What We Learned From Afghanistan(Army Lessons Learned)

The decision to leave artillery at home and rely on precision air power in Afghanistan left U.S. troops vulnerable, according to the officer in charge of assessing the lessons to be learned from the war there.

From October through July, U.S. forces in Afghanistan, including the 10th Mountain Division (light Infantry) and 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) battalions who fought Operation Anaconda in March, had no artillery support. For reasons still unclear, the 3rd Brigade of the 101st was told not to deploy with the 105 mm howitzer battalion that would usually accompany it into battle.

When those troops found themselves under heavy mortar fire during Anaconda, the only fire support available other than their own mortars, was close air support from AH-64 Apache helicopters and precision-guided bombing from jets.

That approach, according to a Center for Army Lessons Learned briefing obtained by Army Times, had some significant drawbacks. Not the least of these was the difficulty coordinating suppression missions - those requiring a heavy volume of fire over an area rather than against a single target - when only precision munitions were available.

"Precision guided munitions are very accurate for specific target coordinates, but not every fire support mission lends itself to the requirement for specific coordinates," says the briefing, "Emerging Lessons, Insights and Observations - Operation Enduring Freedom." The briefing primarily was based on ghainformation gathered by teams from the center who visited Afghanistan in January, March and April. The teams gathered information from Army, special operations and Joint sources.

Col. Mike Hiemstra, the Center's director, said it would be "a legitimate conclusion" to assume that, had there been a battery of howitzers on the Anaconda battlefield, the guns could have shut down al-Qaida mortars that inflicted most of the roughly two-dozen U.S. casualties on the first day of battle.

The 82nd Airborne Division troops replacing the 101st troops in Afghanistan deployed with their 105 mm howitzers.

"You could argue that we've learned a lesson and said, 'Hey, there is room for artillery on this battlefield, and there is a reason why the artillery plays a significant role in the construct of the battlefield as we envision it.' And that's a hugely important issue," Heimstra, a field artillery officer, said.

"The maneuver commander needs to be provided with a full range of fires. And if you don't provide him with that full range of fires, then you open up a vulnerability.

"Precision fires are good, but they are a piece of the pie, not the entire pie. There are still times when you don't need precise effects, you need area effects - a lot of effect, over a wide area.

"The cannon artillery system is still the only all-weather, day/night, close support fire capability available to the ground commander. By not having it there, the ground commander then has to rely on other things."

Those "other things" included mortars and Apaches, both of which proved themselves in battle, Hiemstra said. The 60 mm mortars that each light infantry company has were "very effective," according to the briefing.

But mortars have drawbacks, he said. First, they have a limited range. They also consume ammunition at a high rate, which imposes a strain on the logistics system in an austere environment like Afghanistan, Hiemstra said.

In the case of the Apache, commanders took a weapons system designed primarily for night attacks against Soviet armor formations following behind the first echelon of an attack, and by adapting quickly to the situation on the ground, used it instead for day and night attacks against close-in guerrilla targets.

The Apache's inability to hover at high altitude meant that instead of crew members firing from a hover position, as they would under normal conditions, they attacked enemy positions during Anaconda using "running gunfire," swooping down on the enemy while firing rockets and chain-gun rounds. This tactic required a greater level of coordination with ground troops, according to the briefing.

"My understanding, from the people that we've talked to, is that it worked very well," Hiemstra said.

From the platoon up to the three-star general level, the war in Afghanistan has required units who do not have a habitual relationship to work closely together. This process has not always been smooth, the briefing suggests. "The Army needs to examine how it … develops trained staffs that trust each other," it states.

"Friction" between higher and lower headquarters is inevitable, Hiemstra said. "One of the ways that you help to work through that is to train together as much as you can, and learn to trust each other as a result of that habitual association."

The briefing also suggests that the pressure to keep the number of troops in Afghanistan to a minimum created some command and control (or C2) problems.

"Force caps and mobility constraints forced [the Army component of Central Command] to flatten the traditional C2 structures," the briefing states. "The flattened C2 structure supported deployment restrictions, but created C2 problems."

Normally when military members talk about "flattening" organizations, they mean removing layers of command and control. But in Enduring Freedom, the layers seemed to be present: the 101st's 3rd Brigade headquarters answered to the two-star 10th Mountain division commander at Bagram air base, who answered to Lt. Gen. Paul Mikolashek, the coalition forces land component commander. Mikolashek's boss was Central Command chief Gen. Tommy Franks.

While there was no corps headquarters in Afghanistan until XVIII Airborne Corps took over from 10th Mountain recently, there are only about 7,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan - about half of a normal division.

Hiemstra was reluctant to go into detail about the command and control problems, saying some of the command relationships are still classified. But he implied the term "flattened" referred not to missing layers of command, but rather to smaller-than-usual staffs at some levels.

"That required people to use a great deal of innovation, and find a number of workarounds, to make things work."

The lessons-learned briefing does not concentrate exclusively on issues related to high-level command-and-control relationships and combat tactics. It also deals with more mundane issues.

"Field sanitation is a lost art," according to the briefing. "Units need to deploy with materials to build showers and latrines."

Since the end of the Cold War, the Army has conducted large-scale deployments to southwest Asia, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Albania and Kosovo. The notion that somewhere in the middle of this high operational tempo units have forgotten how to take care of field sanitation might strike some observers as odd.

Environmental restrictions at home posts are partially to blame, according to Hiemstra. "There are limitations in most training areas today about digging a slit-trench latrine - you can't do it," he said. "Those are environmental considerations … because you're using that same terrain to train in all the time, and so there are hygiene considerations.

"If you look at our training in the United States, we rely a lot on fixed-latrine kinds of facilities, even if it's a port-a-potty," he said. "Then you go into a very austere theater like folks are in in Afghanistan, and the local port-a-potty contract isn't there anymore.

"There's a specific discipline that goes with being able to take care of yourself in the field for a long time,… [and] we don't train to that standard in normal training here in the States."

Hiemstra noted that disease had cut a swath through Soviet and Russian forces in Afghanistan and Chechnya. "Disease and non-battle injury casualties can bring you to your knees," he said.

** The "Gator" all-terrain vehicle has proven its worth in the mountains and the base camps in Afghanistan.

** Soldiers prefer the Camel-bak hydration system to the canteen, because it allows them to drink without fumbling with a canteen cap or forcing their eyes upward.

** The operational environment in Afghanistan places a high demand on human intelligence sources.

** Bottled water is not the solution to the challenge of meeting potable-water requirements in an austere theater.

** "Army engineers need to be trained and equipped to perform rapid runway repairs."

** The ground-laser designator being used by conventional forces is "too heavy and cumbersome for use in mountainous terrain."

** "Small, lightweight binoculars, laser range-finders and global positioning system [receivers] are indispensable."

Some thoughts:

The Army preaches and trains Combined Arms Team, then fails to execute properly. Why? It was beat into my head from the time I was a young infantry lieutenant and throughout my career as a combat arms officer that you always planned, coordinated and used a range of supporting fires in depth, everything from mortars to CAS to naval gunfire, if available. Don't rely soley on one single system to support your operation. What happened that would allow this scenario to take place? I suspect it was a variety of factors, including some arrogant assumptions on CENTCOM staff's part of the enemy, and our airpower capabilities. I suspect that artillery fire supporters at the staff level either didn't weigh in like they should have or were left out of the decision making process. This is unacceptable IMO. The 101st, in particular, trains extensively with their organic fire support, slinging them in via CH-47. They could have deployed, adapted and been useful in theater supporting the task force. I can't imagine MG Dick Cody, Div Cdr, 101st not raising hell over this issue. I'm sure he did, and I'm just as sure that he was shouted down by someone with more horsepower. Unfortunate.

"My understanding, from the people that we've talked to, is that it worked very well," Hiemstra said.<

OK, I'm a bit biased here, being an old, worn out Apache driver. I'm extremely proud of these guys and the airframe. They went over there with only a Company. That's eight Apaches. Usually, you can count on six being fully operational on any given day. That's best case, and assumes you have the maintenance and logistics support tail to keep it that way. So, my hat's off to the crews and maintainers for providing the level of support they did.

I'm glad the crews adapted to the tactics. Running fire with rockets and guns is a skill we need to practice more of. It's become a lost art in the Army attack helicopter world (the Marines do this better IMO), and in this scenario is essential to provide effective supporting fires and survive. Incidentally, the aircraft that got shot up during Anaconda took some incredible hits (from RPGs), stayed in the fight and recovered safely.

Translation: Too many chiefs at CENTCOM, not enough indians at the fight. Staffs are necessary to plan and coordinate, but reduced staffs as described here (He didn't say it, but it's the commander on the ground with the reduced staff)just adds to confusion and friction and resentment. There is a natural tendency for senior commanders to go this way. The urge is that more is better at their level, a fresh set of eyes, different outlooks, etc.. Field Commanders are the ones who need the staff in adequate levels to plan and coordinate for combat, and who hold a real stake in the outcome of their plan, not a bunch of Theater level guys sitting at keyboard terminals in Tampa.

"Field sanitation is a lost art,"

I'd say that environmetal restrictions are the main reason for this. You can't even go to the field to train anymore unless there's a truckload of porta-potties following you to the training area (actually, they pre-place them before you even arrive). It seems like an unimportant issue, but, for those of us who have had to make field conditions as sanitary for combat soldiers can attest, if you don't take necessary measures, you run a real risk of becoming combat inneffective. Environmentalists are putting us at risk and this needs to change. The incoming Chief of Staff is attacking this issue with Congress without much success, so far.

** Soldiers prefer the Camel-bak hydration system to the canteen, because it allows them to drink without fumbling with a canteen cap or forcing their eyes upward.

Yes these are good to have (I carried one with me in the front seat), carry more water and are more convenient, however, the bags and water line are a breeding ground for bacteria and require regular cleaning to keep from getting sick. Canteens, OTOH, are relatively easy to keep clean, are generally more durable and more easily replaced.

** The operational environment in Afghanistan places a high demand on human intelligence sources

Thanks, Frank Church. //Sarcasm off// ** Bottled water is not the solution to the challenge of meeting potable-water requirements in an austere theater

Whatever happened to iodine tablets? Sure, they make water taste like crap, but at least you won't die of thirst waiting for the next crateload of bottled Evian to reach you. We have gotten spoiled. Pure and simple.

** "Army engineers need to be trained and equipped to perform rapid runway repairs."

No s**t, Sherlock! Why send them if they can't or aren't equipped to do so. I guess they're too busy working on setting up porta-lets and shower stalls instead.

** The ground-laser designator being used by conventional forces is "too heavy and cumbersome for use in mountainous terrain."

The (lightweight) off the shelf technology is there, if only the Army will acquire it.

** "Small, lightweight binoculars, laser range-finders and global positioning system [receivers] are indispensable."

Yes, I'm sure they are, but soldiers need to learn basic field expedient ranged estimation and land navigation techniques, especially in the desert. These gadgets have a way of going tits up at the worst possible time (Murphy's Law).

Just my 2 cents...

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