October 14, 2001

Reconsidering Saudi Arabia

oments of international crisis have a way of stripping away diplomatic facades and exposing uncomfortable truths. One of the disturbing realities clarified by last month's terror attacks is Saudi Arabia's tolerance for terrorism. Students of America's deeply cynical relationship with Riyadh have long known that the kingdom did little to discourage Islamic extremists, as long as they operated outside its borders, and that Washington muted its objections to keep oil flowing to the West. It is now clear that the Saudi behavior was more malignant. With Riyadh's acquiescence, money and manpower from Saudi Arabia helped create and sustain Osama bin Laden's terrorist organization.

Over the decades, the United States and Saudi Arabia have benefited from the cold-blooded bargain at the core of their relationship. America got the oil to run its economy and Saudi Arabia got the protection of American military might whenever the kingdom was threatened by its violent neighbors, including Iraq and Iran. Now, as international affairs are reordered in the wake of the terror attacks, it is time for American and Saudi leaders to see if they can fashion a healthier relationship that still serves the interests of both countries but with greater frankness and honesty than in the past.

The Saudi royal family can begin that process by looking unblinkingly at its passive attitude toward terrorism. Osama bin Laden happens to come from a wealthy Saudi family, but that is not the issue. The problem is Saudi Arabia's tangible connections to Islamic fundamentalist terrorism.

Until recent weeks, Saudi Arabia was one of the two critical sponsors of Afghanistan's ruling Taliban movement, along with Pakistan. Saudi money, religious teachings and diplomats helped the Taliban secure and keep control of Afghanistan. The country was then used to provide sanctuary and training camps for the bin Laden network. Saudi Arabia has also sponsored the fundamentalist academies known as madrassas in Pakistan. Many graduates of these madrassas have headed straight to Afghanistan, some to bin Laden training camps.

The Saudi government has allowed Saudi-based Muslim charitable organizations to funnel money to Al Qaeda and its terrorist network. On Friday, Washington moved against a prominent Saudi businessman said to be involved in these transfers. Since Sept. 11, Riyadh has refused pleas from Washington to freeze Mr. bin Laden's assets and those of his associates. Of the 19 hijackers who carried out last month's attacks, at least 10 were Saudi nationals. Riyadh has so far refused to cooperate fully with Washington's investigations of hijacking suspects. It has also barred Washington from using Saudi air bases to launch attacks against Afghanistan.

This is hardly the performance Americans expect from a country that is nominally its closest ally in the Persian Gulf region. It reflects the powerful tensions in Saudi society between the absolute rule of its worldly and Western-aligned royal family and the Islamic puritanism of the officially sanctioned Wahhabi sect on which the monarchy's legitimacy is built. In a closed political system, the only available outlet for criticism of government policies and corruption is Islamic fundamentalism. For some, that path has led to Pakistan and Afghanistan. For a small minority, it has led to terrorism and Al Qaeda.

Washington's embrace of the Saudi royal family dates back to the era of Franklin Roosevelt. It has always been primarily about oil, but other factors have played a role, including Saudi investments in American Treasury bonds and the purchase of expensive American weapons systems. Since the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia has given American military forces limited access to its bases. Until now, the stream of Saudi oil and money has all but silenced serious American criticism of the royal family's pervasive corruption, its contempt for democracy and the appalling human rights abuses carried out in its name.

There is no simple way to refashion this unsound relationship. The demise of the Saudi monarchy could well lead to the installation of an anti- Western fundamentalist theocracy like that in Iran. Nor can America and its allies abruptly close the Saudi oil spigot. Still, reforms are possible. The royal family has a self-interest in making Saudi Arabia more democratic to ease political pressures that now drive some Saudis to extremist groups and could eventually destabilize the kingdom itself. The monarchy should crack down on its own corruption and do a better job of distributing the nation's wealth so that economic inequities do not generate new legions of terrorists. Saudi temporizing on matters like freezing the assets of terrorist groups and their supporters must end immediately.

Washington's evasions need to cease as well. Pretending that Saudi Arabia is not a source of support for terrorism only invites further trouble. Muting criticism of corruption and political repression in the kingdom simply encourages these destructive habits. Over the longer term, the United States should be trying to develop alternative, environmentally sound sources of energy so that Western reliance on Saudi oil is reduced.

Decades of equivocation and Hobbesian calculations have left American relations with Saudi Arabia in an untenable and unreliable state. The deformities must be honestly addressed before they do further damage to both nations.