Posted on 07/10/2005 9:47:23 PM PDT by SAMWolf
|
are acknowledged, affirmed and commemorated.
|
Our Mission: The FReeper Foxhole is dedicated to Veterans of our Nation's military forces and to others who are affected in their relationships with Veterans. In the FReeper Foxhole, Veterans or their family members should feel free to address their specific circumstances or whatever issues concern them in an atmosphere of peace, understanding, brotherhood and support. The FReeper Foxhole hopes to share with it's readers an open forum where we can learn about and discuss military history, military news and other topics of concern or interest to our readers be they Veteran's, Current Duty or anyone interested in what we have to offer. If the Foxhole makes someone appreciate, even a little, what others have sacrificed for us, then it has accomplished one of it's missions. We hope the Foxhole in some small way helps us to remember and honor those who came before us.
|
The key to success in Afghanistan was U.S. carrier air powerhere, an F/A-18C Hornet launches for a combat mission from the USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67). Still, the conflict revealed some serious problems. The U.S. military is in danger of learning some false operational lessons by overemphasizing technology and targeting. Operation Enduring Freedom was highly successful, accomplishing most of the stated U.S. strategic objectives. The fundamentalist Taliban regime collapsed in a matter of weeks, and the Afghani people enjoy far more freedom now than at any time during the past 20 years. The al Qaeda international terrorist network and its supporting structure in Afghanistan have been seriously, if not fatally, disrupted. Thousands of Taliban and al Qaeda fighters were killed or captured. The U.S.-led victory was relatively quick and achieved at the cost to the United States of only 31 killed and fewer than 100 injured. Yet despite these successes, some serious political and security problems remain in Afghanistan. Operation Enduring Freedom confirmed that the relationship between policy and strategy remains the most critical factor in conducting a war. Policy always dominates strategy, and clear, militarily achievable political objectives are critical for ultimate success in any conflict. Determining a desired end state is the first and most important step before the use of military sources of national or coalition power. Mistakes made in policy are hard to overcome by strategy and operational art. Aviation ordnancemen move a 1,000 pound bomb onto the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) in preparation for strikes against al Qaeda terrorist training camps and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan on Oct. 7, 2001. The carefully targeted actions are designed to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a base for terrorist operations and to attack the military capability of the Taliban regime. The operation showed a high degree of professionalism and dedication by all service members. U.S. air power was undoubtedly the key factoralthough not the only onein the U.S.-led victory. Smart munitions, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), satellite communications, and advanced information technologies were used extensively and successfully during the conflict. The operation, however, revealed some potentially serious problems in the application of operational warfare. Moreover, the U.S. military is in real danger of learning some false strategic and operational lessons from the conflict. Any military action with a strategic objective and intended to end hostilities requires the determination of a desired end state by the highest national leadership. Such guidance should state in clear terms what political, diplomatic, military, economic, informational, and other conditions should exist in a theater after the end of the hostilities. Only afterward can strategic objectives be determined. Four B-52H Stratofortress bombers taxi for take off on strike missions against al Qaeda terrorist training camps and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan on Oct. 7, 2001, during Operation Enduring Freedom The broader the desired end state, the greater one's flexibility to determine strategic objectives and to modify, refine, or alter them in the course of a conflict. Also, by articulating a militarily achievable desired end state, the highest national leadership would be in a much better situation to measure the progress of a campaign or major operation. The United States had two courses open in determining the desired conditions at the conclusion of Enduring Freedom: the establishment of a commonly accepted central government in Kabul or a country fragmented along ethnic lines. The establishment of a central government would lead to the end of civil war, free elections, and the start of economic reconstruction and recovery. Such a situation, while highly desirable for both political and military reasons, is extremely difficult to create given the country's recent history. A fragmented Afghanistan perhaps is a more realistic ultimate outcome. Yet such a situation most likely would lead to greater instability in the region as the neighboring powers support their proxies and try to carve up spheres of influence in the country. Ironically, a fragmented state would reduce the possibility of the emergence of another radical Islamicist regime that could provide safe haven for international terrorist networks such as al Qaeda. Also, a fragmented Afghanistan would be too weak to pose a serious threat to any of its neighbors, although it would not serve as a buffer between competing powers. Other aspects of the desired end state could include the creation of conditions for the country's economic reconstruction, significantly reducing the production of opium, and the appeal and influence of militant Islam on the Afghani population. A U.S. Air Force B-1B Lancer bomber takes off on a strike mission against al Qaeda terrorist training camps and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan on Oct. 7, 2001, during Operation Enduring Freedom The U.S. national strategic objectives in the war against international terrorism include the destruction of all components of the al Qaeda network worldwide and other radical groups dedicated to attacking the United States and denying the terrorists safe havens and other forms of support. The ultimate objective of these efforts should be to reduce drastically the ability of international terrorist groups to inflict political, economic, psychological, and other damages on the United States and its allies. The task of Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command (CinCCent), was to translate these national strategic objectives into strategic objectives for the theater. On 7 October 2001, President George W. Bush announced that the U.S. military action was designed to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations, to attack the military capability of the Taliban regime, to bring bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders to justice, and to prevent al Qaeda's network from posing a continuous terrorist threat. Northern Alliance soldiers watch as US air strikes pound Taliban positions in Kunduz province near the town of Khanabad. Even in an undeveloped theater such as Afghanistan, strategic objectives usually cannot be accomplished in one fell swoop. Therefore, the planners work backward to derive intermediate operational objectives. In a conventional war, the accomplishment of each operational objective would require planning and the conduct of a major operation. The ultimate strategic objective was accomplished through a single major offensive air operation and series of major tactical actions aimed at seizing the northern, eastern, southern, and western parts of Afghanistan. The unique feature of the operation was that each of the four operational objectives on the ground was accomplished through a major tactical action rather than a major operation. Enduring Freedom can be considered a counterterrorist campaign, the first such in history. In any conflict, the optimal use of one's military and nonmilitary sources of power is achieved by focusing on defeating or neutralizing an enemy's center of gravity (COG). For any military objective, there is a corresponding center of gravity. The higher the level of war, the smaller the number of COGs because there are feweralthough largerobjectives to be accomplished. At the strategic level, there is a single COG, while at the operational and tactical levels normally multiple COGs exist. A COG always is found among an enemy's critical strengths, never among his critical weaknesses. It cannot be identified in isolation from a specific military objective to be accomplished. Both the objective and its corresponding COG are related closely. Whenever the objective changes, the enemy's critical strengths and weaknesses must be reevaluated as well. This, in turn, would require modification or refinement of the existing COG, or in case of a drastic change in the scope and the content of an objective, identification of a new COG. For U.S. planners, the enemy's strategic center of gravity was the leadership of al Qaeda and the Talibanand their will to fight. Because the Taliban regime was largely dependent on al Qaeda for its own survival, bin Laden and his inner circle represented the most important part of the enemy's strategic center of gravity. In many cases, an enemy's will to fight can be degraded seriously by inflicting on him a series of defeats in the field. This is hard to achieve when fighting fanatics such as hard-core Talibans or al Qaeda fighters. The only way to accomplish one's objective is by physically eradicating or capturing the leadership. Reportedly, of the 20 to 25 close associates of bin Laden, so far only one-third have been eliminated or captured. At least 15 top aides of bin Laden are in flight. Most of the 550 al Qaeda members held in Kandahar or Guantanamo are foot soldiers. As long as the leadership is at large, the ultimate strategic objective in Afghanistan will be difficult to consolidate. In planning and executing a campaign against terrorists, one's efforts should be focused against an enemy's strategic COG. In contrast to a conventional war, an international terrorist network's leadership must be physically eradicated or at least captured. Otherwise, it is difficult to consolidate and exploit one's strategic success. In Afghanistan, for each of the operational objectives there was a corresponding COG. Initially, the Taliban fighter aircraft and surface-to-air missiles were operational COGs. Subsequently, the Taliban and al Qaeda forces defending the northern, eastern, southern, and western parts of the country also were considered operational COGs.
|
www.globalspecialoperations.com
www.defenselink.mil
Many experts have asserted that the success in Afghanistan proved the value of the "revolution in military affairs." While many new technologies successfully passed the test, it must be remembered that U.S. forces possessed overwhelming power and faced a weak opponent. The enemy never had a chance to challenge air power. The victory in Afghanistan was easy and cheap because Afghanistan had few economic centers and poor infrastructure. The Taliban air defenses were virtually nonexistent and that accounts for the fact that the United States obtained air superiority within hours. The Taliban had few, if any, antiaircraft weapons with the reliability, range, and guidance systems to pose a credible threat against high-flying aircraft equipped with the most advanced sensors. The UAVs were used against almost nonexistent opposition, and Special Forces were allowed to roam freely in the countryside. At sea, the U.S. and coalition forces faced no opposition at all. Nor did the Taliban possess any capability to interfere with or attack U.S. computer networks. Network-centric warfare enthusiasts assert that their ideas have been proven in Afghanistan because targeting information from sensor to shooter was obtained almost instantly. Critical advances in computer networking and broadband satellite communications enabled intelligence from UAVs and other sources, such as the radars on board the E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (J-STARS) aircraft, to be combined with signals intelligence and satellite images. But the conflict in Afghanistan only proves that netting of diverse platforms technically works in a nonhostile or low-threat environment. It does not tell us whether U.S. systems are robust enough to operate smoothly in the face of a determined physical and electronic attack by a resourceful and skillful enemy. Too much emphasis on technology is unsound because the human element of warfare is being dismissed as irrelevant to our modern age. Technological advances have steadily reduced uncertainties in the situation on the battlefield, but they cannot eliminate the Clausewitzian "fog of war" and "friction." The emphasis on technology and tactics of weapons and platforms already has some serious and negative repercussions. This trend must be reversed soon. Otherwise the United States might find itself outthought and outfought by a relatively weaker but a more agile opponent who pays attention not only to tactics, but also to operational art and strategy and therefore better matches ends, means, and ways to achieve victory. |
KAF got rocketed this morning. First time we had been hit in over a year. I discovered that I don't like rockets.
Good morning, Snippy and everyone at the Freeper foxhole.
Good morning, work up to rain from Dennis. My Dennis would have found it amusing they named a storm after him..he was a avid weather watcher who was better than most weathermen at predicting the weather.
The young boy looked up at his grandfather and wondered aloud, "Grandpa, how do you live for Jesus?" The respected grandfather stooped down and quietly told the boy, "Just watch." As the years went by, the grand-father was an example to the boy of how to follow Jesus. He stayed rock-steady in living for Him. Yet the grandson often lived in a way that was not pleasing to God. One day the young man visited his grandfather for what both knew would be the last time. As the older man lay dying, his grandson leaned over the bed and heard his grandpa whisper, "Did you watch?" That was the turning point in the boy's life. He understood that when his grandpa had said, "Just watch," he meant, "Imitate me, just as I also imitate Christ" (1 Corinthians 11:1). He vowed that from then on he would live as his grandfather didstriving to please Jesus. He had watched, and now he knew how to live. Is somebody watching you? Are there younger Christians who need to see that it is possible to live for Jesus every day and in every way? Challenge themand yourself. Challenge them to "just watch." Then show them the way. Dave Branon
As you go along your way; Your example is remembered More than anything you say. Hess There's no better sermon than a good example.
The Mind Of Christ |
On This Day In History
Birthdates which occurred on July 11:
1274 Robert the Bruce Scotland, King (1328-1329)
1558 Robert Greene Elizabethan dramatist (Friar Bacon)
1754 Thomas Bowdler famous prude, bowdlerized Shakespeare
1767 John Quincy Adams Braintree, Mass, 6th Pres (D) (1825-1829)
1825 Edward Henry Hobson, Brig General (Union volunteers), died in 1901
1838 John Wanamaker merchant (Wanamakers Dept Store)
1841 William Paul Roberts, Brig General (Confederate Army), died in 1910
1897 Blind Lemon Jefferson,Blues musician
1899 E.B. White writer (Charlotte's Web, Elements of Style)
1915 Colin Purdie Kelly US, 1st US air hero during WW II
1915 Yul Brynner(Taidje Khan) Sakhalin Is Japan, actor (King & I)
1922 Gene Evans Hollbrook Az, actor (My Friend Flicka, Matt Helm, Alamo)
1931 Tab Hunter actor (Damn Yankees, Lust in the Dust, Battle Cry)
1931 Thurston Harris Indianapolis, vocalist (Little Bitty Pretty One)
1945 Deborah Harry singer (Blondie) actress (Videodrome, Hairspray)
1947 Jeff Hanna rock vocalist (Nitty Gritty Dirt Band-Mr Bojangles)
1950 Bonnie Pointer singer (Pointer Sisters)
1953 Leon Spinks US, heavyweight boxing champ (1978, Olympic-gold-1976)
1987 Matej Gaspar, Yugoslavia, 5,000,000,000th person (UN)
LOL--reads like the definiton of danger is: "a threat to the Navy's aviation budget".
It's all relative. The people doing most of the fighing were the Northern Alliance. Those were the biggest operations they ever launched.
In any event the description of a military action as strategic, operational or tactical is based on whether it achieved strategic, operational, or tactical level effects; not the size of the force involved. A single airplane or sniper aiming at and hitting the right target can achieve a strategic result while an entire corps can be assigned a purely tactical mission.
Great read . . . it's no wonder we have the best minds in the military, just understanding today's post is an undertaking.
Cannot imagine the difficulty to constantly appraise each type of operation or campaign and determine it's respective contingency. Or, how much technology is needed for the corresponding COG. No wonder they send these guys to "War College".
Lawyers were heavily involved in approving the list of targets to be attacked, at all command echelons.
Subsequently, so much time was consumed that targets were severely degraded and removed from the target package list? I understand the need to prevent collateral damage but how do lawyers determine this? Someone has to explain that one!
AMAZINGLY SIMPLE HOME REMEDIES
>
> 1. If you are choking on an ice cube, don't panic.
> Simply pour a cup of boiling water down your throat
> and presto. The blockage will be almost instantly
> removed.
>
> 2. Clumsy? Avoid cutting yourself while slicing
> vegetables by getting someone else to hold them while
> you chop away.
>
> 3. Avoid arguments with the Mrs. about lifting the
> toilet seat by simply using the sink.
>
> 4. For high blood pressure sufferers: simply cut
> yourself and bleed for a few minutes, thus reducing
> the pressure in your veins. Remember to use a timer.
>
> 5. A mouse trap, placed on top of your alarm clock,
> will prevent you from rolling over and going back to
> sleep after you hit the snooze button.
>
> 6. If you have a bad cough, take a large dose of
> laxatives, then you will be afraid to cough.
>
> 7. Have a bad toothache? Smash your thumb with a
> hammer and you will forget about the toothache.
>
> 8. Sometimes, we just need to remember what the rules
> of life really are: You only need two tools: WD-40 and
> Duct Tape. If it doesn't move and should, use the
> WD-40. If it shouldn't move and does, use the duct
> tape.
>
> *** Remember***
>
> Everyone seems normal until you get to know them.
>
> Never pass up an opportunity to go to the bathroom.
>
> If you woke up breathing, congratulations! You get
> another chance.
>
> And finally, be really nice to your family and
> friends; you never know when you might need them to
> empty your bedpan.
WOO HOO, Ahoy matey!!
Thanks for checking in and letting us know you're okay. Stay safe and keep your head down.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.