Russian scientists in Iraq hide during surprise U.N. inspection

WOW! Sammi found this at the FMSO database of the newly released Iraq Regime documents. It details Iraqi efforts to monitor a U.N. inspection team, break into their personal briefcases (actually says it was complained about but not that they did it), and hide Russian and Turkish scientists. As usual, the parentheses are the translators. (PDF)CMPC-2003-000776

A team of the IAEA did a SURPRISE (translator’s emphasis) visit today, on the 15th of December 2002, to

1) Oumm Al Maarek Company (Mother of all battles Company) 2) Al Qadessia Company 3) Badr Company

They left Al Qanat hotel at 8:25 and here follows what time they reached the companies and what they did:

1- Met with the director’s assistant (liaison member) and inquired about all the new buildings (after 1998) and their activities. Then focused on all the mechanical operations done by the company for the 81 millimeter (mm) rocket.

2- Visit the sites containing the manufacturing machines and the steps involved in the production of the 81 mm rocket. They also requested technical drawings for the rocket (copy enclosed with the report).

3- General tour in the factory and checking of the machines, especially the ones imported after 1998 and making a list of equipment present in the Central lab of measurement.

The team arrived at 11:52 and from the gate one of the cars left towards the hotel with 3 inspectors: Coalfield, Franck and Phyllis.

1- They visited the company’s factories and its shops, checked its machineries and made sure the machineries present corresponded to the agency’s lists and checked the newly imported machinery (type CNC, 5 pieces) which is not covered by the inspection scope.

All the old machinery was inspected along with the seals of the double purpose machinery. They also inspected the newly imported machinery, which were not included in the supervision program (except one disclosed in the biannual report).

During this visit signs were put on a large number of new machinery. They totaled 52 and in the building of precision manufacturing 34.

1- I was informed by the team leader (Coalfield) that during the past days two clothing suitcases belonging to inspector Greg Lavender and the inspector (probably Coalfield: translator’s note) were broken into and their contents dispersed. They informed the hotel who promised to buy them new ones. But for the inspector the problem is not with the suitcases but the infraction and he does not want to make a problem but requests that this infraction be stopped.

2- When we visited Badr company there were Turkish and Russian experts at the site and they had to hide away from the inspectors. We demand your (General Director of the Office of National Supervision: translator’s note) instructions for what to do in case there is a face to face between the agency’s inspectors and the experts.

3- During his meeting with the general director of Badr company the team focused on how the new machinery is being imported. The director told them that it is advertised in the newspaper and middlemen or equipment agencies apply for the bid. He also told them that the equipment agency for Badr company is Al Ariqa company.

4- A copy of the special instructions for dealing with journalists was given to the director of Oumm Al Maarek company.

Enclosed: 2 copies of technical drawing (Most probably for the 81mm rocket) 1st signature: Major Ahmad Ibrahim Operations officer. 2nd signature: Not clear.

1) Document CMPC-2003-000776 is made of two reports each one made of two pages, dated 15th December 2002 and 16th December 2002.

2) The first report dated 15th December 2002 is the one I translated. It is interesting for two reasons: 1- It was a surprise visit, therefore the Russian and Turkish experts had to be hidden, and whoever wrote the report is requesting instructions on what to do if the agency’s team comes unexpectedly face to face with them.

3) The breaking in of the suitcases of the inspectors at the hotel. (Was this incident reported at the time? If not, could it be that the Agency intended to show that Iraqis are fully cooperating and had nothing to hide?)

4) The second report also details every move of the team from leaving the hotel to coming back to it. It was not a surprise visit.

5) Whoever scanned the documents made a small mistake. On the computer screen page 2 of every report appears before the first page.

6) Unlike previous typed or nicely written documents, this one was probably rapidly hand written. That is why I could not fully grasp the names of the American inspectors.

Note this is within four months of the start of the war and "poor Saddam" (who the AP reported as frustrated because he was so honest about having no weapons) has Russian experts hiding from U.N. teams. Nice job AP, that is some cutting edge reporting. How is it a clown like me and a dedicated volunteer linguist can find this stuff and the media can't?

"The inspectors then went to the Badr General Company (MIO) and visited the factory and a mold plant, the ministry stated. UNMOVIC stated that the Badr Company was previously involved in the centrifuge program prior to 1991. All three sites are said to have "dual-use" machine tools by the UN."

Note that Saddam published another declaration to the U.N. in December, 2002. I wonder if that report included hiding Russian scientists at a facility used to create centrifuges for nuclear production. Poor, poor Saddam, hunh AP? Soooooooo mistreated....

In 2000, Mr Hamza wrote Saddam's Bomb Maker - an autobiographical account outlining his role in the Iraqi weapons programme.

In the book, Mr Hamza concluded that the best way to ensure that Saddam Hussein was blocked from developing WMD was to stop Russian scientists entering Iraq and help Iraqi scientists escape.

UPDATE: From the UK Guardian September 22, 2002 about the Badr facility (where the scientists were hiding)

With Iraq's capitulation to the allied forces, Badr - like the State Enterprise for Heavy Equipment Engineering and dozens of other enterprises run under the auspices of the Ministry for Military Industrialisation - was supposed to be closed down and monitored under the UN ceasefire resolutions designed to dismantle Iraq's ability to retain, design and build weapons of mass destruction.

But the scientists and managers from Badr had different orders from Iraqi president Saddam Hussein. What they have been up to goes to the heart of US and UK concern that Saddam has been trying to assemble the expertise and materials to build weapons of mass destruction, for the men from Badr turned up at a factory in Minsk in the former Soviet republic of Belarus.The Iraqi delegation that arrived at the Belstroyimpex headquarters in July 1995 was a high-powered one, travelling under the aegis of the Badr General Establishment.

They carried a shopping list of high-specification machine tools, including diamond cutters, a powder-metal production line and a plasma-spray machine - all potentially components for nuclear weapons and a ballistic-missiles programme. The delegation was careful to cover its tracks, keeping the visit and the deals signed secret from the UN. Iraq went to greater lengths still to hide these purchases from the UN sanctions regime, smuggling them into Iraq via the Jordanian free port of Aqaba, and trying to hide the equipment once it reached Iraq.

UNMOVIC/IAEA Press Statement on Inspection Activities in Iraq, 15 December 2002

For full coverage, see the pages on IAEA and Iraq.

15 December 2002 -- Two UNMOVIC teams of missile inspectors visited separate locations involved in missile activity. One team inspected the Tho Al Fekar factory, which is located about 40 km northwest of Baghdad. The factory belongs to the Al Rasheed State Company. It is concerned with the manufacture of mechanical parts for several solid propellant rockets. The other team went to the Al Mutassem Solid Rocket Plant, which is owned by the Military Industrialization Corporation. The facility is located approximately 90 km west of Baghdad and carries out the final assembly of the Ababil and Al Feta'h solid propellant rockets. Additionally, static test firings of these motors are conducted here.

The UNMOVIC chemical team continued inspection of the Al Qa Qaa complex, updating information about selected facilities, namely a sulfuric acid plant, an explosives production plant and storages. Inspection focused on a new production unit, which was built in the period between 1998 and 2002.

The UNMOVIC biological team inspected the Al Amiryah Serum and Vaccine Institute on the western outskirts of Baghdad. All buildings, including new constructions, were inspected.

Two IAEA teams carried out inspections at Al Maarik, a facility some 20 km south of Baghdad that is involved in the manufacture of a number of civil and military engineering projects. This site was previously involved in the Electro-magnetic Isotope Separation (EMIS) programme prior to 1991. The IAEA teams then proceeded to and carried out inspections at the nearby sites of Kadessiya, a facility providing engineering support to the military in a number of areas, and Badr, a facility that was previously involved in the centrifuge programme prior to 1991 and now provides general engineering capability.
At all three sites inspections were carried out to review the activities of personnel and departments since 1998, and to review the disposition and use of a number of dual-purpose machine tools.

Two further IAEA teams travelled to Ramadi, approximately 100 km west of Baghdad to inspect The Glass and Ceramic Company. A Gamma Survey team, accompanying the main team, carried out measurements in the Ramadi area.

An IAEA team visited Tuwaitha and parts of North Baghdad to obtain water and silt samples for radiological analysis.

Additional information on IAEA inspections yesterday:

Yesterday the IAEA inspected Hatteen-Iskandariya, a complex south of Baghdad. This large complex houses several state companies that consist of many factories each. These diverse facilities have civilian and military missions ranging from procuring automobiles to filling ammunition and shells. The teams sampled these sites for dual-use or prohibited activities. They also inspected a new research company inside the complex.

An inspection of a military site south of Baghdad turned out to be an after dark inspection. The Mahaweel military base stores certain high explosives requiring verification by the IAEA. The team also inspected bunkers holding small ground-to-ground rockets to verify their intended use.

Current strength of inspectors:

15 additional UNMOVIC inspectors arrived in Baghdad together with some support staff, and some IAEA inspectors left. Consequently, the current strength of inspectors is 105, with 86 from UNMOVIC and 19 from the IAEA.

Hiro Ueki
Spokesman for UNMOVIC and the IAEA in Baghdad

"Inspection focused on a new production unit, which was built in the period between 1998 and 2002."

There was new construction at this facility (remember the missing explosives?) right up to the war. Inspectors knew it to be built with foreign help, but REFUSED to speculate. IMO it was France and/or Russia.

Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.

The Three Amigos