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“A few thoughts on Prigozhin’s armed insurrection/mutiny/rebellion. For now it appears over. Wagner seems to be standing down, and leaving Rostov for LNR. Prigozhin launched a mutiny that ultimately challenged Putin’s power, and the system. Thread. 1/

This was not a traditional coup, but with Putin’s video and FSB statements it became a challenge that would reveal the extent of brittleness in the regime. It wasn’t a good showing for Russian state capacity or competence to respond to this kind of challenge. 2/

I had long wondered whether Prigozhin understood something intuitively about the system, if the regime was fundamentally hollow, prominent members like Shoigu were weak, and Putin could be pressed into deals, etc. or if he was grossly miscalculating. 3/

My sense is he was proven half right. Wagner was unexpectedly successful because they moved much faster and more deliberately than Russian forces, which seemed to lack orders, largely allowing Wagner units past unopposed. They were located near Rostov to begin with. 4/

Most of the Russian military is deployed in Ukraine. And while to outsiders Wagner is seen as a separate force, it wasn’t treated as such in Rostov. You can chalk this either up to sympathy or stereotypical lack of initiative by local forces. 5/

But Prigozhin also miscalculated in part because this was an act of desperation. He had limited aims, and didn’t appreciate the implications of his mutiny. I was puzzled by his theory of victory. A run on Moscow to do what? Get attention? Storm the Kremlin with a battalion? 6/

I was skeptical on Wagner’s odds because most coups fail, and Russia does not have a strong history of successful military coups to begin with. Though Wagner’s thunder run to Moscow was looking much better than Russian attempts to pull this off against Kyiv in 2022. 7/

This was not a bloodless mutiny. Wagner forces likely did more damage to the Russian VKS over the past day than much of the Ukrainian offensive had in recent weeks in terms of the combat helicopters & aircraft they shot down. 8/

Regarding the bloodless nature of this mutiny. Wagner shot down six helicopters and an Il-18 (Il-22) command and control aircraft. Supposedly 13 pilots were killed in that one day’s action. How many Wagner soldiers died in strikes is unclear. 9/

Putin’s inaction & the slowness of the Russian response has become typical. I’ve often described him as a master procrastinator. The problem with Wagner was growing, it would reach a crisis point after the June 10 declaration by MoD, Putin was likely warned and did nothing. 10/

Prigozhin had declared that Wagner would not sign contracts with the Russian military, designed to neuter their autonomy. Theatrics ensued, but this standoff was clearly going to end poorly. The trajectory was a downward spiral from his May ultimatums leading into a crisis. 11/

Was this a Russian intelligence failure? I doubt it. In DC we joke that something is either a policy success or an intelligence failure. In Russia, the failure of security services to adequately respond, ensuing confusion, and stupidity, are par de course. 12/

It’s unclear if Prigozhin was counting on more support. He certainly didn’t get it from pro-war factions. Security services and the military didn’t side with him either. Apathy is not enough. His timing was poor given the situation at the front. 13/

We still don’t know the terms of the agreement for Wagner. I don’t think Wagner was independent so much as autonomous. The context of where they were deployed mattered. Their autonomy will end in the context of this war. In states like Mali the situation might be different. 14/

After Bakhmut, the military was far less dependent on Wagner. Folks often conflated Bakhmut for the entire Russian winter offensive, and Wagner’s role as though it was omnipresent on the front. It was quite narrow, and Wagner was not used for defense in the south. 15/

This is in part how Wagner found itself so close to Rostov, reconstituting in training camps and deployed to the rear. Their units were not pulled off the line, hence Russian defense (especially in the south) is unlikely to suffer immediately from their absence. 16/

Wagner might be disbanded in its entirety, or absorbed. The Russian state had been trying to set up competing organizations and this process is likely to accelerate now. This in part depends on what happens to Wagner’s backers in Moscow - what was Prigozhin’s cover there. 17/

There’s also the nagging question of whether anyone has seen Shoigu and Gerasimov, and what’s going to happen with them. As Prigozhin’s discussion with Alekseev in the SMD HQ illustrated, they are near universally detested in the Russian military. 18/

My conclusion is that Prigozhin ultimately lost. Wagner will also lose out. But Putin lost as well, and the regime was wounded. What the long term repercussions are remains to be seen. 19/”

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