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STS-107 "Columbia" Loss FAQ Version 1.5
OMWorld ^ | Feb 5, 2003

Posted on 02/06/2003 12:55:14 PM PST by Mr170IQ

 

STS-107 "Columbia" Loss FAQ Version 1.5 Updated 11:00pm 2/5/03

  

 

  Table of Contents  

  I: Introduction & Copyrights  


Introduction

The STS-107 "Columbia" Loss FAQ is Compiled & Maintained by B0b Mosley

This FAQ copyrighted February 1, 2003, Permission to copy, store, and repost elsewhere is granted as long as the original document is unaltered and attribution is given to the author(s) listed below.

Any and all corrections and/or additions should be posted to either the Usenet newsgroups sci.space.shuttle or sci.space.history, as well as e-mailed to the compiler listed above. As this FAQ will be evolving as the situation unfolds, having all the data made public for discussion will help weed out any inaccuracies that this document hopes to circumvent.

If links to this document are provided by commercial news services from their respective websites, permission is granted automatically provided all above restrictions are complied with, and an e-mail notification is sent to the FAQ Compiler listed above.

Contributors to the FAQ

Special thanks go to the following individuals for their contributions to this FAQ:

 
Glossary & Acronyms used in this FAQ

Angle of Attack The Pitch angle of the shuttle in relation to its flight path.
AOA  Abort Once Around. A Shuttle launch abort mode is used in cases in which a sustainable orbit is not possible, and results in the orbiter circling the Earth once and landing approximately 90 minutes after liftoff.
ATO  Abort To Orbit. A Shuttle launch abort mode used to boost the orbiter to a safe orbital altitude when performance has been lost and it is impossible to reach the planned orbital altitude upon initial orbital insertion.
CANADARM  The Remote Manipulator Arm carried onboard most Shuttle missions. It's Canada's major contribution to NASA, and a larger, more advanced version is currently in use on ISS
CDR  Commander
Contingency Abort  A Shuttle launch and/or reentry abort mode caused by loss of more than one main engine during launch, or by failures in other systems during reentry.
Dynamic Pressure  The pressure of the air cased by an aircraft's motion. What you feel when you stick your hand out of the window of a moving car. Abbreviated as "Q".
EAS  Equivalent Air Speed. The air speed at Sea Level that would produce the same dynamic pressure observed in flight.
EVA  Extra Vehicular Activity
 
FCS  Flight Control System. The computer system on the spacecraft that determines the control movements needed to make the ship fly the desired maneuvers. The maneuvers can be ordered by a computer (Autopilot) or human (Manual Control)
ISS  International Space Station
LOS  Loss Of Signal
Mach Number  The ratio of a vehicle's speed to the speed of sound at it's altitude. The Speed of Sound varies with temperature, and is different at different heights.
MECO  Main Engine Cut Off
NEXRAD  NEXt Generation Weather RADar. Uses doppler measurements to show where current precipitation is occurring, where it's going and how fast it's going there.
NASA  National Aeronautics and Space Administration
PAO  Public Affair Office
Pitch  Angle of the nose up or down.
PLT  Pilot
Q  See Dynamic Pressure.
RCS  Reaction Control System. Small rockets used to point the shuttle when there is not enough Equivalent Air Speed for the aerodynamic control surfaces to be effective.
Roll  angle from the vertical along the long axis of the shuttle. (Tilting left or right).
RTLS  Return To Launch Site. A Shuttle launch abort mode designed to allow the return of the orbiter, crew, and payload to the launch site, Kennedy Space Center. approximately 25 minutes after liftoff.
TAL  Trans

Atlantic Abort. A Shuttle launch abort mode where the vehicle would continue on a ballistic trajectory across the Atlantic Ocean, landing on a predetermined runway approximately 45 minutes after launch.
TDRS  Tracking & Data Relay Satellite
Yaw  Angle of the nose away from the flight path of the shuttle. (Slewing left or right)
What is the purpose of this FAQ?

This FAQ is designed to hopefully provide a basic information source for those seeking news on the loss of the Space Shuttle "Columbia" and its crew on 2/1/03. By providing a basic FAQ addressing what are expected to be the most common questions asked by persons new to the sci.space.* hierarchy and/or those regulars who are only now finding out about the tragedy, it is hoped that the degradation of the groups' signal-to-noise ratio that usually follows events of this nature will be curtailed to a tolerable level, as well as hopefully reduce the  level of baseless and unfounded speculation that tragic events such as the loss of Columbia tend to foster.

  II: STS-107 Mission Profile  


What exactly happened to Columbia?

Based on the official NASA statement on the Declaration of the Space Shuttle Contingency being placed in effect, the following mishap occurred:

Following a scheduled braking manouver during reentry after a 16-day scientific mission, loss of communication was experienced with the Space Shuttle Columbia at approximately 8:00am CST on Saturday, February 1st, 2003. Signal loss occurred as Columbia descended toward a landing at the Kennedy Space Center, FL. With touchdown scheduled for 8:16am CST.

Communication and tracking of the shuttle was lost at an altitude of about 203,000 feet (61,900 m) in the area above North Central Texas, approximately above the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex region of Texas. At the time communications were lost. The shuttle was traveling approximately 12,500 miles per hour (20,100 kph or Mach 18). No communication and tracking information were received in Mission Control after that time.

A Space Shuttle contingency was declared in Mission Control, Houston, and search & rescue teams in the Dallas-Fort Worth and in portions of East Texas were alerted. At the same time, a public safety alert was also issued regarding how the public should regard Any debris that is located in the area that may have originated from Columbia. Per NASA, such debris should be avoided as it may be hazardous as a result of toxic propellants used aboard the shuttle. The location of any possible debris should immediately be reported to local authorities.

Flight controllers in Mission Control then secured all information, notes and data pertinent to today's entry and landing by Columbia and continued to methodically proceed through contingency plans.

Who were the crew?

The crew consisted of the following Astronauts:

What sort of mission was Columbia on?

STS 107 was the 113th mission in the Shuttle program. It was primarily a science-dedicated mission, with no docking to the International Space Station (ISS). STS-107 originally had two basic major goals:

  1. It was originally scheduled to have been Columbia's first flight after an 18-month overhaul to install over 100 modifications and improvements, including a “glass cockpit” with nine full-color, flat-panel displays, reduced power needs, old wire removal, and a user-friendly interface. However, due to the fuel liner cracks that caused a temporary grounding of the Shuttle fleet last year, STS-107 was postponed and Columbia flew STS-109 - Hubble Service Mission 3B - instead.
     
  2. The first flight of SPACEHAB’s Research Double Module to conduct over 100 experiments ranging from biomedical research to Earth observation. The experiment manifest for the mission included the following:

Most of the experiments were part of the STARS program, STARS is an educational initiative that challenges students to assume the role of a Shuttle Payload Specialist and promotes interest in engineering, mathematical and scientific careers.

  III: The Breakup of STS-107  


Where and when did Columbia break up?  (Altitude, speed, time, etc.)

Ground controllers lost communications with Columbia at 7:59:22am CST, at a mission elapsed time of 15 days, 22:20:22. At the time, the shuttle was at an altitude of 207,000 feet (63,000 m), traveling at Mach 18.3, approximately 37 miles (60 km) above the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex region of Texas.

What was Columbia's status prior to breakup?

First, let's look at Columbia's re-entry profile. The Shuttle has 3 distinct phases to the standard re-entry profile:

  1. Thermal Control Phase. This lasts from Entry Interface, when the first aerodynamic effects occur, until a speed of approximately 19,000 ft/sec (12,900 MPH, 11,200 kts, 20,900 km/hr) has been reached.
     
  2. Equilibrium Glide Phase. This is flight at a constant attitude as the deceleration due to drag builds up to approximately 1G.
     
  3. Constant Drag Phase. The 1G deceleration is held until the orbiter enters the Terminal Area Energy Management interface, after which it is flying as a conventional, but very heavy and fast, glider. This is usually 52 NM (59 SM, 94 km) from the landing site, at an altitude of 83,000', and a speed of Mach 2.5 (2500 ft/sec, 760 m/sec) The orbiter slows to below Mach 1 at about 49,000', 22 NM (25 SM, 40 km) from the runway.

Columbia was either at the end of the first phase, or the beginning of the second phase when she broke up.

The first phase begins when the orbiter is oriented tail-first, and the OMS engines fire to reduce its speed by about 300 ft/second (90 m/sec). The reaction control system then orients the orbiter nose first to prepare for reentry. At roughly 400,000 ft altitude (122 km), Entry Interface is considered to occur. This normally takes place 4,400 NM (5063 statute miles/3160 km) from the landing site. The speed at this point is about 25,000 ft/second (7600 m/sec). At this point the orbiter is maneuvered to 0 degrees roll and yaw, and a 40 degree angle of attack. The flight control system at this point uses the Reaction Control System to keep things aligned. The forward RCS engines are turned off at the entry interface, and the aft RCS system is used to maneuver the spacecraft.

The spacecraft must dissipate the tremendous amount of kinetic energy it has. It does this by varying the amount of aerodynamic drag that it presents on the way down. This generates a lot of heat because of the speed of the shuttle. This heating is controlled by changing the speed of the shuttle in small amounts. This is done by varying the aerodynamic drag of the shuttle. Most aircraft do this by changing the Angle of Attack. When you pull up the nose, an airplane tends to slow down, unless an engine is used to counteract the drag. For a re-entering shuttle, the angle of attack must be held constant to prevent the structure from overheating.

The shuttle controls drag by rolling into a series of 'S' turns along the flight path. Increasing the roll angle of the orbiter moves the direction of its lift (perpendicular to its wings) away from the vertical, causing it to descend faster. These S-turns are used to fine tune the energy level (A fancy way of saying altitude and airspeed) of the orbiter, something like skiers turning while going downhill to control their speed. When a dynamic pressure of 10 psf is reached (EAS of 62 MPH (100 km/hr)), when the orbiter's ailerons become effective for roll control. At that point, the roll RCS engines are deactivated. At a dynamic pressure of 20 psf (EAS of 85 MPH(138 km/hr), roughly), the elevators on the orbiter become active, and the RCS pitch engines are deactivated.

In the Equilibrium Glide Phase of the reentry, the spacecraft is flown to maintain a constant drag level, where the flight path angle remains constant. This is maintained until the deceleration of the orbiter due to drag is about 1G.

In the last phase of the reentry, the 1G deceleration level is held, reducing the angle of attack as necessary, until the Terminal Area Energy Management interface. The RCS system continues to control Yaw until the rudder become effective at around Mach 3.5.

Columbia was lost either at the tail end of the Thermal Control Phase, or the early stages of the Equilibrium Glide Phase. The ailerons and elevators were providing control, (the Q at that point was around 75-80 psf, or an EAS of about 170 mph (275 km/hr)), and yaw was being controlled by the RCS thrusters in the tail.

Late reports before this writing this indicate that the Flight Control System reported that it was correcting a left yaw/roll just before breakup.

 Is there a timeline of events?

The following is a timeline of events based on reports by news services as well as from NASA press conferences since the loss of Columbia. Be advised that this is not official from NASA, but is close enough for the purposes of this FAQ the rough times have been confirmed by NASA officials during the press briefings:

Was Columbia in reentry LOS at the time of breakup?

No. Both voice communication and data telemetry were still being received right up to the breakup of Columbia. Unlike previous manned programs - Mercury, Gemini and Apollo, as well as the Russian Soyuz vehicles - the Shuttle does not have a loss-of-signal phase during reentry. The reason is actually pretty simple.

First off, understand that the blackout period is caused by a sheath of ionized air, formed during the high-heating, high-deceleration phase of re-entry, through which radio waves cannot penetrate. This is what every manned flight from Mercury thru Apollo experienced, and provided much of the suspense and drama during the reentry phase of John Glenn's Friendship 7 Mercury flight. Even the Shuttle experienced the same effect during its early flights.

The communications loss due to the blackout period was resolved after the second Tracking Data and Relay Satellite (TDRS) was placed in orbit. The reason is that the ionization sheath is open at the trailing end behind the Shuttle, providing a hole through which communication with the shuttle can be maintained with the favorably positioned TDRS. This second TDRS also allows communication during the other portions of entry that did not exist prior to its placement in 1988 - a period roughly from the time of the de-orbit OMS burn to an altitude of 200,000 feet for a landing at Edwards Air Force Base, barring passes over ground sites.

So, with two functioning TDRS satellites in operation, communications with the Shuttle can be maintained throughout the entire reentry phase of the mission.

Were there any anomalies in telemetry prior to the breakup?

Actually, yes. Telemetry just before breakup indicated loss of data about tire pressures and temperatures and then hydraulic pressures on the left side of the vehicle. Note that loss of a few sensors is not uncommon, which may explain why it took a while before a trend was noticed.

The Timeline of Events listed above contains a listing of confirmed anomalies in telemetry.

What was that query about "Tire Pressure" prior to the breakup?

See the Timeline above at 7:59am CST.

What was the last voice communication received from Columbia?

Again, based on what's been replayed over the news services since the loss of Columbia, the last intelligible verbal response believed to be "Roger, uh..." Note that some reports have transcribed this as "Roger, buh..." or "Roger, uh, buh.."

Was it an explosion, or just disintegration due to aerodynamic stress?

At this early date, this is still undetermined. Be advised, however, that although the previous Shuttle loss, Challenger, broke up due to aerodynamic stresses.16 years later it is still often described as having exploded. No doubt the press will fail to make the distinction during their reporting of this tragedy. Also, be advised that the "explosions" that those witnessing the breakup have reported were probably in fact sonic booms, and that during a "normal" reentry, the booms can occur in rapid fashion to one another - the famous, teeth-rattling "double boom".

Keep in mind that Columbia was going ~Mach 18 or so, so the debris would still be supersonic over East Texas and Louisiana. Each piece would have a boom or two associated with it, and, if some pieces were close enough, the boom - coalescing from the individual booms - that reached the ground could be pretty loud. If the pieces were somewhat further apart, the ground boom would be longer and more "rumbley".  

Where did the debris wind up?

As of this version of the FAQ, debris has been reported as being spread out over a region spreading from the Dallas-Fort Worth region to as far east as Fort Polk, LA. The recovery effort as of 02/04/03 now encompasses an area stretched west to east 380 miles from Eastland, TX to Alexandria, LA., and north-south 230 miles from Sulphur Springs, TX, to metropolitan Houston. Some 12,000 pieces of debris have been collected in the region by late Monday afternoon. Although the search was grisly at times, with human remains reportedly found at 15 locations in Nacogdoches County alone.

As of 2/4/03, the following is a list of major debris reports, compiled from the major news services:

Please keep in mind that *only* certain debris reports from Hemphill and Nacogdoches have been 100% confirmed at this time as being from Columbia. All other reports are unconfirmed and should be treated as such until officially verified.

  IV: Recovery, Retrieval and Video Footage  

Have the Astronauts' remains been located?

Not officially as of yet. However, as stated above, authorities in Hemphill, TX have been quoted as saying some remains had been found in an area between Hemphill and Jasper, as well as near Chinquapin TX as well. These remains have reportedly been taken to Hemphill High School, where a local funeral home was assisting officials from the FBI and Defense Department in the post-mortem. However, this has since been partially denied by the Sabine County Sheriff and Emergency Management Office. A representative has officially denied that Hemphill High School had been used as a morgue, and that the remains were moved to an undisclosed location.

That "undisclosed location" is most likely Dover Air Force Base, the same place the bodies of the Challenger astronauts were taken 17 years ago. The base's Charles C. Carson Center for Mortuary Affairs is the only such military facility in the continental United States that has the capabilities of identifying remains and examining them for potentially harmful objects such as sharp pieces of metal that could harm medical workers. The Dover Base Commander's Office has stated to the press that the remains would in fact be brought there, but at the time of this writing no confirmation had been given that any remains had in fact arrived.

Again, as with the debris reports, please keep in mind only a few Hemphill and Nacogdoches debris finds have been confirmed as being from Columbia at this time. At the same time, an additional caveat needs to be stressed at this time: the vast majority of Americans living in the region are not forensic experts, and it should not come as a surprise if the majority of the reports of remains being found turn out to be desiccated dead animals, AKA "roadkill". Until NASA verifies that a particular debris or remains find is in fact from Columbia, all reports should be considered as unconfirmed.

What if I find debris? What should I do?

NASA has established a telephone hotline and electronic mail address for the public to use for reporting information that may help investigators studying today's Space Shuttle mishap.

Anyone who discovers debris from the accident or who has film or video evidence that may be of value to the investigation team is urged to use
these contacts. Please avoid contact with any debris, because it may be hazardous as a result of toxic propellants aboard the Shuttle.

Telephone reports should be directed to the following number:

281/483-3388

Text reports and images should be e-mailed to:

nasamitimages@jsc.nasa.gov

The e-mail address is:

columbiaimages@nasa.gov

In addition, those who think they've suddenly got a new house coming following a sale of debris on eBay should be aware of the following: All debris is United States Government property and is critical to the investigation of the shuttle accident. Any and all debris from the accident is to be left alone and reported to government authorities. Unauthorized persons found in possession of accident debris will be prosecuted to the full extent of the law.

As of this writing, outside of a few tasteless lots on Columbia memorabilia and a few bad joke auctions, nobody's come forth with Columbia debris for sale. To its credit, eBay has been very vigilant in policing its auctions for any scams or actual attempts to sell Columbia debris.

Just how toxic is the debris?

Contrary to some crackpots, trolls and wannabee eBay scammers, handling the Columbia debris could very well be as suicidal as bailing out at ~200,000ft (~60,000 m) in the middle of a 3000° F (1650° C) plasma stream.

There are four hazardous compounds that are in standard use onboard the Shuttles: raw hydrazine, monomethyl hydrazine, nitrogen tetroxide and pure ammonia.

Each of these chemicals have their own reactive and hazard characteristics:

Due to the hazardous nature of these chemicals, people who suspect contact with any of these chemicals are urged to seek immediate medical treatment from a hospital or doctor. Those especially suspecting contact with nitrogen tetroxide should flush their body and clothes with large amounts of water immediately, and, if possible, remove their clothing and bathe with soap and water at least 15 minutes. Eyes should be held open and flushed with water for at least as long, and immediate medical treatment should be sought.

Finally, one additional hazard to the debris should not be overlooked: In many areas of the Shuttle, explosive bolts and other pyrotechnical devices were installed that may have survived reentry and could still be active. Most of these were installed around the port side airlock, and were used to blow the hatch open and away in the event of an emergency. These pyro devices can cause severe injury if they detonate while being physically handled, and are yet another reason any suspected debris from Columbia should be granted a safe distance and allowed to be examined and collected only by trained hazmat personnel.

Bottom line: NASA isn't joking about how hazardous this stuff is. If you really do come across debris from Columbia, keep your distance, immediately contact your local authorities to come rope the area off, and contact NASA at the number listed in the previous section.

I've got video footage of the breakup. Does NASA want it?

Actually, they do. That phase of reentry isn't normally tracked visually, and so far only amateur photography and videotape, and a couple of professional news shots, provide any visual record of the breakup. NASA has put out an official request for anyone having any digital imagery of the mishap to relay it to them ASAP. The actual instructions for doing so are reposted here to assist the efforts.

From http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/COL_upload.html:

Instructions for Uploading Digital Evidence to NASA

For anyone who has recorded video or taken photos that they believe may be of aid in the investigation of the Space Shuttle Columbia accident, NASA has established a special location on the Web where Internet users may upload their media files to be reviewed by NASA.

Using the FTP method of your choice, log on to the server 38.201.67.72 as "anonymous," using your e-mail address as your password.

Example:

User ID: anonymous
Password: john_doe@hotmail.com

Along with any image or video file that you wish to upload, please include a text file containing your name and a detailed description of the time and location at which the image or video was taken.

Example: I, John Doe, recorded this video in my front yard at 1111 My Street in Nacogdoches, Texas, at 7:55 a.m. on the morning of Saturday, Feb. 1, 2003.

Please be sure that your media file and your text file conform to the following naming convention: your first and last name, an underscore, the date the files are being uploaded, another underscore and the time the files are being uploaded. Other than the file extension (.jpg, .txt, .rm), the names of the two files you upload should be the same.

Examples:

Image file:     johndoe_020203_0415pm.jpg
Video file:     johndoe_020203_0415pm.rm
Text file:       johndoe_020203_0415pm.txt

Then, upload your media and text files.

Please note that files contained on this site are not listable. Therefore, users will not be able to view any files uploaded to the server, including their own.

If you have any problems uploading your files, please e-mail Mike Koester of the Johnson Space Center.

What is Israel's big concern over Ramon's remains?

According to Orthodox Jewish burial customs, the mourning period begins with the funeral. It is tradition for the burial to take place as soon as possible, even on the same day of the death, but no more than two nights after the death. Only under certain circumstances, the burial can be delayed. It is considered disrespectful to keep the body from being buried as soon as possible. Otherwise, the deceased's soul may have returned to God, but his body is left to linger in the land of the living. This is considered a matter of great shame.

How much scientific data was lost?

All payloads performed well during the 16-day mission. However, for the following group of four biology and protein crystallisation research instruments, no scientific results will be available as no samples or electronic data can be provided to the Investigators for analysis:

For the following group of three research instruments all data are available for further scientific analysis:

  V: Smoking Guns, Theories, Guesses and Facts:  

What's the best guess as to what caused the breakup?

While it's still too early to tell, NASA officials during the press conferences have given enough information that the following "best guess" can be made as to the chain of events leading to the breakup:

  1.  During ascent, a sizeable fragment of material believed to be 20 inches and 2 1/2 pounds in size - either External Tank insulation or condensational ice - broke loose from the Shuttle's external fuel tank and impacted the underside of the Shuttle. The point of impact appears to be the left wing, based on ground camera observations taken during ascent. This impact may have loosened or even knocked loose one or more of the protective tiles that protect the Shuttle during reentry.

    It should be noted that as of the 2/5/03 press conference, NASA officials are downplaying the possibility that the debris that impacted the underside of Columbia was ice, but was more than likely a chunk of foam insulation. The determining factor at this time appears to be the nature of the way the debris disintegrated after impact as shown on the footage taken by the ground cameras during ascent. At the same time, Shuttle program manager Ron Dittemore was backing off somewhat on the possibility that any sort of impact damage from either ice or foam insulation striking the underside of Columbia was responsible for the mishap. Dittemore also stated that investigators are now asking if there was "another event that escaped our attention'' that might have caused Columbia to break up just minutes before the end of its 16-day mission, killing all seven astronauts.
     

  2. During reentry, reentry heat caused damage to the left wing of the Shuttle, most likely near the landing gear bay based on the telemetry received showing failures in sensors and tire pressure readings located in that area. By this time, temperatures on the leading edges of the wings were in excess of 3000° F.
     

  3. Excessive heating combined with atmospheric stress then appears to have caused structural failure to the left wing, which based on the footage taken by amateur photographers and the news photographers of ABC affiliate WFAA appears to have then sheared off. Shortly after, what appears to be RCS thruster firings are visible, followed almost immediately thereafter by a brief brightening of the main body of the Shuttle, followed by the apparent breakup of the Shuttle into multiple fragments.

Once again, this is speculation based on the meager available data available, and should *NOT • be assumed to be an official scientific analysis in any way, shape or form. It is merely an attempt to speculate what might have happened based on what data is available.

What about "Black Box" data?

While there is a flight recorder on board the Shuttles, it's not exactly a "Black Box" as you'd find on a commercial aircraft. Once the power is pulled, all data collection stops. This is not considered a problem as almost all of the valuable data is downlinked anyway. What little the onboard flight recorders may contain that wasn't downlinked may or may not be relevant to the mishap, and the only way to know for sure is to locate a surviving unit on the ground.

However, one should probably not hold their breath for one to turn up. As noted by the shuttle program manager during the first press conference, there is no hardened "Black Box" on board any of the Shuttles. At the same time, it's also worth noting that since commercial hardened "Black Boxes" have had difficulty surviving airplane crashes, surviving re-entry without special protection is almost an impossibility.

What's this about ice hitting the tiles underneath Columbia?

Video taken during launch showed insulation and/or ice from the External tank falling off and impacting the bottom on the left side. According to NASA, per STS 107 MCC Report 21, the fragment in question is believed to be a piece of foam insulation measuring 20 inches by 16 inches by 6 inches, and weighed about 2.67 pounds.

This is not the first time this has happened on a Shuttle flight. A post-launch analysis determined that this had not caused a thermal protection problem, but this is of course being revisited in the accident investigation which will come.

Other damage to the Shuttle has happened in prior launches, such as the loss of the drag chute door on one flight. Attempts were made on that flight to get photographs from the ground using terrestrial telescopes, but the results were not acceptable.

What this about Columbia being launched with an old External Tank?

The External Fuel Tank used for STS-107 was a heavier model that was being phased out. The 154-foot-high (47 m) single-use External Tanks are produced at the Lockheed Martin Michoud Assembly Center in New Orleans, and this particular model - referred to as a "Lightweight" tank," was a type first used in April 1983 by the space shuttle Challenger.

Since 1998, however, a revised tank model - a "Superlightweight" tank - has been in use. At ~7,500 pounds (3400 kg) lighter and made with an aluminum alloy, these tanks were designed to handle the heavier payloads and steeper rates of incline required for missions to ISS.

In addition to the development of the "Superlightweight " tanks, Lockheed also began using a reformulated lighter version of the inch-thick, spray-on insulation used on all external tanks in the mid-1990s. The switch was made to comply with an EPA mandate to limit ozone-depleting chemicals.

As of the time the "Superlightweight" tanks went into service, Lockheed still had three more "Lightweight" tanks available for non-ISS missions. NASA used one on the Endeavor in 2000, one was used on the ill-fated Columbia mission and the third remains stored in New Orleans where it's scheduled to be used as part of the investigation into the loss of Columbia.

For the record, here's how the various models of External Tanks were flown:

What does the External Tank Insulation consist of?

The Spray-on insulation is actually multi layers of MA-25, MI-15, and a topcoat.

Information on MA-25 is available at http://www.lockheedmartin.com/michoud/products/tpp/tpp_ma25.htm

It is between 25 and 30 lbs/ft^3 (400 and 480 kg/m^3), depending on the type.

Information on MI-15 is available at http://www.lockheedmartin.com/michoud/products/tpp/tpp_mi15.htm

It is between 15 and 30 lbs/ft^3 (240 and 480 kg/m^3), depending on the type.

This is a fair bit denser than "styrofoam" which is between 1.5 and 6 lb/ft^3 (24 and 96 kg/m^3). (Coffee-cup style "styrofoam" is on the high end of this, whereas Stryofoam[tm] brand building board is on the low end of this range).

Could this have been an act of terrorism?

This, by far, was inarguably the first question on everyone's mind at the time of the mishap.

It's so far been the consensus of the sane participants in the sci.space.* hierarchy that at the extreme altitude and speed Columbia achieved during reentry, and with all the various radar tracking systems in place - including NOAA's NEXRAD as an unexpected source of tracking data following the breakup - the odds that Columbia and her crew were destroyed any act of terrorism along the lines of a SAM attack is almost on the verge of absolute nil.

So far, only two "credible" theories have come forth, both with valid reasons for being highly unlikely:

  1. Air-to-Air or Surface-to-Air missile strike: As Columbia was at on approach at ~Mach 18 at an altitude of ~200,000 feet (61 km), the odds of a terrorist group such as the Taliban, Al Queda, or even North Korean or Iraqi agents gaining access to a weapon that could catch up with Columbia, much less intercept it, are astronomically small. At this time, not even the US, the Russians, or even the Chinese possess the capabilities of hitting a reentry vehicle at that speed and altitude with any probable degree of success
     
  2. Bomb planted on board by a spy: More realistic based on Occam's Razor. However, pre-launch security, which has always been high, was even tighter due both in part to post-9/11 restrictions and the presence on the crew of the first Israeli Astronaut, Ilan Ramon. Odds are almost as small of this happening as Columbia getting shot down by some sort of anti-aircraft weapon.  

Now, for clarification's sake,  yes, we're talking both conventional and "laser death ray" weapons here. While the former could be compromised into the hands of an enemy, the latter would be virtually impossible as such a compromise or its use would not be easily concealable. In addition, while one of the primary purposes of "Star Wars" or SDI is to develop a weapon that can hit an incoming target at such an altitude, even after 15 years and billions of dollars SDI is *still a long way from being operational, much less capable of hitting a Shuttle, and even much less likely to be in the hands of a rogue terrorist group.

To put another nail in the anti-aircraft weapon theory, in addition to the fact that the only missiles that could conceivably hit a target at 200,000+ ft and traveling at mach 18 are experimental prototypes, any such missile would almost certainly trail a huge exhaust plume and would be immediately discernable on all the video footage of the reentry. Even more telling, if the aircraft were hit by anything as it reentered the debris pattern would have been very different as it broke up. A missile hit would have immediately created a shower of debris from both the missile and from the target which would have "shot out" - in a similar manner as exploding starburst type fireworks - away from the area. This would have been even more visible in the case of a kinetic "hit to kill" mechanism such as what the Ballistic Missile Defense system is based on. Instead, the Shuttle and the debris stayed on the same track for most of the reentry, even after it had broken up. Even those fragments that strayed from the reentry track did so gradually, retaining some degree of parallel motion to the original path as opposed to drastically perpendicular paths had the Shuttle been hit with a missile.

What's this about a photo of a cracked wing?

Israeli Television has been showing a photo reportedly taken by Ilan Ramon that shows cracks in the wing of Columbia. The source of this photo is unknown, but most experts who've seen the photo agree that it's a hoax thanks to a Photoshopped hack of a shot taken by Ramon earlier in the mission. Other shots exist of that
portion of the wing that were taken later in the mission that show no cracks whatsoever.

Has an Accident Review Board been established?

Actually, there's several review boards and investigation teams being assembled. The only one that's been officially announced is the Space Shuttle Mishap Interagency Investigation Board. The board is intended to be an independent probe into the Columbia mishap, and its membership was announced on 2/2/03. At the time of this writing, the board consists of the following members:

In addition to NASA's own internal investigations, hearings are also expected in the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee

  VI: Preventative Measures and Rescue Attempts:  


Why were there no ejection seats on Columbia?

During its test flight phase, Columbia had two ejection seats - one each for the CDR and PLT. When Columbia became operational and the crew expanded to up to a total of seven, the ejection seats and explosive roof panels were removed and replaced with normal ones for two reasons:

  1. Weight savings, simply put.
     
  2. The concept of not wanting to leave anyone behind in the Shuttle if  bailout was required. Some of the crew were seated on Columbia's lower deck, and ejection seats could not have saved the three crew there in any circumstance.

At the same time, the ejection seats were more of a concession to the test pilot mentality. In actuality, they would have been entirely useless at the altitude and speed that Columbia - or any shuttle, for that matter - was going when the disaster occurred. They would really only have been useful if the shuttle was going slowly, at low altitude, as in the case of a bad landing approach. The seats were deactivated after the first four missions, and removed shortly afterwards during a post-mission refurbishment.

Why didn't they do a spacewalk to inspect the underside?

There are several factors to consider here:

Most of these facts were confirmed at the initial press debriefings following the loss of Columbia. Ron Dittemore, NASA Shuttle program manager, has gone on record as stating that the crew had no capabilities to tile repairs, and that even if they could perform an EVA, because there is nothing around that area for the astronauts to hold onto, they would have had an impossible task of even getting under the Shuttle to get a good look.

Finally, a clarification is in order regarding whether Columbia was equipped with an airlock capable of allowing EVA operations. Below is a link to an image clearly showing the layout of the payload bay contents of STS-107.

PHOTO NO: KSC-02PD-0978
http://mediaarchive.ksc.nasa.gov/photodetail.cfm?MediaID=9872

You can see that there is indeed a hatch near the front of the tunnel, so an EVA would have been possible.

What about using ground-based cameras or orbital spysats to
inspect Columbia while still in orbit? They've been used before.

It's a nice idea, and it was actually tried during STS-1 when tiles were lost during ascent on Columbia. However, due to atmospheric distortion the images taken with ground-based cameras were totally useless due to the poor resolution. As for the satellite photos taken with the Department of Defense "Keyhole" spy satellites, their effectiveness is still in question to this day. As the capabilities of the "Keyhole" satellites is still top secret, only serious space historians and reconnaissance historians such as James Oberg, Allen Thompson and Dwayne Allen Day have had any semblance of access to the documentation and any "leaked" results of such a use of these high-powered optics. All three have pretty much concluded that the 1981 imaging was unlikely to have provided anything useful, and that any such reports regarding usable photos of Columbia while in orbit with regards to resolving missing tiles are likely nothing more than an "urban legend".

So, with that in mind...again, it's a nice idea, but over two decades later, even with ground cameras being equipped with laser-based adaptive optics and even commercial satellites being capable of resolving details previously visible only by the big secret military birds, odds are slim that any of them would have had the required resolution, much less been in position, to have detected any damage on the underside of Columbia.

Could the Shuttle have aborted during launch to avert the damage?

In theory, yes. First off, remember that its unlikely that Mission Control or the crew could have seen the event. It was all over too fast for human reaction times. Even had they seen the strike, it still takes time to evaluate the data and make the abort call.

Assuming that they saw the strike, and had time to analyze the data, the Shuttle has several abort modes prior to reaching orbit which  might have avoided the conditions of reentry which may have caused the failure:

There are four types of intact aborts: abort to orbit, abort once around, transatlantic landing and return to launch site.

There is a definite order of preference for the various abort modes. The type of failure and the time of the failure determine which type of abort is selected. In cases where performance loss is the only factor, the preferred modes would be ATO, AOA, TAL and RTLS, in that order. The mode chosen is the highest one that can be completed with the remaining vehicle performance. In the case of some support system failures, such as cabin leaks or vehicle cooling problems, the preferred mode might be the one that will end the mission most quickly. In these cases, TAL or RTLS might be preferable to AOA or ATO. A contingency abort is never chosen if another abort option exists.

The Mission Control Center-Houston is prime for calling these aborts because it has a more precise knowledge of the orbiter's position than the crew can obtain from onboard systems. Before main engine cutoff, Mission Control makes periodic calls to the crew to tell them which abort mode is (or is not) available. If ground communications are lost, the flight crew has onboard methods, such as cue cards, dedicated displays and display information, to determine the current abort region.

Which abort mode is selected depends on the cause and timing of the failure causing the abort and which mode is safest or improves mission success. If the problem is a space shuttle main engine failure, the flight crew and Mission Control Center select the best option available at the time a space shuttle main engine fails.

If the problem is a system failure that jeopardizes the vehicle, the fastest abort mode that results in the earliest vehicle landing is chosen. RTLS and TAL are the quickest options (35 minutes), whereas an AOA requires approximately 90 minutes. Which of these is selected depends on the time of the failure with three good space shuttle main engines.

The flight crew selects the abort mode by positioning an abort mode switch and depressing an abort push button.

For a full breakdown on each abort mode, NASA has a page dedicated to shuttle mission profiles that contains an extensive section onabort modes:

http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/technology/sts-newsref/mission_profile.html#ato_abort

Given what NASA knew before the flight, there was no reason to choose anything but to continue to orbit. Even had they chosen to abort, it's very uncertain that the craft would have landed intact with the crew alive.

Why didn't they just dock with the ISS and do repairs?

Columbia was in an orbit where it doesn't meet up with the ISS. When you're going at 17500 mph (28000 kph), changing direction requires a LOT of fuel. Also, in this flight, the shuttle did not have the docking system to dock to the station. And they still do not have any way to repair the tiles in space. And remember, neither the crew nor NASA had any suspicions whatsoever that anything was wrong with Columbia that would have required any repairs, much less an inspection.

Still, most people aren't clear on why Columbia was unable to get to ISS in the first place. Orbital mechanics and basic laws of physics made this impossible. When a shuttle takes off, it aims in one direction and then accelerates until it reaches its orbital speed of about 28,000km/h. This direction is called orbital inclination.

Or, to put it in layman's terms: Consider a large round frozen lake with smooth ice. You slide at 100 km/h from 12:00 to 06:00 (south) without any skates. A friend travels from 02:00 to 08:00 (southwest) at 100 km/h.

The goal is for you to shake hands with your friend while both traveling at 100 km/h. To achieve this, you would not only have to change your direction of travel to match that of your friend, but also do this such that your track will match that of your friend, after which, you can simply accelerate to catch up to him. If both are going in same direction but 100m apart (parallel courses), you can't shake hands. Now, think about what is required for you to change direction while sliding on ice.

Columbia launched to a 39 degree inclination. The Space station is at a 51.6 degree inclination. If you do a bit of simple algebra, changing course 12.6 degrees while maintaining 100km/h requires about 24 km/h acceleration or roughly one quarter of the acceleration that gave your your 100km/h.

The shuttle accelerates from 0 to 28,000km/h during launch. Once in orbit, the main engines are without any fuel. Only the OMS and RCS engines are available, and their capability is roughly 1250 feet per second, or about 1400 km/h speed change (delta v). Subtract from that the amounts used to complete the orbit, on-orbit attitude control, as well de-orbit burn.

If you need one quarter of the 28,000 km/h speed to change orbital inclination, it means is 7000 km/h. So the shuttle has nowhere near what is needed to perform a orbital plane change of 12 degrees.

In addition, even if it *had* been possible to reach ISS, Columbia's airlock did not have an Orbiter Docking System, the extra part the other shuttles have, that allows a shuttle to actually dock with the station. In order to move the Columbia crew over to ISS, an EVA would have had to been performed, which would open a whole new can of worms.

Huh? You mean the crew didn't have space suits?

Yes they did, but not ones that were rated for spacewalk duty.  

The reason a total crew transfer via EVA would have been almost impossible to pull off is that Columbia was launched with only 2 EVA-capable space suits onboard. While the crew did have pressurized suits, these were the 7 Advanced Crew Escape Suits (ACES), which are essentially the same suits used on high-altitude aircraft such as the U-2. While these suits are designed are designed to hold up to the extreme low pressures a pilot would experience, they are not rated to withstand the high vacuum of space for any real length of time.  

One problem is with the face mask seals on the helmets. They're only rated to withstand low pressures as would be experienced by a pilot in an unpressurized cockpit at 100,000ft. In addition, the suits are not as efficient at controlling CO2 buildup as an EVA suit. One study involving a simulated egress on the ground resulted in the majority of the participants unable to complete the egress due to CO2 buildup.  

For a more concise breakdown on ACES, Mark Wade's Encyclopedia

Astronomica has an info page dedicated to these suits:  

http://www.astronautix.com/craft/aces.htm  

Now, on a side note, there's been some talk by the press and on the newsgroups of the "rescue balls" - an insulated fabric sphere with a short-duration air supply that an unsuited Astronaut could zip him/herself up inside and be transferred from one spacecraft to another. However, the rescue balls were useful only if you assumed that a second shuttle would be able to go up to rescue the crew of a stranded one. Once it became clear that the launch frequency would never be high enough to make that a very likely occurrence, NASA quietly retired the balls.  

So, even if Columbia had reached ISS and achieved station keeping, an EVA transfer of the entire crew would have required several spacewalks in which only a maximum of two crewmembers could have transferred at a time, with additional delays encountered with transferring the two suits back to Columbia after each use.

Why didn't they wait for a rescue shuttle?

The actual question is whether NASA could have prepped and launched another shuttle in time to rescue Columbia's five men and two women?

In theory, the answer is yes.

Normally, it takes four months to prepare a shuttle for launch. But in a crisis, shuttle managers say they might be able to put together a launch in less than a week if all testing were thrown out the window and a shuttle were already on the pad. Columbia had enough fuel and supplies to remain in orbit until Wednesday, February 5th, 2003, and the crew could have gone into a resource rationing mode to extend that stay for at least 4 to 5 days beyond that. Atlantis was in fact nearly ready to be moved to its pad at the time of the breakup, so it theoretically could have been rushed into service had reentry been deemed unacceptably unsafe. Once the two shuttles had rendezvoused, Columbia's crew could have moved to Atlantis via a series of EVAs. Note that in order to accommodate the entire Columbia crew,  Atlantis would have had to fly with the minimum crew of two required to safely pilot a shuttle mission.

Again, one must also keep in mind that neither the crew nor NASA knew there was anything seriously wrong with Columbia until the breakup occurred. The impact from the peel off from the External Tank was judged to have been a non-issue, and even if you have them ready to launch you don't send up rescue vehicles unless you really need them.

What about sending up a Soyuz for a rescue?

Despite what Martin Caidin semi-prophesized in "Marooned", such a rescue is a difficult, if not impossible task to achieve. Especially if you're looking at sending one up to rescue a Shuttle.

And no, don't even *think* about having one Astronaut sitting on another's lap. Considering the way a Soyuz capsule lands and the stresses that Cosmonauts encounter on a routine landing, this sort of "party pooling" arrangement would be pretty much a guaranteed suicide ticket.

Bottom Line: a Soyuz rescue operation could have at best only saved four of the seven Astronauts, and that's only if everything on the Russian side of the operation worked flawlessly. While Soyuz has proven to be a very reliable vehicle, to this date it has not been required to launch on "zero warning" or function after same. The risks would probably have been prohibitive at best.

How could NASA have let something like this happen again?

It didn't happen again- it happened for the first time.

It's important to remember that the Challenger disaster was a *completely* different sort of accident to the Columbia disaster, and scrapping the shuttle fleet in deference to something else is simply going to invite a raft full of new problems and potential disasters.

  VII: Effects on ISS:  


Is the current ISS crew stranded now?

No. The ISS always has at least one Russian Soyuz spacecraft docked to it, for the purpose of evacuating in the event of a major problem with the station, or in the case of a tragedy like this. The Soyuz is a  capsule-type craft; the section that returns to Earth is bell-shaped, and can touch down on land or, if necessary, water. Depending on how long the Shuttle fleet is grounded, odds are this is how the current Expedition Six crew will return to Earth, and possibly how their replacements will arrive.

Furthermore, there's no need to bring the Expedition Six crew down at this time. They have plenty of supplies, and a Progress resupply module is en route to ISS at the time of this writing, and will most likely have already docked by the time this FAQ gets updated next.

Without the shuttle fleet, how will they reboost the space station?

The space station has two large engines that can be used to do a reboost, using fuel from the station's onboard tanks.

Russia has an unmanned cargo spacecraft called Progress which can carry fuel, food, and other supplies to the station. Most of the time, space station reboosts are performed by the Progress's engines, to save the space station's own engines from wear.

Europe is building a resupply spacecraft of its own, which will be able to carry much more cargo and fuel than the Progress. It is due to enter service in a year or two.

  VIII: Replacing Columbia:  


Will another replacement orbiter be built, as Endeavor 
was built to replace Challenger?

Probably not. In fact, you can probably bet on it never happening. A space shuttle like those we have now can not be made again for the same reasons that Enterprise probably will not be brought into active service. Not only are the tooling and design manpower simply no longer in existence, the cost would be nearly the same as starting from scratch with an all new design for future shuttle type craft. And no, there are not enough spare parts left over to cobble together a new shuttle as was Endeavor.

Can Enterprise be upgraded to replace Columbia?

Perhaps, but odds are against it happening.

First off, a little backhistory: Enterprise was to be the second spaceworthy Shuttle, after Columbia. It would have gone back to Palmdale to be completed for spaceflight after the 747 drop tests and after Columbia was completed. In the end, NASA and Rockwell decided to upgrade the structural test article (STA-099) instead, mainly because it offered greater payload performance than Enterprise. STA-099 became OV-099 Challenger, which is why Challenger's OV number was out of sequence with the rest. Enterprise was then donated to the Smithsonian Air & Space Museum, where it currently resides on display.

Following the loss of Challenger, NASA briefly examined the possibility of making Enterprise operational, but for the same reasons as those justifying the decision to upgrade STA-099 instead, it was decided to use existing spare parts and build Endeavor instead. However, Endeavor was ordered just before the line shut down, and as a result was quite a bit more expensive than the others because facilities had to be reactivated and some subcontractors replaced.

Despite its current existence as a museum piece, NASA still periodically inspect Enterprise at the SASM. It is fairly frequently used for various tests, and the in-depth structural inspection conducted in 1996 found little seriously wrong with the vehicle from her exposure to the elements, etc. In fact, in several respects she has suffered less corrosion than some of the operational Orbiters. However, it would still be a MAJOR undertaking to make her flightworthy, primarily because she would need a real crew module and all of the normal systems installed - particularly the Main Propulsion System, and all of its plumbing. In addition, given the wiring problems suffered by the rest of the fleet, NASA would probably want to replace all 100+ miles of internal wiring.

Finally, there's this to consider: The talented people who built the space shuttles have moved on long ago - and in some cases have passed on - and most of them have most likely forgotten the little skills that they used when building the shuttles. Many of the specialist tools and jigs that were used to build the shuttles no longer exist, either. While one can argue that with enough money anything can be built, in the case of a Columbia replacement of the same design it would be impossibly expensive now.  

  IX: Further information:  


On the mission patch, what does the cursive "ug" mean?
It's in the middle and has streaks to the top to a star.

It's actually a lower case Greek letter 'mu', which is a recognized scientific abbreviation for "micro". The 'g', is for "gravity". Put the two together and they spell "microgravity", which was the focus of most of the experiments on this mission.

Check out the following URL for more info and a very well done memorial patch: http://www.spacepatches.info/

Can you give me a brief history of Columbia?

What other missions has Columbia flown?

Columbia had flown a total of 28 missions.

  1. STS-1: 12 April 1981 - 14 April 1981
    First Flight
    http://www-pao.ksc.nasa.gov/kscpao/shuttle/missions/sts-1/mission-sts-1.html
     
  2. STS-2: 12 November 1981 - 14 November 1981
    First relaunch of space vehicle, test of remote manipulator arm, various science
    experiments
    http://www-pao.ksc.nasa.gov/kscpao/shuttle/missions/sts-2/mission-sts-2.html
     
  3. STS-3: 22 March 1982 - 30 March 1982
    Various science experiments and mechanical tests
    http://www-pao.ksc.nasa.gov/kscpao/shuttle/missions/sts-3/mission-sts-3.html
     
  4. STS-4: 27 June 1982 - 4 July 1982
    Classified DOD payload, various science experiments, first flight of Getaway
    Specials
    http://www-pao.ksc.nasa.gov/kscpao/shuttle/missions/sts-4/mission-sts-4.html
     
  5. STS-5: 11 November 1982 - 16 November 1982
    Launch two satellites (ANIK-C3 & SBS-C) , Getaway Special, various science and
    mechanical experiments
    http://www-pao.ksc.nasa.gov/kscpao/shuttle/missions/sts-5/mission-sts-5.html
     
  6. STS-9: 28 November 1983 - 8 December 1983
    First SPACELAB mission (various tests and experiments), first European Space
    Agency crewmember, largest crew to date (6)
    http://www-pao.ksc.nasa.gov/kscpao/shuttle/missions/sts-9/mission-sts-9.html
     
  7. STS-61C: 12 January 1986 - 18 January 1986
    Launch SATCOM KU-I satellite, Comet Halley observations, various science
    experiments and Getaway Specials
    http://www-pao.ksc.nasa.gov/kscpao/shuttle/missions/61-c/mission-61-c.html
     
  8. STS-28: 8 August 1989 - 13 August 1989
    DOD mission
    http://www-pao.ksc.nasa.gov/kscpao/shuttle/missions/sts-28/mission-sts-28.html
     
  9. STS-32: 9 January 1990 - 20 January 1990
    Launch SYNCOM IV-F5 milsat, retrieve Long Duration Exposure Facility, film with
    IMAX camera, various science experiments
    http://www-pao.ksc.nasa.gov/kscpao/shuttle/missions/sts-32/mission-sts-32.html
     
  10. STS-35: 2 December 1990 - 10 December 1990
    Various science experiments
    http://www-pao.ksc.nasa.gov/kscpao/shuttle/missions/sts-35/mission-sts-35.html
     
  11. STS-40: 5 June 1991 - 14 June 1991
    SPACELAB life sciences experiments and Getaway Specials
    http://www-pao.ksc.nasa.gov/kscpao/shuttle/missions/sts-40/mission-sts-40.html
     
  12. STS-50: 25 June 1992 - 5 July 1992
    SPACELAB microgravity experiments
    http://www-pao.ksc.nasa.gov/kscpao/shuttle/missions/sts-50/mission-sts-50.html
     
  13. STS-52: 22 October 1992 - 1 November 1992
    Launch LAGEOS-II satellite, various science experiments, Getaway Special
    http://www-pao.ksc.nasa.gov/kscpao/shuttle/missions/sts-52/mission-sts-52.html
     
  14. STS-55: 26 April 1993 - 6 May 1993
    German SPACELAB microgravity & life sciences experiments
    http://www-pao.ksc.nasa.gov/kscpao/shuttle/missions/sts-55/mission-sts-55.html
     
  15. STS-58: 18 October 1993 - 1 November 1993
    SPACELAB life sciences experiments
    http://www-pao.ksc.nasa.gov/kscpao/shuttle/missions/sts-58/mission-sts-58.html
     
  16. STS-62: 4 March 1994 - 18 March 1994
    Various science and engineering experiments
    http://www-pao.ksc.nasa.gov/kscpao/shuttle/missions/sts-62/mission-sts-62.html
     
  17. STS-65: 8 July 1994 - 23 July 1994
    SPACELAB microgravity experiments
    http://www-pao.ksc.nasa.gov/kscpao/shuttle/missions/sts-65/mission-sts-65.html
     
  18. STS-73: 20 October 1995 - 5 November 1995
    SPACELAB microgravity experiments
    http://www-pao.ksc.nasa.gov/kscpao/shuttle/missions/sts-73/mission-sts-73.html
     
  19. STS-75: 22 February 1996 - 9 March 1996
    Tethered Satellite System Reflight (TSS-1R) and various science experiments
    http://www-pao.ksc.nasa.gov/kscpao/shuttle/missions/sts-75/mission-sts-75.html
     
  20. STS-78: 20 June 1996 - 7 July 1996
    SPACELAB microgravity and life sciences experiments
    http://www-pao.ksc.nasa.gov/kscpao/shuttle/missions/sts-78/mission-sts-78.html
     
  21. STS-80: 19 November 1996 - 7 December 1996
    Various life sciences, astrophysics and engineering experiments
    http://www-pao.ksc.nasa.gov/kscpao/shuttle/missions/sts-80/mission-sts-80.html
     
  22. STS-83: 4 April 1997 - 8 April 1997
    European SPACELAB microgravity experiments
    http://www-pao.ksc.nasa.gov/kscpao/shuttle/missions/sts-83/mission-sts-83.html
     
  23. STS-94: 1 July 1997 - 17 July 1997
    European SPACELAB microgravity experiments
    http://www-pao.ksc.nasa.gov/kscpao/shuttle/missions/sts-94/mission-sts-94.html
     
  24. STS-87: 19 November 1997 - 5 December 1997
    Launch Spartan-201 satellite, test Autonomous EVA Robotic Camera/Sprint
    (AERCam/Sprint), various microgravity and engineering experiments
    http://www-pao.ksc.nasa.gov/kscpao/shuttle/missions/sts-87/mission-sts-87.html
     
  25. STS-90: 17 April 1998 - 3 May 1998
    SPACELAB/NeuroLab life sciences experiments
    http://www-pao.ksc.nasa.gov/kscpao/shuttle/missions/sts-90/mission-sts-90.html
     
  26. STS-93: 23 July 1999 - 27 July 1999
    Astrophysics experiments, first female shuttle commander
    http://www-pao.ksc.nasa.gov/kscpao/shuttle/missions/sts-93/mission-sts-93.html
     
  27. STS-109: 1 Mar 2002 - 12 Mar 2002
    Hubble Space Telescope Servicing Flight
    http://www-pao.ksc.nasa.gov/kscpao/shuttle/summaries/sts109/index.htm
     
  28. STS-107: 16 January 2003 - 1 February 2003
    Various life sciences and engineering experiments
Where can I find official information on
Columbia and the mishap on the web?

There are numerous sites on the Shuttle, Columbia, and the Manned Space Programs. The regulars on the sci.space.• hierarchy tend to recommend the following sites for additional information:

Also, NASA has several web access methods for NASA TV, which will be the best way to keep up with events when the networks decide to switch programming back to golf, tennis and bowling:

Be advised: many of the sites listed are getting hammered by thousands of requests for information by people surfing to those sites. If you don't get through on the first couple of tries, wait a little bit and then make another attempt, or wait until the really early morning hours when traffic is usually at its lowest.

What about other Websites or Discussion Forums?

In addition to the Usenet newsgroups there's also the following websites recommended by many of the regulars who frequent these groups:

  X: Final Words on Copyrights and Dealing With Trolls, Cranks and Crackpots:  


How should we deal with the troll postings that we'll see
 over the next few days/weeks/months over this tragedy?

By not responding to them, by killfilling them, and by dealing gently with those who would respond to them.

Some of those responding may not be regulars to our groups and may be doing so out of ignorance. The unmoderated sci.space. groups have been hit in recent months by anti-Shuttle crackpots and conspiracy theorists, and the best way to handle them at this time is to simply killfile them and ignore what drivel they attempt to foist on the unsuspecting. At the same time, politely remind those responding to these insensitive trolls of their error, and strongly urge they assist the rest of us by participating in the killfile efforts.

Also, as a side note to the sci.space. regulars, keep in mind that many of the questions addressed in this FAQ are going to be posted again and again by people only just now discovering the newsgroups under this hierarchy. Grant these "newbies" a little slack and simply refer them to this document. If they have any other questions, they can post accordingly.  

Final Copyright Reminders

This FAQ copyrighted February 1, 2003, Permission to copy, store, and repost elsewhere is granted as long as the original document is unaltered and attribution is given to the author(s) listed above in the body of the document.

Any and all corrections and/or additions should be posted to either the Usenet newsgroups sci.space.shuttle or sci.space.history, as well as e-mailed to the compiler listed above. As this FAQ will be evolving as the situation unfolds, having all the data made public for discussion will help weed out any inaccuracies that this document hopes to circumvent.

Finally, if links to this document are provided by commercial news services from their respective websites, permission is granted automatically provided all above restrictions are complied with, and an e-mail notification is sent to the FAQ Compiler listed above. This is *only* for propagation study purposes, and will not be
considered an "official endorsement" of this document for any sort of promotional purposes.


TOPICS: Front Page News; News/Current Events
KEYWORDS: shuttle
A very long and extremely detailed report on the Shuttle and the disaster.
1 posted on 02/06/2003 12:55:14 PM PST by Mr170IQ
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | View Replies]
To: Mr170IQ
Bob Mosely (Omega Man, or OM) bump.
2 posted on 02/06/2003 12:56:56 PM PST by Denver Ditdat
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To: Denver Ditdat
Sorry for the white text on the white background in a few places. My bad.

As I posted earlier, but received no replies:

How they could have checked for damaged tiles:

Put an astronaut in a space suit.

Put him/her in the air lock with a digital camera strapped to his/her arm.

Jump outward, lightly ( ~0.5 m/s ), with minimal rotation. No tether, no rocket thrusters, no way back.

After about a minute, the pilot of the shuttle would match velocity with the spacewalker. Distance from astronaut to shuttle ~40 meters.

Pilot then uses the thrusters to start a slow rotation (roll) of the shuttle. While the bottom of the shuttle is facing the spacewalker, he/she takes several pictures, of the whole shuttle and zooms of anything that looks interesting.

Pilot stops rotation of the shuttle and begins a slow trajectory to bring the free-fall spacewalker into the cargo bay.

Spacewalker uses the handholds in the cargo bay to enter the airlock and return.

Pictures are uploaded to the crew's laptops and forwarded to NASA for analysis.

This would have taken a fairly short time to plan and execute, and the risk would have been slight.



If the cause of the breakup turns out to be damaged tiles around the landing gear on the left wing, then it seems likely that the shuttle could have reduced the heating in that area by using a shallower re-entry angle (smaller de-orbit burn) combined with a smaller angle of attack.

NASA does not want to admit that it knew about the likely problem, decided incorrectly that nothing could be done, and decided that since nothing could be done, there was no point in investigating the extent of the problem.
3 posted on 02/06/2003 1:18:33 PM PST by Mr170IQ
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To: Mr170IQ
Jump outward, lightly ( ~0.5 m/s ), with minimal rotation. No tether, no rocket thrusters, no way back.

You wanna volunteer? It is really big out there. For all practical purposes they will drift apart and never see each other again. So sad.

4 posted on 02/06/2003 5:42:45 PM PST by mcsparkie
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To: Mr170IQ
This would have taken a fairly short time to plan and execute, and the risk would have been slight.

jump on out there Russell ...

5 posted on 02/06/2003 5:53:20 PM PST by fnord (love is so simple ... to quote a phrase)
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To: Mr170IQ
it seems likely that the shuttle could have reduced the heating in that area by using a shallower re-entry angle (smaller de-orbit burn) combined with a smaller angle of attack.

I saw this brought up on a NASA board the other day. This would have resulted in a longer duration re-entry, longer approach flight, and much higher speeds during the landing phase. Heat reduction and stress on the vehicle wouldn't have been reduced significantly through this approach.

6 posted on 02/06/2003 6:01:00 PM PST by Tennessee_Bob (Away up here they've got a name for rain and wind and fire....)
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To: mcsparkie; fnord; Tennessee_Bob
Jump outward, lightly ( ~0.5 m/s ), with minimal rotation. No tether, no rocket thrusters, no way back.

You wanna volunteer? It is really big out there. For all practical purposes they will drift apart and never see each other again. So sad.

This would have taken a fairly short time to plan and execute, and the risk would have been slight.

jump on out there Russell ...

it seems likely that the shuttle could have reduced the heating in that area by using a shallower re-entry angle (smaller de-orbit burn) combined with a smaller angle of attack.

I saw this brought up on a NASA board the other day. This would have resulted in a longer duration re-entry, longer approach flight, and much higher speeds during the landing phase. Heat reduction and stress on the vehicle wouldn't have been reduced significantly through this approach.


An observation EVA would NOT have been a very risky operation. The astronaut performing the EVA would have to trust his suit, the pilot, and the shuttle's thrusters. He would also have to know how to use his arms and legs to control his rotation. The orbiter is designed to perform dozens of small course corrections while in orbit. This would just be more of the same. The maneuver would be comparable to piloting a boat to pick up a life preserver tossed overboard minutes earlier while drifting.

Once an accurate picture of the tile damage was in NASA's hands, they could have done HUNDREDS of simulations of re-entry variations. Although it is possible that none of them would have prevented breakup, I find it very unlikely that the normal re-entry path was optimal.

As for changing the landing speed, I think would only be the case if the course corrections were applied very late in the de-orbit. Once the shuttle is in the sub-sonic phase of landing, everything would be the same as in a normal re-entry.

The NASA officials gambled that everything would be fine, and they were wrong. It upsets me that since the exact extent of the tile damage will never be known, they may be able to get away with falsely claiming that "nothing could have been done".

7 posted on 02/07/2003 2:25:46 AM PST by Mr170IQ
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