer in charge of the hospital should inform the inspecting general which wards contain men whose conduct does not merit compliments. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

The greatest weapon against the so-called “battle fatigue” is ridicule. If soldiers would realize that a large proportion of men allegedly suffering from battle fatigue are really using an easy way out, they would be less sympathetic. Any man who says he has battle fatigue is avoiding danger and forcing on those who have more hardihood than himself the obligation of meeting it. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

Montsec was a huge monument to our dead [in WWI]. I could not help but think that our delay in pushing forward would probably result, after due course of time, in the erection of many other such monuments for men who, had we gone faster, would not have died. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

The Grand Vizier ended up by saying that it was necessary to converse with a great man fully to realize his greatness, and that there was an Arabic saying to the effect that those said all men were equal were either fools or liars, and that he and the Sultan were neither. - General George S. Patton, Jr., diary, December 8, 1942.

If during combat communication breaks down, each commander can and must so act as to obtain the general objective. - General George S. Patton, Jr., Letter of Instruction. March 6, 1944.

Whenever armor and air can work together... the results are sure to be excellent. Armor can move fast enough to prevent the enemy having time to deploy off the roads, and so long as he stays on the roads the fighter-bomber is one of his most deadly opponents. To accomplish this happy teamwork two things are necessary: first, intimate confidence and friendship between air and ground; second, incessant and apparently ruthless driving on the part of the ground commander. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It, 1947.

In my experience, all very successful commanders are prima donnas, and must be so treated. Some officers require urging, others require suggestions, very few have to be restrained. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

The more senior the officer, the more time he has. Therefore, the senior should go forward to visit the junior rather than call the junior back to see him. The exception to this is when it is necessary to collect several commanders for the formulation of a coordinated plan. In that case, the junior should report to the superior headquarters. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

In the old Navy of sail there was a custom that the new Officer of the Deck did not call for any change in the setting of the sails for one half hour — that is, for one bell after he took over. The same thing might well apply to commanders and staff officers who take over new jobs in war. They should wait at least a week before they make any radical changes, unless and except they are put in to correct a situation which is in a bad way. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

This habit of commanding too far down, I believe, is inculcated at schools and at maneuvers. Actually, a General should command one echelon down and know the position of units two echelons down. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

Commanders must remember that the issuance of an order, or the devising of a plan, is only about five percent of the responsibility of command. The other ninety-five percent is to insure, by personal observation, or through the interposing of staff officers, that the order is carried out. Orders must be issued early enough to permit time to disseminate them. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

It is a very difficult thing to order two officers in whom you have great confidence to carry out an operation which neither of them thinks is possible. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

A general who had been relieved came in at his own request and tried to explain why he was no good. I offered him a lesser command in another division, but he told me he needed 48 hours to consider it. I did not tell him so, but I realized that any man who could not make up his mind in less than forty-eight hours was not fit to command troops in battle. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

Use every means before and after combats to tell the troops what they are going to do and what they have done. - General George S. Patton, Jr., Letter of Instruction, March 6, 1944.

We only await the signal to resume our career of conquest. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, September 25, 1944.

It is my opinion that coordination is a very much-misused word and its accomplishment is difficult. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.

Fatigue makes cowards of us all. Men in condition do not tire. - General George S. Patton, Jr., Letter of Instruction. March 6, 1944.

Cowardice is a disease and must be checked before it becomes epidemic. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction. April 3, 1944.

Any man who says he has battle fatigue is avoiding danger and forcing on those who have more hardihood than himself the obligation of meeting it. If soldiers would make fun of those who begin to show battle fatigue, they would prevent its spread, and also save the man who allows himself to malinger by this means from an afterlife of humiliation and regret. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.

In such a close fight a soldier has not time to change his mind. - General George S. Patton, Jr. November 22, 1942.

A good solution applied with vigor now is better than a perfect solution ten minutes later. - General George S. Patton, Jr., Letter of Instruction, 3 April, 1944.

I always had a very funny feeling at such times. The plans, when they came into my mind, seemed simple, but after I had issued the orders and everything was moving and I knew that I had no reserve, I had a feeling of worry and, as usual had to say to myself, "do not take counsel of your fears." The sensation is very much like that I used to have steeplechasing. I was always very anxious to ride the race, but when the saddling bell rang I felt scared. When the flag dropped and the race was on, my fear left me. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.

Wars are not won by defensive tactics. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.

The utter futility of fixed defenses. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.

Pacifists would do well to study the Siegfried and Maginot Lines, remembering that these defenses were forced; that Troy fell; that the walls of Hadrian succumbed; that the Great Wall of China was futile; and that, by the same token, the mighty seas which are alleged to defend us can also be circumvented by a resolute and ingenious opponent. In war, the only sure defense is offense, and the efficiency of offense depends on the warlike souls of those conducting it. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.

There is only one kind of discipline — PERFECT DISCIPLINE. If you do not enforce and maintain discipline, you are potential muderers. You must set the example. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, March 6, 1944.

One of the primary purposes of discipline is to produce alertness. A man who is so lethargic that he fails to salute will fall an easy victim to the enemy. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, April 3, 1944.

Discipline can only be obtained when all officers are so imbued with the sense of their awful obligation to their men and to their country that they cannot tolerate negligence. Officers who fail to correct errors or to praise excellence are valueless in peace and dangerous misfits in war. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, April 3, 1944.

Men cannot have good battle discipline and poor administrative discipline. Discipline is based on pride in the profession of arms, on meticulous attention to details, and on mutual respect and confidence. Discipline must be a habit so engrained that it is stronger than the excitement of battle or the fear of death. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, April 3, 1944.

Administrative discipline is the index of combat discipline. Any commander who is unwilling or unable to enforce administrative discipline will be incapable of enforcing combat discipline. An experienced officer can tell, by a very cursory administrative inspection of any unit, the caliber of its commanding officer. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

All human beings have an innate resistance to obedience. Discipline removes this resistance and, by constant repetition, makes obedience habitual and subconscious. Where would an undisciplined football team get? The players react subconsciously to the signals. They must, because the split second required for thought would give the enemy the jump. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It, 1947.

No man is unafraid in battle, but discipline produces in him a form of vicarious courage which, with his manhood, makes for victory. Self-respect grows directly from discipline. The Army saying, “who ever saw a dirty soldier with a medal?” is largely true. Pride, in turn, stems from self-respect and from the knowledge that the soldier is an American. The sense of duty and obligation to his comrades and superiors comes from a knowledge of reciprocal obligation, and from the sharing of the same way of life. Self-confidence, the greatest military virtue, results from the demonstrated ability derived from the acquisition of all the preceding qualities and from the expert use of weapons. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It, 1947.

Any commander who fails to obtain his objective, and who is not dead or severely wounded, has not done his full duty. - General George S. Patton, Jr.

Battle is the most magnificent competition in which a human being can indulge. It brings out all that is best; it removes all that is base. All men are afraid in battle. The coward is the one that lets fear overcome his sense of duty. Duty is the essence of manhood. - General George S. Patton, Jr.

If I do my full duty, the rest will take care of itself. - General George S. Patton, Jr., diary, November 6, 1942.

It is rather sad to me to think that my last opportunity for earning my pay has passed. At least, I have done my best as God gave me the chance. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.

The Nazis are the enemy. Wade into them. Spill their blood. Shoot them in the belly. When you put your hand into a bunch of goo that a moment before was your best friend's face, you'll know what to do. - George C. Scott, as General George Patton in "PATTON."

Fatigue makes cowards of us all. Men in condition do not tire. - General George S. Patton, Jr., Letter of Instruction. March 6, 1944.

Staff personnel, commissioned and enlisted, who do not rest, do not last.... When the need arises, everyone must work all the time, but these emergencies are not frequent: unfatigued men last longer and work better at high pressure. - General George S. Patton, Jr., Letter of Instruction. March 6, 1944.

All men are frightened. The more intelligent they are, the more they are frightened. The courageous man is the man who forces himself, in spite of his fear, to carry on. - General George S. Patton Jr.

Do not take counsel of your fears. - General George S. Patton Jr., Letter of Instruction, March 6, 1944.

The German is the champion digger. - General George S. Patton, Jr., Letter of Instruction. April 3, 1944.

The trick expression, “Dig or die,” is much overused and much misunderstood. Wars are not won by defensive tactics. Digging is primarily defensives. The only time it is proper for a soldier to dig is when he has reached his final objective in an attack, or when he is bivouacing under circumstances where he thinks he may be straffed from the air or is within artillery range of the enemy. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.

Do not dig slit trenches under trees if you can avoid it, because a shell passing overhead and striking the tree acts as an airburst and the fragments come straight down, so that your slit trench is useless to you, although it may be of some assistance to the Graves Registration people. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.

In my opinion, generals — or at least the commanding general — should answer their own telephones in the daytime. This is not particularly wearisome because few people call a general, except in emergencies, and then they like to get him at once. - General George S. Patton, War As I Knew It, 1947.

There are more tired division commanders than there are tired divisions. Tired officers are always pessimists. Remember this when evaluating reports. Generals must never show doubt, discouragement or fatigue. Generals should adhere to one type of dress so that soldiers will recognize them. They must always be neat. - General George S. Patton, War As I Knew It. 1947.

Infantry troops can attack continuously for sixty hours. Frequently much time and suffering are saved if they will do so. Beyond sixty hours, it is rather a waste of time, as the men become fatigued from lack of sleep. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

In a modern infantry division, if every available vehicle — tanks, armored cars, gun carriages, AA guns and trucks — is utilized, no soldier need, or should, walk until he actually enters battle. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

When a unit has been alerted for inspection, do not fail to inspect it thoroughly. Further, do not keep it waiting. When soldiers have gone to the trouble of getting ready to be inspected, they deserve the compliment of a visit. be sure to tell the unit commander publicly that his unit was good, if such was the case. If it is bad, tell him privately in no uncertain terms. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

Infantry must move in order to close with the enemy. It must shoot in order to move. When physical targets are not visible, the fire of all infantry weapons must search the area occupied by the enemy. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, April 3, 1944.

Information is like eggs: the fresher the better. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, March 6, 1944.

Christmas dawned clear and cold; lovely weather for killing Germans, though the thought seemed somewhat at variance with the spirit of the day. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

The lions in their dens tremble on hearing his approach. - From a citation from the Moroccan govt. to General George S. Patton.

In spite of my reputation as a head-cutter, I really am very long-suffering. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

All very successful commanders are Prima Donnas and must be so treated. - General George S. Patton, Jr.

In the first actions, new troops must receive aggressive leadership by all grades, including general officers, who must be seen in the front line during action. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, April 3, 1944.

In cold weather, General Officers must be careful not to appear to dress more warmly than the men. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It, 1947.

Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do and they will surprise you with their ingenuity. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It, 1947.

All officers, and particularly General Officers, must be vitally interested in everything that interests the soldier. Usually you will gain a great deal of knowledge by being interested, but, even if you do not, the fact that you appear interested has a very high morale influence on the soldier. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

When speaking to a junior about the enemy confronting him, always understate their strength. You do this because the person in contact with the enemy invariably overestimates their strength to himself, so if you understate it, you probably hit the approximate fact, and also enhance your junior's self-confidence. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

Each, in his appropriate sphere, will lead in person. Any commanders who fails to obtain his objective, and is not dead or severely wounded, has not done his full duty. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

The DESPERATE DETERMINATION to succeed is just as vital to supply as it is to the firing line. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, March 6, 1944.

Replacements are spare parts — supplies.... A company without riflemen is just as useless as a tank without gasoline. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, March 6, 1944.

Always remember that it is much better to waste ammunition than lives. It takes at least eighteen years to produce a soldier, and only a few months to produce ammunition. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It, 1947.

The chief purpose of the General and Special Staffs is to insure that the troops get what they want in time. In battle, troops get temperamental, and ask for things they really do not need. However, where humanly possible, their requests, no matter how unreasonable, should be answered. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It, 1947.

The fighting soldiers should carry nothing into battle except what he wears, his ammunition, his rations, and his toilet articles. When he goes back, he should get new uniforms, new underclothes, new everything. The two-bag system ("A" and "B") with which we began this war is utterly foolish, because by the time the "B" bags get up, many of their owners have become casualties. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It, 1947.

The American soldier is absolutely incapable of enforcing the rule that civilians stay off the roads during active operations. His goodness of heart is a credit to him, but I am sure it has cost us many casualties. In war, time is vital, and bull-carts cause waste of time and therefor death.
If I were to fight another war, I would make it an inflexible rule that no civilian vehicle, horse, cow, or motor drawn, appear on any axial road, and I would enforce this by shooting the animals and destroying the vehicles. I did this in Sicily and was criticized by an ignorant press, who considered it very brutal to kick a few donkeys off bridges, and ignored the fact that by so doing we took Palermo in one day and at a very low cost. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It, 1947.

If "the greatest study of mankind is man," surely the greatest study of war is the road net. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It, 1947.

Railroad trains, carrying rations, or fuel, or other articles with a sales value on the black market, must be guarded, and any person attempting pillage must be shot and the fact published. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It, 1947.

There is a great deal of talk about loyalty from the bottom to the top. Loyalty from the top down is even more necessary and much less prevalent. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It, 1947.

Shoot short. Richochets make nastier sounds and wounds. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction. April 3, 1944.

It is vital to good morale that decorations get out promptly and on an equitable basis. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.

When a unit leaves your command, if its performance at all justifies it, a letter of farewell and commendation to the unit should be sent. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.

In war nothing is ever as bad, or as good, as it is reported to Higher Headquarters. Any reports which emanate from a unit after dark — that is, where the knowledge has been obtained after dark — should be viewed with skepticism by the next higher unit. Reports by wounded men are always exaggerated and favor the enemy. - General George S. Patton, War As I Knew It. 1947.

The report of no incident that happens after dark should be treated too seriously. They are always overstated. - General George S. Patton, War As I Knew It. 1947.

One of the great defects in our military establishment is the giving of weak sentences for military offenses. The purpose of military law is administrative rather than legal.As thefrench say, sentences are for the purpose of encouraging others. I am convinced that, in justice to other men, soldiers who go to sleep on post, who go absent for an unreasonable time during combat, who shirk battle, should be executed.... It is utterly stupid to say that General Officers, as a result of whose orders thousands of gallant and brave men have been killed, are not capable of knowing how to remove the life of one miserable poltroon. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.

War may be fought with weapons, but they are won by men. It is the spirit of the men who follow and of the man who leads that gains the victory. - General George Patton.

Supply and administrative units and installations are frequently negected by combat commanders. It is very necessary to their morale and efficiency that each one be inspected by the senior general of the unit with which they are operating. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.

An army commander does what is necessary to accompish his mission, and that nearly eighty percent of his mission is to arouse morale in his men. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.

It is an unfortunate fact that few commanders, and no poiticians, realize the individuality of units and the necessity of playing on human emotion.... [General] Paul once told me, with perfect sincerity, that the greatest moment of his life had been at the Battle of The Bulge when I put my arm around him and said, "How is my little fighting son-of-a-bitch today?" he said that this remark inspired not only him, but every man in the division. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.

The more senior the officer who appears with a very small unit at the front, the better the effect on the troopos. If some danger is involvved in the visit, it's value is enhanced. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.

Officers must posses self-confidence and the confidence of their men. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, April 3, 1944.

Officers are always on duty and their duty extends to every individual, junior to themselves, in the U.S. Army — not only to members of their own organization. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, April 3, 1944.

Officers are responsible, not only for the conduct of their men in battle, but also for their health and contentment when not fighting. An officer must be the last man to take shelter from fire, and the first to move forward. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, April 3, 1944.

The officers must constantly interest himself in the rations of the men. He should know his men so well that any sign of sickness or nervous strain will be apparent to him, and he can can take such action as may be necessary. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, April 3, 1944.

Officers must assert themselves byb example and by voice. They must be pre-eminent in courage, deportment, and dress. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, April 3, 1944.

The responsibilities of an officer are quite analogous to those of a policeman or a fireman. The better he performs his daily tasks, the less frequently does he have to take direct action. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It. 1947.

Avoid as you would perdition issuing cover-up orders, orders for the record. This simply shows lack of intestinal fortitude on the part of the officer signing the orders, and everyone who reads them recognizes it at once. - General George S. Patton, Jr. War As I Knew It. 1947.

While flying over France, I was continually struck with the amount of human effort that had been spent in the construction of trenches and other lethal agents during both this and WWI. A pacifist could get a splendid text for a sermon on human frailty from such monuments to the evil of war. But he could get even better arguments against himself by looking at the cemeteries, where each little white cross attests to the human folly which has invariably resulted in more wars. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.

In the fields the plowing is done with the most peculiar combination of animals. The peasants either use a horse and camel, a burro and a camel, a bull and a camel, or a bull and a horse. I am informed that they cannot use two camels because they fight each other. Any animal hooked up with a camel becomes disgusted and loses interest in life. - General George S. Patton, Jr., Diary. November 22, 1942.

Plans must be simple and flexible. Actually they only serve as a datum plane from which you build as necessity directs or as opportunity offers. They should be made by the people who are going to have to execute them. - General George S. Patton, Letter of Instruction. 6 March, 1944.

successful generals make plans to fit circumstances, but do not try to create circumstances to fit plans. - General George S. Patton, War As I Knew It. 1947.

One does not plan and then try to make circumstance fit those plans fit the circumstances. I think the difference between success and failure in high command depends upon the ability, or lack of it, to do just that. - General George S. Patton, War As I Knew It. 1947.

The best is the enemy of the good. By this I mean that a good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan next week. War is a very simple thing, and the determining characteristics are self-confidence, speed, and audacity. None of these things can ever be perfect, but they can be good. - General George S. Patton, War As I Knew It. 1947.

In planning any operation, it is vital to remember, and constantly repeat to oneself, things: "In war nothing is impossible, provided you use audacity," and "Do not take counsel of your fears." If these two principles are adhered to, with American troops victory is certain. - General George S. Patton, War As I Knew It. 1947.

I have yet to find where politic language produces successful government. - General George S. Patton, War As I Knew It. 1947.

Remember that praise is more valuable than blame. - General George Patton, letter of instruction. March 6, 1792.

Prisoner of war guard companies, or an equivalent organization, should be as far forward as possible in action to take over prisoners of war, because troops heated with battle are not safe custodians. Any attempt to rob or loot prisoners of war by escorts must be strictly dealt with. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.

Your primary mission as a leader is to see with your own eyes and be seen by your troops while engaged in personal reconnaissance. - General George S. Patton, letter of instruction. March 6, 1944.

You can never have too much reconnaissance. Use every means available before, during, and after battle. Reports must be facts, not opinions; negative as well as positive.... Information is like eggs: the fresher the better. - General George S. Patton, letter of instruction, March 6, 1944.

In 40 hours I shall be in battle, with little information, and on the spur of the moment will have to make the most momentous decisions. But I believe that one's spirit enlarges with responsibility and that, with God's help, I shall make them and make them right. - General George Patton.

I believe that one's spirit enlarges with responsibility. - General George S. Patton, diary. November 6, 1942.

A General Officer who will invariably assume the responsibility for failure, whether he deserves it or not, and invariably gives the credit for success to others, whether they deserve it or not, will achieve outstanding success. - General George S. Patton, War As I Knew It, 1947.

Never yield ground. It is cheaper to hold what you have than to retake what you have lost. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, April 3, 1944.

Wars may be fought by weapons, but they are won by men. It is the spirit of the men who follow and the man who leads that gains victory. - General George S. Patton, Jr.

The American soldier is willing to die but not to kill. - General George S. Patton, Jr. Concerning the statistic that only one rifleman in four could bring himself to fire his weapon.

In spite of their magnificent appearance, our men do not put up a good show in reviews. I think that we still lack pride in being soldiers, and must develope it. - General George S. Patton, Jr., diary. may 20, 1943.

The successful soldier wins his batte cheaply so far as his own casuaties are concerned, but he must remember that violent attacks, although costly at the time, save live in the end. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction. April 3, 1944.

The history of our invariablly victorious armies demonstrates that we are the best soldiers in the world. This should make your men proud. This should make you proud. This should imbue your units with unconquerable self-confidence and pride in demonstrated ability. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction. April 3, 1944.

There is a great difference between an old division, irrespective of the individuals composing it, and a new division. War develops a soul in a fighting unit, and while there may not be many of the old men left, it takes a very little yeast to leaven a lump of dough. I suppose I might be funny and say it takes very few veterans to leaven a division of doughboys. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.

The fact that the Allies made a successful landing [in Normandy] demostrates that good troops can land anywhere. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.

Soldiers like to play on a winning team. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.

The professiona soldier is certainly conservative. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.

It is an unfortunate and, to me, tragic fact that, in our attempts to prevent war, we have taught our people to belittle the heroic qualities of the soldier. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.

The soldier is the army. No army is better than its soldiers. The soldier is also a citizen. In fact, the highest obligation and privilege of citizenship is that of bearing arms for one's country. Hence it is a proud priviege to be a soldier — a good soldier.... To be a good soldier a man must have discipline, self-respect, pride in his unit and in his country, a high sense of duty and obligation to his comrades and to his superiors, and self-confidence born of demonstrated ability. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.

American soldiers are most ingenious. When they could not capture a town to sleep in, they would roll three large snowballs or snow rolls, place one on each side and the third on the windward end , and, lining them with pine-tree branches, they slept in groups of three or four. How human beings could endure this continuous fighting at sub-zero temperatures is still beyond my comprehension. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.

Have been giving everyone a simplified directive of war. Use steamroller strategy; that is, make up your mind on a course and direction of action, and then stick to it. But in tactics, do not steamroller. Attack weakness. Hold them by the nose and kick them in the pants. - General George S. Patton, Jr., diary. November 2, 1942.

If I had worried about flanks, I could nevver ahve fought the war. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It. 1947.

Study the map, because, if you find a large number of big roads leading through a place, that is the place to go regardless of enemy resistance. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It. 1947.

You can never be too strong. Get every man and gun you can secure, provided it does not unduly delay your attack. - General George S. Patton, Letter of Instruction. 3 April, 1944.

It is better to attack with a small force at once, and attain surprise, than it is to wait and lose it. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It. 1947.

Catch the enemy by the nose with fire and kick him in the pants with fire placed through movement. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, 3 April, 1944.

There is only one tactical principal which is not subject to change. It is: “To so use the means at hand to inflict the maximum amount of wounds, death, and destruction on the enemy in the minimum time.” - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, 3 April, 1944.

There is no approved solution to any tactical situation. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, 3 April, 1944.

Fire from the rear is more deadly and three times more effective than fire from the front, but to get fire behind the enemy, you must hold him by frontal fire and move rapidly around his flank. Frontal attacks against prepared positions should be avoided if possible. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, 3 April, 1944.

The policy of holding the enemy by the nose with fire and kicking him in the pants with movement is just as true as when I wrote it, some twenty years ago, and at that time it had been true since the beginning of war. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

All the historical studies we had ever read on the crossing asserted that, between Bingen and Coblentz, the Rhine was impossible. Here again we took advantage of a theory of our own, that the impossible place is usually the least well defended. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

Whether these tactical thoughts of mine are the result of inspiration or insomnia, I have never been able to determine, but nearly every tactical idea I have ever had has come into my head full-born, much after the manner of Minerva from the head of Jupiter. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

Never attack along the bottom of a valley unless you have the heights on both sides in your possession. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

Any operation, reduced to its primary characteristics, consists in moving down the road until you bump into the enemy.... When you have bumped, hold him at the point of contact with fire and about a third of your command. Move the rest in a wide envelopment so that you can attack him from his rear flank. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

Vertical or horizontal envelopment for tactical effect should not go too deep or be too large. The best results are attained when the envelopment arrives in or just back of the enemy’s artillery positions. Here you disprupt his supply and signal communications and his guns, and are close enough to the troops advancing along the axis to be sure of making contact in a reasonable time. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

Never halt on the near side of a river or a mountain range. Secure a bridgehead in both cases, because even if you do not intend to exploit the crossing, the possession of a bridgehead on the far side cramps the enemy’s style. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

always capture the highest terrain feature in your vicinity at once, and stay on it. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

Owing to the pernicious traditions of our known distance rifle markesmanship, we are prone to hold our fire until we see targets. In battle these are seldom visible. When any group of soldiers is under small-arms fire, it is evident that the enemy can see them; therefore, men should be able to see the enemy, but seldom are. When this situation arises, they must fire at the portions of hostile terrain which probably conceal enemy small-arms weapons. I know for a fact that such a proceedure invariably produces an effect and generally stops hostile fire. All the historical studies we had ever read on the crossing asserted that, between Bingen and Coblentz, the Rhine was impossible. Here again we took advantage of a theory of our own, that the impossible place is usually the least well defended. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

It is always well to remember that the country is just as hard on the enemy as it is on you. - General George S. Patton, Jr., diary. December 9, 1943.

Throughout history, wars have been lost by not crossing rivers. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

It is my opinion that, in the High Command, small-scale maps are best because from that level one has to decide on general policies and determine the places, usually road centers or river lines, the capture of which will hurt the enemy most. How these places are to be captured is a matter for the lower echelons to determine from the study of large-scale maps or, better still, from the ground. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

High physical condition is vital to victory. - General George S. Patton, letter of instruction. March 6, 1944.

Fatigue makes cowards of us all. Men in condition do not tire. - General George S. Patton, Jr., Letter of Instruction. March 6, 1944.

Battles are fought by platoons and squads. Place emphasis on small unit combat instruction so that it is conducted with the same precision as close-order drill. - General George S. Patton, letter of instruction. April 3, 1944.

Officers and men must know their equipment. They must train with the equipment they intend to use in battle. Equipment must be in the best operational condition when taken to the Theater of Operations. - General George S. Patton, letter of instruction. April 3, 1944.

Combat experienc has proven that ceremonies, such as formal guard mounts, formal retreat formations, and regular and supervised reveille formations, are a great help, and, in some cases, essential, to prepare men and officers for battle, to give them that perfect discipline, that smartness, that alertness without which battles cannot be won. - General George S. Patton, letter of instruction. April 3, 1944.

A pint of sweat saves a gallon of blood. - General George S. Patton, War As I Knew It, 1947.

Soldiers of the Seventh Army: Born at sea, baptized in bood, and crowned with victory, in the course of thirty-eight days of incessant battle and unceasing labor, you have added a glorious chapter to the history of war. - General George S. Patton, Jr., General Order #18, August 22, 1943.

We only await the signal to resume our career of conquest. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, September 25, 1944.

From the bloody corridor at avranches, to brest, thence across France to the Saar, over the Saar into Germany, and now onto Bastogne, your record has been one of continuous victory. Not only have you invariably defeated a cunning and ruthless enemy, but also you have overcome by your indomitable fortitude every aspect of terrain and weather. Neither heat not dust nor floods nor snow have stayed your progress. The speed and brilliance of your achievements are unsurpassed in military history. - General George S. Patton, Jr., commendation issued to the troops of the 3rd Army XIX Tactical Air Command, January 1, 1945.

War is an ancient subject and I, an ancient man. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It. 1947.

One continues to learn about war by practicing war. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It. 1947.

It was a risky operation, but so is war. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It. 1947.

The object of war is not to die for your country but to make the other bastard die for his. - General George S. Patton.

War is a very simple thing, and the determining characteristics are self-confidence, speed, and audacity. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It. 1947.

I love war and responsibility and excitement. Peace is going to be hell on me. - General George Patton.

Few men are killed by the bayonet; many are scared by it. Bayonets should be fixed when the fire-fight starts. Bayonets must be sharpened by the individual soldier. The German hates the bayonet and is inferior to our men with it. Our men should know this. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction. April 3, 1944.

The M-1 rifle is the most deadly rifle in the world. If you cannot see the enemy, you can at least shoot at the place where he is apt to be. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction. April 3, 1944.

During this operation [the Battle of The Bulge] the Third Army moved farther and faster and engaged more divisions in less time than any other army in the history of the United States — possibly in the history of the world. The results attained were made possible only by the superlative quality of American officers, American men, and American equipment. No country can stand against such an army. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It. 1947.

Yah know, everytime I ask myself that if I could speak with a great man of the past, who would be on my list?

The General always comes to mind.

What a guy!

Excellent post and read. And the above I truly wish our current CIC would adhere to.

Also, a singular chassis/motor set, as in the Sherman, also simplified maintenance and logistics to a great degree.

Our fast turn-around rates for returning "knocked-out" tanks to battle had the Germans convinced that many more convoys were getting through their submarine screens.

I recall reading somewhere that Hitler considered his intelligence on our production capability suspect because they could not reconcile the numbers of destroyed tanks being reported by his field commanders with our production numbers and the constant arrival of "new" American tanks.

Amazing what a welding torch and fresh coat of paint can do.

"The Americans, as a race, are the foremost mechanics in the world. America, as a nation, has the greatest ability for mass production of machines. It therefore behooves us to devise methods of war which exploit our inherent superiority. We must fight the war by machines on the ground, and in the air, to the maximum of our ability, particularly in view of the fact that the two races left which we may have to fight are both poor mechanics but have ample manpower. While we have ample manpower, it is to valuable to be thrown away." - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It, 1947.

In the ari you can add the B-17, the P-47, the P-38 and even the B-25 and 26.

Not to mention the Mustang and the entire Cat series. Even the P-40, with the right tactics, put a butt-whoopin' on the Japanese in Indochina. It was slow, lacked armament, couldn't dogfight, but it could absorb punishment, had a higher ceiling and much faster and more stable in a dive. Chennault was brilliant enough to use its strengths. His squadrons flew as high as possible and dove out of the sun on Japanese squadrons, pulled up and went to altitude again. They stayed away from macho dogfights, and did what it took to win, against all odds. It amazes me to think about it.

Both the P-40 and P-47 used the same arial combat techniques. Climb high, power-dive on your adversary, then use the aircrafts weight and momentum to zoom-climb back up to altitude and start all over. Worked well against both the Japs and Germans.

Had he paced Germany's timetable and listened to his people, military and civilian, those wonder weapons might have been our demise.

Scary. Had he held back for a few years instead of trying to take everything at once. The V-2, the Komet rocket plane, the ME-262. If I remember right he also had 4-engine bombers on the drawing board, as did the Japanese. Industrial might, sheer numbers, sure didn't hurt us, did it?

If I remember right, though, the '47 could hold its own in high altitude dogfights, and left the Spitfire pilots in awe as they climbed away from them like a "raped ape", for such a relatively big plane. Although I've seen them at air shows, and they don't look so big at all, quite tiny compared to modern fighters.

That is a very rare picture...
Went hunting on the net for the histories on these 1944 P-51D'S...
Was able to locate a serial number 413281 and its history. But 413287 an 413289 do not appear on the largest net serial number database. 81 to 89 may have been a batch shipment to North Africa... for the 15th AF...52ND FG. They were long range escorts..and flew ops into Germany and the Balkans. 413281 was lost Sept 3 over Belgrade Yugoslavia on an escort mission. The other 2 P-51's in the background of your pik are hard to identify serial number wise.....413281 may be one of those 2 in the background. Any info on where you scooped the picture would be appreciated!

The P-47 was fast, and could, as you say, "climb like a raped ape." But it could not turn with the German fighters in a dog-fight, which is why they "Jug" pilots adopted the proven tactics that the Tigers used in China.

Whenever a German fighter got on their tail they would split-s and dive away (Nothing could catch a P-47 in power-dive except a P-38). Once clear of gun range they would then pull for altitude to get above the german pilot so he could then dive on him.

In level flight, the 47 could walk away from a 109 if it was not too close but not from a 190. But it could still out dive a 190. The super-charged 190's, though, could climb with them.

And last but not least, no other fighter on either side could take the punishment of the P-47. Even if he got one in his sites, German pilots had a tough time shooting them down. Many a Jug pilot survived engagements that would have killed them in any other plane.

Thanks. I thought this post would be appropriate now that the tanks are rolling again in Isreal.

Here's hoping Ariels boys get to grease their treads with the innards of a few Hamas' Nazi thugs.

Your right on the P-40 call..later versions..especially the N were no slouch in the hands of a good pilot..and in some cases..a Russian pilot.
The N series ran production over 3000..
An experimental P-40 with clipped wings..4 blade prop and some fuselage changes did 422 mph.
The 40 was export material after 1942.
A Family member flew with the AVG...his P-40 got him home safe.
My Mother was given his AVG jacket with the "Chinese" resistance message on the back in 1952..
"What did I need that dirty old thing for she said"
I turned to my dad and said..we just lost $5000.00
I can still see my dads head buried in his hands ..shaking side to side!

(Nothing could catch a P-47 in power-dive except a P-38).Interesting, you seem to know your air history. One book I read many years ago said that the 38 was the first plane to break the sound barrier, and the pilot lived to tell about it. Supposedly he put it in a suicide dive just to see how fast he could go, and reached Mach. Have you ever heard that one?

An experimental P-40 with clipped wings..4 blade prop and some fuselage changes did 422 mph.

422, wow, I think of the Warhawk as something around 300-325 mph. Over-400 Club, I think Mustang, Thunderbolt, Hellcat (maybe), Spitfire, Lightning, Mosquito (bomber) (maybe), Twin Mustang, and last but not least, the Tiger Cat. It never saw action in WWII, but the Kalamazoo Air Zoo has a pristine flying example. A truly awesome twin-engine bomber-killer.

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