"Intense Debate by Islamist Movements and Sponsoring States on New Terrorist Attacks on the West"
October 12, 2004Global Information System
Jason Fuchs
A variety of sources have confirmed that the Iranian and Syrian governments, plus major Islamist groups, are continuing to debate whether to proceed with a major new terrorist attack in the West, and specifically the US, before the US elections on November 2, 2004.
GIS sources reported that the Islamist movement was engaged in intense strategic discussions about a new “spectacular” offensive against Western, specifically US targets. Critically, GIS sources added that these discussions involved the Islamist-jihadist movement’s chief state sponsors, including Iran and Syria. On the question of the proposed forthcoming Islamist offensive, GIS sources detailed: “[Government officials in] Damascus and Tehran, and [Islamist leaders in] Islamabad are in on the debate and are having major input.”
This internal debate, although couched in theological terms, was described by GIS sources as “extremely pragmatic”. The debate appeared to be attempting to discern the probable reaction by the US electorate to a pre-election strike, as well as what Washington’s response could be, and the degree to which such a strike would threaten the security of the sponsoring states. It also attempted to discern the anticipated reaction from the Muslim world to the extreme violence and bloodshed being proposed. As a routine, tactical matter, the preparedness and durability of the operational and support cells necessary to facilitate such a strike were also under review, although it appeared as though the debate focused much less on capability — about which many in the Islamist-jihadist community seemed to exude an air of confidence — but the review also considered the strategic ramifications of a new mass-casualty “spectacular”.
On this point, GIS sources stressed that it remained within the power of the sponsoring states to prevent the anticipated strikes. As one source noted: “If the sponsoring states really want to stop the attacks, they can do so on their own in more than one way.” Of particular concern to the Government of Pakistan was the possibility that a “spectacular” attack — which would inevitably involve Islamist networks operating from Pakistan — might push Washington into a position where it would stake US-Pakistani relations on the Pakistani ability to secure Osama bin Laden, as opposed to the current more general counter-terrorism cooperation. The US Bush Administration had repeatedly articulated its perception of Pakistan as a key ally ever since Pres. Pervez Musharraf’s decision to help US military efforts to remove the Taliban administration in Afghanistan following the September 11, 2001, attacks in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania.
Regional reports, notably a leaked Iraqi intelligence report published in the Iraqi daily al-Watan on September 22, 2004, stating that Abu Musab al- Zarqawi was preparing cells for attacks in Western Europe, were somewhat misleading. GIS sources revealed that Zarqawi does not directly control significant assets in Western Europe, but that non-Iraqi or non-resident Islamist fighters who had fought under his command in Iraq, some under the general banner of Jamaat al-Tawhid wa’l-Jihad (Unity and Jihad Group), had been reintegrated into Islamist units upon return to their home countries. These operatives answered to their local commanders in Western Europe and, on major strategic decisions, to the Islamist-jihadist leadership — specifically Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri — and their associated state sponsors. These cadres awaited directions from the above noted high command structure on future strategically significant operations.
Also of concern to the US Bush Administration were the late September 2004 maneuverings of a former “ally”, Iraqi National Congress (INC) President Ahmad Chalabi. GIS sources claimed on October 11, 2004, that Chalabi had assumed the rôle of foreign affairs and national security advisor to Moqtada Sadr. GIS sources explained that this move was, in many ways, a direct result of the resolution of the Najaf crisis and the subsequent US backed negotiations between Baghdad and Sadr’s Jaish al-Mahdi which saw the October 10, 2004, opening of a five-day “grace period” during which fighters in Baghdad’s Sadr City turned in heavy and medium weapons to the interim Government in exchange for promised amnesty arrangements and an accepted political rôle for Moqtada Sadr in the “new Iraq”.
The Najaf resolution had virtually excluded involvement by the Administration of Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi and elevated the Qom-based Ayatollah Al- Sayyid Kadhem al-Haeri into a theological position equal to that of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, legitimizing Iranian influence in Iraqi Shi’ite affairs.
Further, the subsequent deal with Moqtada Sadr had convinced many in the region that, as one GIS source put it, “Moqtada — not the US — is so far the winner. Chalabi knows that Iran is winning and he’s using Moqtada as the gateway.”
That argument that Ahmad Chalabi saw Moqtada Sadr as a conduit to legitimacy and relevance emphasized the degree to which Sadr and his sponsors in Tehran had consolidated their victory in Najaf, in spite of devastating US operations against the Jaish al-Mahdi in the Shiite holy city which had seriously degraded the militia’s fighting capability and operational readiness and, tactically, threatened to render the group an irrelevant military force. The political failure which had followed Washington’s measurable military success had paved the way for Chalabi’s alleged “defection”. As well, the aggressive campaign which had been waged against him by Washington through press leaks which accused the INC leader of providing Iran with intelligence on Coalition forces and the August 8, 2004. Arrest warrants were issued against both Ahmad Chalabi and his cousin, Salem, by the Iraqi Central Criminal Court of Zuhair al-Maliky. These actions followed the late April 2004 “options memo” drafted by the US National Security Council (NSC), and presented at the White House, entitled “Marginalizing Chalabi”.1
Washington’s posture toward issues in central Iraq also continued to vary. By early October 2004, it had become increasingly evident not only that US negotiations with Sunni tribal leaders in Iraq had secured few of Washington’s apparent aims, and that the US Bush Administration was now increasingly aware of this fact. The immediate result of this perceived failure appeared to have been the US decision on September 31, 2004, to deploy a force of some 5,000 Coalition forces (3,000 US, 2,000 Iraqi) to “re-take” the Sunni triangle town of Samarra. While some had anticipated the Samarra operation as a precursor to further action in insurgent-controlled Iraqi population centers, particularly Fallujah, there now appeared to be significant hesitancy to conduct such operations until after the November 2004 elections, in spite of the US Bush Administration’s apparent reading of the situation on the ground.
The Bush Administration had long ago abandoned any hope for success from the ex-Ba’athist composed “Fallujah Brigade”, initially organized and deployed in April 2004 to manage the security situation in Fallujah without the need for a US military intervention. The Fallujah Brigade almost immediately began cooperating with the armed insurgents controlling the city, including, in some instances, turning over weapons and divulging the limited intelligence they had been provided by Coalition Forces.
A second US attempt to pacify Fallujah without an “invasion” had been less well publicized, but equally instructive. Following the perceived success in Najaf, the US attempted to impose a similarly organized settlement with the Sunni leadership of Fallujah. To this end, GIS sources reported, Washington sought to open a channel to a prominent Fallujah-based Ikwhani known as Abu Abdullah. Abu Abdullah, Washington appeared to believe, was in control of a number of armed networks operating both inside Fallujah and throughout the so-called Sunni Triangle. Regional reports indicated that Abu Abdullah’s forces were comprised mostly of former Ba’athists, potentially former Saddam Fedayeen. Based on the “good work” which Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani had done in resolving the August 2004 Najaf crisis, the US Bush Administration sought to open at least one channel to Abu Abdullah through Ayatollah Sistani. These talks continued through at least early September 2004.
Yet, the situation in Fallujah remained unchanged and the Abu Abdallah channel gained the Coalition absolutely no ground, largely because the Sunni cleric had been fundamentally misunderstood by his interlocutors. As GIS sources noted in late September 2004, Abu Abdallah — while extremely influential in Fallujah and, to an extent, throughout al-Anbar province — did not control significant military forces, at all, much less forces comprised of former Ba’athists. The latter expectation, that the forces were Ba’athist, appeared to have given Washington and particularly the CIA false hope; that because his forces were not committed “foreign fighters”, they might be swayed. In fact, while Abu Abdullah’s “forces” — if they could be called that — were negligible, his status as an Ikwhani cleric precluded him from reaching a deal with Coalition forces regardless of the terms offered. Abu Abdullah, and the circles he influenced, were committed Islamists who continued to view the Iraqi intifada in terms of it being a single component of a global jihad and not, as the CIA appeared perceive their position, a nationalist struggle. Thus, the talks had been virtually doomed from the start and further evidenced to many Iraqis that Washington continued to fail to understand the complex situation on the ground.
Moreover, the US decision to use Ayatollah Sistani as an intermediary had reinforced a growing sense among Iraqis that Washington would continue to overestimate the influence and centrality of the Grand Ayatollah. The Sunnis of Fallujah and its surrounding environs paid virtually no heed to Ayatollah Sistani and attempts to interpose the senior Shi’ite spiritual authority into perceived Sunni “internal affairs” had been met with what should have been expected resistance.
Iraqi confidence in the US had been further eroded by concern that a potential US Kerry Administration and (in light of comments by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on October 10, 2004, during a surprise visit to Iraq) perhaps even a second Bush Administration might attempt to quickly reduce US troop strength in Iraq following the January 2004 Iraqi elections.
The goal, apparently, continued to be to reduce the “footprint” of the Coalition occupation force.
Yet, as former consultant to the Strategy Unit of UK Prime Minister Tony Blair’s cabinet, Christopher Catherwood, noted to GIS: “It is not the size of the ‘footprint’ that matters. Just look at the small number of US forces that had been present in Saudi Arabia throughout the 1990s. Yet, even largely constrained to a single base, the reaction by many Saudis and Islamists was the same as though a full-scale occupying force had been deployed to Saudi soil.” Catherwood, the author of a new history entitled Churchill’s Folly: How Winston Churchill Created Modern Iraq, based on his research of the Chartwell Papers at Churchill College, Cambridge, added that he saw distinct similarities between Churchill’s to effectively “garrison” British ground forces to reduce the British military footprint — and, more importantly, expenditure — and the current discussion about “drawing down” troop levels to affect Iraqi perception of the Coalition presence. Even the US resort to airpower to combat the Islamist forces of Fallujah further mirrored Churchill’s efforts in the “Mesopotamian rebellion” of 1920 to rely on the Royal Air Force to subdue the insurgent threat.
While Washington had secured significant victories in both Iraq and Afghanistan, Tehran and its Islamist allies appeared cognizant that they had entered a critical period during which they apparently believed they retained the ability to affect the US November 2004 election and, potentially, reshape the strategic playing field of the region by decisively striking out against the US and the West. The question remained as to how the Islamist-jihadist movement would decide to act on this perceived capability and whether the West would confront the state sponsors of the planned offensive before it was too late.
Footnote
1. Inside the Takedown, Brian Bennett & Michael Weisskop;
Time, June 7, 2004.