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CHOOSE A NAME FOR THIS LATEST CLINTON SCANDAL-- How about "WALLGATE" or "TREASONGATE"?

"...In April, CNSNews.com staff writer Scott Wheeler reported that a senior U.S. government official and three other sources claimed that the 1995 memo written by Jamie Gorelick, who served as the Clinton Justice Department’s deputy attorney general from 1994 to 1997, created "a roadblock" to the investigation of illegal Chinese donations to the Democratic National Committee. But the picture is much bigger than that. The Gorelick memo, which blocked intelligence agents from sharing information that could have halted the September 11 hijacking plot, was only the mortar in a much larger maze of bureaucratic walls whose creation Gorelick personally oversaw..."

"...So it's my clear belief that the wall itself developed this culture which restrained in a substantial way the exchange of information in the intelligence and law enforcement communities. The Bellows report, which was part of some recommendations following the Wen Ho Lee case, indicated that it was part of the culture at the FBI that if one made a mistake and shared information that was later deemed to be inappropriate, it was called a career- ender, so that the risk of a person sharing information improperly was at least known in the culture of the law enforcement community to...

According to The New York Times (8 July 2003): "the federal commission investigating the Sept. 11 terror attacks said today that its work was being hampered by the failure of executive branch agencies, especially the Pentagon and the Justice Department, to respond quickly to requests for documents and testimony." Several alternative media have joined the bandwagon. George W. Bush is accused of obstructing the investigation...Former Jersey governor Thomas Kean, the commission's chairman is presented as an honest and uncompromising individual, who is courageously confronting the US government: "Without greater cooperation, Kean said, ''we cannot do the job we are supposed...

"...It was a deeply rewarding experience to work with highly capable colleagues and for such distinguished and thoughtful commissioners. Our commission sessions had long and occasionally heated discussion, but it was always productive and the commissioners themselves were devoted to achieving bipartisanship and unanimity. They understood very well that their impact would be greatest if they were unanimous..."

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9-11 Commission), an independent, bipartisan commission created by congressional legislation...is chartered to prepare a full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, including preparedness for and the immediate response to the attacks...

A group of 9/11 widows say they are "horrified" over reports that the 9/11 Commission ignored evidence that the Clinton administration had identified the two 9/11 hijackers who destroyed the World Trade Center as terrorist threats two years before the attack. "We are horrified to learn . . . . that the 9/11 Commission failed to fully investigate all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the 9/11 attacks," the group Sept. 11 Advocates said in a statement late Wednesday. A separate group of 9/11 widows, known as "the Jersey Girls," is also expressing outrage over the 9/11 Commission's decision to...

WELDON REJECTS 9/11 COMMISSION CLAIM THEY NEVER HEARD OF "ABLE DANGER" WASHINGTON, D.C. -- Yesterday, Congressman Curt Weldon (R-PA), Vice Chairman of the House Armed Services and Homeland Security Committees, sent the following letter to the Former 9/11 Commission Members, also known as the 9/11 Public Discourse Project, rejecting the Commission's claim that they were not briefed on "Able Danger". In the letter, Congressman Weldon calls on the 9/11 Public Discourse Project to answer two fundamental questions: #1) What lawyers in the Department of Defense made the decision in late 2000 not to pass the information from Able Danger to...

...We do know that Able Danger made their report about four of the attackers in 2000. We do know the report was submitted and the request for action was denied. We do know the Gorelick policy ‘wall’ was in effect at the time. We do know Clinton was President and Dick Clark was terrorism guru. We do know 9-11 commission staffers were briefed on these events and 9-11 commissioners were not...

...The former intelligence official said the first Able Danger report identified all four men as members of a "Brooklyn" cell, and was produced within two months after Mr. Atta arrived in the United States. The former intelligence official said he was among a group that briefed Mr. Zelikow and at least three other members of the Sept. 11 commission staff about Able Danger when they visited the Afghanistan-Pakistan region in October 2003...

WASHINGTON (AP) - Members of the commission that uncovered the government's failures to share intelligence among agencies before the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks want to know whether U.S. defense intelligence officials knew for more than a year that four of the hijackers were part of an al-Qaida cell but failed to tell law enforcement. Lee Hamilton, co-chairman of the now-disbanded commission, said Tuesday that members of the Sept. 11 commission could issue a statement by the end of the week after reviewing claims that defense intelligence officials had identified ringleader Mohammed Atta and three other hijackers, . "The 9/11 commission...

...Rep. Curt Weldon (R-Pa.), the No. 2 man on both the House Armed Services and Homeland Security committees, revealed that an elite military-intelligence unit known as Able Danger identified Atta and three other hijackers as likely members of a terror cell in this country as early as 1999. The spies wanted to turn the info over to the FBI in 2000, Weldon said, "so they could bring that cell in and take out the terrorists." He claimed Pentagon lawyers rejected the recommendation because they mistakenly believed that since Atta and the others were in the country legally on visas, they...

In September 2000, one year before the Al Qaeda attacks of 9/11, a U.S. Army military intelligence program, known as “Able Danger,” identified a terrorist cell based in Brooklyn, NY, one of whose members was 9/11 ringleader Mohammed Atta, and recommended to their military superiors that the FBI be called in to “take out that cell,” according to Rep. Curt Weldon, a longtime Republican congressman from Pennsylvania who is currently vice chairman of both the House Homeland Security and House Armed Services Committees. The recommendation to bring down that New York City cell -- in which two other Al Qaeda...

(CBS/AP) Sept. 11 ringleader Mohammed Atta and three other hijackers were identified by defense intelligence officials more than a year before the attacks, but information about possible al Qaeda connections never was sent to law enforcement, Rep. Curt Weldon said Tuesday. The 9/11 Commission will investigate the claim. Commission co-chairman Lee Hamilton said that Weldon's information warrants a review. Hamilton says the commission "did not learn of any U.S. government knowledge prior to 9/11 of surveillance of Mohammed Atta or of his cell." Weldon, vice chairman of the House Armed Services and Homeland Security committees, said the hijackers were identified...

War on Terror 9/11 commission members want claim on Atta pursued WASHINGTON – Members of the commission that uncovered the government's failures to share intelligence among agencies before the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks want to know whether U.S. defense intelligence officials knew for more than a year that four of the hijackers were part of an al-Qaeda cell but failed to tell law enforcement. Lee Hamilton, co-chairman of the now-disbanded commission, said Tuesday that members of the Sept. 11 commission could issue a statement by the end of the week after reviewing claims that defense intelligence officials had identified ringleader...

WASHINGTON, D.C., Aug 9 - From the U.S. Congressional Record U.S. INTELLIGENCE -- (House of Representatives - June 27, 2005) [Page: H5244] --- The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. McHenry). Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 4, 2005, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) is recognized for 44 minutes. [Page: H5244] Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I rise this evening to discuss for the next 45 minutes the most important topic that will allow us to protect the homeland, provide for the security of the American people and our allies and our troops around the world: our intelligence. Last...

Saturday, June 11, 2005 9:32 a.m. EDT Hillary Appointee Tied to 9/11 Blunder Press reports on Friday about a government report that offers new evidence on how the CIA failed to warn the FBI when two of the 9/11 hijackers entered the U.S. made no mention of the role played in the disastrous bungle by Hillary Clinton's Justice Department protege Jamie Gorelick. Typical was coverage in the Los Angeles Times, which chronicled the efforts of a frustrated CIA agent who desperately tried to warn the FBI that Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar had migrated to San Diego after attending an...

RUSH: All right, now to this 9/11 business. We have some audio sound bites here from Congressman Curt Weldon to go along with this story. I've got two versions of the story, one is by the Associated Press, the other is in the New York Times. I wanted to give you highlights of both. The AP story: "The Sept. 11 commission will investigate a claim that U.S. defense intelligence officials identified ringleader Mohammed Atta and three other hijackers as a likely part of an al-Qaeda cell more than a year before the hijackings but didn't forward the information to law...

9/11 Commission's Staff Ignored Military's Early Identification of Chief Hijacker By DOUGLAS JEHL and PHILIP SHENON WASHINGTON, Aug. 10 - The Sept. 11 commission was warned by a uniformed military officer 10 days before issuing its final report that the account would be incomplete without reference to what he described as a secret military operation that by the summer of 2000 had identified as a potential threat the member of Al Qaeda who would lead the attacks more than a year later, commission officials said on Wednesday. The officials said that the information had not been included in the report...

In September 2000, one year before the Al Qaeda attacks of 9/11, a U.S. Army military intelligence program, known as “Able Danger,” identified a terrorist cell based in Brooklyn, NY, one of whose members was 9/11 ringleader Mohammed Atta, and recommended to their military superiors that the FBI be called in to “take out that cell,” according to Rep. Curt Weldon, a longtime Republican congressman from Pennsylvania who is currently vice chairman of both the House Homeland Security and House Armed Services Committees. The recommendation to bring down that New York City cell -- in which two other Al Qaeda...

Fred Friendly Seminars Presents IN THE BALANCE, a Provocative Look at the Social, Political, Economic, Legal and Health and Safety Implications of Terrorist Threats - Wednesday August 3, 12:42 pm ET Programs To Air During National Preparedness Month In September Presented on PBS by Thirteen/WNET New York NEW YORK--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Aug. 3, 2005-- A videotape claiming that a terrorist attack will happen at a shopping mall in the next few days is sent to a major national news organization. How does the organization respond? On the one hand, this is an exclusive news event; on the other, it's a potential national...

Michael Savage is angry that Department of Defence lawyers knew the whereabouts of four 9/11 terrorists in 1999, but kept intelligence departments from sharing the information. He says that these lawyers are responsible for 9/11 and should go to jail; as though they knew what the terrorists were planning. The information he found in the New York Post is nothing new. Its just more of the same story: we knew who the terrorists were, where they were, and could have gotten them. Just like the many opportunities Bill Clinton had to capture or kill Osama Bin Laden before 9/11, but...

...Among other lessons of 9/11, we have learned the cost of squeamishness that prevented closer scrutiny of young Arab men entering the country even when their behavior raised suspicions.... [A]n airline ticket-taker recalls being stunned by the strange look on the face of customer Mohamed Atta--particularly the unsettling fury the man exuded. Still, he could not bring himself to raise any alarm: indeed, when he heard later that the plane Atta was on had been one of those that crashed in the terror attacks, the agent felt terrible. Terrible because he had been suspicious of the passenger and thought he...

...Al Felzenberg, who served as the commission's chief spokesman, said earlier this week that staff members who were briefed about Able Danger at a first meeting, in October 2003, did not remember hearing anything about Mr. Atta or an American terrorist cell. On Wednesday, however, Mr. Felzenberg said the uniformed officer who briefed two staff members in July 2004 had indeed mentioned Mr. Atta.... Mr. Felzenberg said the commission's staff remained convinced that the information provided by the military officer in the July 2004 briefing was inaccurate in a significant way.... Mr. Felzenberg said staff investigators had become wary of...

Tomorrow's New York Times reports that members of the 9/11 Commission reversed themselves and now acknowledge being briefed on the Army's data mining project, Able Danger, prior to the publication of their report to the American people. After over 24 hours of denying that anyone had told the Commission about the secret project, their spokesman now says that commission officials met with a uniformed officer who told them about the identification of Mohammed Atta and three other 9/11 hijackers in 2000, over a year prior to the attacks: