Posted on 04/02/2002 9:04:18 PM PST by DieselBoy
REACTIVATE THE IDEAL SHIPS FOR COUNTERING THE TERRORIST THREAT
Two major, but easily remediable, deficiencies could severely handicap the Navy in the present war against terrorism, a war that could be waged against “nations, organizations or persons.” With the exception of landlocked Afghanistan, waging war against suspected nations would no doubt require forced entry from the sea, which in turn would depend on adequate tactical naval surface fire support (NSFS) -- which is also essential to our “defeat of anti-access strategy.” (Kosovo demonstrated how bad weather could wipe out air support.) The Marine Corps, the GAO and the Navy’s N764 (Land Attack Warfare Branch, the Navy’s lead experts on NSFS) all have stated that present and planned Navy programs cannot provide the Marine Corps (or the Army) the tactical NSFS indispensable for the success of littoral “combat tactical actions.” And N764 has stated: “Combat tactical actions are central to operational success and strategic victory.” In a recent interview Commandant General James Jones declared: “I know of no combat shortfall that’s more important in my book, for the Marine Corps, than bridging the gap between the absence of naval gunfire and our own organic fire-support systems.”(Italics added)
On June 22, 2001, a presumed threat of possible terrorist attacks by bin Laden agents caused our 5th Fleet to flee from Bahrain and put out to sea. Understandably the fleet commander wanted to avoid another attack like the one that, October 18, 2000, almost sank USS Cole and cost 17 American lives. After the Cole incident, a terrorist threat also caused us to temporarily suspend sending Navy vessels through the Suez Canal. The proven vulnerability of our current warships accounts for this caution. In reference to the June 22nd evacuation, Ambassador (ret.) Hume Horan, who has long experience in the Mideast (he was, inter alia, US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia) noted, “Not our finest hour…nor very reassuring to our friends in the area who wonder about whether Uncle Sam can stay the course.” We must be able stand and visibly show our flag in the face of threats, especially in the critically strategic Mideast where terrorist threats are ever present! For this we must have ships that do not provide terrorists with psychological and political victories by having to flee from such threats because of their vulnerability.
Additionally and critically important, only battleships can provide the massive, high volume, accurate, instant, 24- 7, all weather, tactical NSFS that Marines (and soldiers) must have. (See attachment for more details on the battleships.) In a June 2000 interview, General Jones stated: “I regret that we took them [battleships] out of service before we had actually fixed the naval surface fire support problem.” And, as noted above, this problem cannot be fixed with existing and planned NSFS systems. Only reactivating and modernizing the two battleships can do this. This is why HASC Chairman Bob Stump has declared: “It is imperative that two battleships be returned to active service as soon as possible” to close the “dangerous” NSFS gap. In addition, the battleship’s vast storage and fuel capacity and extensive workshops and hospital facilities make it an ideal secure logistical base. It can, for example, refuel other ships in high threat areas thus avoiding future Cole incidents. Each battleship will have 96 Tomahawk missiles, now called for by the Pentagon. These would be available much faster and at far lower cost than by converting Ohio class SSBNs to SSGNs which would only be single weapon ships, unlike the highly versatile battleship (see attachment)
Modernized Battleships (BBG), Capital Ships for the 21st Century
Those who (mistakenly) regard battleships as outmoded would be astonished at the potential capabilities of a modernized Iowa-class battleship (BBG). This ship would have 96 one thousand mile range Tomahawk missiles (plans for which exist), nine 16-inch guns that can fire conventional rounds or extended round projectiles with ranges out to 100nm (using technology that has already been successfully tested in 16-inch guns) and twelve 5-inch guns that can be used to limit collateral damage. (These 5-inch guns alone can equal the firepower of over 15 modern destroyers.). It would have at least 8 data/video-linked UAVs (for reconnaissance, BDA, spotting and laser terminal guidance), the latest in anti-ship missile/air defense systems, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, a limited ASW and anti-mine capability (including remote mine detection devices when fielded). It would have a Cooperative Engagement Capability and would enhance its support of ground forces with FIREFINDER phased array radar for counter-battery fire and Field Artillery Tactical Data System for integrating supporting fires. In addition, it would have the latest state-of-the-art electronics. These two battleships, needed by the Navy, Marine Corps and the Army, should best be separately funded as joint “national assets”, outside the Navy’s budget and manpower ceilings, thus meeting key Navy objections to bringing back these ships.
(The Navy now plans to spend $1 billion each to reconvert up to four Ohio-class [SSBN] submarines [to SSGNs] each of which could carry up to 154 [most likely 98 to140] Tomahawks, including Tactical Tomahawks [clearly an oxymoron]. Reportedly work will start on the two in 2003 with a 2008 IOC. [Also reportedly, the Pentagon now wants this schedule accelerated.] While we generally support this program, it should be noted that this ship’s weapons are good only for operational and strategic fires, and being expensive and limited, will no doubt be restricted to high value targets. They are incapable of providing tactical NSFS. The SSGN can be configured for special operations forces [SOF], that is, SEAL teams for special missions. In this configuration, it would have 98 Tomahawks.)
If work began on reactivating and modernizing the two Iowa-class battleships in 2002, their IOC (as extensively modernized BBGs) would be 2004. Moreover, they would not only provide essential, now totally absent, effective tactical NSFS, but with 96 Tomahawks each, they could provide operational and strategic fires nearly equal to that of two SSGNs with SOF configurations and at half the cost (i.e., $1 billion to reactivate and modernize two battleships.) For the cost of one SSGN with a maximum of 154 (most probably fewer) Tomahawks, we can have two BBGs with 192 Tomahawks. The Pentagon has made it clear it wants more Tomahawks deployed to assist in the present war against terrorism. This could best be accomplished by bringing back the battleships on a priority basis. In addition, they, unlike the SSGNs, could be used for a forward presence show-of-force that cannot be intimidated by threats and for secure forward logistic support. BBGs would also be effective, near-term true arsenal ships which the President has called for.
These supposedly “old ships” are on the high seas the world’s fastest warships. For example, in August 1990, the carrier Saratoga and the battleship Wisconsin left the East Coast at the same time for the Persian Gulf. Saratoga arrived nearly a week later than Wisconsin because it had to circumvent a hurricane that Wisconsin simply plowed through. In rough seas in general carriers must slow down to avoid aircraft damage. Battleships, however, can plow on ahead. Unlike carriers, battleships can transit the Panama Canal. They can reach a crisis area faster than carriers. As noted above, for a visible show of force, battleships with their nine 66 foot-long 16-inch guns and twelve 5-inch guns present a powerful and awe-inspiring sight. Contrast this with our other ships with their (usually) single little 5-inch guns and with the appearance more of merchant ships than warships. The DD-21 “stealth” ship would, by definition, never be used for a show of force. In addition, as noted above, the battleship is extremely well protected by its massive armor, triple bottoms, extensive compartmentation and other passive and active defenses. Therefore, only they can risk a close-in visible show of force (or use of force) in a wide range of threat conditions. A carrier task force lurking far over the horizon, while militarily very potent, is an abstraction in political/psychological effect; whereas the battleship close to shore in plain view is a powerful reality, especially in high threat situations.
No ship is invulnerable, but the battleships come closest to being so. The still unexplained turret 2 explosion on Iowa in 1989 (the only explosion on any US battleship commissioned since 1917) would, for example, have demolished a CG or DDG (or DD-21) and put a carrier out of commission for a very long time. Iowa, however, deployed again within a few months after the explosion and continued to fire its six remaining 16-inch guns. It should be noted here that, according to the GAO, some seventy countries now have land/sea-based anti-ship missiles which pose a serious threat to all our other ships.
Battleship critics, who have long held sway in the Navy, claim that the battleship requires too many people and too much money and, therefore, cannot be afforded. May 18, 2000, this charge was accurately countered by (now HASC Chairman) Bob Stump, who declared: “Measured against their capabilities, they [battleships] are the most cost-effective and least manpower intensive warships we have.” He also stated that, “It is imperative that two battleships be returned to active service as soon as possible” to close the “dangerous” NSFS gap. The Navy (in 1999) estimated that it would cost $430 million and take 14 months to reactive both Iowa and Wisconsin and estimated that annual O&M costs (including personnel) would, by 2002, be $70.8 million per ship. We estimate that both ships can be extensively modernized for about another $500 million and in an additional ten months. (Given sufficient priority, both ships could actually be reactivated and modernized in about one year.)Thus, for the original cost of the Cole (or one SSGN), we would have two 21st Century capital ships. Each would require a crew of 1300 to 1400. The carrier, which is clearly indispensable for maintaining local air superiority and for deep strikes, requires a crew (with air-wing) of some 5600 (and often additional hundreds of contract employees.). It has a $400 million annual O&M cost (not including air-wing costs) and requires twice as many expensive escorts as does a battleship. On the other hand, the battleship is far more effective in maintaining a critically important credible forward visible presence in high threat situations and in providing ground forces with essential fire support in littoral conflicts.
We would recommend that Wisconsin be deployed to the Middle East [or other current crisis area] immediately upon reactivation while Iowa is being modernized. When this is completed, Iowa can replace Wisconsin which can then be modernized. Both ships could be operating in this presidential term.) (Wisconsin could be reactivated for what it cost just to repair the Cole, which, symbolic of its vulnerability, was recently relaunched at night..)
Within present 16-inch gun ranges (reaching at least 25 miles inland), meeting most current Marine needs, the battleship can, in 24 hours, lay down a weight of ordnance equal to that delivered in that time from all 12 of our carriers, and can do so must faster and more accurately and in all weather. Even with the advent of the more capable F/A 18 E/F on carriers, one battleship loading 60% extended range (out to 100nm [115 miles]) and 40% conventional projectiles will still be the equal of 4.5 carriers and will meet Marines’ projected NSFS range requirements (which the Navy complains it cannot presently do). With 100nm range, the battleship’s guns could have taken out many, maybe most, tactical targets in Kosovo where 14,000 air-delivered bombs (mostly PGMs) destroyed only 14 tanks, 18 APCs and 20 artillery pieces (confirmed). Also 56% of all scheduled air sorties there were aborted because of weather that would not have affected a battleship’s fire. Up to 75% of military targets in North Korea are within present 16-inch range. All targets in North Korea would be in range of 100nm projectiles.
The battleships’ performance, although little publicized, was extremely effective in WWII, Korea, Vietnam and the Gulf War, where, of all 80 naval combatants present, only they (Wisconsin and Missouri) could and did provide our ground forces with NSFS which was highly effective. They also launched the first Tomahawk strikes on Baghdad and coordinated all such strikes from the Gulf. In addition, with their vast fuel and storage capacity, an array of workshops (including forges) and extensive, well-protected hospital facilities, they provided considerable logistical support for the whole fleet. This feature adds to their great value in supporting distant rapid power projection, e.g., they can safely refuel ships avoiding other Cole incidents. And we now have an acute shortage of tankers, none of which could, in any case, risk entering high threat areas. The battleships’ massive fire so intimidated the Iraqis that the Iraqi Marines holding Faylaka Island (for which the Navy had planned an amphibious assault) surrendered to a Wisconsin-based UAV. They realized that the UAV was the harbinger of the destruction of the island. (16-inch guns are noted for being able to rearrange real estate, as well as for terrifying enemy forces. In Vietnam, for example, New Jersey blew off the top of an island near the DMZ. The North Vietnamese successfully insisted that New Jersey be withdrawn because it “impeded peace talks.” They didn’t mention the 4 carriers usually present.)
At the end of the Gulf War, the commander of all US naval forces there, Admiral Stanley Arthur, strongly recommended that the two battleships be retained in active status. (The Sultan of Oman offered to finance keeping two battleships in commission if one could be deployed to his region for at least eight months out of the year.) The Navy, on the other hand, could hardly wait to retire them, as originally planned before the war. In an interview in the June 2000 Armed Forces Journal International, General James Jones stated: “As to their warfighting capability, I regret that we took them [the battleships] out of service before we had actually fixed the naval surface fire support problem.” On March 1, 2000, he testified that Marines “have been at considerable risk” since the battleships were retired. In an interview in the September 2001 Armed Forces Journal International, General Jones stated: “I know of no combat shortfall that’s more important in my book, for the Marine Corps, than bridging the gap between the absence of naval gunfire and our own organic fire-support systems.” (Italics added) In any case, it is clear that absent any effective tactical NSFS, Marines and soldiers could take countless needless casualties in future littoral conflicts, the ones we will most likely encounter, conflicts which now appear to be far more imminent that prior to Sept.11. ( N764 defines “tactical” call for fire response time as “minutes or less because targets are immediately threatening friendly forces.” [In 1996, the Marines called for a response time of 2 ½ minutes from call for (tactical) fire to ordnance on target.] This rules out all current and planned Navy NSFS systems. [This fact required the Marines in 1999 to eliminate key flight time from their 2½ minute response criterion, which rendered it meaningless.]) Kosovo showed us how bad weather can wipe out air strikes. With neither air strikes nor NSFS, there can be no fire support in the critical initial phase of forced entry, a prescription for disaster. The Army should also be taking an acute interest in the NSFS problem. (The N764 May 10, 2001draft CONOPS, repeatedly cited above, noted significantly: “Late World War II battleships [Iowa class] were recalled to service during two periods to offset deficiencies in naval gunfire support.” Is N764 implying this should be done again?)
A July 8, 1995 Senate Armed Services Committee report (S1026) described the Iowa-class battleships as the Navy’s “only remaining potential source of around-the-clock accurate, high volume, heavy fire support…” This remains as true today as it did then; moreover, this will continue to hold true for the foreseeable future.
For at least 25 years, the extremely versatile modernized battleships could provide an invaluable bridge to future systems by coping with a wide spectrum of conflicts, all the way from using their imposing presence to keep the peace in troubled areas to providing massive fires in a full-scale war. We have no other ships that can do that. We obviously must be prepared for all contingencies, especially now, given the present state of war. In addition, who can really know what the nature of future conflicts will be? After WWII, many were convinced that the next war would be largely restricted to “push-button warfare.”(In the [totally unanticipated] “next war” in Korea, its trench warfare actually resembled WWI.) And who in July 1990 would have ever dreamed we would soon be in a major conflict with Iraq, of all countries? Who, prior to September 11, would have thought we would now be in a noholds- barred general war against terrorism?
REACTIVATE THE IDEAL SHIPS FOR COUNTERING THE TERRORIST THREAT
Dubious proposition.
Two major, but easily remediable, deficiencies could severely handicap the Navy in the present war against terrorism, a war that could be waged against “nations, organizations or persons.” With the exception of landlocked Afghanistan, waging war against suspected nations would no doubt require forced entry from the sea, which in turn would depend on adequate tactical naval surface fire support (NSFS) -- which is also essential to our “defeat of anti-access strategy.”
Surface forcible entry is an anachronism. It is NOT necessary, except in the minds of those who believe that a high friendly casualty count is a mark of warrior prowess.
(Kosovo demonstrated how bad weather could wipe out air support.)
It's been known about for years since the advent of the airplane. FWIW, some of the close air support in Afghanistan was delivered in the worst weather ever seen. In short, weather is becoming less of a barrier to CAS than it was previously.
The Marine Corps, the GAO and the Navy’s N764 (Land Attack Warfare Branch, the Navy’s lead experts on NSFS) all have stated that present and planned Navy programs cannot provide the Marine Corps (or the Army) the tactical NSFS indispensable for the success of littoral “combat tactical actions.”
"Combat tactical actions" says nothing about a requirement for battleships. It says "you have to win battles."
And N764 has stated: “Combat tactical actions are central to operational success and strategic victory.”
Wow. A statement of the blindingly obvious. However, it does not equal a battleship requirement.
In a recent interview Commandant General James Jones declared: “I know of no combat shortfall that’s more important in my book, for the Marine Corps, than bridging the gap between the absence of naval gunfire and our own organic fire-support systems.”(Italics added)
There's more than one way to skin a cat. Most of the "bridging" is already in place, and the "last mile" is in advanced procurement now. Again, it doesn't say that battleships are required.
On June 22, 2001, a presumed threat of possible terrorist attacks by bin Laden agents caused our 5th Fleet to flee from Bahrain and put out to sea. Understandably the fleet commander wanted to avoid another attack like the one that, October 18, 2000, almost sank USS Cole and cost 17 American lives. After the Cole incident, a terrorist threat also caused us to temporarily suspend sending Navy vessels through the Suez Canal. The proven vulnerability of our current warships accounts for this caution. In reference to the June 22nd evacuation, Ambassador (ret.) Hume Horan, who has long experience in the Mideast (he was, inter alia, US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia) noted, “Not our finest hour…nor very reassuring to our friends in the area who wonder about whether Uncle Sam can stay the course.”
And we came back into port.
Ships get underway all the time.
We must be able stand and visibly show our flag in the face of threats, especially in the critically strategic Mideast where terrorist threats are ever present! For this we must have ships that do not provide terrorists with psychological and political victories by having to flee from such threats because of their vulnerability.
This is a truly moronic reason for having a battleship. The terrorists will simply figure out a way to attack the ship with some other method--such as shooting up a liberty party, for instance, or sniping topside crew. Tell me the Iowa wouldn't clear out of town after a sniper incident.
Or, the terrorists could simply fight their way aboard, reach a powder magazine, force open safety interlocks with the ship's own damage control gear, and set off a bomb. Battleship sinks at pierside...
Additionally and critically important, only battleships can provide the massive, high volume, accurate, instant, 24- 7, all weather, tactical NSFS that Marines (and soldiers) must have.
"Accurate" and "battleship gunfire" do NOT belong in the same sentence.
It would have a Cooperative Engagement Capability and would enhance its support of ground forces with FIREFINDER phased array radar for counter-battery fire and Field Artillery Tactical Data System for integrating supporting fires.
Wrong answer. Phased-array radars and 16-inch gun blast do NOT mix.
In addition, it would have the latest state-of-the-art electronics.
And antiquated 600-pound steam to power same, with all of the lovely electrical fluctuations 600-pound steam ships are noted for. You'll keep the electronics shop busy fixing all the voltage-damaged electronics...
These two battleships, needed by the Navy, Marine Corps and the Army, should best be separately funded as joint “national assets”, outside the Navy’s budget and manpower ceilings, thus meeting key Navy objections to bringing back these ships.
OK, you want to engage in the same sort of budget chicanery that FReepers despise with Social Security...
No ship is invulnerable, but the battleships come closest to being so.
The battleship holds the distinction of being able to sink itself just from a single act of carelessness. No other weapons system, with the possible exception of the ICBM, concentrates that much explosive energy in one place and dares its operators to make a mistake.
The still unexplained turret 2 explosion on Iowa in 1989 (the only explosion on any US battleship commissioned since 1917) would, for example, have demolished a CG or DDG (or DD-21) and put a carrier out of commission for a very long time.
Here we go: three lies in one sentence. First, the turret explosion IS explained by two words: BAGGED POWDER. Specifically, the serious investigation concluded that the probable cause of the explosion was an overram of bagged powder which led to ignition.
Second, there was a turret explosion in 1943 aboard the USS Mississippi--rather more recent than 1917.
Third, since carriers, CGs, and DDs do NOT use bagged powder, the explosion would NOT have "demolished" a CG or DDG, nor would it have put a carrier out of commission for any length of time--because it wouldn't have happened in the first place!
There's a FOURTH lie hidden here: the author is trying to suggest that the Iowa was never in significant danger. In actuality, the ship came perilously close to sinking.
Iowa, however, deployed again within a few months after the explosion and continued to fire its six remaining 16-inch guns. It should be noted here that, according to the GAO, some seventy countries now have land/sea-based anti-ship missiles which pose a serious threat to all our other ships.
And these countries do not have the targeting capacity to attack these ships unless we're foolish enough to come up to their doorstep--like we would with a battleship, oddly enough. I notice that they don't talk about how many nations we can expect to fight have submarines and torpedoes.
Battleship critics, who have long held sway in the Navy, claim that the battleship requires too many people and too much money and, therefore, cannot be afforded. May 18, 2000, this charge was accurately countered by (now HASC Chairman) Bob Stump, who declared: “Measured against their capabilities, they [battleships] are the most cost-effective and least manpower intensive warships we have.”
"Capabilities" seems to include "the capability to have a dopey gunner's mate blow up the entire damn ship."
For at least 25 years, the extremely versatile modernized battleships could provide an invaluable bridge to future systems by coping with a wide spectrum of conflicts, all the way from using their imposing presence to keep the peace in troubled areas to providing massive fires in a full-scale war.
25 years? What, exactly, is this fool smoking? Try ten, at best. Those ships were NOT perfectly preserved, ever, and they are basically an engineering CASREP waiting to happen.
DD-21 is now in another redesign, I hear. This does not create a lot of confidence in our ability to bridge the gap, IMHO.
And reboilering, and completely overhauling the main armament to get rid of bagged powder, and, and, and, and...
Actually, the end of large-scale battleship procurement in 1943 (when the Montana-class ships were cancelled) led to this development. There just isn't a lot of call out there (read: ZERO) for 18-inch thick Class A armor. When you have only one customer for Class A armor, and they stop buying it, businesses that wish to make money will not leave the forges lying around, unused for 60 years, just on the off chance that the customer might want some more armor plate someday.
But, since you seem to advocate a nationalist and socialist industrial policy, I can see how you might get confused.
If I were the terrorists, I'd send in a suicide squad to detonate a bomb inside the forward powder magazine. That would sink the ship.
All I'm saying is that a BB is a lot more survivable than most anything else in the fleet.
Like I said: a BB is just about the only weapons system out there that concentrates THAT much chemical energy, in one place, in an easily-ignited form, and then dares the crew to make one mistake--or dares the enemy to get ONE bomb into the magazine by any means.
Since you like to use the carriers as examples, how do you think carriers defend themselves from anti-ship missiles?
By killing the archer, not the arrows.
By having a DD or CG get in the missile's way and take the hit for them.
Actually, the idea is that the DD or CG uses their own weapons suite to bag the inbound. DDs and CGs are pretty expensive, after all.
If I had to take an inbound vampire strike, I would certainly rather be on a battleship.
Of course, if I were attacking a CVBG, I'd be throwing nuclear vampires. Being in a BB wouldn't do you THAT much good :o)
Actually, it's the correct argument. A CVBG uses its dominance of the airspace around the ship to prevent the enemy's scouting forces from targeting it precisely. A BB neatly solves this problem for the enemy by driving up within sight of the coastline to do its business.
The Iowa class battleships if reactiveated would be the most difficult ships to sink in the fleet and the only ones capable of surviving near-misses by naval tacnukes of the variety you say might be used against their battlegroups.
The only defense against a nuke is to be nowhere near where it detonates. A carrier is far less likely to be in that position (the enemy will, at best, barrage fire missiles in the general direction of the CVBG and hope they're not shooting at deceptive transmitters) than a battleship (which would be within sight of the enemy-held coast).
A very long shot, IMHO.
MARDET is smaller than you think, and with some topside covering fire, they will have to wait to engage the enemy.
As for the size of the ship...that does not directly impact getting access to the magazine. Up the forward brow, forward along the deck, enter the ship, down a few decks...
A very long shot, IMHO.
About as long a shot as flying some airliners into the WTC and the Pentagon.
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