Turkey Detects Nuclear Material Trafficking

Jane's Intelligence Review | August 2002 | Lale Sabrihomuglu

[Stand Watch Listen]

The fear of nuclear or radiological terrorist attacks since 11 September has focused attention on the trafficking of nuclear material in the Middle East. Lale Sabrihomuglu reports on the record seizures in Turkey and the wider problems of small arms trafficking across Turkey's borders.

Turkey is experiencing an increase in the trafficking of radiological material across its borders, adding to the already long-established trade in small arms, drugs and other illicit goods.

The country shares land borders with Syria, Iran and Iraq - all countries of proliferation concern - to the south and southeast; Georgia and Armenia - potential nuclear smuggling routes - to the northeast; and Bulgaria and Greece to the northwest. It has 73 checkpoints: 21 on its land borders, seven railway checkpoints, 11 airports and 34 sea borders - the majority lacking adequate control measures such as radiation detectors and X-ray equipment.

Turkish police identified two main routes for the trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials used between 1993 and 1999. Material originating from Kazakstan was brought to Turkey by sea from Romania and Bulgaria for shipment, and material also crossed from northern Iraq through the Habur border post, to Turkey. In many cases, the starting points for the trafficking were Russia, Georgia, Iran and Azerbaijan.

Most verified seizures of radiological material between 1993 and 4 April 2001 were in Istanbul, suggesting dealers and sellers are using the city's reputation as a cosmopolitan trading centre to seek prospective buyers, says Aysun Yüce, head of the nuclear safety division of the Turkish Atomic Energy Board (Türkiye Atom Enerjisi Kurumu - TAEK). Yüce stresses that most of the seizures have happened in Turkey's industrial regions at large seaports, rather than at land borders such as Edirne in the northwest, bordering Bulgaria.

"The concentration of incidents in these cities may also support the assertion that shipment of nuclear materials and other radioactive sources to Turkey is done mostly by sea. This raises a question mark over whether the materials seized would be forwarded to other destinations by sea. Unfortunately, the question could not have been answered with confidence," said Yüce.

A Turkish customs expert argues that if physical measures were increased at border gates more traffickers could be caught before entering the country, or reaching Istanbul. "One of the reasons for the apprehension of illicit nuclear material traffickers in Istanbul can be linked to loose security measures at border gates," says the source.

An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) illegal trafficking database report in May, revealed that the number of nuclear material and radioactive source seizures worldwide totalled 387. TAEK data suggested that more than 100 items from various provinces in Turkey were taken to its laboratories for examination between 1993 and April 2001. In the same period, 16 cases of nuclear material and radioactive source smuggling were verified, although none of the incidents involved significantly enriched uranium for weapons use.

In all verified cases, seized material was either natural uranium or low enriched, or depleted uranium. Despite several press reports, Yüce says when seized materials are examined, most cases involve tiny amounts of radioactive material with no nuclear weapons use. For example, the Turkish press reported the seizure by police of four and a half kilogrammes of uranium and six grammes of plutonium from Russia in September 1998. However, "the analysis showed in that incident the materials seized did not involve plutonium. No seizures of verified plutonium were made in Turkey during the years 1993 and 2001", says Yüce.

Most of the reported cases turned out to be frauds involving osmium - red mercury - or other substances. In almost every instance, offenders involved in the incidents were amateur criminals who had acquired the nuclear-claimed materials before identifying potential buyers and without having any accurate knowledge of the materials themselves. However, Yüce accepts that more sophisticated smuggling attempts may have escaped detection.

No nuclear crime, such as nuclear terrorism, other than trafficking has been committed by any radical or terrorist group or organisation until now, says Yüce. However, the Turkish Directorate of Smuggling and Organised Crime Department (DSOCD) does not rule out the risk of nuclear crime by terrorist groups and security measures have been increased all over the country including in the strategic Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits.

In response to the increased threat posed by trafficking of radiological and nuclear materials, the USA has increased help to Turkey by donating more radiation-detection equipment and the training of border guards. Under a memorandum of understanding signed between Turkey and the USA in January, Washington agreed to provide Turkey with radiation detectors. Turkey has already installed 14 radiation detection systems at six land border gates and one airport, while 55 hand-held radiation detectors have been distributed to various unidentified border gates.

Moreover, under an agreement signed in March this year with the China Machinery Equipment Import and Export Co-operation, Turkish customs will receive one fixed and two semi-mobile X-ray systems under a US$5m deal.

Turkey has also launched a $30m Project of Security System for Customs Checkpoints, which is to be completed in 18 months. All land, sea, airport and railway checkpoints - 73 in all - will be monitored by an Ankara-based command and control centre at the headquarters of the Customs General Directorate, for all forms of illicit trafficking.

Hakk~ Teke, a former governor and police chief, currently general director of Turkish Customs Enforcement, agrees that as more radiation detectors are installed on borders the more Turkey's deterrence against trafficking will increase. But, he says, this should be coupled with a healthy exchange of information and intelligence, as well as qualified law enforcement officials. "In these areas we have made progress while co-operation between related ministries and bodies involved in illicit trafficking has also improved. Turkey has close co-operation with countries and international organisations too... It is hard to say that our borders are fully controlled against all kinds of illicit trafficking. With the introduction of new methods our ultimate goal is to have more fish [illicit traffickers] trapped in our net at the borders," he says.

Small arms trafficking

The Turkish General Staff released a report in June concerning the origin of small arms seized from the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the extreme leftist Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP-C). "The terrorist organisations obtained the majority of the arms they used... from criminals [belonging to] organised gangs while they obtained other arms indirectly, from organisations under state control," said the report.

The report covered a total of 36,563 small arms (including hand grenades and mines) seized from guerrilla groups. The origin of 16,131 of those arms were identified, while the serial numbers of the remainder were either erased or damaged. The majority of the arms seized were manufactured in Russia and in countries of the former Soviet Union now comprising the Commonwealth of Independent States, while 60% of anti-personnel land mines came from Italy.

The trafficking of small arms constitutes a threat to Turkish national security, according to one law enforcement official, who says "the country has turned into a paradise for criminals and traffickers developing ties with state officials".

According to statistics released by the Turkish Customs Enforcement Directorate, during 2000-2001, both handmade and factory-produced small arms and ammunition have been seized, the majority of the latter cases involving weapons entering Turkey from northern Iraq through the long-neglected Habur border gate, as well as from Syria. Turkey has also seen an increase in the smuggling of weapons such as Kalashnikovs, which enter the country from Syria, as well as illicitly trafficked handmade arms manufactured in Turkey's Black Sea region in makeshift plants.

The insufficient physical measures on the Iraqi and Syrian borders make it difficult to prevent smuggling cases, says a DSOCD report. The smuggled arms are mainly of Belgian, Spanish, Czech Republic, Italian, German and Iraqi origin.

There have also been increased seizures of weapons that are easy to operate and conceal, with a probable market being members of organised crime groups. On 3 June 2001, Turkish customs officials made a seizure of 18 handmade Pen-Shaped pistols at Habur gate, bringing the total number of such pistols seized to 28.

The pistols were found in a lorry coming from northern Iraq, with a legal load of crude oil. The pistols, wrapped in plastic bags, were found in the fuel tank of the lorry with the use of a fibrescope. Six of the guns were 14cm long, eight were 14.5cm, three 14.8cm and one 15cm long. All were 6.35mm (.25 calibre), said a customs official. Only four of the pistols had some markings on them. During seizures at different checkpoints, lightweight pistols concealed in mobile phones and key holders were also seized.

Despite the continued problem of small arms trafficking, the 1990s saw a decline in the amount of arms and ammunition being smuggled into Turkey, says Ismail Caliskan, director of the DSOCD.

According to Caliskan the decline derives in part from criminals shifting their focus onto other areas of trafficking activities, such as drug smuggling, that have become more attractive economically. The effective use of technology by law enforcement agencies and the introduction of the licenced purchasing of small arms are also cited as contributing to the decline in illicit arms trafficking.

However, the 2001 DSOCD report says that due to the existing concern of people in the southeast over terror, they continue to obtain small arms for self defence, while the northern Iraqi route still continues to be the main gateway for illicit arms trafficking, in addition to the Black Sea region. Demand for small arms by Turkey's growing organised crime groups is also expected to continue.

Legal countermeasures

Turkey's efforts to counter trafficking and organised crime in general were stepped up in 1998 when new anti-crime laws began to be introduced. In 1999, Law 4422 was enacted to fight smuggling and organised crime, and the DSOCD was set up. A new draft law for increased penalties against the trafficking of radiological materials also awaits parliament's approval.

These national efforts are coupled with increased participation in international treaties and bilateral agreements. Turkey is a party to various treaties including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ratified on 29 March, 1979, and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials ratified in 1984. Turkey has endorsed efforts to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the verification mechanisms of the IAEA and signed the additional protocol on 6 July, 2000.

There are no nuclear power plants in Turkey, but there are two nuclear research reactors and a fuel pilot plant.

Lale Sabrihomuglu is a freelance journalist based in Turkey.