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PRECISION-GUIDED MUNITIONS AND THE NEUTRON BOMB
Policy Analysis No. 15 - Cato Institute ^
| Policy Analysis No. 15 - August 26, 1982
| By Robert C. Aldridge
Posted on 10/25/2001 7:55:42 AM PDT by vannrox
Policy Analysis No. 15 August 26, 1982
PRECISION-GUIDED MUNITIONS AND THE NEUTRON BOMB
By Robert C. Aldridge
Robert C. Aldridge is an aerospace engineer who helped de-
sign five generations of strategic missiles. He is now
engaged in private research on military programs.
Executive Summary
"The weapon adds very substantially to the capability
of the United States and its allies to deter an attack based
upon a tremendous preponderance of armor...that would be
one of the characteristics of a Soviet attack on the central
front [in Europe]," claimed Defense Secretary Caspar Weinber-
ger to justify the neutron bomb. He continued: "We think
[it] enormously increases our deterrent, our ability to
demonstrate to the Soviets...that we have the capability to
respond, and to inflict a cost which we hope they would
regard as unacceptably high."[1]
That statement epitomizes the deception being used to
rally support for the neutron bomb. Such claims have re-
sulted in the "informed" U.S. population being about evenly
divided in opinion as to whether this country should deploy
that weapon.[2] But in Europe it is another matter -- par-
ticularly since Ronald Reagan's inadvertent statement that
a limited nuclear war could be confined to that continent.
The people there have become even more skeptical about all
U.S. nuclear weapons including the neutron bomb.
The neutron bomb, or "enhanced radiation warhead" as
it is called in scientific circles, is basically a hydrogen
bomb without the uranium-238 jacket which would absorb neu-
trons to increase the blast. By eliminating that jacket
the full fusion emission of neutrons is released. A one-
kiloton neutron bomb will spread a lethal dose of neutron
radiation to exposed people over a one-mile radius. It
would take a 13-kiloton fission (atom) bomb to produce a
combined lethal dose of neutron and gamma radiation over
that same distance.[3] Although the lethal radius for peo-
ple inside tanks would be somewhat less because of the pro-
tection, pure neutron radiation is more penetrating than a
mixture of neutron and gamma, and the lethal radius would
be greater for a one-kiloton neutron bomb than for a 13-
kiloton fission warhead. But the radius of destruction
from blast and heat would be considerably less for the for-
mer. Neutron warheads are now in production for the Lance
missile and the eight-inch artillery shell. Soon they will
be available as projectiles for the more numerous 155-milli-
meter cannons.
So far it looks as if the claim that neutron bombs
reduce "collateral damage" is true -- collateral damage
being a euphemism for associated civilian casualties. The
neutron bomb does seem to provide a greater penetrating
dose of lethal radiation in a prescribed area without the
wider-spread heat and blast effects typical of other de-
signs. If we had only to choose among nuclear warheads,
the enhanced radiation variety does seem to be the most
desirable.
But this discussion of prompt effects is too confined
and does not address subsequent fallout and lingering radi-
ation from any nuclear weapon. Neither does it address the
motivation behind the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
The Soviets have promised to build neutron bombs if the
United States deploys them, and that would be a gross esca-
lation of the arms race. Egon Bahr, a leading West German
disarmament expert, has concluded that the Soviets have
already tested a neutron bomb.[4] Other nations are also
certain to pursue development of enhanced radiation weapons.
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineer-
ing, James P. Wade, Jr., told Congress that France is firmly
committed to deploying such a device.[5]
Even worse, if the neutron bomb should ever be used in
the surgical manner advertised by U.S. strategists, it could
very easily and most likely trigger total nuclear war.
Former Defense Secretary Harold Brown persistently warned
that it is not at all clear "that an initial use of nuclear
weapons -- however selectively they might be targeted --
could be kept from escalating to a full-scale thermonuclear
exchange ...The odds are high, whether the weapons were
used against tactical or strategic targets, that control
would be lost on both sides and the exchange would become
unconstrained." [6]
In light of these consequences it is a serious mis-
representation to imply that our only choice is among types
of nuclear weapons and that there is no alternative to nu-
clear weapons for the defense of Western Europe. It is
this notion that I wish to challenge in this paper. There
are viable alternatives to the deployment of nuclear weapons
to deter a massive armored attack, and the technologies for
those conventional alternatives are being vigorously pursued.
The Pentagon story changes abruptly when its spokesmen are
trying to persuade Congress to finance non-nuclear, antitank
weapons. Let us take a closer look.
The Christian Science Monitor recently reported that
there "are 19,500 tanks in the Soviet-controlled forces of
the Warsaw Pact aimed at Western Europe. Of these, 12,500
are Soviet tanks in Soviet units. NATO has 7,000 tanks on
its side facing the 19,500."[7] The article went on to
point out that this "massing of Soviet tanks facing Western
Europe is one of the important elements in the power poli-
tics of Europe. For years it has meant a Soviet capability
of mounting a massive armored offensive into Western Eu-
rope."[8]
During a speech in El Paso, Texas, former Defense Sec-
retary Brown pointed out the pitfall of this type of compar-
ison. He said that there is "a tendency to compare NATO
and [Warsaw] Pact forces in terms of static measures, like
numbers of tanks." He went on to explain that "this kind
of shorthand obscures other important differences between
them. To name only two, NATO designs its forces to repel,
not to launch, a tank invasion. And its ground forces are
designed and deployed to take advantage of the classic prin-
ciple that the attack needs at least a substantial numerical
edge to overcome the natural advantages of prepared but
mobile defense."[9]
Brown elaborated on that statement in his fiscal year
1982 posture statement: "Let me illustrate this general
point with the case of ground forces. The Soviets have a
substantial advantage in numbers of troops and armored as-
sault vehicles. Therefore, we need to deploy greatly im-
proved anti-armor weapons for our ground forces and to main-
tain air superiority in order to deny the Soviets air cover
for an armored attack."[10] He then went on to describe
three generations of conventional antitank weapons which
the United States has deployed or has in production or de-
velopment. These will be discussed in detail later.
During hearings in 1978 before a House Appropriations
subcommittee the former Under Secretary of Defense for Re-
search and Engineering, Dr. William J. Perry, presented his
evaluation of the superior Eastern Bloc forces:
...the reason they push so hard in things they
can do well, like building lots of tanks and
building lots of airplanes, is an attempt to com-
pensate for what they perceive as our technical
superiority.... The difficulty with their approach
is that they never have a chance to use those
great quantities of weapons. If they don't have
a chance to use them in the next few years they
have made the wrong decision because they have,
today, 20,000 tanks deployed in Europe. In the
meantime we are developing something called preci-
sion-guided weapons which will allow 155-millime-
ter artillery shells to destroy tanks. By the
time that becomes operational they have the wrong
force deployed. Twenty thousand tanks of the
design they have will be the wrong thing in the
early '80s....[11]
Those precision weapons Perry was referring to are
operational, and they are not nuclear. It was also in 1978
that the Center for Defense Information in Washington, D.C.,
announced that the United States and NATO forces have 49
separate types of antitank weapons in their inventory or
under development, which range from hand-carried devices
(evolutions of the World War II bazooka) to air-launched,
precision-guided munitions from airplanes and helicopters.
It concluded that "all of these antitank weapons...have
increased the superiority of defense over offense."[12]
First Generation, Precision-Guided Antitank Weapons
It is not feasible, within the limits of this paper,
to discuss every conceivable antitank weapon the United
States has in inventory or development. I will confine
this discussion to precision-guided munitions. The first
generation of U.S. antitank guided missiles is called TOW
-- an acronym for tube-launched, optically-tracked, and
wire-guided.
TOW
TOW can be fired from the ground, from light motor
vehicles, and from helicopters. It has been in service
since 1968 with the Army and Marine Corps. Thirty-three
countries have bought 275,000 TOW missiles, including
107,000 which have gone to the U.S. armed forces. The Army
alone is procuring them at the rate of 12,000 per year.
The Marine Corps operates 51 Seacobra helicopters of which
23 can launch TOW. The remaining 28 are being converted to
do so.
TOW is launched toward the tank from a recoilless tube,
like almost any rocket. After it is fired the gunner keeps
the crosshairs of the launch tube sight on the target.
This, of course, means the gunner has to remain somewhat
exposed. An infrared sensor alongside the sight tracks the
missile by means of a small beacon signal on the missile's
tail. At the same time a small wire unreels behind the
missile as it flies, in much the same way that a fishing
line unwinds from a spinning reel during a cast. It is
through this wire that course corrections are sent to the
missile's steering system from the guidance computer asso-
ciated with the launch tube sight. In this fashion it is
possible for TOW to change course to track and destroy a
moving and maneuvering tank.
The Soviets have a missile comparable to TOW which is
called SAGGER. It weighs about 25 pounds and was first
introduced in 1972, in Vietnam. TOW, which has been in
service since 1968, was introduced into Vietnam the day
after SAGGER. In the following year, during the 1973 Arab-
Israeli war, Russian-built SAGGER missiles took a heavy
toll of enemy armor. More than 1,500 Israeli, Syrian, Iraqi,
and Jordanian tanks were destroyed. One Israeli tank bri-
gade lost 77 tanks -- three-quarters of its total comple-
ment -- to antitank weapons in just 16 hours. After the
fighting the battlefield was crisscrossed with fine wires
that had been reeled out behind the missiles.
This massacre of heavy armor prompted Soviet Defense
Minister Marshall Andrei Grechko to acknowledge that "combat
actions in the Middle East...have put anew the question of
the relationship of offense to defense...Tanks have become
more vulnerable and the use of them on the battlefield more
complicated."[13]
That was back in 1973 and a lot has happened since
then to make tanks even more vulnerable. An improved TOW
with a more potent five-inch diameter warhead and better
armor-piercing capability is now fully deployed. It can be
used both day and night and in adverse weather. It has a
range up to three miles.
The year 1982 sees the beginning of deployment of the
still more effective TOW-2 missile with a six-inch diameter
warhead that uses the full volume in the missile's body and
has even greater armor-piercing capability. It also has a
more accurate guidance system based on microprocessors, and
a new tracking beacon which is visible in smoke. TOW-2 is
capable of destroying the Soviets' most advanced technology
armor.
TOW launchers are also being improved to maximize the
effectiveness of the digital guidance of the TOW-2 missile.
And Hughes Aircraft Company, manufacturer of TOW missiles,
is looking at additional improvements which most likely
include replacing the trailing wire with a new high-strength
optic fiber. Besides providing guidance corrections to the
missile, as is presently done, fiber optics will allow infor-
mation to be transmitted from a video scanner in the missile
to the guidance computer on the ground. This would provide
high precision under more adverse circumstances while at
the same time eliminating the need for the gunner to remain
exposed.
DRAGON
Besides TOW, the Army also has a semi-automatic, wire-
guided, light-infantry weapon called DRAGON which was de-
ployed in the mid-1970s and has a range of about two-thirds
of a mile. Two men can operate the 32-pound launcher, which
can also be equipped with a 22-pound night site. DRAGON
has had problems of complex electronics and difficult main-
tenance. It can also be obscured by smoke and haze. But
under favorable conditions it is effective.
Second Generation, Fire-and-Follow Antitank Weapons
The second generation of precision-guided antitank
weapons are still classed as fire-and-follow but they are
laser-guided instead of visibly. That means the missile
follows, or "rides," a laser beam to its target. As long
as the beam is pointed at the tank the missile will destroy
that tank. The most prominent of these weapons is HELLFIRE.
HELLFIRE
The new HELLFIRE helicopter-borne antitank weapon is a
seven-inch diameter missile which has significant improve-
ments over TOW in range, speed, and lethality. Its laser
target designator has been developed to meet the Army's
need for a system that can counter the most advanced tank
design, even in light fog. Other types of target-homing
seekers, such as infrared and radar, are being developed as
modules which can be inserted to handle different battle-
field conditions.
The HELLFIRE missile is slated to go into production
during 1982. The Pentagon plans to purchase 502 missiles
during that year and another 1,213 in fiscal year 1983.
Rockwell International, manufacturer of HELLFIRE, expects
to soon be able to turn out 500 missiles per month on a
single shift to meet the Army's total goal.
This second generation, guided missile will be the
main antitank weapon of the Army's new Apache attack heli-
copter -- the AH-64. Apache also is scheduled to go into
production in early 1982 with 11 aircraft delivered that
year. The total number to be procured by the Army is 446.
Originally there were plans for 536 Apaches at a total pro-
duction cost of $4.84 billion but the unit price estimate
jumped 50 percent. Consequently, the total buy was reduced
to 446 at a cost of $6 billion. Research and development
has cost another $1.2 billion.
Apache is a peculiar aircraft. As an antitank weapons
carrier it needs the speed of an airplane. But a 1947-48
series of agreements aimed at stemming interservice rivalry
between the Army and Air Force limits Army airplanes to
5,000 pounds. There are no restrictions on helicopters,
however. Consequently, Apache is classed as a helicopter
with twin jet engines but it does have stubby wings and its
rear rotor folds up so it can fly like an airplane. Besides
carrying HELLFIRE the Apache helicopter will also be equipped
with a 30-millimeter cannon and 2.75-inch rockets. HELLFIRE,
on the other hand, may also be fitted into upgraded Marine
Seacobra helicopters and Army Blackhawk helicopters.
COPPERHEAD
Another long-range, second generation, antitank guided
missile is named COPPERHEAD. It is fired from a 155-milli-
meter cannon and is deadly over a range of 10 miles -- an
improved version is supposed to extend that range. COPPER-
HEAD also homes on a tank designated by a laser beam and is
claimed to have a high probability of kill with the first
round. Procurement began in 1980 for the first buy of 2,100
projectiles which became operational in 1981.
VIPER
In the area of second generation, man-portable antitank
weapons, the successor to DRAGON is the laser-guided VIPER.
Procurement began in 1980, and the Army plans to have 93,000
VIPER missiles by September 1982.
Third Generation, Fire-and-Forget Antitank Munitions
Prior to guided missiles it took many rounds of ammuni-
tion to destroy one tank. With the procurement of first
generation, precision-guided weapons the number of rounds
needed to destroy each tank was greatly reduced. Second
generation guided munitions brought the kill ratio close to
one missile for each tank. Now, with third generation,
precision-guided antitank weapons the capability is moving
to where one missile can destroy many tanks. We are also
moving from the fire-and-follow species to fire-and-forget.
That name means exactly what it says. Once the missile is
fired, the gunner or pilot, as the case may be, forgets
about it. Sensors and computers take over to make a very
precise kill. These third generation, precision-guided
munitions have branched into a huge spectrum of weapons,
all of which are in development and scheduled to become
operational during the mid-1980s. Also, the Air Force is
joining in the competition for this lucrative and far-
reaching market. Each program is discussed in turn below.
SADARM
The third generation SADARM, which is acronymic for
Sense and Destroy Armor, is an Army program which started
development at the beginning of 1981. Honeywell and Aero-
jet have 38-month competitive contracts to develop this
munition which can be fired from an eight-inch howitzer.
It will have a 15- to 20-mile range in that mode but it
will also be capable of being dropped from an airplane.
Each SADARM round will carry three submunitions, and
each of those will be equipped with a miniature radar sen-
sor to search for tanks. After a round is fired from a
cannon or dropped from an airplane, the submunitions are
dispensed over the battlefield in parachutes where they
drift slowly to the ground, rotating slowly and searching
for targets below. Former Under Secretary of Defense Perry
describes how this weapon works:
This is a device which we have already tested
which is dropped from an airplane or it can be
launched from an artillery projectile. When it
approaches the target, which is a tank, this para-
chute opens up and the object drifts to the ground
in a rotating fashion. As it rotates this antenna
which you see on the front projects a very small
beam down to the ground.... As soon as that beam
passes over a tank it tells the computer that
there is a target below.
Those explosives then go off and take the piece
of metal you see here and project it forward with
hypervelocities and with very great heat generated.
That causes this piece of metal to form a slug
which is then directed at exactly the position
where the beam is pointed and will cause this
high velocity slug to strike the tank from the
top which is its most vulnerable position. Now
we have demonstrated this in experiments and we
have found that at distances of several hundred
feet this slug will essentially destroy the tank.
The accuracy is such that we are getting direct
hits on the tank every time it ignites.[14]
That self-forging slug, as it is called, travels at
many times the speed of sound and strikes the tank from the
top. It will most likely burn a hole through the tank and
spray the inside with molten metal -- incinerating the crew
and igniting fuel and ammunition. But even if the metal is
too thick to penetrate, the terrific impact sends a shock
wave through the metal causing the inside surface to spall
-- that is, to fly off at terrific speeds in much the same
way that plaster can be knocked off a wall. These sharp
and jagged metal fragments ricocheting and bouncing about
inside the tank have a lethal effect on the crew.
SADARM will be able to operate both day and night and
essentially in all weather. It also overcomes the limita-
tions of camouflage, such as smoke, because radar sees
through that as well. And it allows the operator to imme-
diately take cover -- once it is launched all the operations
are controlled by a microcomputer. This weapon is scheduled
for deployment in 1985 or 1986.
WAAM
An Air Force program known as Wide Area Anti-armor
Munitions (WAAM) is developing weapons which can be dis-
pensed by tactical fighter planes. The WAAM family is based
on three concepts: Anti-armor Cluster Munitions (ACM), an
antitank missile known as WASP, and Extended Range Anti-
armor Munitions (ERAM).
ACM. Anti-armor Cluster Munitions can be described as
wedge-shaped devices with a parachute on one end and a sen-
sing probe on the other. After being ejected from a fighter
plane over the target area the parachute opens, causing the
sensing rod to be pointed down so it will make contact with
the ground or a tank in a nearly vertical attitude. When
it makes contact it explodes, sending three self-forging
slugs out horizontally in different directions and one down-
ward (in case it lands on top of a tank). When dropped
amid a concentrated tank formation, many of these slugs
will strike targets, causing the interior incineration or
spallation which is so deadly to tank crews and destructive
to fuel and ammunition. ACMs are now in full-scale develop-
ment and should go into production during 1983.
WASP. The second element of the WAAM family, the WASP
missiles are small mini-missiles weighing about 100 pounds
each. They are so small that many can be clustered in a
bomb dispenser or on pods under an aircraft's wings -- about
a dozen can be carried on a single pod. They can be fired
almost simultaneously from several miles away, and they are
designed to use a high frequency wavelength to find a tank
while flying about five times the speed of sound. Their
armor-piercing warheads would turn the inside of a tank
into a fiery inferno or hail of sharp metal.
WASP missiles went into the initial stage of develop-
ment in July 1981. Hughes Aircraft Company and Boeing Aero-
space each have 42-month competitive contracts to develop
the concept. The first test firing of the missile equipped
with a millimeter wave radar seeker will take place during
1982. It is expected to go into production in 1987.
ERAM.
The final concept of the Air Force WAAM program
is the Extended Range Anti-armor Munition. This has been
described as a clustered, scatterable mine system, but it
is more sophisticated than that description indicates. The
submunition will be delivered by aircraft and will be de-
signed to be either dropped among armored vehicles or in
their path. Sensors and computers in each submunition de-
termine if the vehicle approaching has tracks or wheels --
ERAM will only attack tracked vehicles.
The type designed to be dropped amid a tank formation
is being developed by AVCO and is called "skeet." A small
platform, containing two skeet, parachutes to the ground
and erects an acoustic antenna which rotates to search for
tanks. When one is detected a skeet is launched in a hori-
zontal direction toward but over the tank -- like a skeet
used for shotgun practice, hence the name. The antenna
then seeks out another tank and launches the second skeet.
Each skeet has both infrared and millimeter-wave radar sen-
sors as well as a warhead. As the skeet senses that it is
over the tank, it explodes to send a self-forging slug
downward to destroy the target in the manner previously de-
scribed.
Honeywell is working on a design to be seeded in the
path of a tank column. After parachuting to earth, the
weapon, or mine, erects itself to a near-vertical position
resembling a small mortar. When it senses a tank approach-
ing it launches a small warhead high towards the target. A
parachute opens approximately over the tank and the warhead
descends, spinning slowly to scan the area below with its
sensors. As the tank is located the warhead explodes, send-
ing a self-forging slug to accomplish the destruction.
ERAM is in development with initial production slated
for late 1984 or 1985. The three elements of the WAAM pro-
gram will soon make tanks virtually obsolete. But that is
not the end of Pentagon plans to achieve a total anti-armor
capability.
ASSAULT BREAKER
The weapons so far described are being designed primar-
ily to attack tanks on the front lines, with the possible
exception of ERAM. ASSAULT BREAKER is an ambitious program
for destroying armor moving up to the front from the rear
echelon. It is a multi-service endeavor administered by
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency with the Army
and Air Force as agents for various segments. ASSAULT BREAK-
ER is a long-range system designed to complement the shorter
range WAAM and SADARM described above. It is a system con-
trolled by a high flying aircraft to locate enemy tank for-
mations while they are far behind the front lines. The
three elements are known as the PAVE MOVER control aircraft,
the missile, and the submunitions.
PAVE MOVER.
High flying command aircraft are being
developed under the Air Force PAVE MOVER program which plans
to use Boeing 707 airplanes loaded with sophisticated sens-
ing and computer equipment. This aircraft will use informa-
tion from the new AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System)
planes and acquire its own data by advanced radar. PAVE
MOVER will then send coordinate maps to Army missile bat-
teries, all the while remaining safe over friendly terri-
tory. Processing equipment aboard the aircraft will con-
tinue to track the tank columns and send updated, in-flight
guidance corrections to missiles after they are launched.
PAVE MOVER will also be able to direct the fire of tactical
fighter planes equipped with WAAM.
The Missile. The Army portion of this program is the
missile which follows guidance instructions from PAVE MOVER
to carry the submunitions to destroy a maneuvering tank
column. It is expected that the range will be between 50
and 70 miles.
Two competitive missiles are in development for this
role. Martin Marietta's concept uses its Patriot surface-
to-air, anti-aircraft missile body and a stellar inertial
guidance system to deliver the submunitions. There will
also be an air-launched version of the Patriot design.
The Vought Corporation concept uses its short-range,
battlefield, Lance ballistic missile frame and a laser-gyro
inertial guidance package.
Submunitions.
There are also two types of submunitions
in development. One is the AVCO "skeet" which is function-
ally the same but smaller than the skeet described for ERAM
above. Four skeet are packaged into a cannister approxi-
mately 4 inches in diameter by 25 inches long. Many of
these cannisters are carried on each missile.
The missile dispenses about a dozen skeet cannisters
at approximately 10,000 feet altitude. They fall freely
until about 700 feet when a parachute opens to slow the
descent. At 100 feet above the ground the chute falls off
and fins spin the cannister up to eject the skeet in a hori-
zontal direction. Each skeet wobbles as it spins to search
for a tank with its heat-seeking infrared and millimeter-
wave radar sensors. When the target is detected a self-
forging slug is dispatched on its way. The first full sys-
tem test of this concept was conducted at White Sands Mis-
sile Range during February 1982.
The second type of submunition being considered is a
mini-missile under development by General Dynamics. Each
missile is the same size as the cannister which holds four
skeet. After being released from the missile this Termi-
nally-Guided Sub-Missile, as it is called, uses an infrared
seeker to home on the heat generated by a tank. The first
test to dispense a sub-missile from its carrier missile
took place at Patrick Air Force Base in 1974.
TANK BREAKER
The third generation, man-portable antitank weapon for
infantry defense is called TANK BREAKER. It is a rocket
about 4 inches in diameter by 43 inches long weighing about
25 pounds. A mosaic of tiny infrared detectors with integral
data processing is mounted in the focal plane of the roc-
ket's seeker scope. This sensor guides the rocket to its
target during all weather either day or night.
The rocket is mounted in a throw-away container which
adds another 10 pounds to the weight. Both Hughes Aircraft
Company and Texas Instruments were awarded competitive con-
tracts for the development of TANK BREAKER in July 1981.
STAFF
Another third generation, man-portable antitank system
is called the Small Target-Activated Fire-and-Forget (STAFF)
weapon. It is described as a 155-millimeter (6.1-inch)
diameter recoilless rifle that is fired from the shoulder
like a bazooka. Its range is one to one-and-a-half miles,
and it is aimed to fly over the tank like the skeet previ-
ously described. A millimeter-wave radar looks for the
tank and, upon detection, the projectile explodes, driving
a slug down at the tank. Whereas TANK BREAKER is all-wea-
ther, day-or-night capable, its infrared sensor can be de-
feated by a smoke screen. The millimeter-wave radar of
STAFF overcomes that limitation.
MLRS
The Multiple Launcher Rocket System (MLRS) should also
be mentioned when discussing antitank weapons. It is a
U.S.-NATO joint effort to standardize the various missiles
and launchers used by the United States, Britain, France,
and Germany. The common rocket will have modular warheads
for anti-material/anti-personnel warfare, antiaircraft de-
fense, scatterable antitank mines, or antitank submunitions.
The principle use will most likely be for antitank opera-
tions
Twelve rockets can be fired from each reloadable launch-
er in rapid volley. The system is scheduled for initial
operation in 1983, and the U.S. Army alone plans to purchase
276 of these self-propelled launchers and 360,000 missiles
by 1990.
Future Antitank Weapons
Before concluding I would briefly like to mention some
other antitank weapons that are in the works for deployment
farther downstream. One that could be deployed fairly soon
will put terminally guided submunitions on Tomahawk cruise
missiles. The cruise missile would then essentially fulfill
the function of both the PAVE MOVER aircraft and the deliv-
ery missile.
High energy (killer) lasers are also being considered
for anti-armor use by the Army's Research and Development
Command. Such weapons could penetrate through smoke and
other types of battlefield-screening aerosols. Even a mo-
bile, medium-energy laser could damage a tank's "night vi-
sion." A device for that purpose is being studied under
competitive contracts awarded to Hughes Aircraft Company
and TRW.
Another potential in the distant future is the so-
called RAILGUN being developed by Lawrence Livermore Na-
tional Laboratory. It uses a pair of copper rails to elec-
tromagnetically accelerate an object and is described as so
powerful that it can hurl a bowling ball into space without
a rocket. According to Sea Power magazine: "Relatively
small railguns, firing projectiles at speeds roughly ten
times the speed of the Army's fastest bullet, could blast
through the thickest armor of a tank or battleship..."[15]
Some of these ideas sound exotic right now but they
could very well become the fourth or fifth generation of
antitank weapons. The future does not look good for ar-
mored warfare. The tank is rapidly taking its place in
retirement alongside the shield and lance.
I have gone into considerable detail in this paper to
describe the extent of U.S. capabilities, along with pro-
grams to improve those capabilities, for a non-nuclear de-
fense against Warsaw Pact tanks which have been proffered
as a threat that might come swarming over the borders from
Czechoslovakia and East Germany. I wish to make the point
that, even from a strict military viewpoint, we don't need
the massive and uncontrolled destructiveness of nuclear
weapons -- even the neutron bomb -- to deter or repel such
an invasion. Currently available anti-armor weapons have
proved themselves extremely effective against tanks, and
the much more capable "smart" munitions are only a couple
of years away.
It is possible to confine casualties to combatants
with conventional antitank systems. That is in no way pos-
sible with even the most selective use of nuclear devices,
which would put far more civilians than soldiers on the
casualty list, merely from the immediate heat, blast, and
radiation. Not to mention the lingering effects of global
fallout with its little understood effect on health, future
generations, or the environment; nor the environmental ef-
fects from ozone depletion and the like. In addition, the
almost certain escalation from any use of nuclear weapons
to total thermonuclear war makes these weapons a very un-
stable and dangerous option.
Four former high U.S. officials -- Robert S. McNamara,
secretary of defense from 1961 to 1968; McGeorge Bundy,
national security adviser from 1961 to 1966; George F. Ken-
nan, ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1952; and Gerard
Smith, SALT negotiator from 1969 to 1972 -- have now re-
versed their stand to advocate a no-first-use policy for
nuclear weapons and the elimination of tactical nuclear
weapons in favor of conventional munitions. They point out
that the risk of conventional aggression with tanks in Eu-
rope "was greater in the past than it is today, and it is
greater today than it would be under no-first-use, backed
by an effective conventional defense."[16]
McNamara later stated that "a policy of no first use
is imperative to the survival not only of this country but
of civilization."[17] But to be absolutely certain that a
no-first-use policy would not be violated by either the
United States or the U.S.S.R. if a conventional war should
break out, the tactical/theater nuclear weapons would have
to be eliminated. As the authors concluded in their Foreign
Affairs article: "As long as the weapons exist, the possi-
bility of their use will remain."[18]
Nuclear weapons present a grave danger under any cir-
cumstances, but in the case of defending Europe there are
less destructive options. It is time the American people
question a U.S.-NATO nuclear policy which justifies the
neutron bomb and other theater/tactical nuclear systems.
Presenting nuclear weapons as an acceptable solution to the
overstated tank threat is a blatant exercise in public de-
ception. Our European allies have already perceived the
big lie. It is time for the American people to see the
light.
Published by the Cato Institute, Policy Analysis is a
regular series evaluating government policies and offer-
ing proposals for reform. Nothing in Policy Analysis
should be construed as necessarily reflecting the views
of the Cato Institute or as an attempt to aid or hinder the
passage of any bill before Congress.
TOPICS: Editorial; Foreign Affairs; Front Page News
KEYWORDS:
I found this oldie in the records. I found it interesting - if a bit dated. Enjoy.
1
posted on
10/25/2001 7:55:42 AM PDT
by
vannrox
To: vannrox
In view of the fact that we have all of these wonderful weapons,let's see which of them gives us the most bang for the buck!You can only achieve a deterrant effect by brandishing them for so long.We've got the neutron-bomb,let's see how good it really is!!
To: vannrox
I like CATO, but we should have developed and should now have the neutron bomb. Taliban and al-Queda mountain and cave hiding places look like excellent neutron bomb targets.
3
posted on
10/25/2001 8:06:33 AM PDT
by
hauerf
To: vannrox
But in Europe it is another matter -- par- ticularly since Ronald Reagan's inadvertent statement that a limited nuclear war could be confined to that continent. So Europeans would rather get Soviet protection instead of fighting? Typical of the murderous welfare mentality.
4
posted on
10/25/2001 8:12:29 AM PDT
by
lavaroise
To: vannrox
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