A Note from Afghanistan

THIS IS AN IMPORTANT READ. PLEASE GIVE IT MAX CIRCULATION. TRY TO GET THIS DOCUMENT IN THE HANDS OF THE POLICY AND DECISION MAKERS.

KNOWING YOUR ENEMY IS THE MOST IMPORTANT KEY TO WAR. THIS LETTER WAS WRITTEN BY A VERY BRIGHT AND AFGHANISTAN STREET-SMART WEST POINT GRAD TO HIS CLASSMATES. HE KNOWS THE TERRAIN, THE ENEMY, AND THE WEATHER IN AFGHANISTAN FROM BEING THERE, NOT FROM BOOKS.

HACK (Col David Hackworth) ____________________________________________________________ Author: Richard Kidd

Many of you are probably not aware that I was one of the last American citizens to have spent a great deal of time in Afghanistan. I was first there in 1993, providing relief and assistance to refugees along the Tajik border, and in this capacity have traveled all along the border region between the two countries.

In 1998 and 1999, I was the Deputy Program Manager for the UN's mine action program in Afghanistan. This program is the largest civilian employer in the country with over 5,000 persons clearing mines and UXO. In this later capacity, I was somewhat ironically engaged in a "Holy War," as decreed by the Taliban, against the evil of landmines; and by a special proclamation of Mullah Omar, all those who might have died in this effort were considered to be "martyrs" -- even an "infidel" like myself.

The mine action program is the most respected relief effort in the country, and because of this I had the opportunity to travel extensively without too much interference or restriction. I still have extensive contacts in the area and among the Afghan community and read a great deal on the subject.

I had wanted to write earlier and share some of my perspectives, but quite frankly, I have been a bit too popular in DC this past week and have not had time. Dr. Tony Kern's comments were excellent and I would like to use them as a basis for sharing some observations.

First, he is absolutely correct. This war is about will, resolve and character. I want to touch on that later, but first I want to share some comments about our "enemy."

Our enemy is not the people of Afghanistan. The country is devastated beyond what most of us can imagine. The vast majority of the people live day-to-day, hand-to-mouth in abject conditions of poverty, misery and deprivation. Less than 30% of the men are literate, the women even less. The country is exhausted, and desperately wants something like peace. They know very little of the world at large, and have no access to information or knowledge that would counter what they are being told by the Taliban. They have nothing left, nothing that is except for their pride.

Who is our enemy? Well, our enemy is a group of non-Afghans, often referred to by the Afghans as "Arabs" and a fanatical group of religious leaders and their military cohort, the Taliban. The non-Afghan contingent came from all over the Islamic world to fight in the war against the Russians. Many came using a covert network created with assistance by our own government.

OBL (as Osama bin Laden was referred to by us in the country at the time) restored this network to bring in more fighters, this time to support the Taliban in their civil war against the former Mujehdeen. Over time, this military support along with financial support has allowed OBL and his "Arabs" to co-opt significant government activities and leaders. OBL is the "inspector general" of Taliban armed forces; his bodyguards protect senior Talib leaders and he has built a system of deep bunkers for the Taliban, which were designed to withstand cruise missile strikes (uhm, where did he learn to do that?). His forces basically rule the southern city of Kandahar.

This high-profile presence of OBL and his "Arabs" has, in the last 2 years or so, started to generate a great deal of resentment on the part of the local Afghans. At the same time, the legitimacy of the Taliban regime has started to decrease as it has failed to end the war, as local humanitarian conditions have worsened and as "cultural" restrictions have become even harsher.

It is my assessment that most Afghans no longer support the Taliban. Indeed the Taliban have recently had a very difficult time getting recruits for their forces and have had to rely more and more on non-Afghans, either from Pushtun tribes in Pakistan or from OBL. OBL and the Taliban, absent any US action, were probably on their way to sharing the same fate that all other outsiders and outside doctrines have experienced in Afghanistan -- defeat and dismemberment.

During the Afghan war with the Soviets, much attention was paid to the martial prowess of the Afghans. We were all at West Point at the time, and most of us had high-minded idealistic thoughts about how we would all want to go help the brave "freedom fighters" in their struggle against the Soviets.

Those concepts were naive to the extreme. The Afghans, while never conquered as a nation, are not invincible in battle. A "good" Afghan battle is one that makes a lot of noise and light. Basic military skills are rudimentary and clouded by cultural constraints that no matter what, a warrior should never lose his honor. Indeed, firing from the prone is considered distasteful (but still done).

Traditionally, the Afghan order of battle is very feudal in nature, with fighters owing allegiance to a "commander," and this person owing allegiance upwards and so on and so on. Often such allegiance is secured by payment. And while the Taliban forces have changed this somewhat, many of the units in the Taliban army are there because they are being paid to be there. All such groups have very strong loyalties along ethnic and tribal lines.

Again, the concept of having a place of "honor" and "respect" is of paramount importance and blood feuds between families and tribes can last for generations over a perceived or actual slight. That is one reason why there were 7 groups of Mujehdeen fighting the Russians. It is a very difficult task to form and keep united a large bunch of Afghans into a military formation. The "real" stories that have come out of the war against the Soviets are very enlightening and a lot different from our fantastic visions as cadets.

When the first batch of Stingers came in and were given to one Mujehdeen group, another group -- supposedly on the same side -- attacked the first group and stole the Stingers, not so much because they wanted to use them, but because having them was a matter of prestige.

Many larger coordinated attacks that advisers tried to conduct failed when all the various Afghan fighting groups would give up their assigned tasks (such as blocking or overwatch) and instead would join the assault group in order to seek glory.

In comparison to Vietnam, the intensity of combat and the rate of fatalities were lower for all involved.

As you can tell from above, it is my assessment that these guys are not THAT good in a purely military sense and the "Arabs" probably even less so than the Afghans. So why is it that they have never been conquered? It goes back to Dr. Kern's point about will.

During their history, the only events that have managed to form any semblance of unity among the Afghans, is the desire to fight foreign invaders. And in doing this, the Afghans have been fanatical. The Afghans' greatest military strength is the ability to endure hardships that would, in all probability, kill most Americans and enervate the resolve of all but the most elite military units.

The physical difficulties of fighting in Afghanistan, the terrain, the weather, and the harshness are all weapons that our enemies will use to their advantage and use well. (NOTE: For you military planner types and armchair generals: around November 1st, most road movement is impossible, in part because all the roads used by the Russians have been destroyed and air movement will be problematic at best). Also, those fighting us are not afraid to fight. OBL and others do not think the US has the will or the stomach for a fight. Indeed after the absolutely inane missile strikes of 1998, the overwhelming consensus was that we were cowards who would not risk one life in face-to-face combat.

Rather than demonstrating our might and acting as a deterrent, that action and others of the not so recent past, have reinforced the perception that the US does not have any "will" and that we are morally and spiritually corrupt.

Our challenge is to play to the weaknesses of our enemy, notably their propensity for internal struggles, the distrust between the extremists/Arabs and the majority of Afghans, their limited ability to fight coordinated battles, and their lack of external support. More importantly through is that we have to take steps not to play to their strengths, which would be to unite the entire population against us by increasing their suffering or killing innocents, to get bogged down trying to hold terrain, or to get into a battle of attrition chasing up and down mountain valleys.

I have been asked how I would fight the war. This is a big question and well beyond my pay grade or expertise. And while I do not want to second guess current plans or start an academic debate, I would share the following from what I know about Afghanistan and the Afghans.

First, I would give the Northern Alliance a big wad of cash so that they can buy off a chunk of the Taliban army before winter. Second, also with this cash, I would pay some guys to kill some of the Taliban leadership, making it look like an inside job to spread distrust and build on existing discord. Third I would support the Northern alliance with military assets, but not take it over or adopt so high a profile as to undermine its legitimacy in the eyes of most Afghans.

Fourth would be to give massive amounts of humanitarian aid and assistance to the Afghans in Pakistan in order to demonstrate our goodwill and to give these guys a reason to live rather than the choice between dying of starvation or dying fighting the "infidel." Fifth, start a series of public works projects in areas of the country not under Taliban control (these are much more than the press reports) again to demonstrate goodwill and that improvements come with peace. Sixth, I would consider very carefully putting any female service members into Afghanistan proper -- sorry to the females of our class but within that culture a man who allows a women to fight for him has zero respect, and we will need respect to gain the cooperation of Afghan allies. No Afghan will work with a man who fights with women.

I would hold off from doing anything too dramatic in the new term, keeping a low level of covert action and pressure up over the winter, allowing this pressure to force open the fissions around the Taliban that were already developing -- expect that they will quickly turn on themselves and on OBL.

When we do "pick up" the pieces, I would make sure that we do so on the ground, "man to man."

While I would never want to advocate American causalities, it is essential that we communicate to OBL and all others watching that we can and will "engage and destroy the enemy in close combat." As mentioned above, we should not try to gain or hold terrain, but Infantry operations against the enemy are essential. There can be no excuses after the defeat or lingering doubts in the minds of our enemies regarding American resolve and nothing, nothing will communicate this except for ground combat.

And once this is all over, unlike in 1989, the US must provide continued long-term economic assistance to rebuild the country.

While I have written too much already, I think it is also important to share a few things on the subject of brutality. Our opponents will not abide by the Geneva conventions. There will be no prisoners unless there is a chance that they can be ransomed or made part of a local prisoner exchange.

During the war with the Soviets, videotapes were made of communist prisoners having their throats slit. Indeed, there did exist a "trade" in prisoners so that souvenir videos could be made by outsiders to take home with them.

This practice has spread to the Philippines, Bosnia and Chechnya where similar videos are being made today and can be found on the web for those so inclined. We can expect our soldiers to be treated the same way. Sometime during this war I expect that we will see videos of US prisoners having their heads cut off.

Our enemies will do this not only to demonstrate their "strength" to their followers, but also to cause us to overreact, to seek wholesale revenge against civilian populations, and to turn this into the world-wide religious war that they desperately want.

This will be a test of our will and of our character. (For further collaboration of this type of activity please read Kipling).

This will not be a pretty war; it will be a war of wills, of resolve and somewhat conversely of compassion and of a character. Towards our enemies, we must show a level of ruthlessness that has not been part of our military character for a long time. But to those who are not our enemies we must show a level of compassion probably unheard of during war. We should do this not for humanitarian reasons, even though there are many, but for shrewd military logic.

For anyone who is still reading this way too long note, thanks for your patience. I will try to answer any questions that may arise in a more concise manner.

Thanks, Richard Kidd _____________________________________________________________

A SOLUTION: > THE NOBLE WARRIOR > > The United States and its allies are in the middle of an incredibly > complex crisis. First, we have an enemy that is not officially state > sponsored and has no professional standing army; it fights in a guerrilla > warfare fashion, making it difficult for our soldiers to distinguish > civilian from soldier. Second, and as a result of the first, in a combat > situation, we should expect to see numerous civilian casualties as well as > American military casualties. This will cause the erosion of both > domestic and international support, as was the case during the Vietnam > War. Third, the nature of the conflict is drawing questions in the > Islamic communities in the Middle East and in the U.S. about threats to > Islam by the West. All three of these complexities can be addressed if we > act in a moral fashion and embrace Afghan refugees as our friends in > refugee camps created and facilitated in Afghanistan by the United States > and its allies, while we conduct a military campaign against those who > support and conduct terrorism. By supporting these refugees we will > receive international, domestic, and even Afghan refugee support. Since > this is a new and terrible war that is predicated upon hate, we can unveil > our most powerful weapon -- compassion for Afghan civilians/refugees. If > we launch this moral war in conjunction with our traditional war, we will > gain the greatest resource of all -- support necessary to win. > > In the international sphere, we will gain general moral support by acting > as a caregiver to the Afghan refugees who have endured horrendous living > conditions for years. In caring for the refugees/civilians we will > reinforce the support of countries such as Britain that have already > pledged to support us with soldiers. Moreover, we will encourage, through > open international and political forums, countries that are unsure of or > have outright refused military support to help in the war effort by > providing assistance to the Afghan refugees in our camps. The countries > that continue to refuse to, or are still unsure of, their support will be > seen as unsympathetic to our soldiers and the plight of the refugees. This > will, in effect, make them enemies because even the countries of Iran and > Pakistan are aiding the refugees. When the U.S. is perceived as a noble > warrior, we will shore up support from both enemies and allies, because > few can argue against aiding and improving the living conditions for the > Afghan refugees. We will simply place countries such as Belgium in a > political dilemma and force them to support our efforts in winning this > war. If countries will not help us in a military fashion, they will > surely help us in supporting us with the refugees, and we will gain the > overall credit. > We have been involved in very few large scale military conflicts during > the last twenty-five years because of the concern over eroding > international, and more importantly, domestic support for such a war > effort. Anti-war activists have already shown concerns about previous > imperialistic military failures in Afghanistan by foreign armies (Britain > and Russia) as well as the plight of innocent Afghan refugees/civilians. > If we launch the moral war in conjunction with our traditional war, we > will gain the support of these anti-war activists. The entire world, with > the exception of Saddam Hussein, is united in condemning the actions of > the murderers on September 11, 2001. However, once the bullets start to > fly, people start to die, and the war is brought to people's living rooms > by our ever-present media, support will fade away and Americans will be > seen as the "evil doers" and "Muslim killers" unless we become the noble > warriors. > > The refugees will be assisted in refugee camps that will be administered > by the United States (possibly to be taken over by other agencies) and > supported internationally. Thus, the caregiving role of the U.S. will > reduce the concerns of domestic critics about civilian casualties. > Moreover, it will improve our military's chances of success because the > refugees/citizens will be in the refugee camps, and the enemy guerilla > soldiers will not. The strength of the guerilla soldier is the cover of > civilians. Once those civilians choose to move to the beneficial > conditions in the refugee camps, the only people left will be soldiers. > This will allow our soldiers to identify the true "evil doers". Hence, > there will be large reductions in refugee, civilian, and American military > casualties. Therefore, our former domestic critics will readily > participate in the same collective war effort as the military activists; > however, they will be doing so in their own way, such as by giving > political and/or monetary support or even by working at the refugee camps. > Thus, the United States will be unified in action as well as sorrow. > > Conducting the noble war along with the traditional war will be a great > cost to this great nation, but loss to such an enemy as the Taliban and > Osama Bin Laden would be a greater one. We can overcome the issue of cost > by distributing the expenses to various agencies such as the United > Nations, which will keep its moniker of international peacekeeper by > assisting the civilian refugees. NATO and non-military supporting > countries could also help with the costs. Therefore, we will have both > domestic and international support that we need to efficiently win this > war. It will give our soldiers the best chances of success and reduce > refugee/civilian casualties. We might even win the support of the Afghan > refugees, thereby totally eroding what little support they have had for > the Taliban and Bin Laden. In addition, if our enemies were to assault > the refugee camps to disrupt or undermine our humanitarian efforts, our > cause will be strengthened even more. > > In order to address religious concerns, we will offer to build short-term > (possibly long-term) mosques at the refugee camps under the guidance of > Muslim leadership from America and abroad. This will shore up the support > of Muslims in America and give them an active way to demonstrate their > patriotism while supporting Islam. This noble action will reduce the > religious polarization of Middle Eastern and Western cultures, which dates > back to the Crusades of the 11th century. Our respect and promotion of > Islam on the sites of the refugee camps themselves would eliminate the > need for retaliation through terrorism in the name of Islam. > > With the United States establishing itself as the "noble warrior", we will > encourage critics, both international and domestic, to lend their support > to the United States and its allies. Widespread support is necessary for > our success, and there are few that will find fault with the "noble > warrior". If cost is the only concern, we must consider the implications > of failure, which would lead to the empowerment of Bin Laden and the > increase of terrorism to far more dangerous proportions. The cost of > rebuilding Afghanistan after destroying its pathetic economic and > political structure will be exorbitant in any case. In conducting this > noble war we will, in effect, rebuild Afghanistan while we are destroying > only our enemies. Attempts by the Taliban or other enemies to intervene > will only add greater strength and support to our platform. We will use > their common weapon, the refugee/civilian, against them, which will also > benefit the civilian. > > The United States is the most capable nation-state in the history of the > world, and we will win this war efficiently when we become the "noble > warrior" and gain the support of even our critics. We are facing a new > kind of war, so we have a moral imperative to change our style of war, not > only for our own success, but for the success and preservation of > humankind as well. God Bless those who died on September 11, 2001; we do > this in your memory, and God Bless America, the noblest of warriors. > > Greg Haubner > 9/21/01

I don't like the idea that we must wait for the Taliban to self-destuct, everyone said Saddam and Iraq would self-destuct, and we all know how that's turned out.

I think we have to destroy the Taliban now, and be seen to destroy the Taliban now, by the whole World. If we don't, we start loosing credibilty, soon we will not be taken seriously at all. I already detect creeping appeasement, and attempts at weasel wording the mission (Destroy Terrorists and their supporting states). We need to get busy, because the Taliban and OBL, are not enough. We must topple at least 2 rogue states, and 3 or 4 would be better. I would like to see a US protectorate in Iraq, where we could demonstrate democatic free-enterprise in action. We must change the authoritarian tendancys of the middle-east, or there will never be peace for any of us.

America has fought guerrillas before, and Khe Sanh is an excellent example of how to do it. You offer the rats a juicy bit of cheese, to get them out into the open, and then pound them with modern firepower.

I suggest a hypothetical Camp Crusader, or some other irresistibly named fortification, convenently located to encourage attack. Combat engineers should be able to build one quickly. Strategically Offensive - Tactically Defensive is the way to minimize our losses. One of the advantages of this method is that it identifys the enemy (the bad guys are the ones attacking).

Let's see a few massed frontal assaults, into claymores and miniguns. Why should we wander around in the mountains, getting ambushed, when we can make them come to us. I also think fighting in the winter will enhance the usefullness of our infra-red technology, due to the contrast between body temp and the ambient temp.

The NVA broke their teeth on Khe Sanh, because they thought they had another Bien Dien Phu, where they broke the french. Let's give the Taliban a similar opportunity. Their aggressiveness is made to order for frontal assaults on fortified positions.

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