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Keyword: counterinsurgency

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  • Historical PHOTO: US Soldiers Pose with the Bodies of Moro (Muslim) Insurgents, Philippines; c. 1906

    02/19/2016 10:13:09 PM PST · by DogByte6RER · 43 replies
    Rare Historical Photos ^ | January 29, 2016 | RHP
    US Soldiers Pose with the Bodies of Moro (Muslim) Insurgents, Philippines; circa 1906 On March 7, 1906, US troops under the command of Major General Leonard Wood massacred as many as 1,000 Filipino Muslims, known as Moros, who were taking refuge at Bud Dajo, a volcanic crater on the island of Jolo in the southern Philippines. The First Battle of Bud Dajo, also known as the Bud Dajo Massacre, was a counter insurgency action fought by the United States Army against Moros in March 1906, during the Moro Rebellion phase of the Philippine - American War. After the United States...
  • Learning from Our Wrong Turn - Why American counterinsurgency has proved to be unworkable.

    08/21/2013 12:41:23 PM PDT · by neverdem · 12 replies
    National Review Online ^ | August 21, 2013 | Bing West
    A remarkable book has recently been published: Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency, by Colonel Gian Gentile, U.S. Army. Gentile, a professor at West Point, commanded a battalion in Iraq. In his fast-paced, intellectually challenging book, he argues that America’s strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan was unworkable from the start. Below are his responses to the basic questions I asked him. BING WEST: In a few sentences, describe the counterinsurgency doctrine that our grunts were supposed to employ in Iraq and Afghanistan. COLONEL GIAN GENTILE: American counterinsurgency, as codified in Marine/Army Field Manual 3-24, is armed nation building...
  • US Army Colonel Reveals Failure of COIN and Barbarism of Afghans

    10/10/2012 11:18:31 PM PDT · by Neil E. Wright · 16 replies
    Front Page Magazine ^ | October 10, 2012 | Daniel Greenfield
    The letter from Colonel Harry Tunnell is making its rounds around the internet, but here are some choice and relevant excerpts. But first a shot bio of Tunnell. Tunnell had been gravely wounded in Iraq, where he led a battalion of paratroopers with the 173rd Airborne Brigade. (snip) SNIPBy the time Tunnell took over the brigade, every other infantry commander preparing to go to Iraq or Afghanistan was using Gen. Petraeus’ COIN manual as his lodestar. But not Tunnell. He told his soldiers that their approach to security operations would be drawn from an Army manual that outlined counterguerrilla operations,...
  • Left Out

    12/17/2010 10:44:56 AM PST · by Retain Mike · 1 replies
    World Magazine ^ | December 18, 2010 | Mindy Belz
    Three years ago I attended a meeting outside Washington with a NATO adviser recently returned from briefings with commanders of the war in Iraq. The question had been posed to them: If there should be a targeted massacre of Christians in Iraq (the word actually used was genocide), would the U.S. military respond? The answer from the commanders: No. It was December 2007. Gen. David Petraeus had arrived in Baghdad 10 months earlier bearing orders to carry out his new counterinsurgency strategy with a thrust of 20,000 additional troops throughout the city. Until then, U.S. forces were bogged down in...
  • Battle of Barg-e-Matal: We have met the enemy and he is us

    07/29/2010 5:50:38 AM PDT · by Ordinary_American · 1 replies
    United Press International ^ | July 29, 2010 | Lawrence Sellin
    KABUL, Afghanistan, July 29 (UPI) -- If the battle of Barg-e-Matal ever goes down in history, I am not sure if it will be treated as a victory or a defeat or a tragedy or a comedy. It does, however, illustrate a number of elements that can help explain why progress in Afghanistan can be elusive. Barg-e-Matal, in the eastern province of Nuristan bordering Pakistan, has been the scene of insurgent attacks over several years and in recent months. About two months ago the Taliban captured the district but Afghan and NATO-led international forces retook it after heavy fighting. Subsequent...
  • Outside View: Afghanistan status check (US Army Colonel writes from Afghan)

    07/08/2010 4:39:20 AM PDT · by xzins · 13 replies ^ | July 8, 2010 | COL LAWRENCE SELLIN
    KABUL, Afghanistan, July 8 (UPI) -- I have been in-country about one week, enough time for some initial impressions. Success in Afghanistan isn't just about killing the enemy. It is about shaping the environment such that the insurgency will whither. It is not nation-building but counterinsurgency. Important components of counterinsurgency are good governance and rule of law. Establishing effective and honest governance continues to be a challenge. Far too many provincial and senior district officials are corrupt. They comprise a group of "new warlords" who impose their predatory behavior on the Afghan populace. They sow seeds of distrust and skepticism...
  • The Petraeus challenge

    07/01/2010 2:36:51 AM PDT · by Scanian · 11 replies
    NY Post ^ | July 1, 2010 | Ralph Peters
    We're failing in Afghanistan. Con firmed yesterday as our new com mander there, Gen. David Petraeus has the unenviable task of producing something President Obama can call a success. If Petraeus can salvage the situation so that our minimum needs are met, he'll confirm his reputation as the greatest American soldier of our time. Should he falter, he'll go down as the general who sold the Pentagon a disastrous doctrine. Petraeus did not want this job. But our president didn't know to whom else to turn in the wake of last week's debacle with Gen. Stanley McChrystal. Petraeus did his...
  • How to win in Afghanistan: the Karzai's must go

    06/25/2010 3:19:47 AM PDT · by Scanian · 5 replies
    NY Post ^ | June 25, 2010 | ANN MARLOWE
    President Obama said Wednesday that he didn't fire Gen. Stanley McChrystal over policy disagreements. Too bad. Almost every metric measuring military progress in Afghanistan has gone downhill since McChrystal took command a year ago, as an April Pentagon report detailed. More recently, a UN report revealed that incidents involving improvised-explosive devices -- the main killer of our troops -- rose 94 percent in the first four months of 2010 over a year earlier. It's notable that one of the few strong statements of support for McChrystal came from Afghanistan's most notorious crime boss -- whom McChrystal had claimed as an...
  • Afghan agonies: grim news from the front

    06/21/2010 3:12:48 AM PDT · by Scanian · 7 replies
    NY Post ^ | June 21, 2010 | George F. Will
    Torrents of uninteresting mail inundate members of Congress, but occasionally there are riveting communications, such as a recent e-mail from a noncommissioned officer serving in Afghanistan. He explains why the rules of engagement for US troops are "too prohibitive for coalition forces to achieve sustained tactical successes." Receiving mortar fire during an overnight mission, his unit called for a 155mm howitzer illumination round to be fired to reveal the enemy's location. The request was rejected "on the grounds that it may cause collateral damage." The NCO says the only thing that comes down from an illumination round is a canister,...
  • Outside View: Wanat Afghanistan, tactical victory, strategic defeat

    03/18/2010 7:18:24 AM PDT · by Ordinary_American · 3 replies · 255+ views
    United Press International ^ | March 18, 2010 | Lawrence Sellin
    HELSINKI, Finland, March 18 (UPI) -- Last week it was reported that four-star U.S. Army Gen. Charles Campbell of Army Forces Command issued career-ending official reprimands to Capt. Matthew Myer, Lt. Col. William Ostlund and Col. Chip Preysler, company, battalion and brigade commanders who, according to the Army investigation, failed to adequately prepare their unit for the July 13, 2008, Taliban attack on a remote U.S. outpost in Wanat, Waygal Valley, Afghanistan. All the soldiers and Marines involved in this intense battle fought with exceptional valor and professionalism in keeping with the highest traditions of the U.S. military. This includes...
  • The Insurgent Rationale in Iraq

    02/18/2010 9:12:23 AM PST · by ahmad35 · 5 replies · 255+ views
    The Jamestown Foundation ^ | February 12, 2010 | Ramzy Mardini
    The string of high-profile bombings that followed the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from Iraqi cities on June 30, 2009 exposed not only Iraqi security shortcomings, but also the continued effectiveness of the insurgents to carry out demanding operations. These types of operations suggest the militants are choosing high-profile terrorism as a strategy for undermining counterinsurgency efforts, targeting the confidence and trust of the population in the government as a way of ensuring a climate of uncertainty, feeble governance, and organizational survival. A new security challenge emerged when U.S. combat forces exited Iraqi cities in accordance with the Status of...
  • The Surge Comes to Salinas(plan to apply counterinsurgency doctrine to gang violence)

    02/11/2010 6:19:16 AM PST · by TigerLikesRooster · 5 replies · 479+ views
    City Journal ^ | winter 2010 | Troy Senik
    Troy Senik The Surge Comes to Salinas A plan to apply counterinsurgency doctrine to gang violence Communities beset by seemingly unbreakable cycles of violence; law enforcement overmatched to the point of essentially ceding sovereignty to an organized and heavily armed resistance; citizens so intimidated by thugs that they won’t report them to authorities, for fear of retribution. Eight years into the War on Terror, this scenario sounds familiar. But its location isn’t the Sunni Triangle in 2006 or southern Afghanistan today; it’s a farm town on California’s Central Coast. In Salinas—a predominantly Hispanic, blue-collar community best known for producing John...
  • Outside View: Surely you’re joking, Admiral Mullen

    12/19/2009 11:35:48 AM PST · by Ordinary_American · 6 replies · 888+ views
    United Press International ^ | December 19. 2009 | Lawrence Sellin
    Dec. 19 (UPI) -- A CBS news report filed by Kimberly Dozier states that U.S. Navy Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, met in Kandahar with five Afghan tribal elders. Pulling out his notebook, the admiral asked the Afghans what they need. Apparently the new fashionable counterinsurgency introductory question is "What do you need?" rather than "Are you fighting on our side?" or "Are we winning?" In addition to new dams for irrigation purposes, Afghan elders made two requests, which were surprising only from the standpoint that, after eight years in Afghanistan, either request could...
  • Arnold Schwarzenegger visits Iraq - and aims to transfer military tactics to California

    11/17/2009 6:52:33 AM PST · by TigerLikesRooster · 2 replies · 530+ views
    The Times (UK) ^ | 11/16/09 | Oliver August
    November 16, 2009 Arnold Schwarzenegger visits Iraq - and aims to transfer military tactics to California Oliver August in Baghdad The governor of California trots out his most famous one-liner wherever he goes but, at the Victory military base in Baghdad today, he apparently meant it. “I’ll be back,” Arnold Schwarzenegger growled after working out with a group of American soldiers on active duty in Iraq, all with necks and trunks as thick as his. The muscleman who rose to Hollywood fame as The Terminator came to the site of America’s bloodiest war in a generation to cheer up troops,...
  • Obama wraps up Afghan review, eyes final options (considering sending about 30,000 more troops)

    11/08/2009 12:21:07 AM PST · by Former Military Chick · 12 replies · 698+ views
    (Reuters) ^ | Sunday November 8, 2009 | Adam Entous
    WASHINGTON (Reuters) - U.S. President Barack Obama is wrapping up deliberations on war strategy in Afghanistan and is considering final Pentagon options that include sending about 30,000 more troops, officials said on Saturday. A deployment of that size would be less than the 40,000-troop increase recommended by Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, but more than many of Obama's Democratic allies may support. Record combat deaths have eroded U.S. public support for the war, and a decision to expand troop levels could become a political liability for the president ahead of congressional elections next...
  • 'Good Enough' Isn't

    10/27/2009 7:00:35 PM PDT · by Kaslin · 11 replies · 679+ views ^ | October 27, 2009 | INVESTORS BUSINESS DAILY Staff
    War On Terror: Sen. John Kerry, who was so wrong about Iraq, now says our commander in Afghanistan is "reaching too far, too fast" and that a "good enough" policy should suffice. It won't. Offering his advice on how to micromanage the war against the Taliban, Kerry said Gen. Stanley McChrystal, President Obama's hand-picked general to fight what he called a "war of necessity," is wrong in saying he needs 40,000 more troops to fight and win it. Speaking before the Council on Foreign Relations on Monday, Kerry advocated a "good enough" policy designed not to achieve victory in al-Qaida's...
  • 'Good Enough' Isn't (Kerry Vs. McChrystal)

    10/27/2009 5:52:35 PM PDT · by raptor22 · 13 replies · 1,290+ views
    Investor's Business Daily ^ | October 27, 2009 | IBD editorial staff
    War On Terror: Sen. John Kerry, who was so wrong about Iraq, now says our commander in Afghanistan is "reaching too far, too fast" and that a "good enough" policy should suffice. It won't. Offering his advice on how to micromanage the war against the Taliban, Kerry said Gen. Stanley McChrystal, President Obama's hand-picked general to fight what he called a "war of necessity," is wrong in saying he needs 40,000 more troops to fight and win it. Speaking before the Council on Foreign Relations on Monday, Kerry advocated a "good enough" policy designed not to achieve victory in al-Qaida's...
  • Why No Testimony From McChrystal?

    10/07/2009 4:42:28 PM PDT · by Kaslin · 10 replies · 1,247+ views
    IBD Editorial ^ | October 7, 2009 | INVESTORS BUSINESS DAILY Staff
    War Strategy: When Bush and Petraeus proposed the surge in Iraq, Democrats demanded that the general testify before Congress. So why has the Senate blocked a similar invitation to our commander in Afghanistan? Those with memories longer than the 24-hour news cycle recall that in the dark days of the Iraq War, David Petraeus was summoned to Washington to explain the surge strategy that would eventually lead to victory in Iraq. Democrats hoped for a show trial. took out a full-page ad in the New York Times labeling the commanding general of our efforts in Iraq "General Betray-us." Then...
  • Counterinsurgency is not nation-building

    10/01/2009 9:23:20 AM PDT · by Ordinary_American · 7 replies · 310+ views
    United Press International ^ | October 1, 2009 | Lawrence Sellin
    WASHINGTON, Oct. 1 (UPI) -- A report by Jordan Fabian in The Hill's Blog Briefing Room said U.S. Rep. Phil Roe, R-Tenn., stated that nation-building in Afghanistan similar to what the United States undertook in Iraq would unlikely achieve success because Afghanistan is "medieval" compared with the "20th-century country" Iraq. Roe said that winning the war in Afghanistan would take decades. He emphasized that the government needs to re-evaluate the mission there and define victory in the conflict against Taliban and al-Qaida insurgents. True, Afghanistan is not Iraq and no one can predict when "victory" will be attained there. Roe...
  • Counterinsurgency challenges

    07/28/2009 7:28:58 AM PDT · by Ordinary_American · 175+ views
    United Press International ^ | July 28, 2009 | Lawrence Sellin
    WASHINGTON, July 28 (UPI) -- The effective execution of full spectrum counterinsurgency operations remains a challenge for the U.S. military. U.S. Army doctrine states that successful COIN operations depend on the synchronized application of combat, security, political, economic, psychological and civic actions. To achieve unity of effort, these activities need to be coordinated across military services, government agencies and in collaboration with the host government. The often complex, ambiguous and multidimensional features of COIN are further complicated by the need to adapt to a rapidly changing operational environment. That is, to possess the capability to act decisively before the enemy...
  • Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan Requires New Thinking

    07/23/2009 4:41:02 PM PDT · by SandRat · 8 replies · 369+ views
    WASHINGTON, July 23, 2009 – International forces in Afghanistan must garner popular support among residents to defeat the insurgency, the director of counterinsurgency training there said yesterday. “This is different from conventional combat, which is terrain or enemy focused,” Army Col. John Agoglia, director of Counterinsurgency Training Center Afghanistan, said during a “DoDLive” bloggers roundtable. “Counterinsurgency is population-focused,” Agoglia said in his update on the center’s doctrine, curriculum and methodologies. “How we operate in and amongst the population will determine the outcome more than traditional measures, like capture of terrain or attrition of the enemy.” Making sure all involved in...
  • The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq

    01/07/2009 4:04:34 PM PST · by Retain Mike · 13 replies · 607+ views
    U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings ^ | December 2008 | Bing West
    The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq(See D. Kidwell, p. 62, November 2008 Proceedings)Bing West In her review of my book, The Strongest Tribe, Dr. Deborah Kidwell wrote, "West credits three decisions—Bush's surge strategy, Odierno's broad attack and Petraeus's decision to disperse U.S. forces within neighborhoods—with . . . success." Actually, my book explained that these three decisions in the eastern Baghdad region in 2007 occurred six months after the Sunni uprising in Anbar Province in the west. In the fall of 2006, the Sunni tribes in Anbar Province came over to the American side against al...
  • Counterinsurgency for Beginners

    10/28/2008 8:51:39 PM PDT · by prplhze2000 · 6 replies · 316+ views
    Jackson Jambalaya ^ | July 29, 2007 | Kingfish
    While fighting the current insurgency in Iraq, our military is once again re-learning the same lessons it forgot after Vietnam. One surprising fact I discovered while reading Fiasco by Thomas Ricks, a Pulitzer-prize winning writer for The Washington Post who is very well read on military and counter-insurgency matters, is that during the post-Vietnam era, the Army mothballed the counter-insurgency tactics and strategies in a desire to forget the Indochina experience. While some sections of the military, such as The U.S. Army Special Forces (which is almost a separate branch of the Army and thus not included in this critique),...
  • Afghanistan Doesn't Need a (Obama)'Surge'

    07/23/2008 7:48:09 AM PDT · by Cronos · 16 replies · 334+ views
    Wall Street Journal ^ | July 22, 2008 | ANN MARLOWE
    Barack Obama said: "We need more troops, more helicopters, better intelligence-gathering and more nonmilitary assistance to accomplish the mission there." Mr. Obama should have supported the surge in Iraq, but that doesn't mean that advocating one in Afghanistan makes sense ==== snip ====== Regional Command East has been applying a standard formula in 14 Afghan provinces, usually with great success. Even privates can tell you that it's about living among the people, building projects for them, and, in the Pashtun belt, getting the tribes on your side >==== snip ====== Nuristanis -- who were converted from paganism to Islam only...
  • Concrete Peace [Baghdad]

    06/27/2008 10:28:45 PM PDT · by Uncle Ralph · 4 replies · 142+ views
    Abu Muqawama ^ | June 28, 2008 | "Dr. iRack"
    The horrific sectarian cleansing of much of Baghdad in 2006-2007 separated the warring parities. As a consequence of the surge, the sectarian cleansing slowed and has now basically stopped. It is not "complete" in the sense that there are still some Sunni neighborhoods (mostly in western Baghdad) and a few (somewhat) mixed areas elsewhere, but Baghdad has become a city of enclaves. Beyond the U.S. troop increase, the greater emphasis on population security, and the recruitment of local Sons of Iraq to patrol neighborhoods and man checkpoints, there is another ingredient to the fragile, Balkanized peace in Iraq's capital: concrete....
  • Reconciliation in Iraq: Don't Hold Your Breath

    01/17/2008 6:44:18 PM PST · by Retain Mike · 5 replies · 223+ views
    U.S. Naval Institue Proceedings ^ | January 2008 | Colonel Norvell B. DeAtkine, U.S. Army (Retired)
    Reconciliation in Iraq: Don't Hold Your Breath By Colonel Norvell B. DeAtkine, U.S. Army (Retired) The war-torn nation is a victim of its tortured history. The word "reconciliation" has become a synonym for success in Iraq. It was enshrined as the centerpiece of the 18 benchmarks imposed on the Iraqi government by domestic American political pressures, presumably to have some measure of success or failure in an unpopular conflict. The concept as enunciated in the troop surge was that the calming of Baghdad would give the Iraqi politicians time to work out the differences between the various sectarian demands. The...
  • Reconciliation Takes center Stage Across Muli-national Diviion - Center

    12/07/2007 1:38:29 PM PST · by Retain Mike · 4 replies · 137+ views
    Headquarters United States Central Command ^ | December 6, 2007 | U.S. Central Command
    NEWS RELEASE HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND 7115 South Boundary Boulevard MacDill AFB, Fla. 33621-5101 Phone: (813) 827-5894; FAX: (813) 827-2211; DSN 651-5894 Title: RECONCILIATION TAKES CENTER STAGE ACROSS MULTI-NATIONAL DIVISION - CENTER Release Date: 12/6/2007 Release Number: 07-01-03P Description: CAMP VICTORY, Iraq – The number of Iraqi-led reconciliation efforts swelled over the past two weeks across Multi-National Division – Center as local Iraqi leaders seek to capitalize on an improved security situation by developing the institutions that will enable long-term stability. With Coalition Forces and Iraqi Concerned Local Citizens working increasingly in tandem with the Iraqi Police and Army...
  • Ghurkhas Train with US Soldiers in India

    12/04/2007 7:12:03 AM PST · by sukhoi-30mki · 45 replies · 518+ views
    Army News Service ^ | Dec 03, 2007 | Staff Sgt. Matthew MacRoberts
    Ghurkhas Train with U.S. Soldiers in India Dec 03, 2007 BY Staff Sgt. Matthew MacRoberts CHAUBATTIA, India (Army News Service, Dec. 3, 2007) – More than 120 U.S. Soldiers trained in the foothills of the Himalayan Mountains with their Indian counterparts during Exercise Yudh Abhyas in November, building on existing skills and sharing tactics. Participation of the 25th Infantry Division Soldiers from Fort Wainwright, Alaska, in the exercise demonstrates the command’s ability to deploy as the northwest power projection platform, officials said. The C Company “Gimlets,”3/ 21st Infantry, spent about a week training in a cantonment area before relocating and...
  • How to Win in Iraq

    11/24/2007 6:35:05 PM PST · by Retain Mike · 6 replies · 162+ views
    U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings ^ | December 2005 | Lt. Colonel Terence J. Daly
    How to Win in Iraq By Lieutenant Colonel Terence J. Daly, USAR (Ret.) Sidebar: Recommended Reading (and Viewing) on Counterinsurgency "The population's attitude in the middle stage of the war is dictated not so much by the relative popularity and merits of the opponents as by the more primitive concern for safety. Which side gives the best protection, which one threatens the most, which one is likely to win, these are the criteria governing the population's stand." —David Galula Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice We cannot afford to fail in Iraq, the main front in a struggle for survival against...
  • The Iraqi Military: What If We Win?

    10/01/2007 7:10:35 PM PDT · by Obiter Dictum · 105+ views
    Obiter Dictum Blog ^ | 10/1/2007 | Denis Keohane
    For months the nation has had a deservedly high profile discussion of the potential calamities that would ensue if we were to precipitously withdraw and/or lose in Iraq. There has been little discussion of what may happen if the informal alliance of the Democrat left, the MSM and Al Qaeda fails, and America and its coalition and Iraqis allies prevail. If that happens, we may end up with more than most may now realize.
  • General is 1st a scholar

    09/02/2007 8:53:29 PM PDT · by gpapa · 10 replies · 608+ views ^ | September 2, 2007 | Philip R. O'Connor
    I arrived in Baghdad in mid-March to work on electricity issues, just as Gen. David Petraeus returned to Iraq to lead the "surge," of which he is the prime architect. But my sense of identification with the commander of the Multi-National Force-Iraq goes beyond that. To most people Petraeus is a four-star general, an experienced combat veteran and the consummate military officer. But when I pass him in a hallway of the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, I have to catch myself from blurting, "Good morning, Dr. Petraeus." Like me, Petraeus has a doctorate in political science, his from Princeton, mine...
  • From Surge to Sustain

    05/30/2007 6:21:03 AM PDT · by Valin · 11 replies · 595+ views
    Strategypage ^ | 5/22/07 | Austin Bay
    "You are damned if you are heavy, and damned if you are light -- both cause problems." That sentence appeared in an email I received three weeks ago from a thoughtful Vietnam War vet reflecting on "how devilishly difficult counterinsurgency really is." In his formulation, "heavy" roughly correlates to Gen. David Petraeus' "surge and hold" operations in Iraq and "light" to the "patrol and quick reaction" operational scheme directed by Gens. John Abizaid and George Casey. The military component of the "surge" consists of change in operational and tactical emphasis designed to achieve the original strategic goals. Iraq as a...
  • Counter-Insurgency and "The Single Narrative"

    05/30/2007 5:09:39 AM PDT · by Valin · 5 replies · 223+ views
    Townhall ^ | Austin Bay
    "Since counterinsurgency is a competition to mobilize popular support, it pays to know how people are mobilized." That candid declaration of common sense appeared last year in IOSPHERE, the publication of the Joint Information Operations Center, in an article written by Dr. David Kilcullen. Kilcullen's article expanded on the sources of motivation. "In most societies," he wrote, "there are opinionmakers: local leaders ... religious figures, media personalities ... who set trends and influence public perceptions. This influence -- including the pernicious influence of the insurgents -- often takes the form of a 'single narrative.' This is a simple, unifying, easily...
  • All Counter-insurgency Is Local

    04/09/2007 10:36:27 PM PDT · by Valin · 4 replies · 554+ views
    Page One article in today's Wall Street Journal on how the US Army is learning to swim like fish among the people in rural Afghanistan (sub req): A year ago, U.S. commanders here would have been reluctant to insert a small force of infantrymen into a remote village. But, along the Pech River and tributaries such as the Waygal, one 750-man U.S. Army battalion is trying a risky, grueling way to isolate the insurgents and win the support of the villagers. Instead of operating out of safe rear bases and commuting to the war, for the past year the soldiers...
  • U.S. Should Use Counterinsurgency Methods in War on Terror, General Says

    03/01/2007 3:56:27 PM PST · by SandRat · 19 replies · 815+ views
    ARLINGTON, Va., Feb. 28, 2007 – The United States should approach the global war on terrorism as it would an insurgency, a senior military official said today at the 18th annual Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict Symposium here. “If we look at is as terrorism, we have a tendency to think that the solution is to kill or capture all the terrorists. That’s a never-ending process,” Army Lt. Gen. William G. Boykin, undersecretary of defense for intelligence and warfighting support, said. “We’ll never be successful, we’ll never get there, if we think that’s the primary solution,” he said. “But...
  • Overdue Beginning for Counterinsurgency

    01/12/2007 3:43:17 AM PST · by RWR8189 · 7 replies · 712+ views
    Wall Street Journal ^ | January 12, 2007 | Daniel Henninger
    Immediately after the president's speech, House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer said, "I heard nothing new." Nothing? When Gen. David Petraeus takes command of U.S. forces in Iraq, it will mark the start of an historic turn in military strategy in Iraq and perhaps in U.S. war-fighting doctrine. The U.S.'s primary problem in Iraq, manifest across 2006, has been an urban insurgency in a 30-mile radius around Baghdad and in Anbar province. The Petraeus command is the overdue beginning of the counterinsurgency. This isn't a one-off effort as at Fallujah, but counterinsurgency as daily U.S. military policy. It is the product...

    12/20/2006 12:18:23 PM PST · by OESY · 36 replies · 913+ views
    New York Post ^ | December 20, 2006 | Ralph Peters
    If a prize were awarded for the most-improved government publication of the decade, we could choose the winner now: "Army Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency" (MCWP 3-33.5 for the Marine Corps). Rising above abysmal earlier drafts, the Army and Marines have come through with doctrine that will truly help our troops.... A huge gap remaining in the doctrine is that, except for a few careful mentions, it ignores the role of the media. Generals have told me frankly that it was just too loaded an issue - any suggestion that the media are complicit in shaping outcomes excites punitive media outrage....
  • Army, Marines Release New Counterinsurgency Manual

    12/18/2006 3:38:12 PM PST · by SandRat · 7 replies · 436+ views
    WASHINGTON, Dec. 18, 2006 – “Learn” and “adapt” are the key messages of the new Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, which just hit the streets. The Counterinsurgency Field Manual, FM 3-24 and Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, is a unique joint effort between the Army and Marines to put in place doctrine to help operators as they face the challenges of asymmetric warfare. The manual codifies an important lesson of insurgencies: it takes more than the military to win. “There are more than just lethal operations involved in a counterinsurgency campaign,” said Conrad Crane, director of the...
  • U.S. military publishes manual to fight insurgents

    12/15/2006 10:58:39 PM PST · by Triggerhippie · 15 replies · 1,144+ views
    Yahoo News ^ | Fri Dec 15, 6:43 PM ET | Al Reuters
    WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The U.S. military published a new counterinsurgency manual on Friday that draws on lessons from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and stresses that troops must be able to do more than just fight. U.S. forces battling insurgencies must be ready every day "to be greeted with a hand grenade or a handshake, and to respond appropriately to each," the U.S. Army and Marine Corps said in a joint statement to launch the manual. The document is the U.S. military's first new doctrine on fighting insurgencies in some 20 years, although an interim manual was published two...
  • Winning the Peace: The Need for Full Spectrum Operations

    10/07/2006 1:25:47 PM PDT · by Axhandle · 6 replies · 505+ views
    Military Review ^ | August 2005 | MG Peter Chiarelli and MAJ Patrick Michaelis
    You [military professionals] must know something about strategy and tactics and logistics, but also economics and politics and diplomacy and history. You must know everything you can know about military power, and you must also understand the limits of military power. You must understand that few of the important problems of our time have, in the final analysis, been finally solved by military power alone.—John F. Kennedy1 FOR THE LAST 3 decades serving as an Army officer, the traditional military training model prepared me to win our Nation’s wars on the plains of Europe, or the deserts of the Middle...
  • Counterinsurgency, by the Book

    08/07/2006 12:26:01 AM PDT · by neverdem · 13 replies · 630+ views
    NY Times ^ | August 7, 2006 | RICHARD H. SCHULTZ Jr. and ANDREA J. DEW
    AS we all know, war has changed. In the 21st century it is dominated by irregular and unconventional ways of fighting. Al Qaeda demonstrated this on 9/11, and the bloody wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are only further corroboration. War can no longer be waged effectively by conventional combat forces employed by modern militaries. The Pentagon is just starting to catch up with these changes. It is in the midst of a strategic overhaul aimed at coming up with new ways to fight new wars. This was first signaled in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, which described the “long war”...
  • FReep this poll regarding Rummy and whether or not he should resign

    08/05/2006 7:31:14 AM PDT · by GeorgiaDawg32 · 132 replies · 1,755+ views ^ | 8/5/06 | GeorgiaDawg32
    I don't normally ask people to FReep polls, but the question is: Should Rumsfeld resign? Yes - 80% No - 20% Total votes 2150
  • Divide et Impera

    07/12/2006 6:03:22 AM PDT · by Valin · 2 replies · 159+ views
    Hoover Digest ^ | Winter 06 | Thomas H. Henriksen
    Divide et impera—divide and conquer—is an ancient strategy. Thomas H. Henriksen explains how to adapt it to the war on terror, exploiting the ideological and religious differences of our enemies. “Our priority will be first to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations of global reach and attack their leadership; command, control, and communications; material support; and finances. This will have a disabling effect upon the terrorists’ ability to plan and operate.” —National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002 Politics and Counterinsurgency If war is the continuation of politics by other means, as Clausewitz suggested, then counterinsurgency warfare is the...
  • Taji Center Stresses Counterinsurgency Mission

    05/22/2006 3:58:14 PM PDT · by SandRat · 1 replies · 158+ views
    CAMP TAJI, Iraq, May 22, 2006 – The Counterinsurgency Center for Excellence here was established last year to help units adapt to and train for the war against terror in Iraq as it is fought today, which is much different than it was 2003, 2004 or even 2005. "There is a different nature of operations now," said Army Lt. Col. Pete Cafaro, the center's deputy commandant. "Some of the units were here at the beginning when they were fighting their way to Baghdad. Now that's not the fight. Now what we're trying to do is train the Iraqis so they...
  • Iraqi Forces More Capable in Counterinsurgency Fight

    05/04/2006 5:21:05 PM PDT · by SandRat · 3 replies · 203+ views
    BAHGDAD, Iraq, May 4, 2006 – Iraqi army forces are becoming much more capable and are increasingly taking the lead in counterinsurgency operations, coalition officials said here today at a news conference. About 253,000 members of the Iraqi security forces are trained and equipped, Army Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch, deputy chief of staff for strategic effects for Multinational force Iraq, said. Two divisions, 16 brigades and 58 battalions make up the Iraqi army. Iraqi officials yesterday inaugurated a new system that will allow commanders to exercise operational control of these forces nationwide. Lynch said the million-dollar Joint Operations Center that...
  • A Hundred Osamas: Islamist Threats and the Future of Counterinsurgency

    04/06/2006 6:06:37 PM PDT · by SandRat · 182+ views
    NEW CONFLICT, OUTDATED STRATEGY? The U.S. Government launched Operation ENDURING FREE- DOM, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and the Global War on Terror (GWOT) in response to the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11), and in alliance with various nations. Many other nations objected to the U.S. invasion of Iraq on the grounds that Saddam Hussayn's region did not, in their views, pose a credible Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) threat as was claimed at the time, and because they believed that American dismantlement and occupation of Iraq would surely be interpreted as neocolonialist interventionism. Indeed, Islamist extremists labeled these as Crusader...
  • Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq

    04/06/2006 5:58:45 PM PDT · by SandRat · 1 replies · 161+ views
    The US Army Professional Writing Collection | Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus, U.S. Army
    The Army has learned a great deal in Iraq and Afghanistan about the conduct of counterinsurgency operations, and we must continue to learn all that we can from our experiences in those countries. The insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan were not, in truth, the wars for which we were best prepared in 2001; however, they are the wars we are fighting and they clearly are the kind of wars we must master. America's overwhelming conventional military superiority makes it unlikely that future enemies will confront us head on. Rather, they will attack us asymmetrically, avoiding our strengths-firepower, maneuver, technology-and come...
  • An Infantry Colonel’s Foxhole Report from Iraq

    03/30/2006 7:37:44 PM PST · by Barbarian6 · 59 replies · 2,075+ views
    The American Thinker ^ | 29 March 2006 | COL William Ivey
    Sorry it has been five months since my last update, but then, we have been busy. Let me give you the bottom-line up front (BLUF), and then catch you up on things. Feel free to forward this to whomever, since we still can’t seem to get the press to tell folks what is going on. This is how the fight is going from my foxhole, and it is much more than the bombings, US casualties, and rumors of civil war the press seems to be focused on.
  • Drug Wars, Counterinsurgency, and the National Guard (Professional Reading)

    03/06/2006 4:35:38 PM PST · by SandRat · 249+ views
    U.S. Army Professional Writting Collection ^ | Major Reyes Z. Cole, California Army National Guard
    The United States is engaged in two wars: the war on drugs and the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). These conflicts have stretched U.S. Special Operation Forces (SOF) thin. Many units are in their third overseas deployment in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom or Enduring Freedom. I recently deployed to Iraq, where I was assigned to Combined Joint Special Operations task Force- Arabian Peninsula. There, I witnessed firsthand how skills learned during domestic counterdrug missions could directly affect the success of counterinsurgency operations. My 8 years of U.S. Army National Guard (ARNG) counterdrug experience proved helpful in solving some of...
  • U.S. Unit Masters Art of Counterinsurgency (MSM Acually Reports Good News Out of Iraq!)

    02/16/2006 1:18:15 PM PST · by Basilides · 22 replies · 796+ views
    MSNBC ^ | 2-16-06 | Thomas E. Ricks
    The last time the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment served in Iraq, in 2003-04, its performance was judged mediocre, with a series of abuse cases growing out of its tour of duty in Anbar province. But its second tour in Iraq has been very different, according to specialists in the difficult art of conducting a counterinsurgency campaign -- fighting a guerrilla war but also trying to win over the population and elements of the enemy. Such campaigns are distinct from the kind of war most U.S. commanders have spent decades preparing to fight. In the last nine months, the regiment has...