Posted on 06/03/2002 11:18:54 AM PDT by codebreaker
Chinese President Jiang Zemin will meet with Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee June 4 in an effort to ease tensions between the two countires, China Daily reported.
Indian border guards killed a top commander of a Pakistan based militant group which India accuses of being behind an attack on its Parliament last December, while the Indian military June 3 categorically ruled out the use of nuclear weapons against Pakistan
1625 GMT END
Use of nukes by Pakistan would be highly irresponsible for the Pak authorities as well. While some Muslims have the promise of instantaneous transport to heaven and the 72 pure grapes, those who remained behind would be severely injured in many ways and it would hard to imagine a follower of Islam who would by his own acts deliberately cause such pain and anguish to his family and neighbors who are also Muslim. Goes for Palestine as well: Does the murder-bomber think of the pain he causes his own family when their house is demolished and they lose their means of livlihood by the retribution following his act? Like the WTC911: There were Muslims in the building, how can the jihadist claim their suffering and death is necessary, collateral damage, "You aren't allowed to kill innocents", and yet, you do. See the paradox, do we have to read your own book to you?
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categorically???!!!???
I don't think so...
This sounds like large scale propaganda to me... There is no way in the world that India will sit by and not retaliate in kind if Pakistan lobbed a nuke at them.
Matter of fact, my gut says that Pak will be the one to lob one first!
I would say that their statement is no denial at all. They define the context of their statement in the second sentence.
Neither does it visualise that it will be used by any other country
What if the situation arises where they can "visualise" it very well?
A Defence Ministry statement said: "Government makes it clear that India does not believe in the use of nuclear weapons. Neither does it visualise that it will be used by any other country".
India's army is literally twice the size of Pakistan's. In addition, India has superior numbers of conventional weapons at their disposal. The fear is that Pakistan, after succumbing to India's superior ground forces, would retaliate with nuclear weapons in an act of desperation.
It is this that frightens many.
The stronger nation can make such a pledge because they don't need nukes to defeat the enemy. It also makes them look the good guy in the dispute.
Pakistan's unwillingness to make a no first-use pledge is probably the only reason India hasn't already invaded. Nukes have a way of keeping the peace.
The ironic thing is that Pakistan would also lose a nuclear war, because they have fewer nukes. After a nuclear exchange between these two countries, more of Pakistan would be destroyed, and then India could mop the remnants up with conventional weapons.
So, the nukes don't have any war value to either side, except as a pre-war threat.
That's what we're seeing now, and it was all very predictable.
[Actually, they don't.]
Someone set us up the Bomb!
Launch all Zig!
For Great Justice!
I'm sure it would be preceded by an ultimatum first. Stop the invasion within 24 hours or else. At that point they have nothing to lose. They certainly aren't going to surrender the nukes to India, and if they're going down, they're going to take a few million Indians with them.
At that point India has to decide whether it's worth taking those hits in order to finish off the Pak Army. I don't know the answer to that, but that's the scenario the Indians need to think about now, because that's how it would play out if a full-scale invasion occurs.
Well, things get a little complicated when you remember that there are actually tactical considerations to using nuclear weapons. They don't just spread terror. They don't just "destroy cities" and spread radiation. The people who think of this kind of thing for a living have worked out all sorts of weird ways nuclear devices can be used, so to speak, carefully. They can, for instance, be used by one country to remove the nuclear capability of another if you're willing to strike first (or driven to strike first) and if you know where your opponent's delivery systems are.
One example: If you are planning on launching nuclear weapons on a missle, then your opponent will certainly be aware that they can make it impossible for you to launch your missles by exploding small nukes in the atmosphere above your launch sites, say, at one every couple of minutes. Even if your silos are hardened, a missle can't launch through the nuclear blasts and EM effects. Then your opponent can drop a big ballastic nuclear device through the chaos and destroy your silos...
-- KotS
It almost feels like, what they say is the OPPOSITE of what they really mean. If that's the case, there's trouble ahead.
sir or ms., i thought the no first strike stuff was old news, and that the tenor of this lousy little blurb's title is: INDIA will NEVER use the bomb-oh well, back to bed for this old dog....
In order to take those out, you would have to have superb intelligence information in a battle situation, something I think is pretty unlikely.
One intermediate step I've seen suggested is the detonation of a Pakistani nuke over an Indian armored column within Pakistan. I could see that happening before resorting to the city-killing strikes as a way of demonstrating resolve in no uncertain terms.
I still remain doubtful that any of this will happen. I think the very uncertainty of how nukes might be used is a major deterrent to a full-scale war.
-archy-/-
I believe it was Churchill who said, "When war itself is fenced by mutual destruction, it will inevitably be postponed."
1. Their military establishment is huge, as befits a fairly rich country with a Billion mostly agricultural clymers with nothing else to do. Several castes have a rich military tradition, which includes training the clymers. On the ground, it's Indians as far as the eye can see by about 10 to 1, with good armor, transport, artillery, helicopters, etc.etc. The Indian Navy is also large and well equipped. There is no Paki Navy. In the Air, it's a little more interesting, maybe even.
2. There is a huge Indian Middle Class from which to draw decent junior officers and non-coms.
3. Pakistan has almost none of the above, except a small, highly efficient officer class equal to the Indians, perhaps man for man, even a bit better. But this is a numbers, equipment, and logistics game, just like any other modern war. The Paki Army with a rich military tradition and warrior tribes to draw from, is quite good but quite small. And of course, the Pakis are dealing with fundamentalists who want to take over the place and who have infiltrated the military.
4. The Indians have cleaned the Paki clock quite thoroughly in previous encounters. Embarassingly so.
If I had to bet, I'd say it's the Pakis who'll be sorely tempted to try the nukes to "even the playing field." The Indians don't need them to sort out the Pakis.
The Indians are on a muscle-flexing, manly Hindu roll and so proud of themselves with their A-bomb and strong military they are starting to remind me of Hitler in 1938. They need to be put back in their cage.
Too bad we don't have a UN which can set up a plebiscite in Kashmir and let those Worthy Oriental Gentlemen decide for themselves with which set of other Worthy Oriental Genlemen they would rather associate. All the protagonists here are people who have that annoying native tendency to either be grovelling or trying to tear one's throat out.
The Pakis are the more problematical, since al-Qaida wants three things more than anything else in the world: Saudi Arabia's Money and Oil, and Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal and Technology. The Indians have the chutzpah to think they can take advantage of this situation to grab Kashmir conventionally while the world sits on Pakistan to prevent them from going nuclear.
John Gittings in Shanghai
Tuesday June 4, 2002
The Guardian
China's president, Jiang Zemin, will meet the Indian and Pakistani leaders at the Asian summit in Almaty today as Beijing shows increasing concern over a conflict in which it cannot choose sides.
The foreign ministry spokesman Kong Quan said yesterday that Mr Jiang would urge President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan and the Indian prime minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, to "show the utmost restraint" in order to maintain peace and stability in south Asia.
The Chinese media last night made much of Mr Jiang's presence at the 16-nation conference in the Kazakhstan city, portraying him as a potential peacemaker. Mr Jiang has been in frequent touch with the US administration and would like to be seen to play a significant diplomatic role.
The renewed Kashmir crisis comes at a time when China is seeking a more balanced role in the south Asian region, in spite of its longstanding close relationship with Pakistan.
China and India have agreed to disagree on their longstanding border dispute. While hardliners on both sides would oppose any territorial exchange, both countries are working together to demarcate the actual line of control.
During a visit by India's foreign minister, Jaswant Singh, to China in March this year, agreement was reached to began cooperation on counter-terrorism.
Meanwhile, China has sought new ground for agreement with Pakistan, stressing its own problems with Muslim separatists in the western region of Xinjiang. Last month Xinjiang officials revealed that Pakistan had returned an alleged terrorist to China.
Relations with Pakistan remain on a higher level than those with India, and China continues to supply it with advanced weaponry including jet fighters and - it is widely believed - missile-related technology.
Chinese media coverage of the Kashmir crisis has reflected a variety of views, indicating that authorities in Beijing are not attempting to impose a uniform line.
India has asked Israel - one of its main arms suppliers - to speed up the delivery of radar systems, observation balloons and communications equipment, Israeli newspapers reported yesterday.
Israel has sold £2bn in arms and military equipment to India since the two countries established formal relations 10 years ago.
Suzanne Goldenberg, Jerusalem
Special reports
Kashmir
Pakistan
War in Afghanistan
Useful links
UN resolutions on Kashmir
Pakistan government's site on Kashmir
Jammu and Kashmir government website
Kashmir Information Network
Times of India
Hindustan Times
Pakistan Today
The Nation (Pakistani)
So do I. India knows that if they invade Pakistan, Pakistan will not be able to match them on the battlefield, and will have no choice but to employ nukes to protect itself.
India is trying to appear principled and masters of restraint, so that when they invade and Pakistan retaliates with nukes, they can say they had no choice, and didn't want to have to do it, but what else could they do?
Really, I don't care if they nuke themselves out of existance.
Tuor
Probably they would, but not necessarily. They have to know that any overt move to use their nukes *may* cause the US or India to attempt to forestall such a move and destroy the missle launch sites before the nukes can be employed. Also, from a military perspective, it might be better to surprise the enemy by launching a bit earlier than they expect.
Tuor
That's not the case in this instance. Or, more precisely, the combatants do not believe that would be the case in this instance. They don't -- especially Pakistan doesn't appear to have -- enough nukes to completely wipe one another out. However, they do have enough to mostly destroy Pakistan and drasticly alter India's way of life for a long time to come.
These are tactical nukes, nowhere near the size of ours and nowhere near the number that we or Russia have. A nuclear exchange between these guys, based on what we know of their arsenal, would not be The End of the World as We Know It, but it would be pretty bad for South Asia and, to a lesser degree, China and SE Asia.
China seems to be involving itself in this, too. That is something India wont be able to completely ignore, even though it is unlikely China will directly intervene. It is something we should keep in mind as well.
Tuor
After that, unless their nukes somehow destroyed the Indian Army, there isn't anything to prevent the Indians from finishing the job. Pakistan can't threaten anything anymore.
For that reason, Pakistan would only use them as a last resort, and as a final fatal act.
*Pretty bad?* Indeed!
I'm not saying they wouldn't get their hair mussed a little, but probably no more than 30 million or so dead:
WASHINGTON — When Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld travel to India and Pakistan this week, they'll hand leaders of both countries something frightening to think about: a U.S. study estimating that as many as 12 million people would die instantly if the longtime adversaries were to launch a nuclear war.06/04/2002 - Updated 01:35 AM ET
U.S.: No one wins a nuclear war
By Bill Nichols, USA TODAY
WASHINGTON — When Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld travel to India and Pakistan this week, they'll hand leaders of both countries something frightening to think about: a U.S. study estimating that as many as 12 million people would die instantly if the longtime adversaries were to launch a nuclear war.
As horrific as that death count might seem, Armitage and Rumsfeld will stress that the number is low, because it doesn't include tens of millions of Indians and Pakistanis who could die later from radiation exposure, U.S. State Department officials say.
Beyond such mind-numbing casualties, the first nuclear exchange in history would decimate the economies of both nations and probably trigger a collapse of world financial markets that could spur a worldwide depression, experts predict. Destruction and famine would send millions of refugees to neighboring countries. The U.S. war on terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan would end. The world would face a humanitarian crisis far greater than anything it has seen before.On Monday, both sides played down talk of nuclear war. India said it does not believe in the use of nuclear weapons. At an Asian summit in Kazakhstan, Russia and China tried to broker a meeting between Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf.
Around the world, however, governments still feared the worst. Experts say no computer model can prepare the world for the nightmare it has feared since the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima 57 years ago. "It's really a great unknown," says Tom Zamora Collina, an analyst for the Union of Concerned Scientists. The average person "doesn't have a clue what this would mean," he says.
To head off a nuclear war that might result from the conflict over the disputed Himalayan region of Kashmir, the Bush administration wants to show Musharraf and Vajpayee how bad things could get.
"The problem is once the iron starts to be exchanged between the two sides, then reason and logic seem to go out the window," Armitage said Monday on CNN.
The U.S. government fears that citizens of both countries, which first tested nuclear weapons in 1998, don't grasp the repercussions of a decision to go nuclear. In the West, schoolchildren learn about the devastating effects of the U.S. atomic bombs dropped on Japan in 1945. "But that's not the case in South Asia," says Zia Mian, a nuclear expert at Princeton University. "There's never been a major movie about what would happen in a nuclear war. Even educated people often think about this in the abstract."
In Islamabad, retired Pakistani army lieutenant general Naseer Akhtar says both sides "don't understand the power of the bomb."
U.S. military and intelligence officials, along with private analysts, have run detailed studies and war-game scenarios in recent years to simulate a nuclear exchange in South Asia.
The degree of devastation depends on the number of weapons used, their explosive power, where they are set off and climate conditions. But U.S. officials say they hope the data they are bringing to India and Pakistan will make the idea of nuclear war so chillingly real that both sides will do anything to avoid it.
How it starts
U.S. officials say a war likely would begin in Muzaffarabad, a city on the Pakistani side of the "Line of Control" that divides Kashmir. Indian ground forces would attack Muzaffarabad, which is believed to be the hub for Pakistan-backed Islamic guerrillas seeking independence from Indian control in the region.
India, a largely Hindu nation, controls two-thirds of Kashmir, which is predominantly Muslim, as is Pakistan. More than 30,000 people have died in Kashmir since 1989, when Muslim guerrillas began seeking independence.
Pakistan's likely response would be to use mechanized units to counterattack and try to keep Indian forces from overrunning Kashmir and invading Pakistani territory, says Sam Gardiner, a retired U.S. Air Force colonel who has run more than 20 India-Pakistan war-game scenarios.
India would try to repel Pakistan's counterattack, Gardiner says, which would bring the conflict to the point U.S. officials fear most.
India's military force of 1.3 million troops dwarfs Pakistan's 612,000 soldiers. At some point, Pakistan would retreat in the face of an unstoppable Indian invasion. Musharraf might decide he could save his nation only by striking the enemy with a nuclear bomb.
If Indian troops approached the Pakistani city of Lahore, near the Kashmiri border, "then they have divided Pakistan," Gardiner says. "Pakistan then might use a nuclear weapon in Pakistan against Indian forces. Then India responds against Pakistani nuclear delivery forces. Then things get very bad very quickly."
Making matters worse: Nuclear missiles launched by either country would take only three to four minutes to hit major cities. Either side would have seconds to react — and South Asia has nothing close to the fail-safe mechanisms Washington and Moscow developed at the height of the Cold War.
Pakistan and India have set up a hotline between Islamabad and New Delhi, similar to the one developed by the United States and Russia. But Maleeha Lodhi, Pakistan's ambassador to the United States, said on Fox News S unday that the hotline isn't working.
Both countries have small nuclear arsenals: Pakistan has about 50 nuclear weapons, and India has about 100, Pentagon officials say. Most have the approximate destructive power of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, where 100,000 people died instantly.
But Pakistan and India, which have cities packed with tens of millions of people, would suffer far more casualties than Japan did in 1945.
The Pentagon study Rumsfeld and Armitage will be bearing predicts a range of 9 million to 12 million deaths and 2 million to 7 million injuries in the immediate aftermath of an attack.
Matthew McKinzie, a staff scientist at the Natural Resources Defense Council, has helped run two India-Pakistan nuclear war studies. In one, five major Pakistani cities and five in India were targeted. Nearly 3 million deaths and 1.5 million injuries were predicted.
A second scenario targeted 12 Indian and 12 Pakistani cities. McKinzie concluded that such an exchange would kill 30 million people.
McKinzie's studies factor in the three main ways a nuclear bomb kills: shock waves from the explosion, the resulting fireball and fallout affecting an area as far as 125 miles from the blast. McKinzie's data also track immediate deaths. Experts lack reliable models for predicting longer-term radiation-caused cancers and sickness that would plague South Asia for decades.
India and Pakistan are entering the monsoon season, which analysts say would make nuclear fallout worse because a heavy cloud cover would trap radiation and return it to earth through a process called rainout. "You're looking at a very devastating impact on both countries," McKinzie says.
Many experts say radiation fallout from any nuclear exchange probably would not pose an immediate danger beyond South Asia.
Two days after a nuclear explosion, the initial radiation from the blast would be 1% of its original strength and take weeks or months to settle elsewhere around the globe, analysts say.
Other nuclear experts are less certain about long-term international fallout effects. Scientists are still studying the impact of the nuclear accident at Chernobyl in 1986. That accident, in the former Soviet Union, spewed fallout over much of Europe. Among the lingering effects: a much higher rate of thyroid cancer in children in the affected area. Thyroid cancer throughout Ukraine, for example, increased tenfold.
Computer models have predicted that neighboring Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Nepal would see long-term agricultural and health effects from fallout, as might nearby countries China and Iran.
China's Nuclear ArsenalAn anonymous poster (123889@anon.penet.fi) sent an internal document of the Chinese Defense Ministry to the Hong Kong magazine The Trend (Dong Xiang). This document reveals that China at present has a total of 2,350 nuclear warheads. This number i s about 8 times larger than the 300 generally cited in the Western media. Among the 2,350 warheads are about 550 tactical nukes and 1,800 strategic nukes. The document also reveals that the annual production of warheads was about 110-120 i n the 1980's and about 140-150 at present. China's Nuclear Arsenal
Source: Yang Zheng
16 March, 1996
National University of Singapore
Those figures are reasonable. According to China Built The Bomb (a book published in U.S. during the late-1980's), data from various U.S. intelligence agencies show that, in the mid-1980's, China was producing at least 800 kilograms of U-235 and 4 00 kilograms of Pu-239 per year:
- Lanzhou Gaseous Diffusion Plant 400kg U-235/year
- Helanshan Centrifuge I 400kg U-235/year
- Helanshan Centrifuge II ???
- Yumen Breeder Reactor 250kg Pu-239/year
- Baotou Breeder Reactor 150kg Pu-239/year
- Guangyuan Breeder Reactor ???
A typical fission-only nuclear device (N-bomb) in U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals uses an average of 15 kilograms of U-235 or 5 kilograms of Pu-239, with a typical yield in tens of kiloton TNT. In fact, a fission nuclear device can be built with just 1 .8 kilogram of Pu-239 by using the neutron reflection/multiplying technique with U-238/Beryllium tamper in addition to the normal implosion technique, but the yield will be barely kiloton TNT or ever sub-kiloton TNT. However, this will be enough as the f ission trigger in the thermonuclear device (the so-called "Hydrogen-bomb").
Except for the fission-trigger, the thermonuclear device could be built without the additional U-235/Pu-239, just the Lithium6-Deuteride fusion core plus the U-238 pusher and U-238 jacket in the normal fission-fusion-fission H-bomb, or the fusion core wit h the Tungsten pusher and jacket in the fission-fusion Neutron-bomb. Given the amount of fissionable material (U-235/Pu-239) being produced, it is very likely that China is making 140-150 nuclear warheads a year and she has accumulated 2,350 nuclear warh eads so far.
However, this is just a tiny fraction of the 30,000+ nuclear warheads in U.S. and Russia. Even if the START-II Treaty is implemented by 2010, there will still be more than 20,000 nuclear warheads in U.S. or Russia. So China will never be able to acquire a comparable level of nuclear arsenal of US or Russia.
In discussing the U.S. military involvement in the Taiwan Strait recently, an American war hawk screamed "we should nuke the Chinamen/Chinks" and "we don't have to worry about China's nuclear weapons since they can only reach Hawaii and maybe California" . What a callous ignorant blood-thirsty racist (he's on the eastern coast)!
China does have ICBMs, SS18-class DF-5 with a range of 8000 miles, which can reach virtually every corner of every nuclear power (US, Russia, Great Britain and France). It has the same boosters (CZ-2C) as those used for Chinese spy satellites with a la unch success rate of 100% (no failure out of 18 launches). The failed satellite launch in February of 1996 used a different CZ-3B rocket with 4 strapped-on liquid boosters (the February launch was the first flight of CZ-3B).
China's DF-5 ICBM entered into the service in 1980 after extensive flight tests - at least 5 in 1979 alone. According to Jane's Strategic Weapons, its throw-weight is said to be 3200kg, which I think is much lower than its actual capacity. Jane's Strate gic Weapons Year Book had given wrong specifications of Chinese missiles until 1991, although China had published the complete specifications of CZ-2/3 rocket series in 1985, which is listed in Jane's Space-flight Directory. I think the editors of Jane's Strategic Weapons are good only at creating rumors about China's missile sales. They may have certain motives in doing so and I'll deliberate on this matter later.
According to Jane's Space-flight Directory, the 1st-generation Chinese spy satellites (FSW-1) weighed about 2,500 kg and launched by the same CZ-2C booster (as for the DF-5 ICBM) into the LEO. This information is confirmed by China's offer to launch the international satellite of 2,000 kg with the CZ-2C booster. The 500 kg difference is due to the fairing/shroud used to protect the satellite from the aerodynamic force during the launch. The FSW-1 spy satellite is recoverable and thus its body is harden ed for the atmosphere reentry, and so no extra fairing/shroud is needed during the launch. As a comparison, the French Ariane-4 has a longer and wider fairing/shroud weighing 900 kg and a 520 kg vehicle equipment bay (VEB) for the flight control and guid ance.
It is reasonable to assume that the CZ-2C's vehicle equipment bay weighs at least 500 kg. Together with the 4,000 kg dry weight of CZ-2C second stage rocket motors, at least 7,000 kg of satellite plus vehicle bay plus motor is accelerated to the 7,900 m/ sec burnout speed needed for the satellite launch into the LEO.
For an 8,000-mile-range ICBM, the burnout speed is about 7,200 m/sec. Since the specific impulse of the CZ-2C 2nd-stage rocket motor YF-22 is rated at 295 second (lower for the veneer motor YF-23), for a delta V of 700 m/sec (7900-7200), it is easy to de termine that the CZ-2C booster can accelerate at least 8,900 kg to the burnout speed of 7,200 m/sec, an 1,900 kg increase in the payload. Therefore the 8,000-mile DF-5 ICBM should have a throw-weight of at least 4,400 kg (2,500+1,900) for the warhead, in which you could put a 10-megaton thermonuclear device (such as the one on SS-19) easily (China's Lop Nor nuclear test site won't be able to handle such a monster, probably having to use just scale-up for the design purposes).
In the same Jane's Space-flight Directory, China offered to launch 4 satellites on one CZ-2C. This means that its twin DF-5 is also MIRV-capable (after all, MIRV is not hi-tech and it involves just weight-balancing and proper-timing of warhead-releasing. If Russia could develop it in 1960's, China should have no problem developing it in 1980's). In fact, the DF-5 was probably designed with the MIRV in mind since the CZ-2C's second-stage has 4 veneer motors for steering and they continue to burn for fur ther 190 seconds after the main motor shuts off - this could produce a LARGE footprint for MIRVs.
For the MIRV-version of DF-5, its throw-weight should be reduced to 3,900 kg as the fairing/shroud is needed to protect the MIRVs. So it's very likely that DF-5 is carrying six 600 kg-weight warheads as on the DF-21 IRBM (the twin of JL-1 SLBM). The war head size (about 1.9m x 0.9m) is right for fitting six nukes in the CZ-2C/DF-5 fairing/shroud.
I think Jane's Strategic Weapons is wrong again on the yield of DF-21 warhead (it says 250-kiloton). The JL-1/DF-21 entered into service in 1982 and all of China's nuclear tests before 1983 were either 10-50 kilotons (fission weapons) or 1-4 megatons (the rmonuclear devices). China conducted a nuclear test in the 200 kiloton range until 1990. It is very unlikely that China would put a 250-kiloton warhead on DF-21 without testing it back then (there was no political/technical restriction on testing a me dium-yield warhead).
I think the 600 kg warhead on DF-21 is in fact an one-megaton thermonuclear device given the shape and density of the warhead on the picture published. As a comparison, the W-47 RV on the U.S. Polaris A-1 SLBM (1961) weighs 408 kg and has a yield of 800- kilotons; the bomb itself weighs only 275 kg. So the 8,000-mile DF-5 ICBM is probably carrying six one-megaton MIRVs. Now the question is how many DF-5's does China have?
The number of DF-5's cited in various publications has been the same throughout the decade - that is only four DF-5 ICBMs in silo. Does anyone ever use the common sense that China has conducted AT LEAST seven flight tests of DF-5 in 1979-1980 alone, whi le deploying only four?
There is a photo on page 239 of the 1992 issue of Jane's Space-flight Directory, which shows the final assembly workshop for the CZ-2C/DF-5. In the photo, there are about nine CZ-2C/DF-5's in the various phases of final assembly and the text states that the production rate is about 10--12 per year. Does it really take 9 months to put ONE rocket through the final assembly line? After all, the liquid-fueled rocket is just some aluminum tanks connected with pipelines and combustion chambers!
It has been fifteen years since the DF-5 entered into services, during which China was under the threat of a Soviet invasion (other Chinese missiles could not reach Soviet Europe). During the period, there were no more than 30 satellites launched by Chin a. So there could be between 120 and 150 DF-5 ICBMs in the Chinese arsenal. With six one-megaton warheads on each of them, 700-900 out of 1,800 so-called strategic warheads are accounted for. Now the question is where are the DF-5 ICBMs?
I think the answer lies in the PLA's bible the Art of War written by the famous military strategist Sun Tzu some 2,300 years ago. One of Sun Tzu's lessons is - if you cannot win a battle, do NOT fight it.
China knows that the silos can be easily located by enemy satellites and that China's early-warning systems are inadequate; the launch-on-warning could be very dangerous (despite the popular belief in the newsgroups, all China's liquid-fueled SSMs use the same storable propellants as in SS-18). China recognizes that silo-hardening is just a losing battle and its nuclear submarine technology is generations behind that of US and Russia.
So China avoids the very vulnerable silo-based deployment of strategic ballistic missiles and instead hides her ICBMs in underground tunnels and caves dug in deep canyons and mountains. Those missiles are prepared inside the caves and moved outside to la unch. Command-and-Control will be much easier to maintain for this kind of deployment.
Early 1995, China's media reported that a Great Wall project for China's strategic missile force was completed after 10 years of construction in a "famous" mountain range in North China. Look at the topographic maps and read the news reports caref ully, it can be deduced that the underground tunnel network is in the famous Tai-Hai Mountain Range between Hebei and Shanxi provinces. According to the news reports, "tens of thousands" of Army engineers spent over 10 years there digging tunnels.
Normally, a company of soldiers (about 100 men) can dig about 100 meters of tunnel per month (based on the news reports about railroad tunnel construction) without using any advanced tunnel drilling machinery. So the "tens of thousands" of Army engineers (= hundreds of companies) over the 10-year period would have constructed an underground tunnel network of thousands of kilometers inside the Tai-Hei Mountain Range to hide some of China's strategic missiles. I guess it was called the "Great Wall" projec t not without a reason for the Great Wall is at least 5,000 kilometers long.
Like other known mountain ranges housing underground tunnel networks for China's strategic missiles, the Tai-Hei Mountain Range has many steep cliffs and canyons with large big elevation changes over a short distance between 1,000 and 2,000 meters. So yo u can easily dig tunnel networks with over one kilometer thick earth-cover in mountain ranges.
A typical 500-kiloton nuclear warhead in U.S. or Russian arsenals can `dig' a big hole 70m deep and 300m wide on the ground, and that is more than enough to destroy a missile silo or even an airport. If specially hardened for the earth-penetration purpos e, it may create a huge crater sphere 200 meters in diameter underground. Taken into account of the rupture zone around the crater and the likely penetration depth of warheads, at least three 500-kiloton warheads will have to land on the same spot sequen tially in order to penetrate the 1-kilometer thick earth cover and destroy the tunnel underneath. Even with the monster 20-megeton warhead on Russia's single-warhead SS-18, at least two warheads have to land on the same spot.
Moreover, one would destroy less than 300 meters of a tunnel using three warheads. Assuming the underground tunnel network under the Tai-Hei Mountain Range is only 1,000 kilometer long, one would need to use 10,000 (ten thousand) 500-kiloton warheads in order to make sure the tunnel network is completely destroyed. This is the VERY unlikely case in which you know the exact layout of the entire tunnel network. AND this is just one of several missile sites in China.
China has been digging underground tunnels in the mountains since the mid-1960s. There is no hi-tech needed to dig tunnels - just dynamite and concrete, plus enthusiastic young soldiers who are never in the short supply. China happens to have many huge mountain ranges everywhere. So there are other underground tunnel networks for the strategic missile force in the central and southern China's mountain ranges.
Even if you can eliminate all of them by using tens of thousand of nukes, the problem will be, with so many nuclear warheads detonated on the earth surface, so much earth will be thrown up into the upper atmosphere and spread around the globe in the str atosphere, the sun light will be blocked and we will have a real "nuclear winter", definitely not a pleasant picture even for our friends in America.
Sorry for using anon-service. But I don't want my boss to know I'm wasting his time. Thanks for your understanding.
MA Tuowen
The following information on the Chinese Military was compiled from various sources on the Internet (acknowledgment omitted). This information in no way represents the whole picture of the PLA. PLA guards its secrets quite well and it is extremely diff icult for other countries to conduct spying activities in China (because Chinese are harder to buy with money?)
Chinese ICBMs
Chinese Name West name Range Warhead Notes DongFeng-1 ? 600 km 1500Kg HE ? No longer in service DF-2 CSS-1 1250 20KtTNT No longer in service DF-3 CSS-2 2650 3Mt Nuke DF-3A CSS-2 2800 Nuke Multi heads DF-4 CSS-3 4750 2Mt Nuke DF-5 CSS-4 12000 5Mt Nuke DF-5A CSS-4 13000 5Mt uke DF-6 ? 19000 ? Multi heads DF-7 ? 15000 ? Multi heads DF-11(M11) CSS-7 300 500Kg HE DF-15(M9) CSS-6 600 500Kg HE DF-21 CSS-5 1800 500Kt Nuke M-7 ? 180 500Kg HE For export only M-18 ? 1000 ? HE for export only JuLang-1 CSS-N-3 1700 500Kt Submarine launched JL-2 CSS-NX-4 8000 ? (multi) Sub Launched The strength of Chinese strategic force is unknown; the estimated number of warheads is 2,500, with 140-150 produced each year. Most of the ICBMs are hidden in tunnels in the mountains (only 4 DF-5 are in silos - the figured cited in America as being th e total of China's ICBMs!). The estimated length of the underground tunnels about 1,000 metesr deep is 2,000 km. Chinese missile production capacity is also unknown. The Western intelligence agencies estimate that China has only a dozen of DF-3s; note t hat China sold 120 DF-3s to Saudi Arabia, delivered so quickly that U.S. did not have time to react.
The M-9 was the one tested recently. The export version M-9's precision is 300 meters.
Firing sequence is simple:
- Check things are functioning
- Zero the inertia guidance system
- Input target coordinates
- Fire (the missile will calculate how to get there)
Chinese anti-ship missiles
Chinese name West name Range(KM) Warhead ShangYou-1 CSS-N-2 85 400Kg HE HaiYing-1(land) CSSC-2 85 400Kg HE SH-1A/HY-2 CSSC-3 95 513Kg HE HY-3(C-301) CSSC-X-6 130 513Kg HE HY-4(C-201W) CSSC- 150 500Kg HE FeiLong-1 CSS-N-1 45 513Kg HE FL-2 CSS-NX-5 50 365Kg HE FL-7 ? 30 365Kg HE YingJian-1(C-801) CSS-N-4 40 165Kg HE YJ-2(C-802) CSSC-X-8 120 165Kg HE C-101 ship CSSC-X-5 45 300Kg SemiAP HE plane CSSC-X-5 45 300Kg SemiAP HE YJ-6(C-601/611) CAS-1 110/200 513Kg SemiAP HE
I was speaking more of those areas in South Asia *other* than India and Pakistan, who deserve whatever they get if they're foolish (or desperate) enough to nuke one another. Darwinian evolution in action.
OTOH, I do feel bad for the neighbors to these two nations, because it will be pretty bad for them if the nukes fly.
Finally, I should tell you that I'm ex-Navy. We Navy folks have tendency to...ah...understate things. In fact, the ability to artfully and dramatically understate something is very well respected among most Navy-types. So, yeah, having a radiation cloud descend upon you due to the nuclear exhange of neighbor nations would be pretty bad, but generally survivable (if you discount the three-eyed fish).
Tuor
Yes; and it'll likely go badly indeed for the Nepalese in particular, who have been fighting a largely unnoticed counterinsurgency war with Maoist forces with hundreds of casualties on both sides over the last six years. In the event of full-tilt India-Pakistani hostilities there's an excellent chance they'll soon be seeing a good many new faces heading their way, and the chances of something interesting happening with Taiwan are excellent as well.
Nepalese army soldiers collect bodies of Maoist rebel fighters in Khara, a village about 400 kilometers (250 miles) west of Katmandu, Nepal, Tuesday, May 28, 2002. The Maoist rebels attacked an army camp but were beaten back in a battle that killed at least 100 of them, officials said. The rebels, who draw their inspiration from the late Chinese leader Mao Zedong, launched their insurgency in 1996 in an effort to overthrow Nepal's constitutional monarchy. More than 3,500 people have died in the fighting.
(AP Photo/Sarad Chetri) - May 29 11:29 AM ET
Nepalese army soldiers recover the bodies of Maoist rebel fighters in Khara, a village about 400 kilometers (250 miles) west of Katmandu, Nepal, Tuesday, May 28, 2002. The Maoist rebels attacked an army camp but were beaten back in a battle that killed at least 100 of them, officials said.
(AP Photo/Sarad Chetri - May 29 11:28 AM ET
Oh, I never discount the three-eyed fish:
Lonnie Klumdby
Three Eyed Carp
-archy-/-
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