If this had been anyone else -- car thieves stealing from private citizens for joy riding for example -- the prosecutor would have opted for something less than robbery. But you see this case is a private citizens using property belonging to state officials -- a totalitarian state "no-no". !!!! They might have been so lucky as to be treated as car thieves who, even after deadly car chases, get less than 6 months incarceration.
The one good thing resulting from the publicity in this case is that the children didn't wind up in the hands of the state of Oregon and its sanctioned child-abusing surrogates, but under the care of the grandparents. One wonders that had the Christines not done what they did, whether their children would be with the grandparents now or in the home of some alternative lfestyle fosterparent for which Oregon is well-known.
A little extra money in the hands of these parents, or perhps the offer by the state of free medical care and food for the children, without having to terminate their parental rights to the state first, might have gone a long way to helping the family. But no -- that would mean that the state is a magnanimous institution that gives out free lunches. It is really in the business of controlling the lives of its citizens not for their sake but for the state's sake.
Perhaps the judge and jury will have some second thoughts and sleepless nights before the sentencing phase --- perhaps --
Didn't spend much time on this, you could have done the same and thus been more informed. This is from a quick search. Although it is a Federal case (which can still be filed against the Christines) it gives you a better idea of how the laws work. The Christines intent is derived from their actions and the perception(s) of the victim(s). Gun to head stuff.
Considering the unrebutted medical testimony and the crimes committed in this case, your defense of the Christines is without merit and somewhat contrived.
From the Link
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Fulford contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to satisfy the specific intent requirement of the federal carjacking statute, § 2119. We review this contention de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and drawing all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in favor of the jury's verdict. See United States v. Trujillo, 146 F.3d 838, 845 (11th Cir. 1998).
To constitute carjacking under § 2119, the taking of a motor vehicle must be committed with the "intent to cause death or serious bodily harm." 18 U.S.C. § 2119. The intent requirement of § 2119 is satisfied where the government "proves that at the moment the defendant demanded or took control over the driver's automobile the defendant possessed the intent to seriously harm or kill the driver if necessary to steal the car." Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 12 (1999). The defendant's intent "'is to be judged objectively from the visible conduct of the actor and what one in the position of the victim might reasonably conclude.'" United States v. Guilbert, 692 F.2d 1340, 1344 (11th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted).