Posted on 12/29/2001 12:12:25 AM PST by topher
With the possibility of a nuclear exchange looming between Pakistan and India, one must wonder how Pakistan and India have come up with nuclear weapons.
In the case of India, the colonial ties to the British Empire was the source -- Canada. This came about in the form of a research reactor that Canada sent to India.
India used this research reactor to process weapons grade material (nuclear material, that is).
Pakistan, which has had the United States at one as its supplier of weapons, was less fortunate.
However, after the United States stopped supplying Pakistan with weapons, China has stepped to fill the gap by providing not only nuclear weapons/material, but also missile capability for these weapons.
The confrontation between India and Pakistan could become the first nuclear exchange of weapons in history (the United States bombing of Japan was clearly a one sided attack with nuclear weapons, bringing the end of World War II to a swift end).
Of great concern is that these weapons may not be primitive atomic bombs, but hydrogen bombs capable of a great deal of destruction. How many of these bombs exist on each side I would not be able to find on the web, but even a handful on both sides could have catastrophic consequences.
Maybe we need to turn to prayer as the New Year approaches.
[Page: S6139]
Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, last year the Clinton administration asked Congress for the authority to allow United States military equipment to be delivered to Pakistan. Since 1990, such deliveries were not allowed because of a 1985 law known as the Pressler amendment, which prohibited any United States Assistance to Pakistan if the President failed to certify Pakistan was not in possession of a nuclear explosive device. My colleagues may recall that we debated this issue quite extensively. It was very controversial. In the end, despite strong opposition from this Senator and many of my colleagues, the Senate approved the so-called Brown amendment, which authorized the transfer of military equipment and repealed the Pressler amendment's prohibitions on nonmilitary aid to Pakistan. The Brown amendment became law earlier this year.
To bolster the Clinton administration's request, Under Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff sent a letter to Members of Congress on August 3, 1995, when the Senate first debated the Brown amendment. Secretary Tarnoff attempted to assure Senators that the administration's support of the Brown amendment would be conditional on `no significant change on nuclear and missile non-proliferation issues of concern to the United States.'
Mr. President, that was then.
On February 22, 1996, Dr. John Deutch, the Director of Central Intelligence , testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence . Director Deutch confirmed earlier reports that Pakistan had taken delivery of sensitive nuclear technology used to develop weapons-grade uranium. He also confirmed that Pakistan had received M-11 ballistic missiles from China. My colleagues will recall that when we debated the Brown amendment, there was some dispute over whether Pakistan had in fact taken delivery of the M-11 missiles. Director Deutch's testimony was the first time a Clinton administration official publicly confirmed the existence of the M-11s. In my view, this development should have halted the delivery of the military equipment to Pakistan. Unfortunately, the Clinton Administration did not consider the acquisition of this nuclear technology to be, in Secretary Tarnoff's words, a `significant change on nuclear and missile non-proliferation issues of concern to the United States.'
Mr. President, this morning's Washington Times reveals that Pakistan has done more than just take possession of the M-11's. The Times reported that the M-11 missiles in Pakistan are operational and nuclear capable. If this account is accurate, and I have no reason to doubt it, Pakistan now has a complete, modern, nuclear weapons delivery system.
Mr. President, first of all, in spite of a string of pious promises and written agreements to the United States, China has demonstrated a severe lack of international responsibility. By providing both nuclear technology and the means to deliver nuclear weapons, Chinese Government-owned companies have contributed to a vast escalation of tensions between Pakistan and India. Director Deutch has pointed to the Indian subcontinent as the most worrisome area in the world. He's right.
The more immediate question, Mr. President, is what is the United States going to do? At the time the Senate approved the Brown amendment, we were of the belief that Pakistan did not possess both the technology to produce weapons-grade uranium, and an operational nuclear weapons delivery system. That was then. This is now. I do not believe the Senate would have approved the Brown amendment had we known then what we know now.
The Washington Times also reported that State Department officials attempted to water down or alter the intelligence reports regarding the M-11's, and also tried to prevent these reports from moving through normal intelligence channels. Apparently this was done to prevent sanctions from being enforced. This is a very serious allegation. In effect, Federal officials are being accused of blocking the law from being enforced.
Frankly, Mr. President, the Washington Times story is astounding. It is no secret that I am an outspoken critic of the Clinton administration's nuclear nonproliferation policy, or lack thereof. Before today, I never thought the administration's credibility regarding nonproliferation goals in South Asia could get worse. I was wrong.
I have written to President Clinton, asking that he enforce the nonproliferation laws he has sworn to uphold. I also have asked the President to withhold delivery of any military equipment authorized by the Brown amendment. Clearly, the conditions the Clinton administration made to Pakistan for its support of the Brown amendment have been violated to a degree unimaginable. I also intend to contact the chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence , Senator Specter, to request that the committee conduct a full investigation on the allegations raised involving the blocking or altering of intelligence reports by State Department officials. Finally, I intend to continue seeking the support of my colleagues to repeal the Brown amendment, and may offer an amendment to do just that in the near future. I think we have more than enough evidence to demonstrate why the Brown amendment should not have been passed. In my view, Congress was badly misled last year relative to Pakistan's nuclear arms development and delivery capability. My bill, which already has several cosponsors, would restore the supremacy of our nuclear nonproliferation laws.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my letter of today to President Clinton and a Washington Times article by Bill Gertz be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC, June 12, 1996.
The President,
The White House,
Washington, DC.
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Dear Mr. President: A story in today's Washington Times reported that the U.S. intelligence community has determined that Pakistan obtained M-11 ballistic missiles from the People's Republic of China (PRC) as part of an illegal conspiracy to evade national international arms control agreements. Even more disturbing, the Times reported that these nuclear capable missiles have been deployed by Pakistan.
If these reports are true, I strongly urge you to enforce the law and impose sanctions on both countries to the fullest extent of the law. Further, I urge you to withhold from delivering to Pakistan any U.S. equipment as provided in the so-called Brown amendment to the Fiscal Year 1996 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act.
As you know, the United States has sought for a number of years to put an end to illegal missile transfers originating in the PRC. As you well know, sanctions were imposed on China just three years ago for transferring M-11 components in violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Those sanctions were lifted in 1994, after the PRC pledged not to make future deliveries of missiles or related components listed under the MTCR.
Last year, the New York Times and Defense News reported that Pakistan had received M-11 missiles from the PRC. This was confirmed by Central Intelligence Agency Director John Deutch in his testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee on February 22, 1996.
These are troubling developments. We face a situation in which the PRC has violated both a multinational missile control agreement as well as a written non-proliferation agreement with the United States. As a result of these violations, Pakistan now has for the first time a strategic nuclear delivery capability.
Again, if the reports are true, I see no recourse but to impose sanctions on both Pakistan and the PRC. Our own credibility as a world leader in nuclear non-proliferation requires no less.
Our credibility also requires that we take additional action: the withholding of any U.S. military equipment authorized for delivery under the so-called Brown amendment. Last August, when the Brown amendment was first considered in the Senate, Under Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff stated that your Administration's support for the Brown amendment would be conditional on `no significant change on nuclear and missile non-proliferation issues of concern to the United States.'
At the time Secretary Tarnoff made this statement, Congress and the Administration were of the belief that Pakistan did not have both the nuclear technology capable of processing enriched uranium, and an operational system of ballistic missiles capable of delivering a nuclear payload. Clearly, the conditions set by your Administration have been violated by Pakistan to a degree unimaginable.
Finally, I believe Congress was misled badly last year relative to Pakistan's arms development and delivery capability. Earlier this year, I wrote to you expressing my concern that members of your Administration knew that Pakistan was obtaining illicit nuclear technology from the PRC while the Brown amendment was pending. I am equally concerned with allegations raised in the Washington Times article that members of your Administration may have attempted to alter the content or the processing of intelligence reports in order to avoid sanctions. This is a very serious allegation, and I have requested that the Senate Intelligence Committee conduct a thorough review of this matter.
Mr. President, you and I have not always agreed with the best course of action on nuclear non-proliferation, particularly in South Asia. I am sure you will agree with me that if the Washington Times story is true, we have reached a very dangerous stage in an already very unstable part of the world. It has always been our policy to other nations that nuclear proliferation should carry a heavy price. It is imperative to the peace and security of all the peoples of South Asia that this policy be enforced.
For these reasons, I strongly urge you to enforce fully our nation's non-proliferations laws, and honor the conditions set forth last year by withholding any future implementation of the Brown amendment.
Thank you for your attention to this very critical nonproliferation issue.
Sincerely,
Larry Pressler,
U.S. Senator. --
From the Washington Times, June 12, 1996
Pakistan Deploys Chinese Missiles
(BY BILL GERTZ)
U.S. intelligence agencies have concluded that Pakistan has deployed nuclear-capable Chinese M-11 missiles and that the transfer was part of a conspiracy to skirt missile-control agreements.
The declaration, contained in interagency intelligence reports produced last month, confirms for the first time that Pakistan now has a strategic nuclear delivery capability. The finding is expected to trigger U.S. economic sanctions against both Pakistan and China based on a 1990 law.
State Department officials, however, are trying to block the intelligence judgment through bureaucratic maneuvering to avoid imposing sanctions, according to intelligence sources familiar with the effort.
The intelligence sources disclosed to The Washington Times that a report that Pakistan has operational Chinese M-11 missiles was discussed last month by the Weapons and Space Systems Intelligence Committee. The committee is an interagency panel of intelligence experts who evaluate missile developments worldwide. The report was based on sensitive CIA data.
A separate `statement of fact' also was drafted last month declaring that China and Pakistan took part in a `conspiracy to transfer M-11s,' according to an intelligence document obtained by The Times.
U.S. officials said the statement is the first step in an intelligence M-11 components were spotted in Pakistan three years ago.
China's delivery of the weapons violates the 31-nation Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), as well as a 1994 U.S.-China agreement not to deploy M-11s in Pakistan.
CIA and State Department spokesmen would not comment on the intelligence findings. A Chinese Embassy spokesman also declined to comment.
A Pakistani Embassy spokesman denied that any M-11s are operational in his country or that any were bought from China.
The M-11 finding highlights China's active role in arms-proliferation activities and comes after the recent administration decision not to impose economic sanctions on China for selling nuclear-weapons technology to Pakistan.
The administration announced last month it would not impose sanctions because it claimed senior Chinese officials were unaware of the sale last year of ring magnets--components used to produce nuclear-weapons fuel--to Pakistan.
William C. Triplett, a specialist on China, said the M-11 deployment, when coupled with the sale of nuclear-arms technology, is a major boost in Pakistan's drive for a strategic nuclear capability and will increase tensions in the volatile region.
`This is a major change in the geostrategic balance between Pakistan and India, and a devastating blow to Clinton administration efforts to reduce tensions on the subcontinent,' said Mr. Triplett, a former counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Mr. Triplett, a former U.S. intelligence official, also said he is not surprised by efforts of the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research to block the M-11 deployment judgment. The bureau is notorious for politicizing analyses and should be excluded from taking part in future interagency estimates, he said.
Limited sanctions were imposed on China in 1993 for selling M-11 components to Pakistan.
The sanctions, affecting an estimated $500 million in American sales, were lifted in October 1994 after Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and Secretary of State Warren Christopher signed an agreement halting sales of the M-11 and similar missiles.
Under a 1990 U.S. law, Pakistan's possession of operational M-11s requires the president to impose two years' sanctions on both countries that limit U.S. sales of high-technology products.
The sanctions also would bar imports of any products made by the government-owned China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corp., which makes M-11s, and Pakistan's Defense Ministry. Both companies were sanctioned in the 1993 M-11 component transfer.
Sanctions would have their greatest impact on sales of high-technology goods to China. Those goods were a major portion of the $12 billion in U.S. trade with China last year.
A State Department official said in 1994 when MTCR-related sanctions were lifted that if complete missiles were deployed in Pakistan `we would have no choice but to impose MTCR sanctions.'
Mr. Deutch said in Senate testimony Feb. 22 that China has continued to sell inappropriate weapons and military technology in recent months, including `nuclear technology to Pakistan, M-11 missiles to Pakistan, cruise missiles to Iran.'
`If this is true, there is no longer any excuse for not imposing sanctions on both China and Pakistan,' said Gary Milhollin, director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control.
China's disregard for the arms-control agreements despite U.S. appeals has exposed the weakness of U.S. policy toward Beijing, he said.
The MTCR, which limits sales of missiles with ranges greater than 186 miles or with warheads weighing more than 1,100 pounds, has no enforcement mechanism. But an amendment to the 1990 Defense Authorization Act requires the government to impose sanctions against foreign firms for MTCR violations.
U.S. officials have said the M-11 is a nuclear-capable missile whose export is barred under the MTCR because its warhead capacity exceeds MTCR limits.
U.S. intelligence agencies reported last year that the M-11 deal moved ahead after Pakistan paid $15 million to China for missiles, launchers and support equipment. The M-11s were shipped to Pakistan in 1993, but their assembly was not confirmed.
Spy-satellite photographs taken in April 1995 showed missile canisters at a facility in Sargodha, Pakistan. Two teams of Chinese missile technicians were sent to Pakistan later to provide training and to unpack and assemble the M-11s, intelligence sources said.
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A fair question, but one I will not answer because you will have to research it for yourself. Exchanges of some information is dangerous.
India has many talented scientists -- it has a population of over 1 billion to develop some of the best minds in the world. The British help form their High School and University systems.
In the 1950s, there were high school and college physics textbooks that told one how to build an atomic bomb (they have since removed such information).
India supposedly did some very creative things (from some things I read) about their weapons programs.
Pakistan, on the other hand, had to buy it. They just don't have the talent to choose from as India does (plus the material that is in English is easy for the scientists in India to read -- they are taught in English in their school system).
What you posted is to the point, and shows how Senate debated it...
Nuclear research has a long history in Canada, and in fact I believe the uranium for Fat Man and Little Boy came from Northern Ontario. The CANDU is a very reliable and safe reactor as these things go but the spent fuel can be extracted and used in warhead production. This has long been a topic of debate in Canada as the fear has always been that a nation who bought a CANDU could in fact be planning uses for it well beyond peaceful power generating purposes. This concern came up specifically with regards to the Indian reactor sale both before and after construction.
Agreed!
However it could be said that both Pakistan and India recieved their Nuclear technology from the same sources, just through different routes. Pakistan gained the majority, if not all of their nuclear technology from China who had in turn recieved its technology from the same source as India, The Former Soviet Union and its satelite regions.
If you read mitchbert's post, you will see references to Norhern Ontario and the CANDU reactor.
There is actually a huge environmental mess in Canada because of all the urananium processing that has been done in Canada. There are also many miners who have died because of exposure to urananium ore (from carrying it and mining it). So of these deaths go back to the 1930s.
I read in one URL that CANDU was used as a starting point for Hanford. So CANDU predated Hanford in a sense (during the Manhattan Project).
The actual building of a nuclear bomb is trivial, even a suitcase one. The one thing that is hard to get is weapons grade nuclear material.
In the early 1990s, when Iraq tried to fire up a nuclear power plant, Israel immediately bombed it, for it could have been used to produce nuclear bombs.
Maybe if you can the source of GLOWING MOOSES, you can find a source of nuclear material in Canada.
One of the problems with A-bombs (fission) is that it is easy to make them into H-bombs (fusion). There are certain elements that make this easy. The US, in the 1950s, was able to figure out how to make very small H-bombs. Now with computer technology and some of the best scientists, plus lots of information written in English on this, the scientists of India could figure out how to make an H-Bomb.
I do not know, but I would bet they have an H-bomb, and assume that Pakistan might be able to buy them from China (but Pakistan would not necessarily have the talent for building bombs, just buying them).
But the article starts out by the someone from India stating that nuclear weapons (in 1992) was part of India's defense. Since then, India could only have modernized or increased the number of such weapsons.
We might want to pull our carriers a little further away from the coast of India and Pakistan. Unfortunately, the capital of Pakistan is very close to Afghanistan, so our ground forces in Afghanistan may be in harm's way of fallout.
One can build very clean nuclear weapons, but one reason to make them very DIRTY is to inflict lots of damage on your enemy.
One serious problem for US Forces in the area is the effects of an EMP. Most of our hardware is supposed to be "resistant to that", but I would not want to test that out.
The first experience with EMPs and nuclear tests was when Hawaii had outages due to tests hundreds of miles away.
Finally, the nuclear bombs that India has are potentially very dirty since they would be plutonium-based bombs.
This can be compensated for by making "minimal nuclear triggers" and increasing the yield through other means.
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