4th-Generation Warfare (Long)

"The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish ... the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature." — Carl Von Clausewitz

On May 1, 2003, President Bush declared the end of major combat in Iraq. The brief, high-tech war the administration had planned to overthrow Saddam was officially over. Shortly thereafter, the anti-Coalition Iraqis announced their presence with a bombing campaign that drove the United Nations and Red Cross out of Iraq and put Iraqis on notice that anyone supporting the Coalition was subject to attack.

The violence continues as the new Iraqi government struggles to provide security for its people. Despite the Bush administration’s intention to fight a short, decisive conflict, Iraq has become the scene of yet another fourth-generation war.

The first generation of modern war was dominated by massed manpower and culminated in the Napoleonic Wars. The second generation, which was quickly adopted by the world’s major powers, was dominated by firepower and ended in World War I. In relatively short order, during World War II the Germans introduced third-generation warfare, characterized by maneuver. That type of combat is still largely the focus of U.S. forces. Fourth-generation wars, or 4GW, have now evolved, taking advantage of the political, social, economic and technical changes since World War II. In short, 4GW has evolved along with society to make use of the opportunities it provides.

At the same time things were degenerating in Iraq, the situation in Afghanistan was also moving from third-generation warfare, America’s forte, to fourth-generation warfare, our Achilles’ heel. While al-Qaida and the Taliban only rarely attacked U.S. troops directly, they were moving aggressively to defeat the Kharzai government that the United States had promised to support. Defeated by U.S. firepower in a largely conventional campaign, anti-Coalition forces have gone back to the style of warfare that succeeded against the Soviets.

During the same period, al-Qaida and its affiliates managed a series of high-profile attacks in Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Spain and are promising a major attack on the United States. The global war on terrorism has not been an entirely one-sided fight. It is much too early to predict the outcome of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, but the anti-Coalition forces in both countries are attempting to tie their 4GW tactics into integrated 4GW strategic campaigns. At the same time, al-Qaida is maintaining its own fourth-generation strategic campaign. They intend to beat us.

As debilitating and regular as these 4GW attacks are, this kind of warfare is neither new nor surprising. It has been evolving around the world during the past seven decades. An evolved form of insurgency, fourth-generation war uses all available networks — political, economic, social, and military — to convince the enemy’s decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit.

It is rooted in Mao Zedong’s fundamental precept that superior political will, when properly employed, defeats greater economic and military power. However, unlike the campaigns waged by Mao in China, 4GW does not attempt to win by defeating the enemy’s military forces. Instead, via diverse networks, 4GW directly attacks the minds of enemy decision makers to destroy the enemy’s political will. And fourth-generation wars are often long — measured in decades rather than months or years.

True, guerrilla tactics are as old as recorded warfare. However, Mao was the first to explicitly state their advantages. And yes, today’s high-speed media make it an even more viable form of warfare. Just like mechanized war was not possible until reliable tanks, planes and radios were developed, 4GW makes use of the wide variety of media outlets and other communications networks now available.

It is the combination of changes in the political, economic, social and technical arenas that have made 4GW the dominant form of war, in much the same way that changes in all these areas allowed each succeeding generation to dominate. For instance, first-generation warfare required the political evolution of the nation-state to support Napoleonic-sized armies, an economic evolution to support large, standing armies and navies for extended periods, social evolution that saw loyalty shift from king to nation, and technological breakthroughs that allowed all soldiers to be armed with muskets.

Our opponents know 4GW is the only kind of war America has ever lost — and done so three times: in Vietnam, Lebanon and Somalia. Fourth-generation warfare has also defeated the French in Vietnam and Algeria; the Soviet Union in Afghanistan; and Israel in Lebanon. It continues to bleed Russia in Chechnya; Israel both in the Occupied Territories and Israel proper; and the United States in Iraq, Afghanistan and the global war on terrorism. The consistent defeat of major powers by much weaker fourth-generation opponents makes it essential we understand this new form of warfare and adapt accordingly.

Since World War II, wars have been a mixture of conventional and unconventional. Conventional wars — in Korea, the Israeli-Arab wars of 1956, 1967 and 1973, the Falklands, the Iran-Iraq war and the 1991 Persian Gulf War — have ended with a return to the strategic status quo. While territory changed hands and, in some cases, regimes changed, each state came out of the war with largely the same political, economic and social structure with which it entered.

In sharp contrast, unconventional wars — the Communist revolution in China, the First and Second Indochina Wars, the Algerian War of Independence, the Sandinista struggle in Nicaragua, the Iranian revolution, the Afghan-Soviet war of the 1980s, the first Intifada and the Hezbollah campaign in South Lebanon — each ended with major changes in the political, economic and social structure of the territories involved. While the changes may not have been for the better, they were distinct.

The Iran-Iraq War and the Israeli-Arab wars ended with an essential return to the strategic status quo. Iran and Iraq were exhausted but had no real change in their situation. Even the great Israeli victory of 1967 didn’t really change her strategic situation. For the last 50 years, 4GW has been the dominant form of war, and we must understand its strategic, political, operational and tactical aspects. While this article is too short for a detailed discussion, I will list two or three key elements at each level, which offer a broad overview and insights into how fundamentally different the protracted 4GW is from the short, high-technology war the Pentagon envisions in its network-centric warfare concepts.

The two most important strategic aspects of 4GW are the nature of the conflict and its extended timelines. Strategically, 4GW attempts to directly change the minds of enemy policy-makers. However, this change is not to be achieved through the traditional method of superiority on the battlefield.

The first- through third-generation objective of destroying the enemy’s armed forces is not how 4GW enemies will attack us. They attack the minds of the decision makers with a daily barrage of immediate battlefield images and worldwide propaganda, exploiting differences of opinion in an open society and raising the human, economic and social costs of the struggle. The second key strategic aspect is the fact that these wars often last for decades. The Chinese Communists fought for more than 25 years, the Vietnamese more than 30, the Sandinistas for 18, the Afghans for 10 against the Soviets, the Chechens for more than 10 years and the Palestinians for more than 30, with no end in sight. The Pentagon’s focus on rapid, decisive operations is largely irrelevant in this type of war.

The Iranian revolution provides another clear example that victory goes to those who persevere. Khomeini was exiled from Iran in 1963 for opposition activities. While he moved to various locations (Turkey, Iraq, France), he continued to organize resistance against the Shah.

For the first 10 years he had only limited success, but in the early ’70s discontent grew. Finally, in 1978 he put about 8 million people into the streets for protests. The Shah got the message and, after trying to turn around the situation for a year, left the country on an "extended vacation."

The Iranian revolution is almost pure 4GW. Using "modern" technology of audiotape sermons and long-distance communications, Khomeini established a political movement inside Iran that overthrew the government without a military campaign. He was elected by a landslide on April 1, 1979 — 16 years after he was exiled. It did, however, take him several more years to consolidate his control over the country.

Recent fourth-generation conflicts have involved a loose coalition of the willing on the anti-government side. In Afghanistan, Iraq and the global war on terrorism, there is no single "enemy." In Iraq, a coalition of the willing — former regime loyalists, international terrorists, criminals and radical elements of Iraqi society — have formed a loose, temporary alliance to drive the U.S.-led coalition out of Iraq.

In Afghanistan, a loose coalition of warlords, Pashtun tribal elements, Taliban remnants, drug dealers and perhaps some al-Qaida are working against the Kharzai government. In the war on terrorism, a coalition of various fundamentalist groups has coalesced around the idea of driving non-Islamic elements from what they view as the Islamic caliphate.

Politically, they are using national, tribal, religious and ethnic differences to attack the legitimacy of the government and create distrust between Iraqis and Afghans.

The "loose confederation" has been characteristic of recent insurgencies — Afghanistan, Palestine, Chechnya. The only unifying goal the insurgents have is to drive out the external force. Once that is achieved, they then have to fight it out among themselves for which political vision will win out in the country. This happened in Afghanistan even before the Soviets withdrew. In the last year or two of the Soviet occupation, the various mujahideen groups began to fight among themselves. In fact, the coalition government that moved into Kabul when Najibullah finally quit (two years after the Soviets left) could not rule effectively. The result was civil war, which was still being fought between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance when the United States intervened in 2001. One of the odd historical notes is that during this time, Gulbiddin Hekmatyar, while the prime minister of Afghanistan, had his militia fire rockets into the capital.

While it was not as open a civil war, the Chechens continued to fight after the Soviets withdrew — and have unified again only as a temporary requirement to fight the Russians.

Finally, we can see in the Gaza Strip that various Palestinian groups are fighting for control even as the Israelis are preparing to withdraw. This is one of the most dangerous facts about insurgencies that are coalitions of the willing: They have no viable political alternative, so they engender civil war when the outsider leaves.

Iraq shows that 4GW operational and tactical activities will not be limited to the military sphere.

Economically, the terrorists have attacked humanitarian organizations, oil pipelines, rail lines, power-distribution systems and the people who run them — Iraqi and international alike. The terrorists know that economic or social progress will encourage support for the coalition; therefore, they must defeat efforts to improve the standard of living for Iraqis. Further, attacks on the oil infrastructure and threats to the people who run it have resulted in significant increases in the cost of oil — at a huge cost to the industrialized world.

Via propaganda, assassinations and bombings, they attack the social divisions in Iraqi society to decrease the chances for political and economic stability. From targeted attacks on Iraqi government officials to bombings of Kurdish and Shia leaders, they have tried to deepen the social divisions inherent in Iraq.

The insurgents seek increased disorder in the belief that the lack of progress and rising casualties will undermine support for the war in the United States, ultimately causing the collapse of the Coalition and the departure of its forces.

Militarily, our adversaries in Iraq combine improvised explosives, mortar/rocket attacks and ambushes to keep the pressure on Coalition forces without exposing themselves. They have developed precision munitions by having humans drive bombs to their targets. And they make heavy use of all forms of media to ensure their actions are seen by each of their target audiences. They are sending one message to their supporters ("We are the defenders of Islam and Iraq"); another to the uncommitted ("This is a fight between Islam/Iraq and the invaders, stay out of it or you will get hurt when the Americans leave"); and a third for the Coalition, particularly the Americans ("You are engaged in an endless, unwinnable fight.").

They are making excellent use of 4GW techniques to neutralize superior American military power. Most notable is their use of mosques and civilian neighborhoods as positions. Also, every time it looks like U.S. forces are closing in despite collateral damage, they "negotiate." Ever since Mao, insurgents have used negotiation to freeze superior military power while grinding at the opponent’s political will.

Only by looking at warfare as a 4GW event can we see America’s true vulnerabilities to a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attack. As a 4GW tactic, WMD attacks may not focus on physical destruction but rather on area denial or economic damage. The ability of a single person to shut down Senate office buildings and post offices with two anthrax letters is a vivid example of an area denial weapon.

Even a limited biological attack with a contagious agent, such as plague, will result in a shutdown of major segments of air travel, shipping and trade. Smallpox will require a total quarantine of the affected areas until the incubation period has passed. The potential for billions of dollars in losses to disrupted trade is obvious — as well as years of continuing loss due to subsequent litigation. Finally, for chemical attacks, terrorists don’t even have to provide the materials. The 1984 Bhopal chemical plant accident in India killed more people than Sept. 11 and left more with serious long-term injuries. While an accident, it presents an obvious precedent for a devastating chemical attack.

Fourth-generation wars are much longer than conventional conflicts; therefore, the organizations and objectives are substantially different from those of earlier generations of war. Since Mao, 4GW organizations have focused on the long-term political viability of the movement rather than on its short-term tactical effectiveness. They do not see themselves as military organizations but rather webs that generate the political power central to 4GW. The leadership recognizes that their most important function is to sustain the idea and the organizations — not necessarily to win on the battlefield.

4GW opponents are not invincible. They can be beaten, but only by coherent, patient action that encompasses all agencies of the government and the private sector. It encompasses the fields of politics, diplomacy, defense, intelligence, law enforcement, economic and social development. These efforts must be organized as a network rather than in the traditional vertical bureaucracies of our federal departments. This interagency process must exert its collective influence for the entire duration of the war, from initial planning to the final withdrawal of forces.

After the long timelines inherent in 4GW, developing these genuine interagency networks will be the most difficult problem for America fighting a 4GW opponent. It will require fundamental changes in how we train, develop, promote, deploy and employ our personnel across the federal government.

* Deploy personnel from all segments of the U.S. government — the State and Justice departments, CIA and other organizations — for much longer than the current three- to 12-month tours. While the military has targeted seven-to-12-month tours for Marines and longer for the Army, other government agencies deploy people for as little as three months. It has been reported that the CIA, for one, is deploying its officers for these short tours — this despite the fact that the standard one-year tour in Vietnam was widely decried as a major reason for our inability to understand what was happening in that country.

* Operate as interagency elements down to the tactical level. Individual agencies cannot operate in their peacetime stovepipes. Starting in peacetime, we have to train our people to be effective at linking into the interagency process and then reward those who are.

* Eliminate the bureaucratic processes that characterize peacetime government actions, particularly contracting and purchasing. Wartime requires responsive processes in all areas.

* Focus our research and innovation on fourth-generation wars. Rather than seeking better ways to fight the conventional wars we already dominate, we must find better ways to fight the kinds of wars we lose — fourth-generation wars.

* Develop procedures for fully integrating the wide range of international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, allies and specialists necessary to succeed against an adept, agile insurgent.

Fourth-generation war, like its predecessors, will continue to evolve with society as a whole. As we continue to move from a hierarchical, industrial-based society to a networked, information-based society, our political, economic, social and technical bases will continue to evolve. With this evolution come opportunity and hazard.

The key to providing for our security lies in recognizing these changes for what they are. In understanding the changing nature of war, we must not attempt to shape it into something it is not. We cannot force our opponents into a third-generation maneuver war that plays to our strengths.

As the fighting in Iraq has repeatedly demonstrated, 4GW enemies can simply melt away in front of a 3GW attack and then return when the maneuver forces move on. Sensing defeat, anti-Coalition forces in Iraq have repeatedly put down their weapons and faded into the general population.

We can evict the visible armed insurgents, but we cannot tell who is a sympathizer. They will still be free to move around "controlled" areas until we have an effective, loyal Iraqi police force with good intelligence to find and root out the political and military structure remaining in a city.

Our enemies today know they cannot face the power of our 3GW military; they will fight the fourth-generation war that challenges our weaknesses.

Clausewitz’s admonition to national leaders remains as valid as ever; it must guide our planning for future wars.

Great article & he's go the first 3 "generations" pegged: Manpower Intensive, Firepower Intensive, Maneuver. However, guerilla warfare is not 4th generation and the nature of war is not changing. Guerilla warfare has always been the method of the militarily weak versus the strong. The difference now is that whereas in the past guerilla warfare needed a long period of time to sap away at the will of the stronger power, in modern times with mass media the impact of guerilla actions can be much greater and act faster on the politicial will of the stronger power's home populace & politicians. Not to mention if the G's get WMD!

The author quotes 170 year old dead Prussian military philosopher Clausewitz up front and then writes about the "new" 4th generation (guerilla) warfare. If the author had read Clausewitz further, he would have found that Carl covered the same topic (without the "4th generation" label) in Book 6 of "On War"; which includes this passage evocative of Iraq today:

"The enemy's only action to [guerilla] actions is the sending out of frequent escorts as protection for his convoys, as guards on all his stopping places, bridges, defiles, and the rest. The early efforts of the insurgents may be fairly weak ... but the flames of insurrection will be fanned ...it should be nebulous and elusive; its resistance should never materialize as a concrete body, otherwise the enemy can direct sufficient force at its core and crush it."

On no, not another general re-inventing the wheel. The training and equipment of the foot soldier comes first. And it always will. The "gadgets" are nice and have their place, but those who believe "boots" to be less than priority one, will loose the battle, the war and the peace.

This article is good as far as it goes but it seems to miss a bigger, more important point. The forces engaging in 4GW can be engaged and defeated tactically in ways the writer suggests, but overall victory cannot be achieved in most cases without destroying their sponsors. In the last century the pre-eminent sponsor of international terrorism and much of the 4GW fought against Western Civilization was the Soviet Union. As long as you have such a sponsor willing to finance this sort of war using surrogates, you will never run out of surrogates. You may kill or defeat one group of them, as we did in Nicaragua in the late '80's, but the sponsor will always find someone else to continue the fight in another place. The end of the Soviet Union put an end to alot of this. But as the USSR was grinding its way into the dustbin of history (thereby ending what should rightfully be called WWIII, Soviet Communism against Western Civilization), another group of sponsors was ascendant. Indeed, these sponsors had already initiated WWIV (Islamofascism against Western Civilization) no later than 1979 (with the takeover of the American embassy in Tehran). Some put the start of WWIV as early as 1972 (with the massacre of Israeli athletes in Munich), or even 1964, when Yassir Arafat started the PLO. At this time the sponsors we need to destroy are first the Mullahs in Iran, then the Baathist regime in Damascus, and the Wahhabist elements in the Saudi royal family. If the sponsors are not destroyed or made to "see the light" and reform thmselves, 4GW sponsored by Islamofascist elements will continue indefinitely and will never be decisively defeated.

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