to "answer a challenge" is to rise to a challenge to provide whatever item, innovation, example, or solution the terms of the challenge demand.
so, in this case, the "answer" you would put forth would be one which you believe meets the challenge to name a situation or example in which morality-linked definition of right, as limited in the given, is NOT made by might, as defined in the given. It is satisfactory to demonstrate how the terms of the given are incorrect, thus falsifying the terms of the challenge, if you can do so.
note: "assert" does not equate to *demonstrate*
surely you know how a dialectic works?
Given:
1. “might” is defined as ability to impose positive and negative consequences, immunity to reprisals, lack of needs requiring exogenous sources of fulfillment, and endurance.
2. “right” in this application specifically excludes mathematically correct solutions to specific problems, mechanically sound design, etc... we are speaking SOLELY of the form/concept of “right” tied to “morality”
Postulate:
“right” is always defined by might, and that definition's range and power is always proportionate to the might of the one making the definition.
Challenge:
Provide one case where the above is clearly not operant….
to “answer a challenge” is to rise to a challenge to provide whatever item, innovation, example, or solution the terms of the challenge demand.
so, in this case, the “answer” you would put forth would be one which you believe meets the challenge to name a situation or example in which morality-linked definition of right, as limited in the given, is NOT made by might, as defined in the given. It is satisfactory to demonstrate how the terms of the given are incorrect, thus falsifying the terms of the challenge, if you can do so.
note: "assert" does not equate to *demonstrate*
surely you know how a dialectic works?
Just making sure we’re on the same page here, King Prout!
Sure I know how “dialectic works.” Hegel and Marx gave such exemplary examples, the first “theoretical,” the other spectacularly “practical.” Which is why I prefer dialogue, or debate.
Anyhoot, it’s easy to give an example of “a situation or example in which morality-linked definition of right, as limited in the given, is NOT made by might.”
My example: The Constitution of the United States of America or, more precisely, the moral order it established.
And so I dispute your Postulate. Unless the free consent of We the People can be construed as "might."
You mentioned or rather suggested you didn’t have much use for Plato, preferring Aristotle instead, Plato’s great pupil.
Would that be this Aristotle:
Of things constituted by nature some are ungenerated, imperishable, and eternal, while others are subject to generation and decay. The former are excellent beyond compare and divine, but less accessible to knowledge. The evidence that might throw light on them, and on the problems which we long to solve respecting them, is furnished but scantily by sensation; whereas respecting perishable plants and animals we have abundant information, living as we do in their midst, and ample data may be collected concerning all their various kinds, if only we are willing to take sufficient pains. Both departments, however, have their special charm. The scanty conceptions to which we can attain of celestial things give us, from their excellence, more pleasure than all our knowledge of the world in which we live; just as a half glimpse of persons that we love is more delightful than a leisurely view of other things, whatever their number and dimensions. On the other hand, in certitude and in completeness our knowledge of terrestrial things has the advantage. Moreover, their greater nearness and affinity to us balances somewhat the loftier interest of the heavenly things that are the objects of the higher philosophy. Having already treated of the celestial world, as far as our conjectures could reach, we proceed to treat of animals, without omitting, to the best of our ability, any member of the kingdom, however ignoble. For if some have no graces to charm the sense, yet even these, by disclosing to intellectual perception the artistic spirit that designed them, give immense pleasure to all who can trace links of causation, and are inclined to philosophy. Indeed, it would be strange if mimic representations of them were attractive, because they disclose the mimetic skill of the painter or sculptor, and the original realities themselves were not more interesting, to all at any rate who have eyes to discern the reasons that determined their formation. We therefore must not recoil with childish aversion from the examination of the humbler animals. Every realm of nature is marvellous: and as Heraclitus, when the strangers who came to visit him found him warming himself at the furnace in the kitchen and hesitated to go in, reported to have bidden them not to be afraid to enter, as even in that kitchen divinities were present, so we should venture on the study of every kind of animal without distaste; for each and all will reveal to us something natural and something beautiful. Absence of haphazard and conduciveness of everything to an end are to be found in Nature's works in the highest degree, and the resultant end of her generations and combinations is a form of the beautiful. — De Partibus Animalium.Thanks so much for writing King Prout!
Differently from a conductor?