‘Red’ Alert at Pearl Harbor [Free Republic]

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By John Berlau
jberlau@InsightMag.com
www.insightmag.com/archive/200106185.shtml

Evidence suggests the Soviet Union, fearing its fate at the hands of a growing Pacific power, used agents in Washington and Tokyo to manipulate the U.S. and Japan into open warfare.

This year, remembrance of the 60th anniversary of the great military tragedy that forced America’s entry into World War II began early as Disney’s $140 million Pearl Harbor opened Memorial Day weekend. The movie celebrates the bravery of the World War II generation, coming back to win a two-front war with Germany and Japan after virtually the entire U.S. Pacific fleet was destroyed at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii.

But the movie also has stimulated interest in the events leading up to Dec. 7, 1941, and thrown the spotlight on longtime controversies and questions. Did then-president Franklin D. Roosevelt have warning of the attack and ignore it? Was FDR trying to goad Japan into war to justify U.S. entry against Tokyo’s ally, Germany? Why was the U.S. military so unprepared if top brass knew that war with Japan was imminent? Why was the last-minute warning sent by slow-moving commercial cablegram?

On top of all this comes fresh evidence of a Soviet role in the Pearl Harbor disaster. It was well-established long ago that Soviet leader Josef Stalin was petrified Japan would attack the Soviet Union in the East. He placed a network of spies in Japan to report to him on the Imperial government’s every move. New revelations from the former Soviet Union show that Soviet intelligence tried to reduce the threat to the U.S.S.R. from Japan by manipulating the United States and Japan into war. “What the Soviets wanted was to make sure that they would not be attacked by Japan, that the Japanese would be turned on us and not on them,” veteran Soviet intelligence expert Herbert Romerstein tells Insight.

In The Venona Secrets, the explosive new book Romerstein coauthored with the late journalist Eric Breindel, the former congressional investigator and head of the U.S. Information Agency’s Office to Counter Soviet Disinformation reveals evidence that a Soviet agent with a high-ranking position in the Roosevelt administration helped set the stage for the surprise Japanese attack that killed nearly 3,000 Americans.

It long has been known that New Deal economist Harry Dexter White was a Soviet spy. It even is old news that as assistant secretary of the Treasury he was one of the first to urge Roosevelt to take a hard line against Japan. But it now has been revealed that the policy advice White gave on Japan probably was instigated on direct instruction from his bosses in the Soviet Union.

The evidence is that White was a Soviet “agent of influence,” using his position in the U.S. government both to give the Soviets information and to shape U.S. policy in ways that served the U.S.S.R. In 1946, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover wrote to then-president Harry Truman that White was “a valuable asset to an underground Soviet espionage organization.” Two years later, ex-communists Whittaker Chambers and Elizabeth Bentley identified White under oath in hearings of the House Committee on Un-American Activities as a member of a communist cell operating in the U.S. government.

All doubt that White was a Soviet agent effectively was removed in the mid-1990s when secret Soviet cables intercepted by the U.S. government and decrypted under the Venona project were declassified. Historians, including Romerstein, have found White’s name prominently and frequently mentioned in the Venona documents.

White still has some defenders trying to explain away the constant communications about his activities within Soviet intelligence agencies and the information they received from him. “That was his job to talk to Russians. He was the main liaison for the U.S. Treasury with the Soviet Union,” claims James Boughton, former historian of the International Monetary Fund, which White put together after World War II. “I think it’s probably the case that White was more open in discussing [U.S.] policies than he later wished he had been, but that’s not espionage,” Boughton says.

But most scholars of the Venona documents say it’s abundantly clear from the intercepts that White was a conscious Soviet agent. “I think the evidence is quite satisfying and convincing and adequate to reach a conclusion that he consciously cooperated with Soviet intelligence,” said John Earl Haynes, 20th Century Political Historian at the Library of Congress and coauthor of the 1999 blockbuster book Venona. “I don’t think anyone who spies against the United States is a good spy.” And Romerstein points out that the Venona transcripts confirm the Soviets agreed to pay the private-school tuition of White’s daughter and gave the family other “gifts,” shattering the myth that White’s cooperation was based on idealism and naïveté.

At the same time as the Venona documents were released, a former intelligence officer launched another bombshell: White’s well-known push for the United States to take a hard line with Japan came at the behest of a Soviet plan called “Operation Snow.” Tokyo was on the march in the Pacific, and Stalin was afraid Japan would attack Russia through its eastern peninsula in Siberia. Increasingly, it looked to many like Japan’s next target either would be the Soviet Union or outlying territories of the United States. “There was plenty of indication in 1940 and 1941 that Japan considered itself very much contained and facing shortages in various areas, and it needed to do something,” Haynes said. “It had a choice. It could go south and run into the British and the Americans, or it could go north [into the Soviet Union].”

In 1941, Vitaliy Pavlov was deputy chief of the American section of the NKVD, the Russian secret-police organization that preceded the KGB. Pavlov recalled in a 1995 article in a Russian intelligence journal that he handed White a note in May 1941 outlining the foreign-policy view he wanted White to promote in the administration. This included a U.S. demand for Japan’s total and immediate withdrawal from China, a view many foreign-policy experts knew Japan would consider unrealistic. White wrote a memo shortly after the meeting was said to have taken place that contained many of the same points and urged a hard line against Japan. He sent it to his boss, Henry Morgenthau Jr., then secretary of the Treasury. After getting a second memorandum from White, Morgenthau eventually sent a letter with the same themes to Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull. On Nov. 26, 1941, Hull gave the Japanese government what historians call an “ultimatum” that included White’s demand that Japan totally withdraw from China. Japan responded two weeks later by bombing Pearl Harbor. Haynes reads Pavlov’s account with caution. He notes the former intelligence officer may be trying to rehabilitate Soviet intelligence in the eyes of Russians and that it’s not completely clear how much he influenced White. However, Romerstein notes that Pavlov was reprimanded by a KGB veterans’ organizations for revealing Operation Snow. Romerstein, who has examined White’s Soviet-inspired memo at the Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, N.Y., says it contains “precisely the themes” Pavlov recalls stressing to White.

And it is clear the Soviets had both a fear and hatred of Japan that went back well before World War II. “Stalin was much more frightened of the Japanese than he was of the Germans,” says Stephen Schwartz, a journalist who has written extensively on Soviet intelligence operations. “Stalin was frightened of the Japanese because he remembered the devastating defeat inflicted so quickly on Czarist Russia [in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905.] … Stalin, who was a great Russian nationalist, was deeply, deeply traumatized by this and was frightened that it could happen again.”

Since the 1920s, communists worldwide had been circulating translations in various languages of the so-called Tanaka Memorial, a document allegedly authored by a Japanese foreign minister that outlined Japan’s plan for taking over the world. Japan always has denied its authenticity, and experts including former U.S. State Department analyst Natalie Grant maintain that it was a Soviet forgery. To date, no one has produced an original version of the Tanaka Memorial, and it was not introduced at the Tokyo war-crimes trials.

When Germany broke the Hitler-Stalin peace pact and attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, avoiding war with Japan became all the more important to Stalin, lest he have to fight a two-front war. The Soviets for years had a network of spies in Japan led by Richard Sorge, who was posing as a pro-Nazi German journalist. The record shows the Soviets were delighted when Sorge reported in September 1941 that Japan was planning to attack the United States and not the U.S.S.R., enabling Moscow to commit Eastern forces to help beat back Germany. “Sorge told the Russians, ‘Don’t worry about the Japanese; they’re going to attack the Americans,’” says Donald Goldstein, a professor of public and international affairs at the University of Pittsburgh who has coauthored several books about World War II. “Then the Russians were able to pull 30 to 40 Army divisions off their border, bring them to Stalingrad and win.”

But the Soviets never tipped the United States that Japan was planning an attack. Indeed, many Soviet officials were worried Japan would change its mind. Germany constantly “tried to induce Japan to reorient her policy and to strike at Russia in the East,” wrote historian David J. Dallin in his classic foreign-policy text, Soviet Russia and the Far East. America and Japan also were discussing a “modus vivendi,” an agreement for peacefully coexisting. Sorge later said that “the course of the Japanese-American talks was of great importance for the Soviet Union. … Had the Japanese-American talks succeeded, there would have arisen the danger that after their rapprochement, Japan and the U.S.A. [would] pursue a coordinated anti-Soviet policy.”

In November 1941, White rewrote his memo about pursuing a hard line against Japan. How much this influenced Roosevelt is hard to say. Some historians indicate Roosevelt was so hell-bent on provoking Japan to attack the United States that he didn’t need any convincing. White’s actions were “hardly necessary,” says Thomas Fleming, author of the just-published book, The New Dealers’ War. “Franklin D. Roosevelt wanted to get in the war so badly that he was the real origin of the provocation of Japan,” Fleming says. He notes that in August 1941, Roosevelt slapped an embargo on all oil shipments to Japan.

But Ralph de Toledano, a former Newsweek reporter, columnist and editor who after the war covered the congressional hearings on both Pearl Harbor and domestic communism, re-members it differently. “Roosevelt swung back and forth,” de Toledano tells Insight. But White and other Soviet agents in the administration, such as White House aide Lauchlin Currie, constantly were “working to kill the modus vivendi.”

Fleming writes that the Venona documents show there were at least 329 Soviet agents working in the U.S. government during World War II. Although he doubts they had much influence on policy toward Japan, Fleming argues they made U.S. policy tilt toward the Soviets in several instances during World War II and tipped off the Soviets to what Roosevelt and top officials were thinking.

Regardless of what precipitated the Pearl Harbor attack, the Soviets would have considered it a godsend — had they believed in God. Despite Sorge’s reports, “the possibility of Japanese attack on our rear remained,” Pavlov wrote. “The U.S.A.’s entrance into the war [against Japan] eliminated such a threat, and therefore any actions to achieve such a guarantee were to our advantage.”

Unlike the United States, the Soviets never had to fight a two-front war in Europe and Asia. The U.S.S.R. and Japan remained at peace with one another until Aug. 7, 1945, when Russia declared war on Japan the day after the United States dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Interestingly, Japan and Russia still haven’t signed a peace treaty. Diplomatic disputes concerning Japanese Kuril Islands the Soviets grabbed at the war’s end continue to this day.

If the United States had not made such stringent demands on Japan in November 1941, could a war between the two countries have been avoided? Probably not, Romerstein says. He thinks at some point Japan probably would have attacked. But even a temporary modus vivendi would have bought time to prepare the U.S. military to ward off an attack without the loss of so many American lives, conclude Romerstein and many other military historians. After the war, Gen. George C. Marshall testified that, “Had they not attacked on December 7, had they waited, for example, until January 1, there is a possibility they would not have launched the attack.”

Romerstein says this episode shows that Soviet agents in government did matter and did do damage to the American people. “They put the weapon into the hands of the war party in Japan to start the war and attack Pearl Harbor when they did,” Romerstein says. “What is certain,” he wrote, “is that Operation Snow was being carried out with Soviet, not American, interests in mind.”

Pearl Harbor wasn’t the only incident where White may have done incalculable damage. Late in the war, he delayed gold shipments Congress had authorized as a loan to save China’s currency, saying Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek needed to institute reforms. Runaway inflation resulted, Chiang could not pay or even feed his army, and his government was toppled in 1949 by the Soviet-armed communist Mao Tse-tung, whose murderous party killed more than 64 million people to secure its hold on the mainland.

At the conference to create the United Nations in 1945, White also briefed an official from a Soviet government news agency concerning U.S. positions. He revealed that U.S. officials “want to achieve the success of the conference at any price.” The U.S.S.R responded successfully with demands for disproportionate power in the U.N. The fact that Soviet agent Alger Hiss was doing the planning for the U.S. side and was the first acting secretary general of the United Nations may also have had something to do with this.

In 1948, White denied before the House Committee on Un-American Activities that he ever worked for the Soviets. Soon after that, he suffered a heart attack and died.

“Sorge told the Russians, ‘Don’t worry about the Japanese; they’re going to attack the Americans,’” says Donald Goldstein, a professor of public and international affairs at the University of Pittsburgh who has coauthored several books about World War II. “Then the Russians were able to pull 30 to 40 Army divisions off their border, bring them to Stalingrad and win.”

Bit of confusion here. Those divisions were pulled off the Japanese border in late '41, not late '42 (time of Stalingrad.) The battle they enabled the Russians to win was the Battle of Moscow in Dec. 1941.

Had the outbreak of a Japanese-U.S. war even been delayed, the U.S. would not have actively entered hostilities at a critical time in the war between Germany and the Soviet Union. The final German drive on Moscow began in mid-November 1941. It reached its furthest advance on Dec. 2-5, when some German troops were within 12 miles of the Moscow city center. On Dec. 5, the Germans withdrew their forces from their forward positions, and on the same day the Russian counteroffensive, using the troops Stalin had been able to withdraw from the Japanese border, began.

It was clear to German leaders by late November that their advance on Moscow was running out of steam, but I don't know how clear this would have been to people in the U.S. or Britain. In any case, it was then reasonable to believe that Moscow -- and thus Russia -- were in serious danger. All the secret FDR-Churchill correspondence has now been released, with the exception of one message from Churchill sent on Nov. 26th, just before Cordell Hull rejected the proposed modus vivendi and delivered what was in essence an ultimatum to the Japanese negotiators, leading the Japanese government to give the go-ahead to the Japanese fleet then on its way to Hawaii. I suspect that the Churchill message had to do with the critical nature of the battle then going on before Moscow.

You're right. Isn't it odd that the article doesn't mention the non-aggression pact signed between Russian and Japan which enabled the Russians to shift forces to the west? The author is trying too hard to make his point.

In reality, the Japanese may have been just as afraid of the Russians as the Russians were of them. The non-aggression pact freed the Japanese to act against the U.S. and Brittain if necessary.

I'm not saying he's wrong in his basic thesis: high level soviet agents in the U.S. tried to influence U.S. policy in ways favorable to Russia. I'm just saying leaving out key bits of information hurts his cridibility.

For, example, how could the Russians know that Germany would declare war on the U.S. after Pearl Harbor? Hitler could easily have said to the Japanese "Hey, my pact with you is in the event you are attacked, not in the event you attack someone else". He didn't do this.

To me, the real test is what people like White said before, during and after the German-Russian non-aggression pact. I think you'll find they were "anti-fascists, then isolationist and then anti-fascist again: in other words, ready to switch positions at Moscow's call.

What if Germany had not attacked Russia? Would the left in this country allowed the U.S. to fight Germany or would we have seen massive opposition to the war as we did in Vietnam?

For, example, how could the Russians know that Germany would declare war on the U.S. after Pearl Harbor?

In the days immediately before Pearl Harbor, from Dec. 4th on, German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop was busily negotiating with Italy and Japan a new addition to the Tripartite Pact under which the three countries all committed themselves to go to war with the U.S. once a single one of them found itself at war with the U.S., and under which none of them would make a separate peace. Since the U.S. government acted after Pearl Harbor as if it was certain that Germany (and Italy) would declare war on it, I am sure the U.S. had signals intelligence regarding this diplomatic action -- if through no other source, we had broken the Japanese diplomatic cypher, and Japanese Ambassador in Berlin Oshima was undoubtedly in communication with Tokyo. Probably the U.S. government would have informed the Soviets of such information, but, even if it did not, the Soviets would have known through their spies in our government.

I just heard over C-SPAN Radio a rebroadcast of an address to the nation by FDR delivered on Dec. 9, 1941, two days after Pearl Harbor, and two days before the German and Italian declarations of war on the U.S. In that address, FDR clearly stated that, whether or not there was any declaration of war, Germany and Italy were now at war with the U.S. He tried to blame Germany for Pearl Harbor, saying German had egged the Japanese on.

Let's imagine an alternative history where Germany and Russia and Japan grind each other to pieces, rather than Americans getting involved and ending up dead. Would have been nice.

"Since the U.S. government acted after Pearl Harbor as if it was certain that Germany (and Italy) would declare war on it,..."

Other than the FDR speech you mentioned (which could be taken as evidence of fear on FDR's part that Germany wouldn't declare war on us), what actions were taken that lead you to believe we were certain the German's would do so?

FDR allegedly made a comment in the White House the evening of Dec. 7 indicating he was confident Germany would declare war on the U.S. A draft of the "Day of Infamy" survives at the Hyde Park FDR Library where FDR calls on the Congress to declare war on Germany and Italy -- that was revised out of the final version of the speech that was delivered on Dec. 8. On the evening of Dec. 8, Hitler gave orders for his navy to fire at U.S. vessels -- orders that FDR presumably soon learned of.

Stalin, who was a great Russian nationalist, was deeply, deeply traumatized by this and was frightened that it could happen again.”

Given Stalin's record, I find it difficult to accept that Stanlin was "traumatized" by anything.

I don't think I was clear in my question: what did we actually do (not almost did or wanted to do). For example, did we order our Navy to fire on German ships and subs in the days between Pearl Harbor and the German declaration?

The Japanese WERE afraid of the Russians--you have to step back a couple of years to Nomonhan. There, a Red Army that had been ruthlessly purged of its senior leadership kicked the snot out of the Kwantung Army. Japan didn't want a rematch.

Good analysis. However let us not forget that the puppet-master behind the Soviets were the British manipulators. One good reason the Soviets feared the inclusion of Japan into hostilities was that they were already planning to invade Europe. Operation Barbarossa put the kabash on that endeavor.

The 60 divisions freed up in the east was virtually all that was left of the Russian Army. Most of it had evaporated on the ground when they were overwhelmed by the German Wehrmacht- because the Russian Army was preparing an offensive and were not positioned for a defense in-depth.

If any orders went out to our navy about attacks on German and Italian vessels between Pearl Harbor and the German/Italian declaration of war on Dec. 11, I am unaware of it. I know orders did go out to our navy the day after Pearl Harbor to conduct unrestricted naval warfare -- including unrestricted submarine warfare -- against Japan. This is significant when you recall that our chief grievance against Germany in WWI was its unrestricted submarine warfare.

But you have to remember that our navy had already been authorized to fire on German vessels under certain circumstances during the undeclared naval war in the North Atlantic in the months preceding Pearl Harbor. Several incidents had already occurred.

If Washington was aware of Hitler's order of Dec. 8th to fire on U.S. ships, it's hard to believe further orders would not have been issued. But I'm unaware of them.

Read in my paper today that both Canada and Britain knew of the bombing two weeks ahead of the event.

I see this as less of an effort to herald the actions of our brave men than the propensity for Hollywierd to seek money on the backs of the actions of men they continue to despise to this day. When a group of people support a man like Bill Clinton that s__ts on the military and sells our nation out, it's a little difficult to take them seriously when they state that they are only trying to honor fallen heros.

Two weeks ahead of the event would coincide with Churchill's unreleased message of Nov. 26, and Hull's ultimatum.

I don't have accessible my copy of the book Betrayal at Pearl Harbor, by Rusbridger and Nave. Eric Nave, an Aussie who was one of the Brit cryptographers working on the Japanese messages, claims they had cracked JN25, the Japanese naval operational code, and that he was one of those reading it. He claims to have seen messages that indicated an imminent attack on Pearl Harbor, but I forget precisely when he said he saw such messages. The book claims Churchill deliberately kept FDR in the dark about the imminent Pearl Harbor attack, a claim that I found implausible when I read the book. Churchill, so anxious to bring the U.S. into the war, would not have risked offending FDR as much as such a failure would have done. I think it's much more likely that Churchill informed FDR of the intelligence in the still-secret message.

Read in my paper today that both Canada and Britain knew of the bombing two weeks ahead of the event

I keep hearing this over and over again. People keep using this as an argument that FDR was a traitor and let 2,000+ be slaughtered at Pearl Harbor to "get us into the war."

Custer was given accurate intelligence as to the size of his enemy and ignored it.

Before many battles of the Civil War, correct intelligence was received and ignored.

The CIA was seeing signs of trouble in the Soviet Union but missed predicting a sudden collapse.

At least half the battles of history were lost because correct intelligence was ignored.

Hindsite shows correct foreknowledge of the Japanese attack. It was ignored and simply proves that military incompetence is eternal.

The more information that rolls in about WWII, I am sickened to have to say that in reality, our GI's died for the preservation and expansion of Communism, not for America. The GI's may have believed they died for their country, but they were shamelessly and criminally used and wasted. That should be the lesson we learn each Memorial Day. Only then do we have a chance to prevent the next waste of lives.

I keep hearing this over and over again. People keep using this as an argument that FDR was a traitor and let 2,000+ be slaughtered at Pearl Harbor to "get us into the war."

Me too, should anyone be interested, it is on the front page of "The Ottawa Citizen," Title: Attack on Pearl Harbor, a setup.

Unlike the United States, the Soviets never had to fight two-front war in Europe and Asia.

Let's put things into perspective here. Where the war counted was in Europe, the Japanese were just a distraction. If Hitler had occupied Russia, THEN the US would have been in trouble. Of course, Hitler was really only interested in the East, for his Lebensraum. Though who knows what he would have cooked up if Russia had kneeled. Upon hearing from Keitel that Britain had declared war he basically said "But I didn't want a war with the West".

Unlike the United States, the Soviets never had to fight two-front war in Europe and Asia.

Sorry, just had to reprint this ridiculous line. Russia had >>>480<<< divisions against the Germans, the US had >>>16<<< divisions, (untrained soldiers at that, soldiers that didn't really give a damn for the reasons they were supposed to fight for, as opposed to the drippy tripe that Stephen Ambrose had them dying for in his books. It was about unit cohesion and a desire to go home). Americans came into the European war when the tide had already turned against the Germans. D-Day's purpose was basically to prevent the Soviets' momentum from taking all of Europe.

Whether Americans like it or not, Russia won the war (with American logistical aid, of course, even Eastern European farmers understand that) against Germany. And the fight against Germany was the fight that really counted. Sure, the US fought on two fronts, big whoop, it's the numbers and the fight that count. Germany used 85% of her military resources in its fight against Russia, for every 100 German soldiers lost, >>88<< died fighting on the Eastern Front.

As for Japan attacking the Russkies, they got their hinds whooped in 1936 in Manchuria, courtesy of Zhukov (or was it Molotov?), and were not about to get an a** whippin' again.

What's really annoying is this anti-Soviet crap coming from Americans. Which is not surprising, a dislike (to put it lightly) that's been bred from childhood, all the way from Rocky and Bullwinkle to BS coming out today lamenting the fall and lack of an enemy to focus on, and wishing that a new one would spring out of the ashes.

Sure Stalin made Hitler look like an innocent Boy Scout, but, as Americans claim, if Hitler really HAD planned on taking over the World, and America, (no idea how, but in Hollywood anything is possible), then it was the Russians who saved the day. Show some gratitude, or at least respect. This is a country that lost TENS of millions (according to recent studies, and my mother's friend who did casualty statistics for the Soviet government, and described how STalin lied), a country whose people have admired the US, until maybe the last couple of years.

WWII was won with Russian blood, and American money.

Check out today's WWW.ANTIWAR.COM for their Pearl Harbor special.

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from http://www.feldgrau.com/econo.html

A Germany-Soviet Military-Economic Comparison

A Germany-Soviet Military-Economic Comparison
By Arvo L. Vercamer

The Soviet Union was the single most important factor in the defeat of Nationalist Socialist Germany. Germany essentially lost the Second World War on the eastern front, and the key to that loss can be directly attributed to the different economic and industrial factors of both the Soviet Union and of the Third Reich.

To win in an armed conflict, a nation must be able to optimally supply one’s own forces both in offensive and defensive situations. Germany was able to (reasonably) supply her forces with military supplies in the early years of the war, when she fought a series of small, quick action campaigns. But after 1942, Germany could no longer provide her armed forces with the needed military supplies. Quick campaigns gave way to a prolonged war. The Soviet Union however could supply her army with the needed materials and the United States was indeed the global Arsenal of Democracy.

Since Adolf Hitler and the German Nationalist Socialist party came to power in 1933, Germany was both economically and militarily preparing for war. German military officials studied the failures of the last World War, recommended corrective measures and developed new combat techniques, which would deliver a proverbial deadly knockout punch as early as possible in any future conflict. German propaganda specialists made sure that all of Germany’s future opponents also believed that Germany was militarily superior to one and all.

In reality, Germany was not prepared for war in 1939. The German economy of the 1930’s continued to satisfy both civilian and military requirements, even after September of 1939 when production should have shifted to military needs. Hitler believed that he could have it both ways, “Kanonen und Butter” - that is, satisfying the civilian population at home by not placing restrictions on their consumer product consumption, while at the same time satisfying the production needs of Germany's military forces. In fact, Germany was not geared for total war production until 1944. This indicates that German economic and military resource management efforts were not optimally configured for a nation at war previous to that time, and in 1944, the tide had already long since turned.

For example, in FY 1942, Germany produced 30 million tons of steel - but only 8 million tons of that was directed towards military production efforts (airplanes, guns, munitions, supplies, tanks, etc.). The following chart highlights German steel production allocations for the fourth quarter of 1939:

Heer - 3.060.000 tons
Marine - 1.250.000 tons
Luftwaffe - 2.220.000 tons
Military construction - 2.060.000 tons
Total military - 8.590.000 tons

Civilian sector - 7.320.000 tons
Export - 1.730.000 tons
Total civilian - 9.050.000 tons

Total steel - 17.640.000 tons

The civilian sector thus consumed 41.5% of the total German steel production in the fourth quarter of 1939. By the fourth quarter of 1940, the civilian sector “only” consumed 40.8% of the steel output. When Speer reorganized the German economy when Fritz Todt died and he replaced him, it is clear to see where the slack came from.

In terms of human resources, Germany should have increased the hours of a workday to way beyond a regular “9-5” day early in the war. Women were not considered as a serious alternative work force until late in the war either. In 1939, German industries utilized 2.62 million women. In July of 1944, German industries still only utilized 2.67 million women. This average was maintained from 1939 to 1944.

In terms of manufacturing/production related intricacies, the Germans too made a number of long-term calculation errors. For example, the Germans would begin to produce one type of a weapons system (say a Pz IV), then, for whatever reason, added to or modified the basic production model within a very short period of time (the Pz IV came in a myriad of variants as time progressed). This “upgrading” only served to slow down the total number of units which could be produced in the long run. Standardized production equals mass quantaties. The Germans should have produced the Pz IV in just one or two variants and produce them as much as possible, just like the Soviets with their T-34 production. German tanks utilized more complex gasoline engines (higher maintenance and production costs); Soviet tanks ran on very basic diesel engines (and also less flammable when hit). Here too, the Germans realized their error in 1941, but it was too late to convert the German economy over to diesel engines.

From 1939 to 1941, Germany used her now well refined Blitzkrieg tactics to conquer Poland, Denmark, Norway, the BeNeLux nations, France, the Balkan, and so on. The end goal was to obtain a German victory through the utilization of the minimum quantities of men, materials and supplies as possible, and in the shortest time. This worked quite well in the early years of WWII. If there was a chance to win the war, it was most probable during the summer and fall of 1941 provided that the existing resources were not squandered or misused.

But in 1941, the Germans came up against a proverbial brick wall - their summer and fall offensive against the Soviet Union stalled. The winter season arrived with bitterly cold temperatures. Interestingly, on 16 August 1941, General Keitel and the Wehrmachts-Waffenämter agreed that Germany reduce its military production efforts in the fall of 1941. Both were so sure that Germany had defeated the Soviet Union, and Hitler concurred. Then came November and December of 1941. In short, the Germans had not adequately prepared for an extended winter campaign. One of the negative consequences was that many Wehrmacht infantrymen and tankers suffered accordingly (of note is that the Luftwaffe and the KM had sent proper winter clothing to most of their troops in the east).

In the end, Germany’s excellent military leadership and her many technical advantages were not enough to overcome the economic advantages of her enemies. From the very beginning, Germany should have been able to exploit many of her economic and technology advantages far more optimally. Placing Herman Göring in charge of domestic economic planning was not the wisest of selections either. While Albert Speer did achieve some very impressive production increases in 1943, 1944 and 1945 (he became Armaments Minister on 18 February 1942, replacing Fritz Todt), the German efforts were essentially a day late and a dollar short.

Germany lost the Second World War not because of any single military action, she lost it primarily to a war of economic and human attrition.

The Soviet Union took a different approach to the economic situation of the pre-war era. According to I.K. Malanin, a Soviet military history writer; the following six factors determine a nation’s ability to win or lose a war:

The economic base
The technological competence of the nation
The established military doctrines and existing military traditions
The geographic environment
The ability and the experience of her personnel
The comparative power of the enemy

The economic base: An economic base must be sufficiently developed to survive a prolonged conflict. The Soviet Union had built up a much more effective and reliable economic infrastructure since the 1920’s when compared to the German economy. It was more optimally geared for mass production of simple, yet reliable (military) goods and products. Throughout the Second World War, Soviet military forces never really suffered from serious supply problems, Soviet production centers continued to pour out what was needed on the front lines. But the Germans often suffered from supply shortages. In addition to their own production capabilities, the Soviet Union also obtained significant quantities of U.S. and British lend-lease aid as can be seen a few paragraphs down.

The technological competence of the nation: Technical expertise must be available to run existing equipment and to develop “this generation and the next generation” of military hardware. In this field, the Soviet Union obtained the needed expertise from abroad. Many state-of-the-art military technologies were in part, provided to the Soviet Union by the Germans. One need only recall the secret German-Soviet military bases, which operated in the Soviet Union in the 1920’s. While the Germans certainly learned much from those experiences, so did the next generation of Soviet military leaders. In addition to the secret bases, both Germany and the United States provided the bulk of the industrial and technical production competencies to the Soviet Union through the myriad of “economic assistance” contracts signed by the Soviet government with such American industrialists as Armand Hammer, Henry Ford, etc. Actual combat competence in the Soviet military was obtained by fighting the Spanish, Japanese, Polish, Finnish and German armies.

How significant was the American contribution to the Soviet war effort of WW2? Let us look at the Soviet car manufacturing industry of the pre-war era as but one example. The following table might help to place some U.S. contributions into a more optimal perspective:

AMO vehicles - Moscow plant - assistance through Brandt.
GAZ vehicles - Molotov Nr. 1, Gorky plant - assistance through Austin and Ford.
GAZ vehicles - Nizhni-Novgorod plant - assistance through Austin and Ford.
YAZ vehicles - Yaroslav plant - assistance through Hercules.
ZIS vehicles - Kuznetsk plant - assistance through Autocar and Brandt.

On 31 May 1929, Henry Ford and the Ford Corporation signed a contract allowing the Soviet Union to construct GAZ-A cars and GAZ-AA trucks at the Nizhni-Novgorod plant. U.S. engineers directed the construction of the factory and Ford provided most of the tools and jigs. Soviet engineers were sent to Ford’s Rogue River plant near Detroit to study U.S. automotive engineering methodologies (Ford basically told the Soviets the economics behind mass production techniques, American style). The Austin Company, Cleveland, OH, provided the Soviets with assistance for the construction of the AMO-3 two and a half ton trucks.

The ZIS-5 and ZIS-6 trucks were copies of the U.S. Autocar trucks. Holley carburetors (Holley Carburetors Co., Detroit, MI) were built at the Samara carburetor and motor plant after 1932. The Yaroslav tire plant was patterned after the Seiberling tire plant in Akron, OH. Of interest is that 34% of all trucks manufactured by the Soviet Union during the war were made at the Molotov Nr. 1 plant in Gorky; the GAZ-M trucks produced there being a direct copy of the 1934 Ford truck.

Because of the United States and all of the economic help it (and Germany to a lesser extent) provided to the Soviet Union during the 1930’s, the Soviet Union essentially advanced technologically 50 years in only an eight to 10 year span. When the U.S. engineers and specialists were forced to leave in the late 1930’s (some were never allowed to leave the Soviet Union despite the fact they were U.S. citizens), the Soviets were really only left with one realistic economic option - continue to utilize the basic systems and the mass production methodologies the Americans had left behind. And that is what they did during the Second World War. They were understandably crude copies of their American counterparts, but never-the-less, they were effective copies.

The Germans were not able to copy the American production methodologies; though they clearly analyzed and studied them very extensively. German factories were not designed for “mass” mass production. The American and the German economies of scale were so much different. In addition, the Allied air war forced the Germans to increasingly scale down the size of all of their production facilities and disperse them to prevent them from being bombed. By 1942/1943, just when the Germans needed it most, it was no longer possible for them to produce “one item” from start to finish under one roof.

The aviation sector can serve as but one example. From the European perspective in 1939, flying 400 miles (640 km), from Frankfurt to London - that was a “long” distance flight. And thus, many European fighter a/c of the early World War Two era were built with these “long distance” flights in mind. From the American perspective, flying 400 miles (640 km), from Los Angeles to San Francisco - that was a little puddle hopper flight. Flying 2.500 miles (4.000 km) from New York to Seattle - that was “long distance” flight. And thus, U.S. a/c were built primarily with U.S. type distances in mind.

The established military doctrines and existing military traditions: This was a rather unique situation for the Soviets in 1939. A great percentage of their soldiers had been trained during the Czarist era. The Soviets melded many traditional Czarist era military traditions with new, “Soviet” ones; as the war progressed, more and more older “traditions” were re-introduced into the Soviet military. Mobile warfare was learned by reading and studying western (primarily British and German) combat philosophies and learning from actual combat situations, such as fighting the Spaniards, the Japanese, the Finns and the Germans.

The geographic environment: Not much one can say here. A nation has what it has in terms of geographic features and that’s pretty much it. But, one can use geographic advantages to help alleviate military disadvantages. If you can, draw the enemy deep into your country - extend his logistical capabilities way beyond the norm - trade land for time to rebuild you armed forces, etc. - these thoughts and more were prime Soviet methodologies of the pre-war and war era.

The ability and the experience of her personnel: While the Soviet military truly worked on reforming itself in the 1930’s, the many purges also severely weakened the aggregate experience level of her military personnel. This placed the Soviet Union at a severely disadvantageous position in June of 1941. Only by 1943 and 1944, did the Soviet soldiers reach general parity with their German counterparts; and even then, the average German soldier held many competence and experience advantages over many of opponents.

The comparative power of the enemy: Since the 1930’s, the Germany and the Soviet Union were engaged in an arms race. After first investing heavily in building up an industrial base, starting in approximately 1937, the Soviet Union’s economy switched over to the production of military goods. But the Germans had a bit of an early lead - they started the arms race in 1933 (earlier in secret). From 1939 to approximately 1941/42, the German military economy retained a distinct advantage in both quality and quantity when compared to same of her opponents. By 1943, the Soviet Union had caught up and began to surpass the German production capabilities.

Allied lend-lease aid to the Soviet Union during the Second World War was also a factor in the Soviet economic and military situation during WWII. The United States provided the Soviet Union with approximately USD 11 billion in aid. Great Britain and Canada provided the Soviet Union with an additional USD 6 billion in aid. Both figures are for USD values in 1945. Since 1945, Soviet historians have tended to downplay the significance of Allied lend-lease efforts - it is unequivocably accepted that in the end, over 20 million Soviet citizens needlessly lost their lives in the conflict, lend-lease aid or not. But Allied lend-lease aid did make a difference, even if only a small one, to the Soviet war effort, as can be seen in the below paragraphs.

As soon as the German Army crossed into the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, Stalin asked Churchill (and Roosevelt) for military assistance. Both agreed to provide it (not only in the form of military supplies, but after December of 1941, also in the form of opening up a “second” front in the west). The first lend-lease convoys to in fact depart for the Soviet Union, did so before any formal document had been signed between the Soviets and the Western Allies. It need be noted that although the United States was not officially at war with Germany, the U.S. agreed to help supply the Soviet Union with lend-lease aid. The promised supplies were agreed to in a series of protocols. The Soviet Union would receive goods and supplies up front, and it could repay its debts at the end of the war in cash or negotiable bonds (plus a small interest charge for late or non-payments).

On 06 October 1941, Winston Churchill advised Josef Stalin that a British convoy would depart from the west every 10 days. The first official convoy, PQ 1, departed from Iceland bound for Archangel (Archanglesk). It carried 20 tanks and 193 fighter a/c. It, as well as the next few PQ’s made it safely to and from the Soviet Union with their freight. It need be noted that in February of 1942, British lend-lease aid to the Soviet Union received a higher priority level than supplying British Home-Guard units and Commonwealth forces operating in the Pacific with military goods. Thus, badly needed Hurricane fighters went to the VVS, not to the RAF in Burma.

The Allied lend-lease aid effort was truly a monumental undertaking. During the course of the Second World War, the Western Allies sent 811 ships to Soviet ports filled with lend-lease aid. The Germans sank 58 of those ships. 33 of the 811 ships returned to port (mechanical breakdowns; damaged by a German attack, but able to proceed under their own power; etc.).

Murmansk and Vladivostok were among the most utilized ports. The route over the Pacific was safer, but it also took longer. Allied convoys had to first cross the Pacific, then the lend-lease aid goods had to traverse Siberia via train. Initially, Iran was hardly used as a trans-shipment route. The existing infrastructure needed to transport lend-lease goods to the Soviet Union was not optimal. After 1943, when the Allies developed better transportation networks in Iran and the Middle East in general, the Persian route became a more critical link. Of all the lend-lease aid, approximately 50% was delivered via the Pacific, 25% via Persia and 25% via the northern route to Archangel and Murmansk.

If the Allies were not well prepared to initiate lend-lease support to the Soviet Union in 1941, so was the Soviet Union not in an optimal position to accept the aid. Interestingly, in August of 1941, the heaviest crane at Murmansk could only lift an 11-ton load. The British had to quickly supply the Soviets with a heavier crane to help speed up the lend-lease off-loading efforts. The RAF also provided aerial support to protect Murmansk from the Luftwaffe. With VVS approval, the 151st RAF Wing arrived at their new base in Vaenga (about 20 miles out of Murmansk) in August of 1941 with 24 Hurricanes (15 additional Hurricane a/c were shipped in crates to Vaenga).

The first PQ’s arrived safely in the Soviet Union with their precious freight. But the Germans reacted quickly by sending both Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe units against the new threat. The first major loss was inflicted on PQ-13 in March of 1942 (PQ-13 lost five ships). PQ-14 and PQ15 also took heavy losses. Churchill wanted to increase the spacing between the departing convoys as a measure to offset losses. The Royal Navy wanted to stop all lend-lease aid during the summer months. The sun was out nearly 24 hours a day in the far northern Arctic waters and this would make any ship easy pickings for the Germans. For political reasons, the British could not select either option. The convoy schedule had to continue. PQ-16 was given a heavier escort and was increased in size to 35 merchantmen. The Germans sunk seven merchantmen and damaged one in PQ-16. PQ-17 was delayed in departing because the RN had to first protect its convoys going to Malta - it did not have enough escort vessels to go around. The U.S.Navy also could not provide escort assistance at that time because the USN was engaged in escorting U.S. merchantmen off of U.S. waters. PQ-17 sailed in June of 1942; it was a disaster for the Allies. The Germans sank 23 of the 36 ships. PQ-18, which departed on 02 September 1942, lost 13 out of 40 ships.

Here is an example of PQ convoy. In January of 1944, an American lend-lease convoy left Seattle bound for Vladivostok. Its manifest read as follows:

46 merchantmen (all 8-10K ton ships); built by McCormack Ship Yards; Soviet flagged (to avoid being torpedoed by the Japanese who could attack U.S. flagged vessels but who could not attack Soviet flagged ones) and Soviet crewed.

Six of the 46 ships were loaded with ammunitions and small arms. Four of the 46 ships were loaded with foodstuffs. Two of the 46 ships were loaded by Dodge (presumably with trucks). One ship was loaded by Westinghouse (presumably with communications gear).

They carried:
22.000 tons of steel provided by U.S. Steel.
3.000 truck chassis, by Ford (the Soviets also assembled U.S. trucks from parts).
3.000 truck differentials from Thornton Tandem Co.
2.000 tractors by Allis Chalmers Co. (agricultural and military use)
1.500 automotive batteries from the Price Battery Corp.
1.000 aircraft provided by the North American Aviation Co.
612 airplanes from the Douglas Aircraft Co.
600 trucks from Mack.
500 Allison aircraft engines.
500 half-tracks from Minneapolis Moline Co.
400 airplanes from Bell Aircraft
400 electric motors from Wagner Electric Co.
400 truck chassis by GM (see Ford above)
310 tons of ball bearings from the Fafnir Company.
200 aircraft provided by the U.S. Navy
200 aircraft engines by Aeromarine
100 tractor-trailer units by GM (trucks)
70 aircraft engines by Pratt & Whitney

In the end, Ultra and more dedicated Allied naval efforts helped to secure the northern lend-lease routes from German attacks. The Kriegsmarine lost a number of heavy ships for their efforts as well.

The following table, not an inclusive one by any means, shows the extent of lend-lease aid the Western Allies provided to the Soviet Union from 01 October 1941 to 31 March 1946 (not a typo, aid went on well after WWII ended). CW - Commonwealth contribution; US - American contribution:

Aircraft - 7.411 (CW) + 14.795 (US) = 22.206
Automotive:
--- 1.5 ton trucks 151.053 (US)
--- 2.5 ton trucks 200.662 (US)
--- Willys Jeeps 77.972 (US)
Bren Gun Carriers - 2.560 (CW)
Boots - 15 million pairs (US)
Communications equipment:
--- Field phones - 380.135 (US)
--- Radios - 40.000 (US)
--- Telephone cable - 1.25 million miles (US)
Cotton cloth - 107 million square yards (US)
Foodstuffs - 4.5 million tons (US)
Leather - 49.000 tons (US)
Motorcycles - 35.170 (US)
Locomotives - 1.981 units (US)
Rolling stock - 11.155 units (US)
Tanks - 5.218 (CW) + 7.537 (US) = 12.755
Tractors - 8.701 (US)
Trucks - 4.020 (CW) + 357.883 (US) = 361.903

In the early 1930’s the U.S. helped lay the foundations for a formidable Soviet truck production capability. During the war, Soviet production efforts were augmented through lend-lease aid. In terms of truck usage, U.S. lend-lease trucks generally went directly to front line combat units. Soviet built trucks were generally used in rear areas. Chevrolet, Dodge, Ford, Studebaker, etc., all could be found on the eastern front. The Soviet Union ended the Second World War by having over 650.000 trucks available for use. Of those, 58% were Soviet in origin, 33% British or U.S. and the remaining percentage captured from the Germans.

U.S. lend-lease food supplies were sufficient to supply 6 million Soviet soldiers with one pound of (quality) consumables for each day of the war. Also, U.S. food supplies, such as canned Spam, had a seemingly indefinite shelf-life and could be stored anywhere without spoilage when compared to one of the standard Soviet military staple diets, dried fish (consuming dried fish causes one to drink more - this in turn increases the number of "breaks" one has to take - and that is not a desirable condition if one is close proximity to enemy lines).

Lend-lease aid amounted to approximately 10-12% of the total Soviet war production effort. While this does not seem like a significant amount, having 10% more key supplies available could make the difference between holding the line to going on the offensive.

From the Soviet geo-political perspective, Germany was enemy number one; especially after 1933. In order to defeat Germany, the Soviet Union would first have to establish the economic and the military infrastructures that would lead to the primary goal (the defeat of Germany). The Soviets searched high and low for the best of everything the west could offer; Christie tank designs from the U.S.; U.S. industrial production know-how; Czechoslovakian and German military hardware; etc. The Soviets also made a “top to bottom” review of their military supply system to seek the most efficient solutions. Western armies of the World War Two era were still modeled on the old Napoleonic way of thinking - provide each combat division with ample service and supply capabilities so they can draw upon rear area stocks as needed. The Soviets reversed that order - army depots and army transportation units would (more efficiently) deliver supplies to the troops; more combat troops could then be placed at the front lines. Of note is that the Soviets military transportation system was far more mechanized than the German one (though no one in WW2 beat the nearly 100% mark of the U.S. transportation system). The German military transportation system still relied on horses in May of 1945.

Mention is often made of the fact that Soviet weapons were crude or simple in design and manufacture. While many were clearly so in appearance, they nearly always worked. German weapon systems, for the most part, became more complex as the war progressed and they did not always work as expected (such as the new Pz V’s at Kursk). There were never enough German service technicians on hand to keep all of the German military hardware operating at peak strength. Building complex military technologies often requires having a larger pool of technicians available to fix the inevitable breakdowns.

The bottom line - the ultimate question is one of simple economics and opportunity costs. How does a nation allocate its existing economic resources? What could one do instead if one changed one’s econimic priorities? One could produce a mighty slick looking and most effective Jagdpanther V with all the bells and whistles or one could opt to produce five shoddy looking, but most functional and reliable T-34’s instead. And so the equation goes. The Soviets opted for the latter scenario and they essentially defeated Germany in May of 1945. The Soviet Union produced great quantities of very basic weapons systems to counter the exceptional skills of the German military command. The Germans elected to go for the Jagdpanther V type scenario - they thus lost the economic battle of the war, and thus the war itself.