Excerpted from a report dealing with prominent Saudi families of Yemeni origin. FRONTLINE obtained this report from a well-placed French source.

The beginnings of his activity are shrouded in mystery. It is said that, having satisfied King Abdul Aziz with construction work on the royal palace, Mohammed bin Laden was awarded a much more prestigious contract: the renovation of Mecca. Whatever the actual circumstances, it is a fact that the Saudi royal family gave the bin Laden family--and group--exclusive rights to all construction of a religious nature, whether in Mecca, Medina or--until 1967--the Holy Places in Jerusalem. This enabled the bin Ladens to establish an industrial and financial empire which now extends far beyond religious construction projects.

The relationship between the bin Ladens and the Saudi royal family is quite exceptional in that it not simply one of business ties: it is also a relationship of trust, of friendship and of shared secrets. This is particularly the case with regard to the group's present-day leaders and the Soudairi clan.

Thanks to the renovation of Mecca, Sheik Mohammed bin Laden did not become merely Kin Abdul Aziz' official contractor, but his friend and confidant as well. This friendship has been handed down to their children. The bin Laden sons went to the same schools as the numerous offspring of King Abdul Aziz and they all followed the same path.

One of the connections which still explains many of the personal ties existing throughout the Middle East is the Victoria College in Alexandria, where the bin Laden boys attended classes along with schoolmates such as King Hussein of Jordan, Zaid Al Rifai, the Kashoggi brothers (whose father was one of the king's physicians), Kamal Adham (who ran the Saudi [security] services under King Faisal), present-day contractors Mohammed Al Attas, Fahd Shobokshi and Ghassan Sakr and actor Omar Sharif.

The relationship of trust between the royal family and the bin Laden group has never been repudiated, although it is known to have undergone some serious crises. The most important was doubtless the 1979 Mecca affair. Because the bin Laden company had the exclusive contract for repairs in the Holy Places, its trucks entered and left Mecca at all hours without being inspected. And the rebels used "bin Laden" trucks to get weapons into the city. One of the bin Laden sons, Mahrous, was actually arrested on account of his ties with the Islamists, but was later freed. He is currently manager of the group's Medina branch.

The reason is as follows: after studies in England, where he had kept company with Fadli (son of the ex-sultan of the Abdin region in South Yemen, now leader of a Yemeni fundamentalist group and arrested in Aden last January), Mahrous struck up friendships with a group of Syrian Moslem Brothers in exile in Saudi Arabia. Subsequent Saudi intelligence investigations showed that these Moslem Brothers had taken advantage of Mahrous to use bin Laden trucks without his knowledge.

There was a touch of irony to the episode: when the insurrection broke out, the Saudi security services had to go for help to the bin Ladens, the sole parties in possession of maps of Mecca enabling the Saudi (and Western) police to find their way through the city's underground passageways.

In any case, the episode also demonstrated the strength of the ties between the royal family and the bin Laden Group. Had it been some other group, there is no doubt that Mahrous--whether accomplice or patsy--would have been thrown into prison and the group barred from further economic activity in the kingdom, the sentence serving as a warning to others. This was not the case.

Likewise, the Saudi authorities' decision to issue an arrest warrant for Osama bin Laden on 16 May 1993 does not threaten to affect the relationship between the bin Ladens and the royal family. Osama, one of Mohammed's youngest son, has been known for years for his fundamentalist activities. ...The arrest warrant was issued both because of his support for fundamentalist groups involved in terrorist operations in Algeria and Egypt and his ties with upstart religious circles that tried to establish an independent human rights organization in Saudi Arabia at the beginning of May.

Contrary to appearances, both the Osama and the Mahrous incidents testify to the bin Laden's influence within the kingdom.

The ties of friendship binding bin Laden family members to King Fahd and his brothers make them prime confidantes and advisors. They play an obvious advisory role in Saudi-Yemeni relations. Still, they hold very few economic or financial interests in their ancestral homeland and certainly do not flaunt their family origins.

King Fahd's two closest friends were: Prince Mohammed Ben Abdullah (son of Abdul Aziz' youngest brother), who died in the early '80s and whose brother, Khaled Ben Abdullah (an associate of Suleiman Olayan), still has free access to the king; and Salem bin Laden, who died in 1988.

Like his father in 1968, Salem died in a 1988 air crash...in Texas. He was flying a BAC 1-11 which had been bought in July 1977 by Prince Mohammed Ben Fahd. The plane's flight plans had long been at the center of a number of investigations. According to one of the plane's American pilots, it had been used in October 1980 during secret Paris meetings between US and Iranian emissaries. Nothing was ever proven, but Salem bin Laden's accidental death revived some speculation that he might have been "eliminated" as an embarrassing witness. In fact, an inquiry was held to determine the exact circumstances of the accident. The conclusions were never divulged.

In spite of Salem's death, the bin Ladens are still part of the small group of friends surrounding the king which includes, in particular, Prince Khaled Turki Al Soudairi (married to one of Fahd's sisters), Prince Faisal Ben Turki Al Abdullah (married to another sister and father of Prince Abdullah Ben Faisal, head of the Royal Jubail Commission) and the family of Moona (Fahd's wife), the Ibrahims.

As trusted servants of the royal family, the bin Ladens have also often acted as chaperones to the king's sons, helping them get their start in business. This was the case with both Prince Mohammed Ben Fahd and Prince Daud Ben Nayef, two of the most active second-generation princes and both at the head of financial empires during the '80s. Both princes were often encountered along with one or another of the bin Laden sons at the head of international companies.

Appointed governor of the Eastern Province in the mid-'80s, Prince Mohammed Ben Fahd resigned from the chairmanships of his companies, putting Prince Saud in his place. The latter, named vice-governor of the Eastern Province last June, has also since withdrawn from a number of business activities.

There was also a political aspect to Salem bin Laden's financial activities. Like Ali Ben Moussalem, Salem bin Laden played a role in the US operations in the Middle East and Central America during the '80s.

On his death in 1968, Sheik Mohammed left behind not only an industrial and financial estate but also a progeny made up of no less than 54 sons and daughters, the fruit of a number of marriages. The lastborn came into the world in 1967 and is presently a student in Boston.

In an initial phase, the group was headed by Mohammed Bahareth, brother of Mohammed's first wife and uncle of his oldest children. As of 1972, Sheik Salem bin Laden, the eldest son, took over as his father's successor, with the assistance of several brothers.

Upon Sheik Salem's death, the leadership of the group passed to his eldest son, Bakr, along with thirteen other brothers who make up the board of the bin Laden group. The most important of these are Hassan,Yeslam and Yehia.

Most of these brothers have different mothers and different nationalities as well. Each has his own set of affinities, thus contributing to the group's international scope. Bakr and Yehia are seen as representatives of the "Syrian group"; Yeslam, of the "Lebanese group". There is also a "Jordanian group." Abdul Aziz, one of the youngest brothers, represents the "Egyptian group" and is also manager of the bin Laden group's Egyptian branch, which employs over 40,000 people. Osama bin Laden is, incidentally, the only brother with a Saudi mother.

Given the size of the family and the financial empire, the bin Ladens have obviously not managed to escape internal conflict.

One of the most significant clashes involved Ali bin Laden, Salem's youngest son and Bakkr's older brother. Ali currently lives between Beirut, Damascus and Paris. Some have said that the break took place over religious reasons. In fact, our information tells us that Ali bin Laden felt smothered under the weight of the bin Laden empire and chose freedom. This distancing has been accompanied by financial disputes, as the other brothers are in no mood to share the group's dividends with Ali and turn a deaf ear to his repeated demands for remittances.

This said, relations between Ali and his brothers had thawed during recent years. His son Mohammed, now completing his studies in Paris, is set to take on important duties within the group at the appropriate moment. It should be noted that he is currently in discussions with French weapons manufacturers and is strengthening his ties with the Saudi Defense Ministry.

In turn, Mahrous bin Laden is still a member of the group's board of directors. His mistakes during the '70s are still a sticking point, however, and he is primarily involved in the organization's Medina branch without engaging in activity at the central level...a way of getting himself forgotten.

Yeslam bin Laden chose the same path as his brother Ali, but without a family break. Very early on, and in consultation with Bakr and Hassan, he decided to move to Europe, where he heads up a portion of the group's international activities. He divides his time between Geneva and Paris. This choice also stems from his marriage with a woman of princely (but Iranian) family, Mirdoht-Sheybani. He is one of the most "Westernized" of the bin Laden brothers, and we are told that his household language is French.

It was only in 1972, four years after the death of Sheik Mohammed, that the [bin Laden] organization was given a group structure in order meet the needs of its expanding activities. Named Binladen Brothers for Contracting and Industry, the group is headquartered in Jiddahh.

With 1991 sales of SR 125 billion, the group is ranked 32 in Saudi Arabia.

After winning its spurs in the rebuilding of Mecca, the group extended its activities to the broad area of construction and infrastructural works, the Mecca-Medina highway, tens of thousands of housing units, etc., It also entered into agriculture, irrigation and representation of foreign groups (Audi, Porsche and the Dutch Heras Hekwerk group, which it represents for fencing and steel distribution). At the beginning of the `80s, it associated with Hunting Surveys Ltd (UK) for prefab construction and with the Dutch Pander Projects group for distribution of luxury products.

The group is extremely discreet with regard to its financial activities, contracts and projects. On the one hand, the group is a family business and does not have to account to anyone; on the other, its ties with the royal family increase its aura of mystery. Its main contracts are not decided at the industrial or economic level, are not run through the Saudi bureaucracy, but instead emanate directly from discussions held with the seraglio of power.

A discrete link thus exists between the bin Laden group, the royal family and the Chamberlain, Ali Ben Mousalem, a link about noone wishes to speak.

There have been many instances of companies which have seen their contracts withdrawn after having made their association with the bin Laden group the object of publicity judged inappropriate by the group.

This concern for avoiding any and all publicity is also emphasized by the fact that, in contrast to the majority of Saudi companies, the bin Laden group rarely if ever buys advertising space in industry publications.

Rarely, then, does one know in advance just what the next bin Laden project will be: generally, the information is there when it is all over. A number of significant projects have been noted in Saudi Arabia itself during recent years:

* A $296 million contract with other companies such as Ditco (Ben Zagr), Saud Ben Birdgis, Al Mouraiban, Kara, etc., for the construction of a ring freeway around Riyadh.

* A SR1.3 billion contract for construction of housing units for the security forces in Jiddahh.

* A SR1.3 billion contract for similar units for the National Guard at Mecca.

* A SR1.1 billion contract for construction of the Kharaj Military City near Riyadh.

* A SR1.1 billion contract for the Mecca Royal Divan.

* A SR4 billion contract for expansion of the Mecca Holy Places.

Several other major projects in Saudi Arabia have been noted recently:

* Construction and improvements at the Riyadh Airport for the Al Salem Aircraft Company, including construction of nine hangars, as part of one of the five offset programs in the US-Saudi Peace Shield agreement. Scheduled for completion in 1995, these operations are to transform Riyadh's King Khaled International Airport into one of the world's largest, ranking with Singapore, Frankfurt, etc.

* A $10 million contract for construction of a molded plastics factory at Jubail, in partnership with the Swiss group Buss AG, in the framework of the Jubail regional expansion plan and in cooperation with Prince Abdullah Ben Faisal and Saudi Formaldehyde Chemical Co. (SFCCL), founded in November 1990 at the initiative of the Jubail-Yanbu Royal Commission and businessman Mazen Al Lahiq.

The bin Laden group is represented in most Saudi cities (Riyadh, Damman) and in a number of capital cities in the region: Beirut, Cairo, Amman, Dubai.

* With over 40,000 employees, the bin Laden group in Egypt, managed by Abdul Aziz bin Laden, is that country's largest foreign private group. Sheik Salem had good relations with one of the largest local contractors, Osman Ahmed Osman, going back for many years. Together with the Saudi Shobokshi group, the bin Laden group is currently negotiating a $400 million contract for construction of a paper plant.

* The bin Laden group, represented by Yehia bin Laden, is also holding negotiations with the Lebanese authorities for a $50 million share in the project to rebuild central Beirut, within the framework of the Solidere project and in conjunction with the Al Baraka group and the Ben Mahfouz group. In 1981, the bin Laden group also set up a local company, Sarco SAL, directed by the Sarkissian brothers, but which has not shown any activity.

* The bin Laden group's domestic and regional activities are complemented by international operations. The group set up a representative firm in London, Binexport, in November 1990, but its international business is handled by the SICO offices in Geneva.

The bin Laden family has been present in international finance for many years. With regard to France, this was the case with the Banque Al Saoudi, whose vicissitudes in recent years are common knowledge. Shored up by Banque de France in 1989 to avoid bankruptcy, it was partially taken over by Banque Indosuez, becoming Banque Francaise pour l'Orient, which has just merged with Rafik Hariri's Mediterranee group.

It is interesting to note that the bank's honorary chairman was none other than Prince Mohammed Ben Fahd, and its board of directors included Sheik Salem bin Laden, Sheik Bogshan and Khalid Ben Mahfouz. Banque Al Saoudi and Indosuez' special connections in the Middle East were instrumental in financing a portion of the weapons contracts of the `70s and `80s.

Banque Al Saoudi was 75%-owned by the Paris-based Saudi Arab Finance Corporation, which also controlled a number of other companies: 75% of Saudi Finance Corporation (Saudifin), headquartered in Geneva and in turn controlling the Saudi Arab Finance Corporation and the Arab Finance Corporation International, both in Luxembourg..

Generally speaking, the same set of shareholders was involved: Salem bin Laden, Khalid Ben Mahfouz, Salam Ahmed Bogshan, Saad Khalil Al Bahjat, Taha Baksh, etc.

In London, the bin Laden group also controls the Abdoulla brothers' Evered Holdings.

Since 1980, the bulk of the bin Laden group's international activities are routed through the Geneva offices of Saudi Investment Company (SICO), which was established on 19 May 1980 and whose capital was increased to SF100 million on 30 April 1991.

Located at 13 rue Ceard, the company is chaired by Yeslam bin Laden. Board members are Beatrice Dufour, Baudoin Dunant and Tilouine el Hanafi.

Beatrice Lafour is Yeslam bin Laden's sister-in-law. She is of Iranian origin and is married to a Swiss financier.

Baudoin Dunant, one of French-speaking Switzerland's leading lawyers, is on the boards of over twenty companies in Geneva, Fribourg, Morges, Nyons, etc. He received international publicity in 1983, when he represented Swiss banker Francois Genoud. Genoud, an admirer of Hitler and heir to the rights to Geobbels' writings, had helped finance the FLN during the Algerian Ward and was on trial for participation in international terrorism.

This unseemly publicity did nothing to shake the confidence of Yeslam bin Laden, doubtless an indication that the lawyer is top-notch in his profession (he is also counsel to the financial group of William Kazan , who is currently liquidating a major portion of his banking investments).

During the `80s, the board of directors also included members of the Swiss Wyss family, a branch of which controls the Holderbank Company, which has just signed a $100 million contract with Qatar National Cement. Also on the board were members of the Shakarshi family, whose name is linked to a money-laundering scandal and drug trafficking in Zurich. A Shakarshi family member was also a director of the SICO London branch.

As a result of these scandals and bent on avoiding any publicity, the bin Ladens decided that it was necessary to break publicly with the Shakarshis. In actual fact, the Shakarshis were never overly troubled and it appears that the Zurich company was just another CIA front used to finance the Afghan resistance.

The tie between Yeslam bin Laden and the Shakarshi family would thus seem quite consistent with both family and royal policy. Our information tells us that Yeslam bin Laden continues to maintain relations as usual with the Shakarshi group.

One might also note that the chairman of board of the Zurich Shakarshi company was Dr. Hans Kopp. Kopp is an important lawyer (his wife was then Justice Minister, since resigned) known for his international activities, particularly with the American [intelligence?] services (since the `60s), and is close to the Swiss defense industry (Oerlikon-Buhrle/Contraves).

The Geneva-based SICO is the parent house for the Group's international financial activities and investments, with branches in London and Curacao. The Curacao branch, established in 1984, manages the bin Laden group's partnership with the American Daniels Realty Corporation (Duspic), part of the Fluor Corporation conglomerate. It is partly through the bin Ladens' influence that the Fluor group was one of the major recipients of reconstruction contracts in Kuwait.

Despite a few recent attempts (particularly with the Swiss Contraves group), the bin Laden family has never been directly involved in weapons contracts and has never been bent on adding this activity to its portfolio.

At most, it might be said that the activities of Salem bin Laden in the context of Irangate and Contragate, or of Yeslam bin Laden within his association with the Shakarshi family, have placed the family at the center of these negotiations, but solely as a guarantor or as a representative of the interests of the royal family. The real contracts have been signed directly by members of the royal family: Prince Mohammed Ben Fahd or Prince Saud Ben Nayef.

The bin Laden family (and Yeslam bin Laden in particular) have thus had long-standing and close ties to the London/Geneva-based Albilad company, created in the `70s by Mohammed Ben Fahd and taken over by Saud Ben Nayef in 1984. Albilad was the main instrument for negotiation of the Anglo-Saudi Al Yamama agreement. Saudi interests were represented by businessman Wafik Said, while the British side was represented by Jonathan Aitken, currently a minister in the Major government. It might be noted that a major player in these negotiations was none other than Mark Thatcher, son of the former Prime Minister and very close to Wafik Said.

Nonetheless, while the bin Laden group does not deal directly in armaments, it is an obvious presence in the big military-related construction contracts. We have mentioned a few of these above. At present, its most important contract is for the Riyadh Airport, through the intermediary of the Al Salam Aircraft company, in the framework of the compensation contracts stipulated by the Peace Shield agreement.

Born 1957 for Syrian mother, Osama bin Laden was the seventh son among fifty brothers and sisters.

			Note: This document is published here exactly as in the original translated document given to FRONTLINE. No changes have been made to grammar or punctuation.

In 1969 the father took the task of rebuilding Al-Aqsa mosque after the fire incident. Interestingly the bin Laden family say that they have the credit of building all the three mosques, because later on their company took over the task of major extension in Mecca and Medina mosques.

The father was fairly devoted Moslem, very humble and generous. He was so proud of the bag he used when he was a porter that he kept it as a trophy in the main reception room in his palace. The father used to insist on his sons to go and manage some projects themselves.

The father had very dominating personality. He insisted to keep all his children in one premises. He had a tough discipline and observed all the children with strict religious and social code. He maintained a special daily program and obliged his children to follow. At the same time the father was entertaining with trips to the sea and desert. He dealt with his children as big men and demanded them to show confidence at young age. He was very keen not to show any difference in the treatment of his children.

Osama was exposed very early on his age to this experience but he lost his father when he was 13. He married at the age of 17 to a Syrian girl who was a relative. He grew up as religiously committed boy and the early marriage was another factor of protecting him from corruption.

Osama had his primary, secondary and even university education in Jeddah. He had a degree in public administration 1981 from King Abdul-Aziz university in Jeddah. Countries of the Arabian Peninsula, Syria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Sudan are the only countries he has been to. All stories of trips to Switzerland, Philippines, and London are all unfounded.

In addition to the general Islamic commitment he started forming an Islamic responsibility at early age. His father used to host hundreds of pilgrims during Hajj season from al over the world. Some of those were senior Islamic scholars or leaders of Muslim movements. This habit went on even after his father's death through his elder brothers. He used to make good contacts and relations through those gatherings.

At secondary school and university he adopted the main trend of many educated Muslims at that time, Muslim Brotherhood. There was a collection of Muslim scholars in Jeddah and Mecca at that period. There was nothing extraordinary in his personality and that trend was rather very non-confrontational. Interestingly, the 1980 raid in the Grand Mosque in Mecca was not appealing to him, neither the theology or that group. He had two distinguished teachers in Islamic studies, which was a compulsory subject in the university. First was Abdullah Azzam who became later as one of the big names in Afghanistan and the second was Mohammed Quttub, a famous Islamic writer and philosopher.

The first encounter with Afghanistan was as early as the first two weeks of Soviet invasion. He went to Pakistan and was taken by his hosts Jamaat Islami from Karachi to Peshawar to see the refugees and meet some leaders. Some of those leaders like Rabbani and Sayyaf were common faces to him because he met them during Hajj gatherings That trip which was [a] secret trip lasted for almost a month and was an exploratory rather than action trip. He went back to the kingdom and started lobbying with his brothers, relatives and friends at the school to support the mujahedeen. He succeeded in collecting huge amount of money and material as donations to jihad. He made another trip to take this material. He took with him few Pakistanis and Afghanis who were working in bin Laden company for more than ten years. Again, he did not stay more than a month The trip was to Pakistan and the border only and was not to Afghanistan. He went on collecting money and going in short trips once or twice a year until 1982.

In 1982 he decided to go inside Afghanistan. He brought with him plenty of the construction machinery and put them at the disposal of the mujahedeen He started spending more and more time in Afghanistan occasionally joining actual battles but not in an organized manner. His presence was encouraging to more Saudis to come but the numbers were still small at that period.

In 1984 he had one further step in strengthening his presence in Afghanistan by establishing the guesthouse in Peshawar (Baitul'ansar). That house was supposed to be the first station of Arab mujahedeen when they come to Afghanistan before going to the front or start training. At that period Osama did not have his own command or training camps. He used to send the newcomers to one of the Afghan factions.

The guesthouse establishment was coinciding with the formation of Jihad Service Bureau by Abdullah Azzam in Peshawar. The Bureau was very active in terms of media, publications and charity work. The Bureau publications were important in attracting more Saudis and Arabs to Afghanistan.

In 1986 Osama decided to have his own camps inside Afghanistan and within two years he built more than six camps. Some were mobilized more than once. He decided to have his own front and to run his own battles with his own command. Among the Arab fighters he had, there were senior Arab ex-military men from Syria and Egypt with good military experience. The story of the guesthouse and the camps was very attractive for more Arab mujahedeen to come and there was a significant surge in their numbers at that period.

In addition to many exchanges of fire and small operations, the first major battle he had face to face with the Soviet army with pure Arab personnel was the battle of Jaji in the province of Baktia 200 kilometers away from Khost. From then until 1989 he had more than five major battles with hundreds of small operations and exchanges of fire. During the period 1984-1989 he was staying more in Afghanistan than Saudi Arabia. He would spend a total of eight months a year or more in Afghanistan.

In 1988 he noticed that he was backward in his documentation and was not able to give answers to some families asking about their loved ones gone missing in Afghanistan. He decided to make the matter much more organized and arranged for proper documentation. He made a tracking record of the visitors, be they mujahedeen or charity or simple visitors. Their movement between the guesthouse and the camps had to be recorded as well as their first arrival and final departure. The whole complex was then termed Al-Qa'edah which is an Arabic word meaning "The Base." Al-Qa'edah was very much public knowledge. It was funny to see some people triumphing because they discovered it!

Late 1989 after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, he went to the kingdom in an ordinary trip. There he was banned from travel and was trapped in the kingdom. The Soviet withdrawal might have been a factor but the main reason for the travel ban were his intentions to start a new "front" of jihad in South Yemen. In addition, he embarrassed the regime by lectures and speeches warning of impending invasion by Saddam. At that time the regime was at very good terms with Saddam. He was instructed officially to keep low profile and not to give public talks. Despite the travel ban he was not hostile to regime at this stage. Indeed he presented a written advice in the form of a detailed, personal, private and confidential letter to the king few weeks before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

He reacted swiftly to Iraqi invasion and saw it fulfilling his prophecy. He immediately forwarded another letter to the king suggesting in detail how to protect the country from potentially advancing Iraqi forces. In addition to many military tactics suggested, he volunteered to bring all the Arab mujahedeen to defend the kingdom. That letter was presented in the first few days of the incident, and the regime response was of consideration!

While he was expecting some call to mobilize his men and equipment he heard the news which transferred his life completely. The Americans are coming. He always describes that moment as shocking moment. He felt depressed and thought that maneuvers had to change. Instead of writing to the king or approaching other members of the royal family, he started lobbying through religious scholars and Muslim activists. He succeeded in extracting a fatwah from one of the senior scholars that training and readiness is a religious duty. He immediately circulated that fatwah and convinced people to have their training in Afghanistan. It was estimated that 4000 went to Afghanistan in response to the fatwah. The regime was not happy with his activities so they limited his movement to Jeddah only. He was summoned for questioning twice for some of his speeches and activities and was given warnings. To intimidate him, the regime raided his farm in the suburb of Jeddah by the National Guard. He was not there during the raid and was very angry when told. He wrote a letter of protest to Prince Abdullah. Abdullah apologized and claimed he is not aware and promised to punish who ever were responsible.

Osama was fed up with this almost house arrest situation and did not imagine himself able to stay in the country with the American forces around. One of his brothers was very close to King Fahad and also close to Prince Ahmed, deputy minister of interior. He convinced his brother that he needed to leave the country to sort out some business matters in Pakistan and come back. There was a difficult obstacle, the stubborn Prince Nayef, minister of interior. His brother waited until Nayef went in a trip outside the kingdom and extracted lifting the ban from prince Ahmed. When he arrived in Pakistan around April 1991 he sent a letter to his brother telling him that he is not coming back and apologized for letting him down with the royal family.

After his arrival to Pakistan he went straight to Afghanistan because he knew the Pakistani intelligence would hand him back to the Saudis. There, he attended the collapse of the communist regime and the consequent dispute between the Afghan parties. He spent great effort to arbitrate between them but with no success He ordered his followers to avoid any involvement in the conflict and told them it was a sin to side with any faction. During his stay the Saudis tried more than once to kidnap or kill him in collaboration with the Pakistani intelligence. His friends in the Saudi and Pakistani establishments would always leak the plan and make him ready for it. After his failure in sorting the Afghani dispute, he decided to leave Afghanistan. The only alternative country he had was Sudan. He left Afghanistan disguised in private jet only few months after his arrival. That was late 1991.

His choice of Sudan had nothing to do with jihad or "terrorism." He was attracted to Sudan because of what was at that time an Islamic banner raised by the new regime in Sudan. He wanted to have good refuge as well as help the government in its construction projects. There was no intention from his side or from the Sudanese regime to have any military activity in Sudan. Indeed the Sudanese government refused even sending some of his followers to the front in the south. He was treated in Sudan as a special guest who wanted to help Sudan when everybody was turning away. In Sudan he mobilized a lot of construction equipment and enrolled himself in busy construction projects. He spent good effort in convincing Saudi businessmen to invest in Sudan and had reasonable success. Many of his brothers and Jeddah merchants had and still have investment in real estate, farming and agricultural industry. In Sudan he had again escaped an assassination attempt which turned out later to be the plan of Saudi intelligence.

During his stay in Sudan anti-American incidents happened in Somalia and South Yemen. Neither of the two incidents was performed by his group in the proper sense of chain of command. Both were performed by people who had training in Afghanistan and had enough anti-American drive. He might have given some sanctioning to the operations but one thing was certain, the Sudanese were completely unaware of either.

Between his arrival to Sudan and early 1994 he was not regarded publicly as Saudi opposition and Saudi citizens were visiting him without too much precautions. Only the well-informed people would know that he was classified as enemy to the Saudi regime. His assets were frozen sometime between 1992 and 1994 but that was not published. The Saudis decided to announce their hostility early 1994 when they publicized withdrawing his citizenship.

After long silence and tolerance, bin Laden replied by issuing a communiqué condemning the Saudi decision and saying that he does not need the "Saudi" reference to identify himself and it is not up to Al-Saud to admit or expel people from Arabian Peninsula. He then formed together with activists and scholars from the kingdom a group called "Advice and Reform Committee" (ARC). The ARC was, according to its communiqués and published agenda, a purely political group. The ARC published around 17 communiqués which might have contained harsh criticism of the Saudi regime and plenty of religious rhetoric but never contained reference for violence or incitment of violence.

The car bomb in spring 1995 in Riyadh was the first major anti-American action in the kingdom. Bin Laden never claimed responsibility, but the Saudi government tried to link the incident to bin Laden by showing video confessions of four "Arab Afghans" involved in the bombing.

Sudan was exposed to huge international pressure for hosting bin Laden and his followers, and bin Laden felt that he is becoming an embarrassment to the Sudanese. Early in 1996 he started making contacts with his old friends in Afghanistan to prepare for his reception. He fled Sudan in a very well planned trip with many of his followers to go straight to Jalalabad in Eastern Afghanistan.

When he arrived there, the situation in Afghanistan was very unsettled between the many factions, but he had very good relations with all factions and all would protect him. The area he arrived to was under control of Yunis Khalis, a very influential warlord who later on joined Taliban.

June 1996, after his arrival in Afghanistan was the Khobar bombing. Nobody claimed responsibility, but sources from inside the Saudi ministry of interior confirmed involvement of Arab Afghans, with possible link to bin Laden The Saudi government wanted to frame Shi'a, at the beginning but Americans were very suspicious of the Saudi story. Bin Laden himself never claimed responsibility but gave many hints that he might have been involved. The Saudi government has acknowledged recently that bin Laden's men were behind the bombing.

After few months of his arrival he issued his first anti-American message, a Declaration of War. That declaration was limited to expelling American forces outside the Arabian Peninsula. His sense of security and nobody to embarrass must have been the drive to release that 12 page declaration. Interest in him by the Saudis never stopped and they tried very hard to convince Yunis Khalis to hand him over, and he flatly refused despite the luxurious offers.

Taliban swept Jalalabad late 1996, almost without war, and bin Laden came under their control. He was optimistic that they will give him sanctuary but he was not sure. He was surprised when a delegation of Taliban came to meet him by order of Mullah Omer, the leader of Taliban, with instructions to reassure him that he will have even better protection under Taliban. The delegation expressed Taliban honor of protecting somebody like him who sacrificed a lot for the sake of jihad.

The Saudis never gave up. Early 1997 they bought some mercenaries in the Pakistani Afghani border. The operation was arranged with the Pakistani intelligence. The information leaked to bin Laden and he decided to move immediately to Qandahar, the stronghold of Taliban. The operation was then cancelled.

When bin Laden left Jalalabad, he ordered many of his followers to join Taliban in their war against Dostum and to protect Kabul. The unexpected happened. Taliban troops were fooled by a trap in the north and Kabul front was exposed to Shah Masood. Taliban were so disorganized at that stage that it was only those few Arabs who were there to push Shah Masood off Kabul and they did efficiently.

The leader of Taliban Mulla Omer was keen to meet Osama. He met him early 1997 after two TV interviews, Channel 4 and CNN. Mulla Omer expressed respect and admiration but requested him to have low profile. He stressed that that was a request and not an order. Osama replied with appreciation and thanks and reassured Mulla Omer that he was going very low profile.

Sometime in late 1997 a big operation was planned by the Americans. The primary plan was for American special forces to attack bin Laden's residence in Qandahar and kidnap him in a commando style operation. The plan was mocked in Pakistani desert and proved dangerous. While the Americans were reconsidering the decision, the news leaked to bin Laden, again through the Pakistani military, and he made it public. That was published in Al-Quds Al-Arabi in London. The Americans had no choice but to cancel. Americans acknowledged this incident only recently, but did not acknowledge the leak.

Bin Laden noticed that the driving force in Taliban were Ulema (religious scholars). He made very good links with them and lobbied specifically for the subject of American forces in the Arabian Peninsula. He was able to extract a fatwah signed by some 40 scholars in Afghanistan sanctioning the use of all means to expel the American forces from the Peninsula. The issue of that fatwah was an asset to him inside Taliban domain. He felt that Ulema were at his back and he can go high profile after long silence.

His second presence in Afghanistan has attracted many mujahedeen to move there again. Among those were Ayman El-Zawahery of Egyptian Jihad and Rift'ee Taha of Jama'a Islamia. There was also new phenomenon during that period. Bin Laden decided to go pan-Islamic instead of Saudi or Arabic. He attracted Kashmiris, Pakistanis, Indians, and Muslims from the Soviet Republics. He thought at that stage that he could make an international alliance against America. In February 1998 he declared the formation of the International Front. The declaration contained two elements, formation of the front and a fatwah sanctioning killing Americans and Jews. Apart from two Arabic newspapers, the declaration had minimal coverage by the press.

After avoiding the media for almost a year he decided to open the door wide for them. In April 1998 he received the ABC TV team and two weeks later he held press conference in Khost and warned of impending attack in few weeks time. Mulla Omer was not happy with this new media escalation, but felt it difficult to control him while he is protected by the scholars. Indeed bin Laden said that he would abide with what ever the Ulema board decides

The bombings in Kenya and Tanzania July 1998 were not a big surprise. Yes, it was a surprise but in terms of choice of location and targets. Despite his declaration of war against America anywhere, the attack was expected inside Saudi Arabia. Having said that, it is not [to be taken] for granted that he is behind the bombing.

It is not known why the Americans chose a camp in Khost to retaliate. The camp was an almost deserted camp where only few Arabs have stayed, with a neighboring camp of Kashmiris. Bin Laden himself was hundreds of miles away, and the rest of Arab Afghans were in the northern front celebrating their recent victories.

Since the American attack bin Laden was put in heavy protection and advised to stay hiding. His followers made another credit when they protected Kabul front again and pushed Masood forces back.

Bin Laden was brought up with good manners. He matured as extremely humble and very generous person. He insists to join his comrades in every act. Very frequently he cooks for them and serves them. He lives a simple life in a small flat in Jeddah or in a shed in Afghanistan and insists on his family to eat simple and to dress simple.

He is known to be strictly truthful and would never lie, but he is politically conscious and believes there is a room for political maneuver even if you are devoted person. Despite being shy he has dominating personality. He speaks very little and looks serious most of the time. He would appear with a soft smile but he seldom laughs. His followers see a lot of aura on him and show great voluntary respect to him. For some reason that falls short of a proper charisma. He is not known for giving distinguished speeches, and there is almost no audio or video recordings of him.

He is widely educated and spends a good deal of time reading. He is fond of media monitoring and information gathering and research. There was always a data management team with him wherever he went.

Among the outstanding features is his courage. He will not show a flicker even if a bomb exploded near him. He was exposed to more than 40 incidents of heavy bombardment, three of them were full of death and flesh around him. A Scud missile exploded 17 meters distance from him. At one time he was almost the victim of chemical weapons. More than once he needed treatment in hospital for body injuries. Despite this courage he is very cautious person. He would not keep any electronic instrument close to his vicinity. Some times he even avoids any device even if it is a simple watch near him because he believes this might help in targeting him.

He is intelligent and has reasonable strategic thinking, but he downgrades himself in the presence of Islamic scholars. He always admires Shiekh Safar al-Hawali and would have not gone through his current controversial path if al-Hawali was free. Some people saw him as a man with vision, others doubt it. They think that he never had clear long term plan. They see the last fatwah as evidence of that.

Contrary to what is always reiterated bin Laden has never had official relations with the Saudi regime or the royal family. All his contacts would happen through his brothers. The brothers would approach two members of the royal family who were fairly sympathetic to Osama. They were Ahmed bin Abdul Aziz, deputy minister of interior and Abdul Rahman bin Abdul Aziz, deputy minister of defense. He might have met them in few occasions but those meetings would have been purely social or accidental in one of his brother's houses. Specifically he had no relation with Turki al-Faisal head of Saudi intelligence. He used to be very suspicious of his role in Afghanistan and once had open confrontation with him in 1991 and accused him of being the reason of the fight between Afghan factions. He was wary of the Saudi government very early in the eighties, but he thought it was wiser to keep silent and benefit from their de facto support to jihad in that period.

Bin Laden has never had any relation with America or American officials. Claims of relation with CIA or other American departments are all unfounded. Since the late seventies he had strong anti-American feeling. He committed himself and family and advised all friends to avoid buying American goods unless it was necessary. He was saying very early in the eighties that the next battle is going to be with America. ... No aid or training or other support have ever been given to bin Laden from Americans. Bin Laden would bring money from individuals donating straight to him. The weapons he had were either captured from the Soviets or bought from other factions.

Again there were no official relations with officials in Pakistani government. However, he had paramount respect by many Pakistanis including people in the army, intelligence and religious establishment. They were so penetrating that they would always leak any plan against him by the Pakistani-Saudi-American alliance.

His relation with Taliban would best be understood if Taliban themselves are understood properly. First of all Taliban are not simply another Afghan faction supported by Pakistan. Taliban are sincere to their beliefs, a religiously committed group unspoiled by political tactics. They would never bargain with what they see as matters of principle. Bin Laden for them is a saint. He is a symbol of sacrifice for the sake of jihad. They see him as very rich Arab from the Holy Land who gave up his wealth and luxury to fight for the sake of his brother Muslims in Afghanistan. They see themselves performing a double duty here, an Islamic duty of protecting this distinguished person and a tribal duty of protecting a descent refugee. The latter is a big value in Afghanistan. Once, a Taliban leader said to a Saudi envoy that if a goat would seek refuge to my tent I would never hand it over, how on earth do you want us to hand over a holy man like bin Laden?

There was no argument within Taliban about handing over bin Laden. There is however some difference in opinion about how high his media profile should be.

In addition to the factor of principle, bin Laden had twice had the credit of protecting Kabul recently.

Bin Laden became an intimate part of Taliban structure when he taught them how to deal with state affairs in a proper manner. For example, they were to be fooled by some oil and gas companies and sell the pipeline project for cheap. He advised them to learn from the Iraq-Turkey and Iraq-Syria agreements. They wanted to privatize some factories and were about to sell them to Pakistani businessmen for cheap prices. He taught them how to conduct proper bidding procedure and guarantee good prices.

It is needless to say that bin Laden has not had any relation with Iran. Iran knows that bin Laden is a committed Sunni and he regards Iran as Shi'a state. The trust between the two is minimal but both have avoided criticizing each other publicly. Having said that, he sees America as common enemy and according to a Pakistani newspaper he regards an anti-American alliance with Iran and China as something to be considered.

bin Laden has two circles of followers. First are the closed core followers who are related to him by a chain of command and take orders like a secret organization. Most of those are probably in Afghanistan. Many are inside Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Somalia and probably Gulf countries. Like any secret group, those followers would not disclose their relation. Inside Saudi Arabia many of those would appear like any average citizen. The number of those is probably in hundreds.

The second circle is much wider and the number is probably in thousands. They are located in the same countries. They would look at bin Laden as Godfather but they do not have proper chain of command or secret links with him. They would regard themselves obliged to perform some of his general orders. Most of those followers are not organized and get trapped by the Saudi police fairly easily. But some are intelligent and make use of the loose nature of their structure to function without attracting attention.

Before his final departure from Saudi Arabia, his financial activities were almost copies of his brothers. Indeed, he is still part of the big mother company. However he had committed himself at very early stage to a special code which he thought was necessary to guarantee the Islamic nature of this activity. For example he would never invest in non-Islamic country. He would never use banks unless it was absolutely necessary. He does not believe in stock market because he thought the investor cannot escape interest since the money has to be in a bank and produce some interest. He is also preoccupied with the idea that Jews control banks and stock market.

He had three setbacks which would have made him bankrupt otherwise. The first was the freezing of his direct assets by the Saudi government. All his traceable money was frozen including his share in the big mother company of bin Laden. No body knows the exact amount but it was probably in the range of 200-300 million Dollars.

The second setback was the loss he had in Sudan. The Sudanese government was too weak financially to pay him for the construction projects and he ended up hardly with 10% of the payment. He lost in Sudan not less than 150 million dollars.

The third setback happened last year when one of his close aids defected to the Saudi government. The defector Sidi Tayyib Al-Madani had some financial information about him until early 1995. Bin Laden knew about the plans of this man to defect and so had few months to liquidate the few businesses known to this defector. There was very little trace of those businesses but dismantling them was not without loss.

There is, however the other side of the story. Bin Laden is a member of a big family. His father's financial inheritance has not been sorted. The brothers agreed to keep many assets of the father and distribute the profits only. Most of the brothers and sisters are observing Muslims and very keen not to "spoil" their income with money which is not theirs. They believe it is their duty to let the owner of any riyal to have it. The only way they guarantee that is by letting bin Laden's share reach him. Some of the brothers and sisters believed it was their religious duty to support this distinguished brother from their own money. While many are very careful not to irritate the royal family, many more do not care and insist on letting the money reach Osama.

The way bin Laden family money is structured is very complicated because there is the big company and there are many small companies of few brothers together, and there are many individuals with their personal investment. To make the matter even more complex it is very well known that bin Laden family money is intimately mixed with the royal family money in a very complex way. Most of the companies are joint ventures with members of the royal family including King Fahad himself.

There is another big source of income to bin Laden, donations. During the early jihad era when it was blessed by the Saudi regime, he made excellent relations with many wealthy Saudis and Arabs. It is true that most of those would not support him now because of the Saudi government position but some do take the risk.

Lastly, bin Laden activities are not very dependent on money. His followers are not mercenaries. Training does not cost a lot of money. Explosives and weapons are very cheap in some parts of the world. In Somalia TNT for example is cheaper than sugar. In Yemen you can buy an RPG for less than TV set. The role of money here is over exaggerated by many writers.

In the eighties bin Laden was seen as a star of the Afghan Jihad. He was very much admired and respected for his sacrifice but he was not seen as a potential leader. Almost nobody saw leadership ambitions in him at that period. His public image was so good that the regime used this image to have a boost during early days of the Gulf War. The regime published a fabricated interview with him in "Al-Muslimoon" newspaper claiming he supported the regime measures to counteract the Iraqi invasion.

In the period between Iraqi invasion and his reappearance in Afghanistan 1996 he was almost forgotten by the public. The elite and especially the jihadis were still admiring him and following up his news. Some even made their way to Sudan to meet him and offer support. The public were reminded about him by the video confessions of the group attributed to Riyadh bombing.

After his declaration of jihad in 1996 his public image had a surge but this time as a leader rather than a star. There was a lot of controversy about him. In Saudi Arabia nobody would accuse him of being part of conspiracy but people would differ about his new program. There was almost a consensus in the Saudi domain on refusal of American presence in Arabia and many would like the idea of expelling the Americans by force. Many others had reservations and thought violence will bring a lot of trouble to the country. Interestingly those who disagreed with him did not accuse him having personal agenda or looking for personal benefits.

This image went on with occasional boosts by the media until the African bombings. Interestingly the story of the International Front and fatwah did not attract much attention. The Kenya Tanzania bombings reminded people of bin Laden. The media coverage was so overwhelming that the Saudi authorities felt jealous of bin Laden. People's reaction, however, was mixed. While many felt triumph for scaring the Americans, many others felt upset by the picture of hundreds of civilians killed and injured in the attack. They felt that this can never be justified.

The American missiles then played very strong role in sorting the controversy. After the American attack on Sudan and Afghanistan it became almost shameful to criticize bin Laden. People inside Saudi Arabia and in other Arab countries were full of anger towards America, and whoever can antagonize America would provide a fulfillment to their desire of discharging their anger. The American strike with the associated remarks by Clinton and American officials proved that bin Laden is a big challenge to America. In the mind of average Arab and Muslim bin Laden appeared as the man who was able to drive America so crazy that it started shooting haphazardly at unjustified targets. There was another factor which made people forget the scene of civilian victims, the special nature of the Sudanese factory. Those who had reservations of the African bombings thought that this arrogance of the Americans is much worse than the embassy bombings. Their view was that while bin Laden or others can make "executive" mistake because of their difficult circumstances, logistics and communication, America is not supposed to do this mistake unless it is done in purpose.

Interestingly the jealousy of the Saudi regime was seen clearly in the Saudi media when they instructed the Saudi TV and radio not to mention bin Laden name at all. Even when they reported the American missile attack the news item was " attack on terrorist base in Afghanistan, period".

			Oriana Zill was Associate Producer of FRONTLINE's "Hunting Bin Laden"

A month after the bombings, El Hage was arrested after testifying before a grand jury. Originally charged with eleven counts of perjury, or lying to the grand jury, the charges were later expanded to include conspiracy to kill United States nationals. Prosecutors claim that El Hage, one of two American citizens who have been charged, was useful to bin Laden because of his ability to travel freely around the world with an American passport.

El Hage's lawyer requested the February hearing to discuss the restrictive conditions of El Hage's jailing and to ask the judge for a decision on bail. After several hearings, Judge Leonard B. Sand denied bail and El Hage was taken to solitary confinement at the Metropolitan Correctional Center to await trial.

El Hage was born in 1960 into a Catholic family in Sidon, Lebanon. He grew up in highly Islamic Kuwait, where his father worked for an oil company. According to El Hage's mother-in-law, he converted to Islam as a teenager after reading the Koran.

His family disapproved of El Hage's conversion and shunned him. But he was taken in by a Muslim Sheik in Kuwait who paid for his education in the States, and he became a deeply religious young man.

In 1978, El Hage moved to Lafayette, Louisiana, to attend the University of Southwestern Louisiana (USL). He studied urban planning and got a job at a donut shop where many young Arab men worked. His advisor at USL remembers El Hage as an average student who showed no signs of strong political views.

At the beginning of the Afghan war against the Soviet Union, El Hage left Louisiana and traveled to Pakistan to enroll in mujahedeen war training programs. Thousands of young Arab men from around the world flocked to Pakistan to help the Afghans expel the Soviets. Sources told FRONTLINE that El Hage was a follower of Sheik Abdullah Azzam, one of the most important spiritual leaders of the Arab mujahedeen forces. Azzam preached that the war in Afghanistan was a jihad, or holy war, and that those who participated would have a special place in heaven.

During the Afghan war, Sheik Azzam became aligned with Osama bin Laden, who was at that time becoming active in fundraising and organizing mujahedeen fighters. Some reports have speculated that this may have been the initial connection between El Hage and Osama bin Laden.

By January 1985, El Hage returned to the United States and to USL. Later that year, he traveled to Arizona to marry an 18-year-old American Muslim named April. April's mother told FRONTLINE the two were introduced through an arranged marriage. In May 1986, El Hage graduated from USL and moved permanently to Arizona to start a family.

El Hage and his wife returned to Pakistan several times over the next few years, and for about a year, his mother-in-law and her husband accompanied them. "I was the Matron surgical nurse at an Afghan Surgical Hospital," she told FRONTLINE. "Wadih did not actually fight, but acted as an educator. My husband went with Wadih to deliver textbooks and Korans to the young people. It was a Jihad, a fight for Islam."

When they returned to Arizona, El Hage worked at several minimum wage jobs, including city custodian. In 1989, he was granted U.S. citizenship.

Dr. Rashad Khalifa was an unorthodox imam in Tucson, Arizona who preached numerology and claimed that the Koran was written by man, not God. This claim is heresy to most Muslims and a sin punishable with death. The imam also let men and women pray together and wear non-traditional dress.

New York prosecutors say that in the first days of 1990, El Hage was called up by a "tall man" from New York who suddenly arrived in Arizona and said he was there to check Rashad Khalifa. El Hage entertained him at his house and drove him to the mosque, prosecutors say.

Several weeks later, Khalifa was found murdered in the kitchen of the Mosque. Several members of the radical Islamic sect, Al Fuqra, were convicted for conspiring to commit the murder, but no shooter has ever been convicted. Prosecutors have repeatedly implied El Hage knows who committed the murder and may have been involved.

El Hage's family calls the claim ridiculous, saying El Hage was out of the country at the time of the murder. Prosecutors have repeatedly said El Hage at least should have contacted the authorities with what he knew after he found out that the man was murdered.

Soon after, El Hage moved his growing family to the suburban community of Arlington, Texas.

In December 1989, according to prosecutors, El Hage met Mahmud Abouhalima at an Islamic conference in Oklahoma City. According to a confession Abouhalima later gave U.S. Attorneys, Abouhalima contacted El Hage in 1990 to purchase assault weapons to be used against radical Jewish Rabbi Meir Kahane. Kahane was murdered in November 1990 in New York City.

El Hage's family told FRONTLINE that he did buy some weapons for Abouhalima, but they were never picked up. Family members also say El Hage was told the guns were for self-defense against the Kahane group.

In early 1991, according to El Hage's grand jury testimony, he was called to New York to help direct the Alkifah Refugee Center, a Brooklyn-based group that raised money to support veterans of the Afghan war. According to documents from the World Trade Center case, Alkifah had a Tucson office and contacts with the main mosque in Arlington, Texas, and family members confirmed that El Hage had been in contact with the group.

On the same day that El Hage arrived in Brooklyn, on March 1, 1991, the leader of the Alkifah Center, Mustafa Shalabi, disappeared. A week later his mutilated body was found in the apartment he and Mahmud Abouhalima shared in Brooklyn. The murder case has never been solved, but prosecutors believe the murder was the result of a dispute over allocation of the group's resources.

The family maintains that El Hage was called in as a mediator on this and other occasions when his friends from Afghanistan developed disputes. "I know he was good friends with Shalabi," says El Hage's mother-in-law. "He [Shalabi] was running the organization to help Afghan veterans and Wadih wanted to help him. Wadih cried on the phone about Shalabi's death. Shalabi must have called him to go to New York to help when the trouble started."

Other friends of the family from Arlington, Texas, also described El Hage as a mediator and a person whose religious purity and strong faith were trusted by others "He was calm and devout, not violent or rash," said a close family member. "I would get more upset over politics than he would."

Whether El Hage was a mediator or collaborator, evidence shows he was friends with many people who were later convicted in the World Trade Center and New York City Landmark bombing cases. On March 8, 1991, El Hage signed in to visit El Sayyid Nosair at the Riker's Island. Nosair was serving a sentence for gun charges stemming from the Meir Kahane murder case. Both El Sayyid Nosair and Mahmud Abouhalima were central figures in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and both have been convicted in that crime.

There are other unusual connections between the men. In January of 1992, El Hage was arrested in Arlington, Texas, for writing several bad checks. He was riding in the car with a companion named Marwan Salama. According to phone records from the World Trade Center case, Salama had extensive phone contacts with the World Trade center bombers in the two months before the actual bombing.

In early 1992, El Hage moved his family to the Sudan and he began working as a secretary for Osama bin Laden. Family members say El Hage worked only in bin Laden's legitimate businesses in the Sudan. FRONTLINE research shows that bin Laden had quite a few businesses there, including a tannery, several farms, a road construction firm, a transport company and two investment companies.

"He [bin Laden] was a busy person and had hundreds of people working for him," said one El Hage family member. "You didn't get to see him unless he invited you." El Hage's mother-in-law received letters from El Hage that contained seed samples from the Sudanese farms. El Hage frequently took international trips to Europe and elsewhere on business for bin Laden, family members say.

Prosecutors, however, believe that El Hage was becoming a key aide to bin Laden, who in turn was becoming an international terrorist leader. "The intelligence that was being created pointed increasingly to him as someone who had to be dealt with," said Larry Johnson, a former CIA officer and Deputy Director of the State Department's Office of Counter Terrorism from 1989 to 1993. "There were other intelligence indicators that were starting to surface in the '94 time frame that pointed out that Usama was a problem."

Little evidence has emerged that proves what El Hage was doing in Sudan. His family admits freely that he worked for bin Laden, but cannot provide details as to everything he did. Prosecutors have alleged in court papers that El Hage "is being investigated for his efforts to try to obtain chemical weapons for Osama bin Laden's organization." But no evidence has been provided to back up this claim.

Finally, it was April El Hage who convinced her husband to leave the Sudan and bin Laden's company. According to family members, bin Laden had been encouraging Wadih to take a second wife and had even started to arrange someone for him. "April would have none of that," said April's mother. "She is Muslim, but she is also American, and she wouldn't stand for it."

In 1994, El Hage left the Sudan for Kenya and became director of a Muslim charity organization called "Help Africa People." Kenyan government documents say the organization was dedicated to malaria control projects. El Hage also worked in the gem business to make extra income.

During his time in Kenya, El Hage stayed in contact with members of bin Laden's inner circle. In particular, say prosecutors, El Hage associated with Ubaidah al-Banshiri, a key figure within bin Laden's organization who was living in Kenya. U.S. prosecutors believe Al-Banshiri was a key military leader, one of two top-ranking commanders, of "al Qaeda," bin Laden's organization. In May of 1996, al-Banshiri drowned in a ferry accident on Lake Victoria.

Another bin Laden associate, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, also known as Haroun Fazul, moved into El Hage's house in Nairobi during this period and began to work for El Hage as a secretary. "He had no money and needed a place to stay," says El Hage's mother-in-law. "Wadih was always letting people stay with them. That is the proper Muslim way."

Haroun Fazul, according to prosecutors, was a key player in the Nairobi embassy bombing in August of 1998--accused of renting the house where the bomb was built and driving the lead truck in the bombing.

When told of the charges that Haroun Fazul was a key organizer of the bomb plot, El Hage's family laughed. "April always called him the black Ronald McDonald," said April's mother. "She thought he was kind of goofy. And she finds it very hard to believe that he could have been a terrorist."

Another man charged in the bombing, Mohammed Saddiq Odeh, has admitted during his interrogation that he knew El Hage in Kenya and that El Hage had attended his wedding. Odeh was captured trying to enter Pakistan just after the bombings and provided investigators with the first link that the bombings were conducted by people working for Osama bin Laden.

U.S. officials in Washington D.C. had first started investigating Osama bin Laden in the mid-1990s based on growing evidence that he was funding terrorist activity. The New York Times reported that in 1996, CIA and State Department officials secretly met with a Sudanese agent in Washington and asked for the names of 200 bin Laden associates from the Sudan. In their efforts to get more information on bin Laden, U.S. investigators attempted to locate and interview as many bin Laden associates as possible. That investigation eventually led them to Nairobi, Kenya-- and, in August 1997, to Wadih El Hage. This was a full year before the Nairobi bombing.

"I arrived in Nairobi and not even 12 hours later there was a knock on the outer gate," said El Hage's mother-in-law, who was visiting the family. "They came into the house...it was the police department of Nairobi and American FBI agents." El Hage was away at the time, family members told us, on a gem collecting trip to Afghanistan.

FBI officials had a search warrant and collected all the papers in the house. They also took El Hage's personal computer, and told the family that they were searching for stolen property. They also gave April El Hage and her mother a firm warning.

"They spoke to us that night and told us it would probably be best if we got back to the United States right away," said El Hage's mother-in-law. "They said it might not be safe to live here. She [April] got frightened. She's got all these little children, and she's frightened and I'm upset. So she says, no, I'm not leaving without my husband. I'm afraid I don't quite remember the words but the inference was plain, that something might happen to her or the children."

On El Hage's personal computer, the authorities found a letter that has been released as part of the federal case against the Africa bombers. In the letter, which prosecutors now believe was written by El Hage housemate Haroun Fazul, the author describes the presence of an "East African cell" connected to bin Laden.

The letter also states that the cell members had recently become aware that bin Laden had declared war on America by watching the international media. They seem upset because they were not advised of the decision before it happened and are worried about the security of the cell.

"There are many reasons that lead me to believe that the cell members in East Africa are in great danger," says the letter. "...the Hajj [bin Laden] has declared war on America. My recommendation to my brothers in East Africa was to not be complacent regarding security matters and that they should know that now they have become America's primary target... I am 100 percent sure that the phone is tapped."

El Hage's real name is evident in the letter, as is his assumed name from Afghanistan, Abd'al Sabur, which means "servant of the most patient." The letter seems to imply that El Hage is an "engineer" of the cell.

Two days after the raid on El Hage's house, he returned to Nairobi from Afghanistan and was questioned by police. He was also told to leave the country, according to the family. One month later, in September 1997, Wadih El Hage and his wife left the country and returned to America. According to family members, they sold everything they had in order to raise the money to get home.

Intelligence sources have told FRONTLINE that the Nairobi raid was a "counter-terrorism disruption" and that forcing Wadih El Hage to leave the country was part of the strategy to fracture these cells as soon as they are found. They did not, however, deport Haroun Fazul. In hindsight, the authorities clearly did not understand the danger posed by El Hage's associate at that time, and the evidence is unclear whether they were aware of Fazul at the time of the raid.

El Hage moved back to the suburban community of Arlington, Texas and got a job in a local tire store. The family moved into a small apartment near the University of Texas and the children enrolled in a local Muslim school.

According to friends and neighbors contacted by FRONTLINE, the family lived a normal Muslim life, regularly attending Mosque and schooling their children in the Koran. "He was a hard worker, had a good business sense and was very devout," said his co-worker at the Lone Star Tire Store, Mahmoud Mazouni. "He became something of a religious leader, like an imam and sometimes led the prayers."

The Muslim community in Arlington was shocked when El Hage was arrested and insist he is innocent of any charges. Many members of the community offered to try to raise bail for El Hage after he was arrested, to show their support.

Mr. Mazouni said that El Hage showed no special reaction on August 7, 1998, when the East Africa bombings took place. At home, however, he and his family were worried. "When the bombings first happened, we were shocked," said a close family member who asked not to be named. "We said, oh god, Nairobi--don't let it be Muslims who are involved. Then, when we found it was Muslims, we knew trouble was coming."

Two weeks after the bombings, FBI agents interviewed El Hage about his connections to bin Laden and the people in Nairobi. According to prosecutors, El Hage denied knowing Odeh and claimed to not recognize him in a picture during this interview.

On September 15, 1998, El Hage testified before the grand jury investigation into the Africa bombings. Here, prosecutors say, he testified that he never heard that al-Banshiri died and that he didn't know Odeh and other people who knew bin Laden. Several days later, El Hage was arrested and charged with perjury. On October 7, 1998, a new indictment was returned by the grand jury, expanding the charges against El Hage to include conspiracy to kill United States nationals. In May, 2001, he was found guilty by a federal jury of both perjury and conspiracy.

last updated September 12, 2001

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