Posted on 09/25/2001 4:56:53 PM PDT by Fred
NCI document
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Nuclear Control Institute Committee to Bridge the Gap WASHINGTON—The nation’s 103 nuclear power reactors are vulnerable to attack by terrorists, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and other government entities have failed to move decisively to impose the further security measures that are needed to prevent a successful attack and avert catastrophic radiological consequences. This was the warning issued today by two watchdog organizations that have made many attempts over the past 17 years to convince the NRC and commercial nuclear plant operators to upgrade their defenses against assaults by terrorist organizations. In their letter, the Washington-based Nuclear Control Institute and the Los Angeles-based Committee to Bridge the Gap released a recent exchange of letters with NRC Chairman Richard A. Meserve. The two organizations cited “the extraordinary and unprecedented threat that now exists inside the United States in the wake of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.” They laid out specific proposals for denying terrorists the opportunity to destroy nuclear power plants. These proposals include immediate use of National Guard troops to deter attacks from land and water, prompt deployment of advanced anti-aircraft weapons to defeat suicidal attacks from the air, and a thorough re-vetting of all plant employees and contractors to protect against sabotage by insiders. In addition, the groups called on the NRC to significantly upgrade its security regulations to protect against the larger numbers and the greater sophistication of attackers posed by the new terrorist threat. In a brief response to the specific proposals, Meserve stated only that the “Commission is evaluating current requirements and statutory authority relating to acts or threats of terrorism, including but not limited to those that you presented in your letter.” “This is a familiar refrain, and we do not have the luxury of time to allow the NRC and other federal agencies to engage in a prolonged bureaucratic review process,” said Paul Leventhal, president of NCI, at a press conference in Washington. “Iran threatened attacks against U.S. reactors as early as 1987, but recent trial testimony has revealed that bin Laden’s training camps are offering instruction in ‘urban warfare’ against ‘enemies’ installations’ including power plants. It is prudent to assume, especially after the horrific, highly coordinated attacks of September 11, that bin Laden’s soldiers have done their homework and are fully capable to attack nuclear plants for maximum effect.” Daniel Hirsch, president of the Committee to Bridge the Gap, underscored the immediate danger by noting that nearly half of the plants tested in NRC-supervised security exercises have failed to repel mock terrorist attacks. “These exercises involve small numbers of simulated attackers compared with the large cell of terrorists now understood to have waged the four sophisticated attacks of September 11. The NRC’s mock terrorist exercises severely limit the tactics, weapons and explosives used by the adversary, yet in almost half the tests they reached and simulated destruction of safety systems that in real attacks could have caused severe core damage, meltdown and catastrophic radioactive releases. Now in response to operator complaints, the NRC is actually preparing to shift responsibility for supervising these exercises to the operators themselves. Current events clearly show that nuclear power plant security is too important to be left to industry self-assessment.” Dr. Edwin Lyman, a physicist and NCI’s scientific director, pointed out that a direct, high-speed hit by a large commercial passenger jet “would in fact have a high likelihood a penetrating a containment building” that houses a power reactor. “Following such an assault,” he said, “the possibility of an unmitigated loss-of-coolant accident and significant release of radiation into the environment is a very real one.” Such a release, whether caused by an air strike, or by a ground or water assault, or by insider sabotage could result in tens of thousands of cancer deaths downwind of the plant. A number of these plants are located near large cities, he noted. In making their presentations, the organizations acknowledged that they have long been troubled by the dilemma of speaking about the present vulnerability of nuclear power plants. “We have tried to work quietly for a decade and a half in a largely unsuccessful attempt to get the NRC to upgrade reactor security.” said Leventhal. “Our principal success came in 1994 when the NRC agreed to require nuclear plant operators to erect barriers and establish setback distances to protect against truck-bomb attacks. But this reform came only after the lesson of the bombing of the World Trade Center the year before, and the NRC has refused our appeals to upgrade protection to defend against the much larger bombs used by terrorists since.” Hirsch said that the horrendous attacks of September 11 have now made NRC foot dragging intolerable. “The new threat should now be evident to all, and the country can afford to wait no longer,” he said. “The vulnerabilities at these plants can and must be closed, now. The American people have a right to know the dangers and to demand the prompt corrective actions that we propose to protect nuclear power plants from terrorist attacks and the unthinkable consequences that could follow.” Copies of the letter to Meserve were sent to the governors of the 32 states where nuclear power plants are located and to several Federal agencies. Some members of Congress, including Rep. Edward Markey (D-Mass.) who sent his own letter to Meserve, are actively monitoring the NRC’s role in protecting nuclear power plants against the heightened terrorist threat. |
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Well...I don't think a 747 or a 757/767 could actually penetrate the 'can'. However, the trick isn't to penetrate, but to shock and dislodge the reactor core and damage the steam containment system when the auto-leluge system kicks in.
Some frequently asked questions about nuclear power plant security:Q: Are nuclear plants likely targets for terrorist attacks? A: The likelihood of a terrorist act against a nuclear facility is low, because plants are equipped for, and prepared to defend against, most types of attacks. They are structurally fortified to withstand the impact of natural forces like hurricanes and tornadoes and airborne objects up to a very substantial force. Reactors at nuclear power plants are enclosed in containment buildings made of steel and reinforced concrete up to four feet thick. Containments at nuclear power plants along the glide paths into airports are designed to withstand airliner accidents. Each nuclear plant has a well-armed security force trained to defend against armed assaults and acts of sabotage, and has a multiple barrier, defense-in-depth design to ensure against a potential release of radioactivity in case of an accident or act of sabotage. Given all that has been done to “harden” plants against attack or sabotage, the FBI historically has rated the chances of their being targeted by terrorists as low. Even so, the nuclear industry is taking steps to strengthen security programs against terrorist threats. The industry—under NRC oversight—is seeking to further enhance the effectiveness and comprehensiveness of the evaluations of our security program, including “force-on-force” exercises. Q: What has the industry’s response been to the terrorists attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on Sept. 11? A: All U.S. nuclear plants went on the highest level of alert status immediately after the events of September 11, even before a security advisory was issued by federal authorities, and will maintain a heightened level of vigilance as long as circumstances dictate. Those measures include: adding additional security personnel and erecting physical barriers where needed; increasing patrols of grounds and perimeters; and restricting access by the general public. Current security measures are highly effective in deterring sabotage and safeguarding the public, but industry representatives are working with local, state and federal officials to explore additional ways that nuclear plant security can be enhanced in light of the New York and Washington events. Q: What is the responsibility of the industry regarding the safety and security of nuclear plants? A: Companies that operate nuclear power plants must demonstrate the ability to defend against assaults by a well-trained paramilitary force, armed with automatic weapons and explosives, intent on forcing its way into a plant to commit radiological sabotage, with the aid of an “insider.” High-tech surveillance and communications systems are in place to identify potential intruders and speed the response to possible threats. In addition, internal security programs reduce the sabotage threat from an “insider” by conducting background checks of plant personnel, tightly controlling access to certain areas of the facility, and maintaining “fitness-for-duty” standards to deter drug and alcohol problems and detect erratic behavior. All U.S. nuclear power plants meet the security requirements of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Regular mock drills and “force-on-force” exercises help hone the response of plant security forces to a wide range of threat scenarios. On the limited number of occasions when such exercises have shown potential weaknesses in plant security, companies have implemented additional protective measures. Although the industry and government have acknowledged that armed frontal assaults on nuclear power plants are unlikely, preparing for even unlikely events is in keeping with the defense-in-depth strategy for protecting public health and safety. Q: What kind of damage could occur if an aircraft strikes a nuclear power plant? A: While nuclear plants cannot be guaranteed to be impervious to every imaginable threat, commercial nuclear reactors are designed and constructed with that extremely remote possibility in mind. Design requirements with respect to aircraft impacts are tailored to each individual facility, but all nuclear reactor containment buildings are like bunkers, built of thick, steel-reinforced concrete. Inside the containment building, the reactor is encased in a steel pressure vessel up a foot thick. This defense-in-depth safety strategy minimizes the risk of penetration from outside forces, and helps prevent the release of radioactivity in the event of an accident.
Also see:
Plant Security: Physical Barriers, Armed Guards, Personnel Procedures
Credibility = zero!
What a crock!
Terrorists will not attack nuclear power reactors because they are too hard to get at, and will not have the desired effect (no big explosions, no big loss of life, etc)
You could float right into Turkey Point on Biscayne Bay with a group of terrorists and take the plant over without having to worry about any land based defenses, who would stop them the Marine Patrol?
So where IS this data?? I note you don't provide a link to any?? There isn't any back in the "source" (NCI.ORG).
I don't, but neither is anything else guaranteed to be absolutely safe from a well organized military attack of sufficient force. We can spend ourselves blind securing everything - and still not do the job. It is a matter of priorities.
Elsewhere you posted look at the data.
So you are either in league with these opportunistic fear-mongering NGO's or you have succombed to their sirene song of sweet "give a bunch of unemployable attornies a handout to raise hell in Washington."
One thing is for sure - they don't have the data. They don't even have a clue of the data. Real vulnerabilities or lack thereof from real red-teaming [delta-force] against nuclear facilities is very sensitive classified information.
NPR?? You mean "National Socialist Radio"? The wholly-owned subsidiary of the left?
"So suppose, just to clarify our policy commitments, it's good data. Wouldn't this be a priority?"
The deal is that it is quite unlikely to be good data. The power reactor guys KNOW (and have known for years) that they are likely targets. So I am absolutely certain that steps have already been taken to enhance security. They may need more, they may not--I suspect we are unlikely to know, as they (like the military, and wisely) are not going to publicize ALL (or even most) of the precautions in place simply with a view to taking the potential terrorists by surprise.
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