Skip to comments.CIA Finds No Evidence Hussein Sought to Arm Terrorists
Posted on 11/16/2003 4:14:23 AM PST by areafiftyone
The CIA's search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq has found no evidence that former president Saddam Hussein tried to transfer chemical or biological technology or weapons to terrorists, according to a military and intelligence expert.
Anthony Cordesman, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, provided new details about the weapons search and Iraqi insurgency in a report released Friday. It was based on briefings over the past two weeks in Iraq from David Kay, the CIA representative who is directing the search for unconventional weapons in Iraq; L. Paul Bremer, the U.S. civil administrator there; and military officials.
"No evidence of any Iraqi effort to transfer weapons of mass destruction or weapons to terrorists," Cordesman wrote of Kay's briefing. "Only possibility was Saddam's Fedayeen [his son's irregular terrorist force] and talk only."
(Excerpt) Read more at washingtonpost.com ...
Dr. Ray S. Cline, the key CIA analyst on Korea from 1949 to 1952, passed away on 15 March, 1996 in Arlington, Virginia. He was responsible for clanking out monthly "Estimate of the World Situation" on sensitive areas. Korea was covered now and then. Referring to his failure to spot Kim Ilsung's invasion of S Korea, Cline admitted that "Mostly I simply wrote down analytical comments based on my reading of newspapers and periodical literature, adding items from the research analysts wherever possible." Dr. Ray Cline is assumed to be the author of the infamous CIA report on Korea, issued only a few days prior to the invasion:
US Central Intelligence Agency: Current Capabilities of the North Korean Regime, Office of Research and Estimates 18-50 (19 June 1950) ...
As shown in the extracts below, the CIA estimates were off by as much as 150% on the low side. This error enhanced the US confidence that the S Korean Army could repel any invasion from North. Cline claimed that MacArthur kept the CIA out of Japan and Korea. Later in 1960-1962, he made significant contributions by correctly assessing the Soviet missile sites in Cuba and also publishing Nikita S. Krushchev's secret speech which denounced Stalin.
"N Korea suffers from a shortage of skilled administrative personnel and from weaknesses in its economy and its official Party organizations. There is widespread, although passive, popular discontent with the Communist government. Despite these weaknesses, however, the regime has, with Soviet assistance, clearly demonstrated an ability to continue its control and development of northern Korea."
"The northern Korean regime is also capable, in pursuit of its major external aim of extending control over southern Korea, of continuing and increasing its support of the present program of propaganda, infiltration, sabotage, subversion, and guerrilla operations against southern Korea. This program will not be sufficient in itself, however, to cause a collapse of the southern Korean regime and extension of Communist control over the south so along as US economic and military aid to southern Korea is not substantially reduced or seriously dissipated."
That's a highly political (as opposed to analytical) statement. It's also noteable that the Post is tripping all over itself to publish the mere opinions (as opposed to facts) of a private citizen as the basis of this article.
There is absolutely nothing new in this article, just a twisted presentation of information that has been hashed and rehashed through the press that laast few months.If this is all they could come up with. most of it already refuted, it's pretty pathetic.
No, that was what Kucinich efectively did to Cleveland, but do't expect them to write about that. ;-)
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