Why Bush (Senior) Didn't Blow It in the Gulf War

ANTHRAX! Where, one wonders, might terrorists have gotten anthrax powder, processed and milled to just the right size and consistency to waft freely through the air but then lodge fatally in the lungs? Could the source be, perhaps, the Trilateral Commission? The World Trade Organization? France? Or -- now here's a thought -- Saddam Hussein?

The tyrant of Iraq has retained both the capability and the determination to obtain weapons of mass destruction. He has thumbed his nose at the West and turned economic sanctions into a propaganda weapon. He is weakened militarily but still menacing enough to require the presence of American forces in Saudi Arabia, thus inflaming anti-American sentiment among Islamic hard-liners who are glad to have reasons to be inflamed. And now we can guess that he is helping to kill Americans anonymously, having learned the drawbacks of killing them openly.

If there is one thing that everyone now agrees is true, it is that the first President Bush blew it when he called off the war on Saddam. America should have finished the job in 1991 and removed Saddam from power, driving from Basra to Baghdad if necessary to find and eliminate him. The failure to do so showed, once and for all, the bankruptcy of coalition war-making and the folly of quitting when the enemy is still on his feet.

Or, to be more exact, partly right, but in a way that is unhelpful at best and misleading at worst. Given what the Administration knew in February 1991, and given the nature of the war it was fighting then, the President's decision to stop when he did was a good one. Those who say George H.W. Bush left the job unfinished are undoubtedly right, but they are right in the same unhelpful way that it is right to say I should have sold my stocks when the market peaked. Like stockbrokers and quarterbacks, Presidents and generals must base their decisions on what they know and see rather than on what may become apparent later on. The real lesson of the Gulf War's early end is not that Bush blew it but that the very compelling reasons to quit then underscore the equally compelling reasons not to quit now.

Early on the morning of February 28, 1991, the White House phoned the headquarters of General H. Norman Schwarzkopf in Riyadh with orders to cease fire against Iraqi forces at 8 a.m. The ground war was only four days old but had been crushingly successful. Iraqi forces were disintegrating, fleeing, surrendering. Still, Saddam's elite Republican Guard units were largely intact and rapidly escaping toward the Iraqi city of Basra, near the Kuwaiti border. The American command needed more time if was to destroy or disarm those divisions. Thanks to Bush's cease-fire, the Republican Guard got away, soon to reappear in southern and northern Iraq slaughtering thousands of hapless Shiites and Kurds whom the United States had encouraged to rebel.

During the Civil War, President Lincoln repeatedly and rightly cursed his generals for licking their wounds rather than giving chase to battered but undefeated Confederate troops. Military doctrine then and now warns against letting the enemy escape to fight again. So why did Bush let the Republican Guard and their leader get away? For four reasons, all of them sound, given (one cannot repeat this qualification too often) the way things looked and the war America was fighting at the time.

Politically, the Administration wanted to keep its coalition together, and the coalition included Arab states whose participation was crucial, both militarily and diplomatically. Although the Arab partners might have acceded to a few more hours or perhaps days of fighting, more than that -- as might have been necessary to finish Saddam -- could well have pushed them beyond their limits. Then the war would have changed from World versus Iraq to United States versus Arabs -- not a war Bush wanted to fight.

People who today criticize the elder Bush for letting the coalition constrain American action in 1991 forget that the coalition had both strategic and tactical reasons for concern. The Saudis and Egyptians, for instance, pressed Bush to stop not because they had any affection for Saddam, nor even primarily because they feared domestic backlash (though that was certainly a factor, and an Islamic revolution in Cairo or Riyadh just then could have been catastrophic), but because they feared that the one thing that might be worse than Saddam would be the chaos that might follow his destruction. In particular, they worried about the rise of a fundamentalist Shiite regime -- another Iran, perhaps -- in part or all of Iraq. That, in turn, might have tipped fundamentalist dominoes throughout the region.

His son, by exactly the same token, would be wrong to pull up short. George W. Bush's situation is the obverse of his father's. The current President Bush answers not a faraway threat to regional stability but multiple attacks on American soil. He is not defending American hegemony; he is defending America. For that reason, Americans will have few qualms this time about fighting hard and taking casualties. A turkey shoot of Al Qaeda forces would not break many hearts at The New York Times.

In 1991, the coalition was fundamental to the war's aim, which was to restore stability in the region; this time, the coalition is incidental to the war's aim, which is to defend the United States of America. Stability remains an issue: The current Bush Administration is right to worry about keeping diplomatic damage to a minimum, and about such niceties as installing a postwar government that the Pakistanis and Pashtuns can live with. Nonetheless, this time the aim of the war is not to preserve the order of things but to change it, even at what is likely to be a considerable cost to peace and quiet in the region and in the world and in America. No one imagines that Al Qaeda and Mullah Omar, if spanked, would behave themselves. The enemy has declared his implacable hostility to America; if he wins, we lose. Restoring a sustainable status quo ante is not an option, and therefore is not a goal.

In short, this is a real war against a real enemy, and not a "military operation" against a regional bully. It is fundamentally an American war, rather than a coalition war; and it is being fought not to restore an old power balance but to establish a new one, for better and also, inevitably, for worse. The first George Bush, notwithstanding the errors revealed by hindsight (and compounded by President Clinton), was a good war leader because he quit prudently. The second George Bush will be a good war leader if he perseveres doggedly.

Given what the Administration knew in February 1991, and given the nature of the war it was fighting then, the President's decision to stop when he did was a good one. Those who say George H.W. Bush left the job unfinished are undoubtedly right, but they are right in the same unhelpful way that it is right to say I should have sold my stocks when the market peaked. Like stockbrokers and quarterbacks, Presidents and generals must base their decisions on what they know and see rather than on what may become apparent later on. The real lesson of the Gulf War's early end is not that Bush blew it but that the very compelling reasons to quit then underscore the equally compelling reasons not to quit now.

This is tripe. We're not talking about people who waited until long after the fact to criticize Bush 41's decision not to win the Gulf War. Many of us knew it was a bad decision (although with somewhat defensible motivations) back in 1991.

Forget about what we knew or thought we knew or didn't know, and understand this...

There are only two ways to win a war: the unconditional surrender of the enemy, or their total annihilation.

It didn't take a crystal ball in 1991 to recognize that we chose not to take the victory over Saddam Hussein that was in our grasp.

Most of the armchair general critics of Bush 41's handling of the Gulf War couldn't balance their own checkbooks, let alone manage global, coalition warfare.

Failing to win the Gulf War in deference to obsequious fawning over the coalition brought us the Oslo Accords, a Nobel Peace Prize for the little butcher Arafat, a knife at Israel's throat, and the attacks of 9/11.

It was an obviously bad decision ten years ago, and it gets worse as time goes on. Saddam Hussein is an evil megalomaniac, and virtually everything in the following link was known at the time of the Gulf War failure.

Hussein the Conqueror

Is Saddam Hussein the Reincarnation of the Chaldean Emperor Nebuchadnezzar?
Is it his destiny to sack Jerusalem, destroy Israel, and kill and capture the Jews?
Forget what you think… What does he think?

Click on the flags for the link

BALONEY
We had proven ourselves a winner. A huge winner, and could have pulled the coalition along enough to smash Saddam Hussein and his close hoodlum cronies. The Muslims respect and fear a winner and at this point we were winners! The Muslims look to the alpha dog for orders and that's what we were.

(*We* includes a few valuable allies such as UK. I don't include any Arab nation in this group of valuable allies)

This is a novel re-writing of history -- and exactly what I was talking about in post #2. Oslo and 9/11 have nothing to do with the way the Gulf war was conducted. Your hindight is 20/20. Please post your resume here and let's see the biggest coordinated operation that you've ever managed.

It was not obviously a bad decision then. The big concern after the Gulf War was not Saddam Hussein (he'd been effectively neutralized and marginalized) -- it was the possibility of another Iranian-style theocracy in charge of Iraq. If we had removed Hussein, it would have created a pwer vaccuum in the Middle East, a vaccuum right between Iran (then and now a terrorist sponsor) and Syria (then and now a terrorist sponsor). And nature abhors a vaccuum.

Back to basics, folks.
What AUTHORITY did President Bush I have to fight the Gulf War? He had a declaration of LIMITED war. Congress authorized the use of force in accord with a UN Resolution, which permitted "member states" to use "force against Iraq" as long as it remained in possession of Kuwait.
We NEEDED UN authority in that war, because the only circumstance under which a member nation can use force on its own decision is "self-defense." We were not directly attacked before the Gilf War. Only Kuwait suffered that fate.
Noe, we HAVE been directly attacked. That is why we have NOT sought any UN authority. We don't need to.
Militarily, would it have made sense to pulverize the remainder of the Republican Guard and take both Baghdad and Sadddam? Yes. And it made sense then. But Congress HAD NOT AUTHORIZED THAT under our Constitution.

See the link for the discussion below on "The Law of War."

The (More er Less) Honorable Billybob,
cyberCongressman from Western Carolina

Click here and go to "ALCU Watch" for "The Law of War," a detailed legal discussion of how the US declares war, both historically and in this instance.

For a clear discussion of the difference between what the US can constitutionally do in wartime with aliens (but NOT with US citizens of foreign extraction), see my book, Manzanar, published in 1988.

This is a novel re-writing of history -- and exactly what I was talking about in post #2. Oslo and 9/11 have nothing to do with the way the Gulf war was conducted. Your hindight is 20/20. Please post your resume here and let's see the biggest coordinated operation that you've ever managed.

You've caught on to me... I've never been President. Which is irrelevant. If not having a resume disqualifies me from correctly criticizing a failed policy, doesn't it also disqualify you from incorrectly defending it? (Or maybe you do have a resume... Are you Clinton or Carter?)

As to History, I've rewritten nothing... t was the momentum from what should have been a very expendable Gulf War coalition that brought various parties to the negotiating table in '91 and '92 (Barcelona, I believe), which opened the door to foolhardy Oslo negotiations with Hussein's Gulf War sympathizer, the George Washington of terrorism, Yasser Arafat. Rewarding a butcher for bad behavior was clearly stupid, and those of us who said so at the time have been proven correct. Furthermore, if you want a little 20/20 hindsight, take a look at the last 3000 plus years of history, and you'll see that without exception, every time Israel has traded part of the Promised Land for "peace," they've very shorly been attacked from that very land by their so-called peace partners. The outcome of the entire Oslo process was not only predictable, some of us predicted it.

By the way, how can you say with a straight face that 9/11 wasn't a consequence of failing to win the Gulf War? The architect of the attacks was Saddam Hussein.

That's like saying that 4 is not a consequence of 2 + 2. I don't care if your resume says you're a mathematician, it's not a smart statement.

The big concern after the Gulf War was not Saddam Hussein (he'd been effectively neutralized and marginalized) -- it was the possibility of another Iranian-style theocracy in charge of Iraq. If we had removed Hussein, it would have created a pwer vaccuum in the Middle East, a vaccuum right between Iran (then and now a terrorist sponsor) and Syria (then and now a terrorist sponsor). And nature abhors a vaccuum.

Nature abhors hand-wringing, which is a symptom of a vacuum of will.

That might have been your big concern, it might have been Bush 41's big concern, but it wasn't universal, and it wasn't mine. The fact that you didn't see it clearly then doesn't mean it wasn't obvious. The consequences of failing to win a war are always more unpleasant than whatever unexpected consequences might arise from winning it. Victory soves problems. That's the point.

Would we have had a power vacuum, and a problem with Iran?

Maybe, so what? Who's to say that Turkey wouldn't have filled the vacuum? Even if it was Iran, that would have been the next problem to deal with, but the problem of Saddam Hussein would have been solved. Ten years later, we've solved neither problem, and the "palestinian" problem is worse than ever.

I don't need a resume to be correct, being correct for the last 10 years is its own resume.

Our demand for the unconditional surrender of Germany in WWI, coupled with severe reparations, led directly to Hitler's rise and WWII.

The blue sky, "coupled with severe reparations, led directly to Hitler's rise and WWII."

The Babe Ruth trade in 1919, "coupled with severe reparations, led directly to Hitler's rise and WWII."

The marriage of Douglas Fairbanks Sr. and Mary Pickford, "coupled with severe reparations, led directly to Hitler's rise and WWII."

The point is, if you didn't have the chains of Versailles, Hitler couldn't rattle them.

There are only two ways to win a war: the unconditional surrender of the enemy, or their total annihilation.

Meeting one of those conditions requires the other also be met, a very rare occurrence. Most wars are won with some sort of negotiated settlement. WWII is used as a benchmark for victory but the reality is that total victory is a historically rare occurrence that has its own unique repercussions and dangers.

BTW. Have you considered what would have happened if we had ‘taken Baghdad’ in 91 like we did in Japan and German? I sure wouldn’t want to be one of the GIs trying to work occupation duty in that screwed-up hellhole.

There are only two ways to win a war: the unconditional surrender of the enemy, or their total annihilation.

No. In fact, both are the exception rather than the rule - people were horrified when Grant proposed this in the U.S. Civil War and many felt that it compelled the Japanese to fight longer than they otherwise might have in World War Two. Historically even annihilation is extremely rare - the Hebrews didn't manage it in Canaan, the Huns didn't manage to do it to the Goths, Genghis Khan, like the ancient Assyrians, managed it only on a couple of cities (and used it to terrify the rest into submission)...you get the drift. It simply turns out that extirpation of entire peoples is a very difficult thing to do.

I think the bottom line with Bush Sr. is that in an attempt to avoid the endless commitment of Vietnam he set a very precise and limited set of objectives, and was surprised (as were we all) to be handed their completion in only 100 hours of ground combat, and with nearly no casualties. He was then faced with either expanding those objectives at the risk of exceeding his mandate and breaking up the coalition, or stopping with Hussein still in power. I suspect he chose the latter under the assumption that Hussein, faced with that stinging a defeat, would be easy for the coalition and his internal enemies to topple from power, an assumption which proved incorrect.

The absurdities I gave are tongue-in cheek illustrations of yours.

Germay's defeat was worse in WWII, than WWI, was it not? Yet we haven't had a war with them since WWII, have we?

So what's the difference?

The reparations... The Chains of Versailles.

Therefore, it's the differences of the pre-existing conditions that leads to the differences in the outcome, not the pre-existing similarities. And it's the onerous reparations, not the surrender of Kaiser Wilhelm, that led to the rise of Adolph Hitler and WWII.

That's a rather well-settled matter of 20th Century History.

The absurdities I gave are tongue-in cheek illustrations of yours.

That was hardly an absurdity, and it's telling that you saw it as such.

Germay's defeat was worse in WWII, than WWI, was it not? Yet we haven't had a war with them since WWII, have we? So what's the difference? The reparations... The Chains of Versailles. Therefore, it's the differences of the pre-existing conditions that leads to the differences in the outcome, not the pre-existing similarities.

Versailles WAS the formal surrender, in case you haven't bothered reading up on the subject ... you are attempting to separate the reparations when they were an INTEGRAL part of the terms of surrender ... i.e., unconditional surrender.

What AUTHORITY did President Bush I have to fight the Gulf War? He had a declaration of LIMITED war. Congress authorized the use of force in accord with a UN Resolution, which permitted "member states" to use "force against Iraq" as long as it remained in possession of Kuwait.

We NEEDED UN authority in that war, because the only circumstance under which a member nation can use force on its own decision is "self-defense." We were not directly attacked before the Gilf War. Only Kuwait suffered that fate.

The primary function of the United Nations has been to restrain the United Sates from winning any war it enters, as they are trying to do now by calling for a woefully premature end to the bombing.

The only thing we need the UN for is an excuse to lose a war.

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