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Scientists Question Electronic Voting
SFGate ^ | March 3, 2003 | Henry Norr

Posted on 03/03/2003 3:22:01 PM PST by Shermy

Edited on 04/13/2004 2:41:56 AM PDT by Jim Robinson. [history]

Oddly enough, Silicon Valley has been a laggard when it comes to applying the technology it's famous for to the election process. Now it's finally beginning to catch up, and it has suddenly become the locus of an overdue -- and profoundly important -- debate about the mechanics of democracy in the 21st century.


(Excerpt) Read more at sfgate.com ...


TOPICS: Constitution/Conservatism; Crime/Corruption; Extended News; Front Page News; Government; Politics/Elections; Technical
KEYWORDS: computersecurityin; electronicvoting; pledge; votefraud; weaselslist

1 posted on 03/03/2003 3:22:01 PM PST by Shermy
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To: csprof; Doctor Stochastic; boris; PetroniDE; zeugma; toupsie; Rubber Duck; Revel; pawdoggie; ...
Ping.
2 posted on 03/03/2003 3:26:44 PM PST by Shermy
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To: Shermy
One "expert" said that it might be possible for some types of equipment for recording of votes at each voting machine to be electronically "fixed" or pre-determined even before the votes are cast. The account could be modified slightly at each precinct so as not to raise suspicion.
3 posted on 03/03/2003 3:31:33 PM PST by bobg (Bob G.)
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To: Shermy
This is a very big deal if elections are to remain free. The Rats have dead people and felons voting imagine what they will do when they get their hands into this one. It is my understanding that Hillary even owns one of these companies, try to guess why. It doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure it out. We finally have the White House and Congress and this is how it will all be taken away.
4 posted on 03/03/2003 3:33:33 PM PST by Theyknow
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Comment #5 Removed by Moderator

To: Shermy
The only reason the treasonous Cheatocrats want electronic voting is because it takes human error out of their system of cheating.
In short, bumbling oafs like those that got caught last time.
6 posted on 03/03/2003 3:35:34 PM PST by Darksheare (<====Still not uncovered as a VRWC member, but theyre getting closer. I can smell their CK one...)
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To: Shermy
High-tech boondoggle.

The doggone things will only get used maybe 3~4 times a year MAX if you include local elections. Then they'll sit and gather dust, and become "obsolete" before the next election.

IMHO, the optical scanners are the best approach at the moment: they simplify the task of counting the ballots/votes, instantly reject a ballot if an error is made (allowing the voter to make "corrections") and will not confuse the senior citizens who are accustomed to marking paper ballots.

7 posted on 03/03/2003 3:35:49 PM PST by Willie Green (Go Pat Go!!!)
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Comment #8 Removed by Moderator

To: Shermy
An electronic system, properly implemented, could provide better security against tampering than a conventional paper ballot box. Key requirements for such security would be:
  1. The software and all configuration data are stored in memory which physically cannot be altered without such alteration being detectable, and which are never reused. Bipolar PROMs would be ideal for this, but OTPROMs could be used if they were enclosed in radiation-evident sealed cases. Once the system is configured, these devices should be secured against alteration. The media should be kept until there is no possibility of challenge to an election, and in any event never reused.
  2. Votes must likewise be recorded in write-once media, which--as above--should never be reused.
  3. The voting machine should have all plans and firmware published for anyone who wants them and should be built entirely of widely-available off-the-shelf parts.
  4. The machine's design should allow anyone with a suitable machine to read out a copy of all code and data storage devices, with protection circuitry to prevent a surreptitiously-designed reader from altering them.
Unfortunately, I'm unaware of any machines that meet these criteria. Does anyone else know of any?
9 posted on 03/03/2003 4:10:02 PM PST by supercat (TAG--you're it!)
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To: Shermy
1. Why do we have to have our results overnight? Why can't it take a few days?

2. This says there's really no improvement on a paper ballot. At least with a paper ballot, you got to see what you wrote down. Then, in case of a close vote or other challenge, the ballots were there to check.
10 posted on 03/03/2003 5:25:18 PM PST by xzins (Babylon, you have been weighed in the balance and been found wanting!)
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To: xzins
This says there's really no improvement on a paper ballot. At least with a paper ballot, you got to see what you wrote down. Then, in case of a close vote or other challenge, the ballots were there to check.

There are two weaknesses to a paper-ballot system:

A well-designed electronic system could overcome these weaknesses without adding new ones. Unfortunately, many electronic systems not only add new weaknesses, but they also fail to correct the problems of paper ballots.
11 posted on 03/03/2003 5:28:47 PM PST by supercat (TAG--you're it!)
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To: supercat
Unfortunately, many electronic systems not only add new weaknesses, but they also fail to correct the problems of paper ballots.

Whereas previously there were 2 weaknesses, now there are 2+X.

Paper ballots win.

12 posted on 03/03/2003 5:34:42 PM PST by xzins (Babylon, you have been weighed in the balance and been found wanting!)
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To: Shermy
"Votes cast for the Democratic candidate for governor in one precinct during last fall's gubernatorial race were credited to Jeb Bush because of a "misaligned" touch screen. No one knows how many votes were misrecorded. "

They lost there credibility here. They don't know how many were "misrecorded', because they are not sure it really happened. This was an allegation, not a fact.

The rest of the 'non-partisan' organizations are suspisiously located in California, some at universities, non-partizan California universities? Come on.
13 posted on 03/03/2003 5:48:29 PM PST by uncbuck (Sen Lawyers, Guns and Money.)
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To: Shermy
Computer-based voting is no more reliable than any other method. Never will be.
14 posted on 03/03/2003 5:51:07 PM PST by Spruce
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To: Willie Green
I agree with you re optical scanners. We have 'em here and they work well.

I'm dead set against sytems with no paper-trail.

15 posted on 03/03/2003 6:16:18 PM PST by expatpat
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To: Shermy
Thanks. This is a big issue. I am afraid that there are not too many people that get it though. I know how easy it would be to fix the vote electronically. It could even be done by a program that loads into memory via modem and quickly deletes itself after the voting. Or it could be done using programable Rom that would delete the corrupt part of the program after the vote. Of course since no one knows what the software contains then there are even more possiblilitys. The experts in this article know that better than anyone. They are ones who design stuff like this. There are to many non-experts arround who don't have a clue about the reality of this electronic voting system. Why the republicans would be pushing this has me a bit confused. The problem has not been with paper ballots. It has been with the people who are not smart enough to vote and vote in english. In my opinion there vote should not count anyways.
But as the experts say...if we are going to go to this electronic voting then there still needs to be a paper trail. They should know.
16 posted on 03/03/2003 7:44:28 PM PST by Revel
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To: supercat
oops...we accidently deleted those votes.
17 posted on 03/03/2003 7:46:07 PM PST by Revel
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To: Shermy
Re: punch cards [ snip ] .. the technology that caused so much grief in Florida in the 2000 presidential election.

Tripe like this really yanks my chain. Gore never had a case, which is why he lost every case regarding his false assertion that the punch card was a problem.

If one, just one, of Gore assertions were true, he would have won one of these cases in court. He did not.

18 posted on 03/03/2003 7:49:40 PM PST by ChadGore (No matter where you go, there you are.)
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To: Revel
oops...we accidently deleted those votes.

It was a bureaucratic snafu.

19 posted on 03/03/2003 7:51:58 PM PST by ez ("Stable and free nations do not breed ... ideologies of murder."- GWB)
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To: Revel
oops...we accidently deleted those votes.

Consider the following design: votes are stored on a bipolar 32Kx8 PROM encased in a clear tamper-evident package with serialized seals provided by both/all parties. Initially, the PROM is blank except for a header identifying it. Past the header (assume it's 768 bytes), the PROM is divided into one thousand 32-byte blocks (which, as noted above, are initially all blank).

Every time someone casts a ballot, the contents of their ballot are converted to a 192-bit blob organized as 32 6-bit bytes. These are run through a lookup table to convert them into 8-bit bytes which have exactly four "1" and four "0" bits. These 32 bytes are then stored in a randomly-selected vacant block in the PROM.

Tell me how anyone could delete any votes from such a system without the alteration being obvious.

20 posted on 03/03/2003 8:15:43 PM PST by supercat (TAG--you're it!)
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To: Revel
Or it could be done using programable Rom that would delete the corrupt part of the program after the vote.

It's easy to design the hardware so that is not possible. Further, if the code is stored in bipolar PROM and the chip is protected from physical tampering (using serialized seals, etc.) while allowing electrical access, then it's possible to protect the PROM against alteration by including at the end three bytes indicating how many "unburned" bits there are in the PROM [these bytes may have to be inverted depending upon the default state of the PROM]. Once the check bytes are "burned in", it is physically impossible to alter the PROM contants without such alteration being detectable.

21 posted on 03/03/2003 8:20:40 PM PST by supercat (TAG--you're it!)
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To: xzins
Unfortunately, many electronic systems not only add new weaknesses, but they also fail to correct the problems of paper ballots.

Whereas previously there were 2 weaknesses, now there are 2+X. Paper ballots win.

I have outlined a system design which would avoid the above two problems with paper ballots (elsewhere, BTW, I've outlined elsewhere a design for a mechanical system which would do even better and allow voters to physically confirm that their vote was counted while maintaining anonymity. Any interest in my rehashing that one?

22 posted on 03/03/2003 8:24:14 PM PST by supercat (TAG--you're it!)
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To: supercat
- Open Source - any technique used should be open-source for all to examine, test, hack and crack.

- Hashing/Hamming/Convolutional codes - 'hashes'/coding of each vote cast - hashes/ECC coding accompanies each 'vote record' image en route to tallying data base. This would be used a check/to correct against hand massaging of vote records.

- Encryption - used on all data I/O between 'boxes'

- Challenge and Authenticate protocols - used between boxes/voting machines and tally centers. All machines must have an ID assigned must be made known to others through a hierarchal structure worked out BEFORE hand - machines not meeting hierarchy will not communicate ...

Just a few points to consider in a system ...

23 posted on 03/03/2003 9:35:15 PM PST by _Jim (//NASA has a better safety record than NASCAR\\)
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To: _Jim
While open source is certainly a requirement, I think the other items are not so necessary. The key requirements, which you don't address, are that the software be configured indelibly, and that votes be stored indelibly upon being cast. Beyond that, I'd suggest that there's one use for a secure one-way hash function: have all precincts report a secure one-way hash of their election results before any report the election results themselves. That would avoid giving crooks the information they need to cook "just enough" votes.
24 posted on 03/03/2003 10:01:03 PM PST by supercat (TAG--you're it!)
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To: Shermy
"He who controls the count controls the vote."

All that need be said.

--Boris

25 posted on 03/04/2003 2:20:00 AM PST by boris
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To: supercat
"Consider the following design: votes are stored on a bipolar 32Kx8 PROM encased in a clear tamper-evident package with serialized seals provided by both/all parties. Initially, the PROM is blank except for a header identifying it. Past the header (assume it's 768 bytes), the PROM is divided into one thousand 32-byte blocks (which, as noted above, are initially all blank). "

"Every time someone casts a ballot, the contents of their ballot are converted to a 192-bit blob organized as 32 6-bit bytes. These are run through a lookup table to convert them into 8-bit bytes which have exactly four "1" and four "0" bits. These 32 bytes are then stored in a randomly-selected vacant block in the PROM."

"Tell me how anyone could delete any votes from such a system without the alteration being obvious."

Whatever you said makes no sence to me. Or to the overwhelming number of people who must maintain confidence in the accuracy of the outcome of the election results. Mark my words, if the integrety of the voting system is in doubt the legitmacy of the Government itself comes into question.

Optical scanners are understandable to everyone, they have the bonus of paper back up and where ballot boxes can be stuffed scanners can be punched.
26 posted on 03/04/2003 6:09:43 AM PST by Theyknow
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To: uncbuck
"The rest of the 'non-partisan' organizations are suspiciously located in California, some at universities, non-partisan California universities? Come on."

If California scientists found a cure for cancer would you turn it down because it was from a suspicious source? Like it or not some of the best scientists are located in California, particularly in the area of computer science.




"Votes cast for the Democratic candidate for governor in one precinct during last fall's gubernatorial race were credited to Jeb Bush because of a "misaligned" touch screen. No one knows how many votes were misrecorded. "

"They lost there credibility here. They don't know how many were "misrecorded', because they are not sure it really happened. This was an allegation, not a fact."

You are absolutely right that there is no fact here that can be proven. But that is the point exactly. There is no way to determine what, if anything, may have gone wrong once the voting is complete. Think of the potential for manipulation in places like Chicago when they figure this trick out.
27 posted on 03/04/2003 6:21:43 AM PST by Theyknow
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To: Theyknow
I don't have a problem with California scientists, it's the statement that the university organizations are 'non-partisan'. Where is there a university, anywhere, but particularly in California, that is 'non-partisan'?
Have you looked at some of the 'non-partisan' tripe coming from ANY university Poli-sci, History or philosophy departments lately?

As for the example they give for it not working, my problem isn't wether the new machines worked, it's that it was Jeb Bush who got false votes. Yep, this article is 'non-partisan'.

Now, I agree that the system was put into place as a knee-jerk reaction to the events of Nov 2000, and that it may not have been developed enough and was forced into the system by the Democrats. The Dems cheat so much, that when it was as close as it turned out to be in Florida, they couldn't imagine how thier Gore lost when they 'fixed it' for him to win. I also think it was a waste of taxpayer moneies, better spent elsewhere, PARTICULARLY by the tax payer.
28 posted on 03/04/2003 6:42:00 AM PST by uncbuck (Sen Lawyers, Guns and Money.)
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To: supercat
A well-designed electronic system could overcome these weaknesses without adding new ones. Unfortunately, many electronic systems not only add new weaknesses, but they also fail to correct the problems of paper ballots."

I agree with Willie G. The best approach is optical scanning of paper ballots. It combines the best of both worlds (immediacy of result, "paper trail" in case of error). All-electronic voting is WAY to vulnerable to behind-the-scenes hacking.

29 posted on 03/04/2003 7:19:27 AM PST by Wonder Warthog (The Hog of Steel)
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To: supercat
"Tell me how anyone could delete any votes from such a system without the alteration being obvious."

This places too much "trust" in the system designers, and can only be "checked" by computer gurus. Any auditor can check paper ballots.

30 posted on 03/04/2003 7:21:41 AM PST by Wonder Warthog (The Hog of Steel)
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To: uncbuck
"As for the example they give for it not working, my problem isn't wether the new machines worked, it's that it was Jeb Bush who got false votes. Yep, this article is 'non-partisan'."

We both know Jeb did not benefit from the touch screen system. That has nothing to do with my point. My bet is that they did a search on any search engine and that example is the only one that came up. This is very new and there have not been many opportunities for problems to come up yet. Who cares if it had to do with Jeb? No one took it seriously anyway. The problem is that we shouldn't wait until the Rats get a hold of this potential and run with it. When that happens and questions arise what will we do? Just because the only early example of how it could be done (NOT THAT IT WAS DONE) had to do with Jeb should not be reason to ignore the potential that it could ACTUALLY be done by the Rats. There are accurate automated systems which can also be counted manually if there is an issue, These new systems do not instill faith.
31 posted on 03/04/2003 9:10:42 AM PST by Theyknow
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To: supercat
The biggest problem I see with the untamperable electronic schemes is the infrastructure required to support them. Lots of equipment to create/read/validate the PROMS.

I've developed touchscreen systems, and miscalibration is a very real problem. With no printout to review prior to committing your vote it would be easy for a miscalibrated screen to register the wrong choice. Even with the printout, most folks would simply throw the slip away without looking at it.

Simplicity is the way to go.

Optical scanner is by far the best system. It requires the voter to actually read the ballot and mark their choice on the ballot. It also provides an audit trail as well as allowing for use of old fashioned ballot boxes if the machines break or there aren't enough machines to go around.
32 posted on 03/04/2003 10:53:17 AM PST by 6ppc
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To: Shermy
...future requirements for a tangible audit trail

Absolutly necessary!

33 posted on 03/04/2003 11:00:27 AM PST by afraidfortherepublic
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To: Wonder Warthog
Any auditor can check paper ballots.

How can any auditor ensure that they are genuine and have not been altered?

34 posted on 03/04/2003 3:36:51 PM PST by supercat (TAG--you're it!)
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To: Theyknow
BTW, here's my mechanical voting system design; tell me how you like this one.

Votes for this machine would be recorded on 1/2" paper tapes which would be factory-punched with sprocket holes every 1/4" down one side. Each tape would be marked with a unique design (preferably identifying the race, candidate, district, ward, and machine) which repeated every 1/4" or 1/2" (lined up with the sprocket holes). There would be one tape for each candidate, plus one for each race for a write-in candidate, and one for each race for "no candidate selected". An additional tape would be used in any "vote for two" race to indicate that only one candidate was selected [two extras in vote-for-three or vote-for-four races].

Initially, the tapes would have no punches in them other than the sprocket holes. Before the election, each tape would be marked at the end to indicate the race, precinct, ward, and machine for which the tape would be used as well as the candidate the tape represents. It would be further signed and sealed by representatives of all interested parties. [One set of seals could be applied by a surely-trusted representative of each party who need not be present on-site and another set applied by on-site representatives].

To the extent possible, everything in the machine would be transparent except the enclosures holding the tape spools. Each tape would come out of an opaque enclosure, through a visible mechanism, and proceed into another opaque enclosure. After the voter selects candidates using pull-levers and pulls the "finish voting" lever, the visible mechanism would, in clear view of the voter, punch the appropriate tape for every selected office (or two tapes for vote-for-two offices) and advance the appropriate tapes by 1/4" (or 1/2", depending upon the design size).

If there are four inches of tape between the punching mechanism and the opaque takeup-spool enclosure, it would be necessary to prep the machine by punching each tape ten times after loading, to ensure that every voter saw punched tape from the puncher to the takeup spool; these ten punches would be figured in the tally below.

Once voting is complete, the tail end of each tape would be marked and sealed by appropriate party representatives and the tapes submitted for counting. Counting could be accomplished very quickly and easily, since each tape would simply have a uniform bunch of holes on it. Subtract ten from the number of holes to get the number of votes for the candidate represented by the tape.

The use of a "no candidate selected" tape would protect other tapes from alteration; if 2,500 people voted and there were six presidential candidates (plus "write-in" and "no-candidate-selected") then there should be exactly 2,580 non-sprocket holes in all the presidential tapes. Assuming the tape is designed so that patching holes is impossible, and assuming that the number of voters is logged immediately upon the close of the election, it would be difficult for anyone to perform fraud upon the tapes without detection.

Anyone like that as an approach? The mechanics might be a little bit complicated, but hopefully not too bad. I think it would give voters a unique ability to actually see their vote permanently and indelibly recorded, something which is lacking in other voting systems.

35 posted on 03/04/2003 4:15:17 PM PST by supercat (TAG--you're it!)
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To: supercat
"How can any auditor ensure that they are genuine and have not been altered?"

Easier than he can check on anything electronic. But the real answer is that forensic chemistry methods WILL allow such things to be ascertained. Fraud will still certainly be possible, but detection and prevention are far easier with a real "hard-copy" paper trail than with evanescent electrons.

36 posted on 03/04/2003 4:36:02 PM PST by Wonder Warthog (The Hog of Steel)
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To: Wonder Warthog
but detection and prevention are far easier with a real "hard-copy" paper trail than with evanescent electrons.

Bipolar PROMS work by blowing very small metal fuses. A machine using bipolar PROMs may be x-rayed if needed to ensure that everything is as it should be.

37 posted on 03/04/2003 5:25:51 PM PST by supercat (TAG--you're it!)
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To: Wonder Warthog
But the real answer is that forensic chemistry methods WILL allow such things to be ascertained.

How? Ballots are not individually traceable, and the requirements of secret voting specifically require that they not be. How, then, do you prevent unscrupulous election officials from replacing legitimately-cast ballots with "properly-voted" ballots? Bear in mind that no voter has any way of ensuring that the ballot on which he actually voted is the same as the one that's counted "on his behalf".

I actually like the idea of a fully-visible mechanical voting machine, though I don't know if we still have the manufacturing abilities necessary to produce it at a reasonable price.

38 posted on 03/04/2003 6:14:05 PM PST by supercat (TAG--you're it!)
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To: supercat
"Bipolar PROMS work by blowing very small metal fuses. A machine using bipolar PROMs may be x-rayed if needed to ensure that everything is as it should be."

Counting paper ballots is a whole lot faster, simpler, and cheaper.

39 posted on 03/04/2003 6:35:31 PM PST by Wonder Warthog (The Hog of Steel)
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To: supercat
"How? Ballots are not individually traceable, and the requirements of secret voting specifically require that they not be. How, then, do you prevent unscrupulous election officials from replacing legitimately-cast ballots with "properly-voted" ballots? Bear in mind that no voter has any way of ensuring that the ballot on which he actually voted is the same as the one that's counted "on his behalf"."

Uh, that is what poll and ballot counting observers are for. With the optical scanning process, the paper ballots are sucked into and stored in the SEALED scanning machine. That SEALED machine is only opened if there is a question necessitating a recount, and then the SEALED machine is opened in the prescence of witness from all interested parties and the paper ballots re-counted. You can't do ANY of that with "all-electronic" means.

As I said before, the combined "paper/electronic" system has the fewest problems and limitations of any of the systems I know about.

40 posted on 03/04/2003 6:36:28 PM PST by Wonder Warthog (The Hog of Steel)
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To: Theyknow
Hillary even owns one of these companies, try to guess why.

So she can ensure accurate election results? BUZZZZZZZZ!

No? I didn't think so.

41 posted on 03/04/2003 6:40:50 PM PST by Samwise
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To: Wonder Warthog
Uh, that is what poll and ballot counting observers are for. With the optical scanning process, the paper ballots are sucked into and stored in the SEALED scanning machine. That SEALED machine is only opened if there is a question necessitating a recount, and then the SEALED machine is opened in the prescence of witness from all interested parties and the paper ballots re-counted. You can't do ANY of that with "all-electronic" means.

The problem is that once you open the sealed machine, it's no longer sealed, and much of the evidence that it really was sealed before it was opened is destroyed.

One thing, though, that would substantially improve the tamper-resistance of the optical-scan ballots would be to add two columns to the right hand side in which the voter had to mark how many marks were placed in the rest of the ballot. If a voter was incapable of counting, putting in the ballot without that field completed would cause the ballot to be spit out while the machine showed the necessary number, but no ballot would be accepted unless it was fully valid and the "magic number" was filled in correctly. Further, no ballot would be accepted if there were any ovals that read anywhere between 25% and 75% density [i.e. every oval must be marked well or not at all].

With those provisos, there would be no way of altering a validly-cast ballot without rendering it void [substitution would still be a danger, though], and there would be no excuse for any void ballots to appear in the box.

42 posted on 03/04/2003 7:26:11 PM PST by supercat (TAG--you're it!)
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To: supercat
You are obviously very technical minded. Maybe if someone really wanted to make an infallible system then we could come close. But I hardly doubt any such system will ever come to exist. From what I have read these systems are even tied via modem to a central location. You can bet that updates to the program can even be uploaded. Program code could be stored in Ram temporarily. Ideally the Main program stored in Rom would not allow this, and experts on all sides would be able to examine the main program code. But they cannot...it is not allowed. And something tells me that it never will be allowed either. If certain officials wanted to be really brave then they could even slip in hardware altercations that could do the trick. You would have to be really brave to do it...but hey these people are capable of anything these days. They are not going to solder the main proms in the circuit because they will need to be changed for each election(Or be updated via flashing) . So anyone with a certain influence could obtain a replacement prom to exchange in just for the election. You could come up with all kinds of ways to prevent this but hey...where there is a will then there is a way...especially if your influence is an inside contact at the company that makes these machines.

I know what you are saying too...but I feel like nothing is more reliable than a paper trail that is carefully planed. I suppose that they are subject to tampering too. But it is time consuming to do and eaiser to catch. I agree that chads are out, but the fill in the circle kind of cards seem pretty good. They can be optically read too. And anyone who messes those up does not deserve to even have there vote count.

If it were not for the planned destruction of our culture via multiculturalism then those who can't read english(other than the blind) would not even be allowed to vote in the first place. I prefer to have people vote who have an interest in the well being of this country period. So all of this multilanguage crap via touch screen is a bad thing to me. During the election of 2000 this was pretty much the consensus on FR. It does not appear to be anymore since people have excepted the idea that foreigners and deviants should be allowed to vote. So this is another reason why I hate this electronic voting.

It is no indication of the intelligence or loyalty of the voter. And lets say that some precinct worker wants to manufacture votes. Well we found out during 2000 that is no problem. We found out that it is even legal to not have these places monitored by all partys...much to our surprise. It is recommended but not required. And if there is a dispute with poll watchers then no one is required to listen to them. Well at least if someone manufactures votes using a paper trail then you have a chance at catching there repetitive actions. How do you go back and prove that one of them sat at one of these screens and kept punching in votes. And we say that they would get caught doing that. But these things are rarely checked against any real list of voters. We found that out in 2000. And the dems especially are so bold about it that they are willing to take there chances. Almost never is there any arrest over such matters. Money for votes, assisted voting, dead people voting, Manufactured absentee ballots, Discarded military ballots,...People gain citizenship by being given the answers to the test just so can vote for more social benefits. We saw it all. And what was done about that?

So I would say that this electronic voting scheme is nothing more than a distraction really. Something to make us think something is being done when in reality the only thing that is actually be done is that a system that makes cheating even easier is being setup. Because this secure system that you dream of is not even in the works. The only one that has ever been consulted is the company that is manufacturing these devices. No on else is listened to. If we don't put or foot down then some day we will even have presidents winning with %100 of the vote like they do in Iraq. That may sound crazy, but so do so many things that are happening today. Things we claimed would never happen here. We are losing out voice.

And that includes the experts in this article. This idea of a future printer add on is nothing more than a scam to be able to say "We are listening to you". When the authorities know full well that these "add ons" will never likely be implemented. It is a typical socialist trick to "Shut up the decenters". When will people start learn and start demanding a foolproof system from the start? They are not building a system with a paper trail. They are not even building the secure electronic system that you envision. So in my mind the only thing left to do is to scream foul play.

How I miss the days when Americans demanded provable honesty. How I miss the days when Americans held there officials accountable.

43 posted on 03/04/2003 8:23:34 PM PST by Revel
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To: seamole
Election.com Sold To Group Tied To Saudi Nationals
44 posted on 03/04/2003 8:47:26 PM PST by Revel
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To: supercat
"The problem is that once you open the sealed machine, it's no longer sealed, and much of the evidence that it really was sealed before it was opened is destroyed."

Which is why that opening and counting is done before multiple witnesses. This is really NOT a complicated problem. You are making it more so by putting the "whole job" on the deus ex machina of the voting machine, when in fact one has to look at the overall "voting system".

"One thing, though, that would substantially improve the tamper-resistance of the optical-scan ballots would be to add two columns to the right hand side in which the voter had to mark how many marks were placed in the rest of the ballot. If a voter was incapable of counting, putting in the ballot without that field completed would cause the ballot to be spit out while the machine showed the necessary number, but no ballot would be accepted unless it was fully valid and the "magic number" was filled in correctly. Further, no ballot would be accepted if there were any ovals that read anywhere between 25% and 75% density [i.e. every oval must be marked well or not at all]."

The machines already do this (won't accept an improperly marked ballot). They "do" spit it back out if it is incompletely/incorrectly filled out so the voter can correct it. They also do so without needing ANY action from the voter (i.e. the filling out of "number of marks".

45 posted on 03/05/2003 4:07:13 AM PST by Wonder Warthog (The Hog of Steel)
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To: Andy_Stephenson
Ping.
46 posted on 03/10/2004 6:08:17 PM PST by Shermy
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