What really happened to TWA Flight 800?

In this exclusive interview, author Jack Cashill explains why he doesn't buy the government's explanation of the tragedy and presents some of the compelling evidence detailed in "First Stike."

Question: From the title of your book, can we assume that terrorists destroyed TWA 800?

Answer: Ultimately, yes. On the night of July 17, the military was on the highest state of alert since the Cuban missile crisis. They were looking for something.

A: No, although terrorist missiles were capable of hitting the plane, they were not capable of creating so massive an explosion.

A: A terrorist plane filled with high-energy explosives. This is a complex story, one that would have been difficult to explain to the American people in 1996 – or now.

A: According to the FBI, 270 people – several of them in the military – saw flare-like objects with smoke trails converging on TWA 800 in the seconds before it exploded. FAA radar technicians saw an object merging with TWA 800 at the moment of the first explosion. These facts are indisputable.

A: The NTSB tells us that these were all optical illusions or computer glitches and that at that very second, for the first time in the 75-year history of commercial aviation, without a word from the cockpit, an airplane spontaneously self-destructed in mid-air because of a fuel tank explosion.

A: No. This was a genuine issue of national security. The few military who really knew what happened followed legitimate orders not to disclose any information, even to the FBI. The eyewitnesses have been eager and willing to talk from day one, but no one would listen, even the media, and that in itself is scandalous. Actual "conspirators" could be counted on one hand.

A: After two desperate years of raising money to keep the presidency, Clinton knew that telling the truth would have meant the end of peace and the end of prosperity. We would have had to impose the kind of air restrictions we did after Sept. 11. Clinton was also famous for his indecision, and once he hesitated, it would have been highly problematic to explain the delay.

A: No. The authorities would have been alert to other air-terror schemes, and the American people would have been motivated and prepared.

Q: How sure are you that a spontaneous fuel tank explosion did not destroy the plane?

A: One hundred percent. We disprove this theory 20 times over. A month after the crash, investigators were telling the New York Times that chances of mechanical failure were "remote" and getting "more remote" with every passing day.

A: It certainly wasn't the evidence. There was none. It was largely the need to find some explanation that would not suppress air travel – all the better to raise campaign cash from the airline industry.

A: Just the opposite. After four years and $40 million, the NTSB could not even find a credible theoretical scenario. In the final report, moreover, the aerospace mechanics union (IAMAW) forcefully rejected the NTSB's position and argued instead for a massive explosion outside the airplane.

A: U.S. Navy missiles destroying a terrorist airplane. To learn the details, please read the book.

A: Ninety percent. All available evidence leads to this conclusion, but we have not identified the servicemen that pulled the trigger or spoken to them. We would, however, be willing to share all of our evidence with any interested parties and challenge the authorities to do the same.

*Real* research from: http://www.le.ac.uk/scarman/research/TWA.pdf

3.2 The Aircraft The 747 passenger jet is made by one of the world’s oldest and largest aeronautics companies, Boeing Commercial Airplane Group (USA). In 1966, the company risked $1 billion on the 747 project (Gunston, 1993: 51-53). At the time of its first flight in 1969, the 747 represented a significant improvement in aircraft performance: ‘[The 747] more than doubled passenger and cargo payload capabilities by comparison with any previous commer-cial air transport’ (Jane’s, 1985: 339). The first Boeing 747 commercial service was operated by Pan American on January 22, 1970 (Green, 1975: 34). Today, the Boeing 747 is one of the safest aircraft flying: ‘Almost 1,100 747s have been delivered ... and nine aircraft have been involved in fatal accidents, excluding terrorist actions’ (Flight International, 1996: 4). Put another way, the entire fleet of 1,100 aircraft has suffered an attrition rate of less than 1% through mechanical failure. In one post-disaster report on Flight 800, the 747 was described as ‘... a famously safe plane’ (Freedland, 1996b). The figures confirm this. The fatal accident rate (FAR) for all commercial jetliners is 1.83 per million departures. The FAR for the Boeing 747 is 1.6 per million departures (Maraniss, 1996: 1). The aircraft involved in the crash was an early model — a Series 100. The TWA aircraft, registration number N93119 (Boeing line number 153), was rolled out on July 15, 1971 (Lucas, 1981: 154). It was delivered to TWA on October 27, 1971. Sold by TWA to the Imperial Iranian Air Force (IIAF) in December 1975, it was bought back in December 1976 (Lucas, 1981: 81). Between the time of its roll-out in 1971 and its loss in 1996 (a period of 25 years), N93119 had completed in excess of 92,000 flight hours (Flight International, 1996: 4); i.e. it had spent over ten years in the air. Although this was 32,000 hours over its designed air-lifetime (Newsnight, 1997; Hewson, 1994), it should be noted that some 747s have completed 100,000 flight hours without difficulty (Kingsley-Jones, 1996: 36). As Ramsden (1975: 283) has pointed out, a well-designed and maintained aircraft should give long and reliable service: There are hundreds of DC-3s [a piston-engined passenger aircraft] still giving safe and sound public service 30 or 40 years after they were built ... the economic life of well-maintained airliners is often longer than originally expected. The Boeing 747 N93119 had proven reliable: ‘[There were] only minor infractions on its FAA record: a blown tyre on take off in 1987, and a leaky oil line that resulted in an engine shut down in 1988’ (Chua-Eoan, 1996: 22). Despite its popular reputation as ‘a famously safe plane’, how-ever, the Jumbo Jet design does have its flaws. Three 747 crashes (all involving cargo-carrying versions of the aircraft), have been attributed to engine-mounting failure. In 1992, for example, an El-Al 747 cargo-carrier crashed into two blocks of flats while trying to make an emergency landing at Schiphol airport near Amsterdam, Holland. Two of the 747’s engines were found in a lake near the crash site. At the time, there was some debate over the degree of structural failure: ‘[It is not known whether] a single engine or both engines broke from the wing and set up a chain of events that led to the disaster’ (Civil Protection, 1992). A cargo-carrying 747-100 exploded in mid-air in 1976, while approaching Madrid airport. At the time, there were reports that ‘... it caught fire and exploded, losing its left wing as it fell’ (USA Today/Associated Press Internet Site, 1996a). Four theories were offered; that the wing had been overloaded by strong winds; that it had been hit by lightning; that leaking fuel had been ignited; or that ‘... vapour from the fuel may have been ignited by a spark from equipment’ (USA Today/Associated Press Internet Site, 1996a). Shortly afterwards, the FAA ordered all 747 operators to inspect for fuel leaks. Most airlines found leaks (USA Today, 1996a; Learmount, 1997). Jumbo jets have displayed other faults, too. In 1977, a decompression caused the death of a passenger on an El-Al 747. In 1985, a decompression caused a Japanese-registered 747 to crash. 520 people died. In 1989, a cargo door blew out on a 747 Series 100 belonging to United Air Lines (UAL811). The aircraft was climbing at the time (Curtis, 1997).
Boeing 747s that exceed their designed air-lifetime of 60,000 hours undergo what is known as a ‘Section 41’ inspection and rectifi-cation programme that ‘... repairs potential cracks in the nose-frames around section 41 [of the airframe]’ (Hewson, 1994: 26).

That having been said, the fuel tank explosion theory is a virtual impossibility

That ranks up there with "Man will never fly - for he has no wings."

From the NTSB's report:

1.18.1 Accident Record and History of Fuel Tank Fires/Explosions on Airplanes
The Safety Board has participated in the investigation of several aviation accidents/incidents involving fuel tank explosions. According to a list prepared by the FAA, since 1959 there have been at least 26 documented fuel tank explosions/fires in military and civilian transport-category airplanes ...
The Safety Board conducted a special investigation of the May 9, 1976, accident involving an Iranian Air Force 747-131, as it approached Madrid, Spain, following a flight from Iran. All 17 people on board the airplane were killed, and the airplane was destroyed. Witnesses reported seeing lightning strike the left wing, followed by fire, explosion, and separation of the outboard wing before the airplane crashed. Examination of the wreckage revealed evidence of an explosion that originated in at least one of the left wing fuel tanks near a fuel valve installation. The airplane.s fuel tanks contained a mixture of JP-4 and Jet A fuel. The Board's report noted that almost all of the electrical current of a lightning strike would have been conducted through the aluminum structure around the ullage but discussed how some energy might have entered the fuel tanks. Although the Board's report did not identify a specific point of ignition within the tank, it noted that discharges could produce sufficient electrical energy to ignite the fuel/air mixture and that energy levels required to produce a spark will not necessarily damage metal or leave marks at the point of ignition. Upward flowing burn patterns were observed on the compensator that the FAA considered a potential ignition source for the surge tank fire.
The Safety Board also participated in the investigation of a May 11, 1990, accident, involving a Philippine Airlines 737-300 at Ninoy Aquino International Airport, Manila, Philippines, in which the Jet A fuel/air mixture in the CWT exploded as the airplane was being pushed back from the gate. Of the 120 people on board the airplane, 8 were killed, and 30 were seriously injured. As a result of this accident, the Safety Board issued Safety Recommendations A-90-100 through -103 to the FAA. In its safety recommendation letter, the Board noted that the exact source of ignition had not been established. However, lightning damage and damaged FQIS wires were found. The Board stated that "it is possible that the combination of a faulty float switch and damaged wires providing a continuous power supply to the float switch may have caused an electrical arc or overheating of the switch leading to the ignition of the center fuel tank vapor".

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