Attack On Europe: Documenting Russian Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion Of Ukraine (2 year anniversary)

Love drone porn. Don’t care where it’s from. Thanks.

What is Happening in Kharkiv?

Many global media sources are exaggerating the Russian attack on Kharkiv. Therefore, it is important to clarify several points:

1. Gray Areas :

2. Ukrainian Ammunition Shortage :

3. Vovchansk:

4. Potential Attack from Sumy :

5. Media Exaggeration:

6. Kharkiv City :

Conclusion : The Russian attack on Kharkiv was not unexpected. While the initial Russian advance was swift, it is likely to encounter significant resistance and slow down upon reaching the established Ukrainian defensive lines.

https://x.com/Alfaiomi/status/1791953032940298266

Click on the link above to read the entire analysis.

Raisi got high and was playing with grenades on board.

These inexpensive FPV drones are scary.

Their ability to destroy a moving armored vehicle has drastically changed the battlefield.

WW3 will be the first drone war. We are not ready for it.

Does he qualify for 72 virgins?

Maybe he only gets one.

The visibility near the suspected crash site of the Mullah-Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi is very bad due to fog.

The Iranian TV has suspended normal broadcast and is transmitting prayers.

Source of video: Tasnim News

https://x.com/Tendar/status/1792219512802066775

Fog, mountains, and helicopters are a deadly combination.

What is Happening in Kharkiv?

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Also see comment #2273

What is Happening in Kharkiv?
https://x.com/Alfaiomi/status/1791953032940298266

Many global media sources are exaggerating the Russian attack on Kharkiv. Therefore, it is important to clarify several points:

1. Gray Areas:
Most of the Russian advance so far has been in territories considered gray areas ( as shown on the map ), meaning these are regions where neither Ukrainian nor Russian soldiers are typically present due to the risk of coming under fire from the opposing side.

The rapid advance in these areas makes sense under a leadership that does not care about its soldiers, particularly with a new defense minister seeking to achieve any success to prove his worth.

2. Ukrainian Ammunition Shortage:
Ukraine has recently been suffering from a significant shortage of ammunition due to delayed Western support, which has greatly contributed to the Russian advance. The Russian tactic may have been to exploit this shortage to secure progress in the gray areas with fewer human losses, which appears to have been the case.

3. Vovchansk:
This town, with a pre-war population of about 20,000 but now fewer than 3,000, is the first Ukrainian defensive point in this region and is among the initial targets for the Russians.

Intense battles have been ongoing around it, and it is expected that the Russians will eventually capture it because most Ukrainian fortifications are situated beyond Vovchansk. Russian difficulties are likely to begin beyond Vovchansk.

4. Potential Attack from Sumy:
There is talk of a potential attack from Sumy to engage the Ukrainians along the longest possible front line. This would indeed pose a significant problem for the Ukrainians, but it is also not easy for the Russian forces, which have had to redistribute some units to achieve the current attack.

Thus, while the Russian tactic might be to distract Ukrainian forces from focusing on other areas like Donbas, this attack also means the Russian units are relatively occupied along the current contact line.

5. Media Exaggeration:
The Russian advance in the early days was rapid, but once they reach Ukrainian defensive lines, the speed will noticeably decrease.

Criticism within the Ukrainian camp about the lack of fortifications in the gray areas does not take into account the strategic reality of the difficulty in constructing military fortifications close to the front lines and within enemy fire range.

6. Kharkiv City: Some media figures have gone as far as to discuss Kharkiv city as a declared target. Personally, I do not expect such significant outcomes from the Russian attack.

The most likely scenario is a change, at least temporarily, in the front lines with a Russian advance in the gray areas and some adjacent towns, with the attack eventually faltering after reaching the deeper Ukrainian defensive lines.

Especially given that the approximately 60,000 units currently engaged in the fighting cannot significantly alter the map of Kharkiv, the second-largest city in Ukraine.

Conclusion:
The Russian attack on Kharkiv was not unexpected. While the initial Russian advance was swift, it is likely to encounter significant resistance and slow down upon reaching the established Ukrainian defensive lines.

WW3 will be the first drone war. We are not ready for it.
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Like you said. If it isn’t very, very expensive and does not have sex appeal, the Pentagon won’t touch it.

Green Beret A-Teams Training On FPV Drones Being Driven By War In Ukraine
Green Beret FPV drone training is the latest example of a growing uncrewed future, and the U.S. lag in fielding its own capabilities
https://www.twz.com/news-features/green-beret-a-teams-training-on-fpv-drones-being-driven-by-war-in-ukraine

WWIII will be all about killing civilians until the other side cries “Uncle”.

Sadly not even the eye bleach one pictured, due to a miss-translation from the Old Salic to Arabic, they get the most valuable commodity at the time the Koran was transcribed, white raisins - chow down.

Russian channels report that today an ATACMS missile attack was reportedly carried out on Project 22800 Karakurt class “Tsiklon” in the port of Sevastopol.

As a result of the strike, the ship reportedly sunk and 6 servicemen were killed and 11 more were injured.

https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1792229142970118274

Most likely the M57 Block IA Unitary version with a 214kg HE warhead and a CEP of 9 meters.

ETCM: any additional information is greatly appreciated.

On May 17th there was a big Russian attempted attack on Chasiv Yar, Bakhmut front. Approximately 20 AFVs were used by Russians in this attack.

In total 10 Russian AFVs were destroyed/damaged during the attack. One group of Russian infantry was able to land on the outskirts of the town near multi-story buildings. But the group was cut off from Russian forces. In the evening of the 18th of May there were no more Russian infantry in the town.

“Currently there are also no Russians in the cities of Chasiv Yar. For the third day in a row, Russians are trying to attack with AFV groups of up to 20 units. On the morning of May 19, there was another attempt to break through the towns defenses, without success. Some of the armored vehicles were destroyed, some moved back to their positions”

The last video shows part of the Russian infantry group that has reached Chasiv Yar but was cut of from the Russian forces and was captured by Ukrainian ‘Kraken’ unit.

https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1792216449018106273

Missile Corvette Tsiklon, Black Sea Fleet

A ship in port should be a reasonable target for ATACMS. Though a direct hit might require a little luck, a “mission kill” would be pretty likely, depending on the warhead. I’m not sure if we have delivered M48/M57 yet. Of course, there is a current trend in Russia to call everything ATACMS, so it could have been some other weapon.

BREAKING: Iranian president missing in helicopter crash on Azerbaijan border, presumed dead

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you called it

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 18, 2024
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2024

Key Takeaways:

1. Russian forces have recently intensified their effort to seize the operationally significant town of Chasiv Yar, seeking to exploit how Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast and ongoing offensive operations throughout eastern Ukraine have generated greater theater-wide pressure on Ukrainian forces.

Russian forces have not made notable tactical gains in the Chasiv Yar area since conducting a company-sized mechanized assault on the town's eastern outskirts on April 4 and have not conducted similar sized-mechanized assaults in the area until May 17.

The April 4 mechanized assault was followed by intensified Russian offensive operations near Chasiv Yar, and recent Russian mechanized assaults in the area likely portend an overall intensification of the Russian effort to seize the town.

The Russian seizure of Chasiv Yar would be operationally significant since it would provide Russian forces with favorable positions to launch subsequent offensive operations against Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka, cities that form the southern portion of a Ukrainian defensive belt that is the backbone of Ukraine's defense of Donetsk Oblast.

Russian forces will likely pursue an offensive operation in Ukraine over the coming months that aims to stretch Ukrainian forces across a wide frontline and maintain regular offensive pressure to attempt to weaken the Ukrainian defensive line in aggregate.

Russian forces likely hope to make an operationally significant penetration anywhere along the frontline but will likely prioritize the Chasiv Yar area, where Russian forces have the most immediate prospects for an operationally significant advance, and the front west of Avdiivka, where Russian forces have been able to achieve tactically significant gains in recent weeks.

Russian forces are currently attempting to achieve tactically and operationally significant gains in Ukraine before the arrival of US security assistance at scale in June and July 2024 allows Ukrainian forces to blunt Russian advances.

2. Russian forces are likely preparing for the second phase of their offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast, which Russian forces likely intend to launch following their anticipated seizure of Vovchansk.

Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi recently reported that Russian forces have roughly 35,000 personnel deployed to the border area in Kursk, Bryansk, and Belgorod oblasts and that Russian forces intend to establish a grouping in the area that is between 50,000 to 75,000 personnel in size.

Ukrainian sources also recently reported that an additional 3,750 Russian personnel may arrive in the northern Kharkiv Oblast area in the near future. Russian forces have repeatedly conducted offensive operations along different sectors of the front in "pulses" with one sector decreasing in intensity as another increases, and Russian forces may temporarily slow offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast in order to replenish losses and bring the Northern Grouping of Forces up to its desired end strength before resuming the tempo in a second wave at a later time of their choosing.

3. Zelensky also outlined materiel requirements for Ukraine to combat Russia's air superiority and defend against the Russian air threat, especially given US-imposed restraints on Ukraine that prohibit Ukraine from striking targets within Russian territory and airspace.

Zelensky also stated that Ukraine would need about 120-130 F-16s or other advanced fighter aircraft to achieve air parity with Russia. Air parity is the lowest level of air control, in which no side controls the sky.

Zelensky stated that Russia's biggest advantage is Ukraine's restriction against using Western-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russia, and ISW has recently noted that this restriction creates a sanctuary for the Russian military in Russia to strike Ukraine safely without leaving Russian airspace.

Ukrainian forces have been able to strike Russian airbases in Russia and occupied Ukraine with some success, but Ukrainian forces have not made a sufficient impact to deter Russian forces from conducting missile and drone strike campaigns against Ukrainian deep-rear areas or glide bomb strikes on frontline and near rear areas.

Zelensky's proposed two Patriot batteries in northern Kharkiv Oblast will have a limited effectiveness in defending against Russian airstrikes if Ukrainian forces cannot use the Patriots to intercept Russian fighter-bombers in Russian airspace.

4. Ukrainian officials have reportedly asked the US presidential administration to ease the restriction against using US-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russia.

The NYT and WSJ reported that Ukraine also requested additional targeting assistance for military targets inside Russia, and former Ukrainian military officials reportedly told the NYT that targeting assistance would allow Ukrainian forces to more accurately plan for drone and missile strikes given the requirements for more detailed terrain mapping for these strikes.

White House officials state that the United States does not want to encourage or enable attacks within Russia, and the NYT noted that the White House has rejected similar appeals in the past.

ISW continues to assess that this US policy severely compromises Ukraine's ability to defend itself, particularly against Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

5. Zelensky noted that Ukraine must overcome its manpower challenges in order to contest the theater-wide initiative in Ukraine.

Zelensky stated that Ukraine is currently forming a significant number of brigades as part of its reserve and that Ukraine still needs to fully staff some of these units.

ISW has repeatedly assessed that addressing Ukraine's manpower challenges will be crucial to Ukraine's ability to conduct counteroffensive operations and contest the theater-wide initiative in Ukraine in the future

6. Ukraine's new mobilization law went into effect on May 18 and will help Ukraine stabilize its force generation apparatus amid ongoing manpower constraints.

7. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev called for Russia's envisioned "buffer zone" to encompass all of Ukraine, illustrating that the Kremlin’s concept of the buffer zone is a thinly veiled justification for Russia's long-held intent to subsume the entirety of Ukraine and likely an effort to garner domestic support for the Russian war effort.

Medvedev stated in a post on his Russian-language Telegram channel on May 17 that Russia's "sanitary [buffer] zone" must at least extend over all central Ukraine and a significant part of western Ukraine in order to place Russian cities out of the range of Ukraine's Western-provided long-range strike systems.

Medvedev claimed that if Ukraine continues to strike Russian cities, then Russian forces will have to extend the sanitary zone further to Ukraine's western border with Poland or within Poland itself. Mikhail Zvinchuk, founder of the Rybar Telegram channel, also called during an interview on May 18 for Russian forces to occupy additional areas of Ukraine as part of a "buffer zone," claiming that Russian forces should seize areas of Sumy and Chernihiv oblasts along the Russian border.

Russian President Vladimir Putin recently characterized Russia's offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast as part of Russia's effort to develop a "buffer zone" on Ukrainian territory to defend Belgorod City against Ukrainian strikes.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov suggested during an interview on April 19 that Russian forces will have to keep attacking further into Ukraine to protect the settlements that come under Russia's expanding buffer zone, insinuating that the Kremlin intends to use the creation of a buffer zone to justify Russian offensive operations even further into Ukraine.

Medvedev's and Zvinchuk's comments highlight Russia's likely intent to use this buffer zone narrative to justify Russia's occupation of all of Ukraine. Medvedev's decision to publish this post on his Russian-language Telegram channel suggests that his message is intended for a domestic Russian audience, and Medvedev may intend to generate support and excitement around an imagined future Russian victory in Ukraine ahead of Russia's anticipated summer 2024 offensive operations, which will likely result in large-scale Russian personnel losses.

Medvedev's and Zvinchuk's comments highlight Russia's likely intent to use this buffer zone narrative to justify Russia's occupation of all of Ukraine.

Medvedev's decision to publish this post on his Russian-language Telegram channel suggests that his message is intended for a domestic Russian audience, and Medvedev may intend to generate support and excitement around an imagined future Russian victory in Ukraine ahead of Russia's anticipated summer 2024 offensive operations, which will likely result in large-scale Russian personnel losses.

8. Founder of the Kremlin-linked Rybar Telegram channel, Mikhail Zvinchuk, gave an uncharacteristically public interview in which he criticized the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and speculated on possible changes in the MoD.

9. Should the Kremlin allow select prominent Russian milbloggers to increase their criticisms of the Russian MoD, public pressure may grow in favor of reforms that would, if implemented, assist Russia's war effort in Ukraine.

The Russian MoD notably awarded Zvinchuk in December 2023 for his efforts in military-patriotic education and military-political work for the Russian military, and Russian President Vladimir Putin awarded Zvinchuk with the Russian Order of Merit to the Fatherland Second Class in November 2023.

ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin awarding Zvinchuk, whose Telegram channel has over 1.2 million followers as of May 18, was likely part of wider efforts to gain control over and co-opt the often-critical Russian milblogger information space.

Russian milbloggers have largely reduced their personal criticisms of Shoigu and Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov following the Wagner Group's armed rebellion in June 2023.

Zvinchuk may be trying to use his public interview to gauge the Kremlin's response to critical voices following Shoigu's replacement with Belousov.

Considering Zvinchuk's affiliations with the Kremlin, however, the Kremlin may have tasked Zvinchuk with criticizing the Russian MoD publicly while dictating the content and severity of his statements, which may establish an accepted bound of criticisms against the MoD.

Any possible Kremlin permittance of increased criticisms of the Russian MoD from Russian milbloggers could lead to bureaucratic reforms that improve the efficacy of Russia's war effort in Ukraine, especially when coupled with Belousov's and Putin's intentions to mobilize the Russian economy and defense industrial base (DIB) to support a protracted war in Ukraine and possibly prepare for a future confrontation with NATO.

11. Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Avdiivka, Hulyaipole, and Robotyne.