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Posted on 11/22/2001 5:08:16 PM PST by Pokey78

IT IS not surprising that negotiations to arrange the surrender of Taliban and al-Qa'eda forces in Kunduz appear to be running less than smoothly.

Large-scale surrender on the battlefield, even between sovereign states and within the framework of the international law of war, is always fraught with difficulty.

In this case neither party to the conflict, the Northern Alliance and the Taliban, is sovereign and neither is bound by the Geneva Convention or the normal rules of warfare.

Moreover, there is a long regional tradition of broken promises and treachery in such circumstances. The notorious massacre of Gandamak on the Khyber Pass road in January 1842 occurred despite the giving of a safe conduct by the Afghan ruler to the British commander.

Gen William Elphinstone, commanding the Kabul garrison the British had installed in 1839, was promised safe passage to India if he would withdraw. Once in the open, the small army of 4,500 British and Indian soldiers attempting protect 12,000 civilians was attacked in a mountain defile. Most were killed.

Memories are long in Afghanistan, and it would be surprising if Gandamak were not remembered by the Taliban, who are now calculating their chances in Kunduz.

Their predicament is complicated by the pronouncement made recently by the American defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, that he is not prepared to see the Taliban, mainly ethnic Pathans from southern Afghanistan, make their escape.

His statement was modified later by Kenton Keith, the spokesman for the international anti-terrorist alliance, who indicated that Taliban fighters might be allowed a safe passage out of Kunduz.

He supported Mr Rumsfeld's statement, however, that the al-Qa'eda fighters, mainly Arabs and Chechens, would not be allowed safe passage.

Mr Rumsfeld said he wanted the "Arabs", as they are collectively known in Afghanistan, killed or at least taken prisoner. He set his face against their leaving the country to undermine the stability of states elsewhere.

It is very difficult to perceive what arrangements might be made to deal with the Kunduz garrison. Historically, large-scale surrender, under convention, is a well-accepted diplomatic device.

The British Army, which surrendered to the American colonists at Saratoga in 1777 did so on condition that, after its return to England, it should not again take part in hostilities. Bonaparte's army in Egypt was allowed to return to France, unconditionally, in 1801, after the British victory at Aboukir. The British were glad to be rid of it.

However, the Americans reneged on the deal after Saratoga and made those who surrendered prisoner. Conventions are intrinsically unstable arrangements and difficult to enforce, even between sovereign states.

In the current situation, it is possible to foresee the Taliban in Kunduz agreeing to surrender if they were allowed to keep their weapons while arrangements were made for their longer-term future.

That would be in the interests both of the Northern Alliance and the Americans, who might agree in the circumstances to feed and shelter them. Surrender on agreed terms would provide a pause, in which tempers might cool and provision for the government of Afghanistan be made.

The "Arabs" present a different and more difficult case. Mr Rumsfeld is clearly correct in refusing to countenance an arrangement that would allow them to return to their countries of origin, even if they were willing to go.

The Chechens might agree to go to the Chechen rebel area, but that would infuriate Russia. They would not agree to be handed to the Russians.

The ethnic Arabs from Saudi Arabia, Somalia, the Sudan and the Gulf states would equally not agree to be returned to native territory, where they would certainly be arrested.

The problem therefore is to find some means, if and when their surrender can be arranged, by which they can be held in conditions where they cannot make trouble. That would require the co-operation of a third-party, anti-terrorist state.

America, should it get its hands on the "Arabs", would probably seek to put them on trial. So would Russia, and possibly China, which has its own Islamic problem.

European Union states, which have difficulties with Islamic illegal immigrants and terrorist cells, will not want them. Nor will states in Latin America, Black Africa or Australasia, as yet untouched by Islamic terrorism. Where can they be sent?

It would be trespassing on the good nature of moderate Islamic states such as Indonesia, or merely Muslim states such as Turkey, to request that they provide internment facilities.

A desert island would be the best solution. Today, however, even desert islands belong to larger political units, none of which, understandably, wants to touch terrorists with a barge pole.

Mr Rumsfeld, in his recent statements, has made it clear that swift, local brutality may cause the problem to disappear. Better not to speculate about the detail.

We are dealing with the modern equivalent of pirates and bandits, whose fate was sealed historically by peremptory measures. That may be the best way out.

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