Harris, Haley, and Ramaswamy Cannot Be President

English Law is monarchical law, and anything incompatible with monarchy is incompatible with English law.

This is flatly untrue.

In Noah Webster's very first 1828 edition of his famous dictionary, this is the provided definition of common law: "11. Unwritten or common law a rule of action which derives its authority from long usage, or established custom, which has been immemorially received and recognized by judicial tribunals. As this law can be traced to no positive statutes, its rules or principles are to be found only in the records of courts, and in the reports of judicial decisions."

There is nothing inherently monarchical about common law, and so English law in and of itself is not strictly monarchical either. This definition of common law would have been applicable even without the existence of a monarchy.

I'm being serious, because you're giving divine weight to something which can be undone by acts of man.

A natural-born citizen can still voluntarily relinquish their own citizenship.

They can let it go, but people cannot pretend it wasn't given to them by God.

You can do the same with your life, but it was still given by God.

Perhaps it would be best to lay off the hyperbole, lest your arguments be tainted with absurdities.

My argument is not tainted with absurdities. I have spent quite a long time looking for the origins of "natural born citizen", and what I have discovered is that it derives from "natural law."

Now you may not know what is "natural law", and I wouldn't blame you, because I didn't know what it was either when I started looking into this issue, but "natural law" was the concept that God's workings in the affairs of man could be discerned by a logical mind with a few basic assumptions.

While the concept is forgotten today, it was the dominant philosophy of the time period in the 18th century. Some examples of the philosophers of "natural law" were Samuel Rutherford, John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, and so forth.

If you read their essays and follow their logic, their arguments all revolve around the rights of man as given by God.

Take a look at Rex Lex and see how he derives this notion of government and rights from a few basic assumptions.

"QUESTION I. "Whether government be by a divine law, ..... 1
How government is from God. â€” Civil power, in the root, immediately from God.
QUESTION II.
Whether or no government be warranted by the law of nature, ... 1
Civil society natural in radicâ‚¬, in the root, voluntary in modOj in the manner. â€” Power of govern- ment, and power of government by such and such magistrates, different. â€” Civil subjection not formally from nature's laws. â€” Our consent to laws penal, not antecedently natural. â€” Government by such rulers, a secondary law of nature. â€” Family government and politic different. â€” Govern- ment by rulers a secondary law of nature ; family government and civU different. â€” Civil govern- ment, by consequent, natural.
QUESTION III.
Whether royal power and definite forms of government be from God, . . 3
That kings are from God, understood in a fourfold sense. â€” The royal power hath warrant from divine institution. â€” The three forms of government not different in specie and nature. â€” How every form is from God. â€” How government is an ordinance of man, 1 Pet. ii. 13.

Samuel Rutherford was one of the writers of natural law cited in the debates of the US Constitution. So was Vattel.

There is nothing inherently monarchical about common law, and so English law in and of itself is not strictly monarchical either.

Here I will have Madison answer you.

The common law is nothing more than the unwritten law, and is left by all the constitutions [of the several States] equally liable to legislative alterations. I am not sure that any notice is particularly taken of it in the Constitutions of the States. If there is, nothing more is provided than a general declaration that it shall continue along with other branches of law to be in force till legally changed. The Constitution of Virga. [Virginia] drawn up by Col Mason himself, is absolutely silent on the subject. An ordinance passed during the same Session, declared the Common law as heretofore & all Statutes of prior date to the 4 of James I. to be still the law of the land, merely to obviate pretexts that the separation from G. Britain threw us into a State of nature, and abolished all civil rights and Obligations. Since the Revolution every State has made great inroads & with great propriety in many instances on this monarchical code. The "revisal of the laws" by a Committee of wch. Col. Mason was a member, though not an acting one, abounds with such innovations. The abolition of the right of primogeniture, which I am sure Col. Mason does not disapprove, falls under this head. What could the Convention have done? If they had in general terms declared the Common law to be in force, they would have broken in upon the legal Code of every State in the most material points: they wd. have done more, they would have brought over from G.B. a thousand heterogeneous & antirepublican doctrines, and even the ecclesiastical Hierarchy itself, for that is a part of the Common law. If they had undertaken a discrimination, they must have formed a digest of laws, instead of a Constitution.

The notion of Jus Soli is feudal in nature. It ties the man to the land, and thereby to the lord that owns the land. -It is anti-republican and violates the rights of man.

Here is a citation from a law book I found at Boston University, some years back, but the link is dead. I only have the text because I cited it.

In the first seventy-five years of our independence, many Americans – lawyers included – attacked the common law and advocated strongly for codification of all American law, in part, for the better security of citizens from arbitrary rule by judges. The common law was denounced as a barbaric, feudalistic relic of medieval England that imposed ex post facto, retroactive law on parties whenever judges found a new tort or new common law crime.50 Jefferson wrote in a private letter in 1788 that courts in America should be forbidden to cite any English decision since the accession of Lord Mansfield to the bench (in 1756),51 and in a private letter in 1812 that it was improper to quote in American courts any English authorities later than the accession of George III (in 1760).52 During the early codification movement three states – New Jersey in 1799,53 Kentucky in 1808,54 and Pennsylvania in 1810, 55 passed statutes specifically forbidding citation of English cases decided after July 4, 1776. The statutes did not last long in force, and there is some evidence that they were not enforced.56 In New Hampshire, a rule of court was adopted forbidding English citations.57

They can let it go, but people cannot pretend it wasn't given to them by God.

God positively grants citizenship to individuals? What are you talking about?

Now you may not know what is "natural law", and I wouldn't blame you, because I didn't know what it was either when I started looking into this issue, but "natural law" was the concept that God's workings in the affairs of man could be discerned by a logical mind with a few basic assumptions.

Now you're mixing metaphors and concepts. An "act of God" already has a defined legal definition: namely, a natural hazard outside human control for which no person can be held responsible. If you're referring to the natural way of things based on observations of reason in nature, then that is not an "act" of God in the proper sense.

Also, with regards to your citation of Samuel Rutherford, it would behoove to note that he distinguished the common law as being in existence before ratification by King and Parliament (underline is emphasis mine): QUEST. XLIII. Whether the King of Scotland be an absolute Prince, having Prerogatives above Parliament and Laws? The Negative is asserted by the Lawes of Scotland, the Kings Oath of Coronation, the Confession of Faith, &c.: "...The 1. Parl. of K. Iames the 6. 1567. approveth the Acts, Parl. 1560. conceived only in name of the States, without the King and Queen, who had deserted the same. So saith the Act, 2.5.4.20.28. And so this Parliament, wanting the King and Queenes authoritie, is confirmed, Parl. 1572. Act. 51. K. Ia. 6. and Parl. 1581. Act. 1. and Parl. 1581. Act. 115. in which it is declared, That they have been Common lawes from their first Date: and all are ratified, Parl. 1587. and Parl. 1592. Act. 1. and stand ratified to this day, by K. Charles his Parliament, An. 1633. The Act of the Assemblie, 1566. commendeth that Parliament, 1560. as the most lawfull and free Parliament that ever was in the Kingdome."

Now, notwithstanding your citation of Madison's letter to George Washington from 10/18/1787, his choice of adjective ("monarchical") is applicable only insofar as various aspects of the English common law in relation to the British monarchy (which would not fit within . A common law system, in and of itself by definition, is simply a system of law where precedent, custom, and long-usage is utilized over that of an actual civil code that prescribes the procedures and penalties of cases that can be brought to court; it's the entire reason why case precedent holds so much sway in our legal system, because a case decided in one way should be decided similarly in future cases of the same kind, unless the underlying facts and accidents of the future cases differ so much that they change the very nature of what's under deliberation.

And, as Madison himself admits in your own citation, the aspects of the common law which had not been altered by force of legislation were still in effect. (Keep in mind, he is also referencing George Mason — another Founding Father — in this discussion on the common law, as he is explicitly writing to George Washington about George Mason's objections related to a perceived lack of verbiage regarding the common law. This is the same Mason, mind you, whose objections regarding the Constitution forced Madison's hand enough to propose the Bill of Rights as amendments to the Constitution.)

The notion of Jus Soli is feudal in nature. It ties the man to the land, and thereby to the lord that owns the land. -It is anti-republican and violates the rights of man.

You're mixing concepts again. "Jus soli" (nationality or citizenship acquired by birth within a given territory) and "common law" are different things. We know this, for example, because every single country in South America operates off of a civil law system and not a common law system; meanwhile, every single one of them practices birthright citizenship/nationality to some degree or another.

Here is a citation from a law book I found at Boston University, some years back, but the link is dead. I only have the text because I cited it.

A quick search shows that this particular section is cited from a 2006 article by David J. Seipp: Our Law Our Law, Their Law , Their Law, History, and the Citation of F , and the Citation of Foreign Law eign Law . Context is important, because the author is criticizing the position that citation of foreign laws is somehow a new phenomenon in American jurisprudence (underline is emphasis mine):

----

BAD HISTORY

The objection to citation of foreign law is bad history because it is a new complaint (that has been made to appear old) about an old practice (that has been made to appear new). The objection draws on a false history or myth about American and English common law.

A. A New Complaint

First, this is a new complaint. Criticism of lawyers as unscrupulous, greedy liars and judges as pompous, arrogant know-it-alls is as old as the law itself. Lawyers and judges hear these criticisms and we remember them. Nowhere in this vast torrent of vile abuse have I found a hint that citation of foreign law was one of our faults, before Justice Scalia's opinions from 1988, 1997, 2003, and 2005. Surely there would be some trace in the long historical record of criticism of lawyers and judges if a vast overwhelming majority or even a tiny fraction of the American people objected to citation of foreign law. Lawyers and judges have not heretofore been condemned for having read too many books, knowing too many languages, or being too well acquainted with the world.

In the first seventy-five years of our independence, many Americans - lawyers included - attacked the common law and advocated strongly for codification of all American law, in part, for the better security of citizens from arbitrary rule by judges. The common law was denounced as a barbaric, feudalistic relic of medieval England that imposed ex post facto, retroactive law on parties whenever judges found a new tort or new common law crime. Jefferson wrote in a private letter in 1788 that courts in America should be forbidden to cite any English decision since the accession of Lord Mansfield to the bench (in 1756), and in a private letter in 1812 that it was improper to quote in American courts any English authorities later than the accession of George III (in 1760). During the early codification movement three states - New Jersey in 1799, Kentucky in 1808, and Pennsylvania in 1810 - passed statutes specifically forbidding citation of English cases decided after July 4, 1776. The statutes did not last long in force, and there is some evidence that they were not enforced. In New Hampshire, a rule of court was adopted forbidding English citations.

But all of this was Anglophobia, not xenophobia. Proponents of American codification pointed with admiration and envy to the success of France's Code Napoleon, parts of which were translated almost immediately in America's first law journal, and other codes of law. Pennsylvania's statute expressly approved the citation of post-1776 British precedent about the law of nations. Justice Henry Brockholst Livingston's dissent in the 1820 case of United States v. Smith was not objecting to Joseph Story's citation of more than twenty-five sources of foreign law because it was foreign law, but rather was objecting to the open definition of a common law crime of piracy without prior statutory specificity. If Congress had named a statutory offense that could only be defined by reading dozens of relatively inaccessible American books, it seems Livingston would have had the same objection to such a common law crime. This broad-brush complaint about citing to or using foreign law is new.

----

End quote.

I do not see criticisms of the common law in principle; rather, I see particularities of common law as practiced by England which were rejected due to incompatibilities with the new American government.

This can be seen from the fact that we have trials by jury at all, since this a feature which evolved within common law systems (England's most notably), as juries tend to be absent from civil law systems or Sharia law systems, where cases are usually bench trials by default.

In summary: a common law system is not inherently monarchical by definition.

Blah, typos.

“(which would not fit within .” should read “(which would not fit within our system of republican government).”

“Our Law Our Law, Their Law , Their Law, History, and the Citation of F , and the Citation of Foreign Law eign Law .” should simply read “Our Law, Their Law, History, and the Citation of Foreign Law.”

Now, notwithstanding your citation of Madison's letter to George Washington from 10/18/1787, his choice of adjective ("monarchical") is applicable only insofar as various aspects of the English common law in relation to the British monarchy

Which is exactly what jus soli is.

Are you not familiar with the feudal origins of being bound to the land?

You're mixing concepts again. "Jus soli" (nationality or citizenship acquired by birth within a given territory) and "common law" are different things.

No they are not, they are the same thing. Else, cite me the English statute that makes a man a subject from having been born within the realm of the king. You won't find it because it's "common law."

Calvin's case was not even unanimous.

We know this, for example, because every single country in South America operates off of a civil law system and not a common law system; meanwhile, every single one of them practices birthright citizenship/nationality to some degree or another.

They practice jus sanguinus.

England and it's derivatives are about the only places in the world that do it the wrong way, and this of course traces back to Calvin's case, which was decided exactly as the King *REQUIRED* it to be decided.

A quick search shows that this particular section is cited from a 2006 article by David J. Seipp: Our Law Our Law, Their Law , Their Law, History, and the Citation of F , and the Citation of Foreign Law eign Law .

Well i'm glad you found it, because I could not, but his point remains. The Colonies immediately rejected English Law and especially monarchical based English law.

I do not see criticisms of the common law in principle; rather,

*He* is not criticizing the common law, he is pointing out that during the early era in US history, the new leadership was criticizing the common law, just as Madison did in his letter.

In the past I have ran across many articles confirming that the early leadership eschewed anything that could be connected to Monarchy, as in jus soli.

Here is an official example of it.

... I see particularities of common law as practiced by England which were rejected due to incompatibilities with the new American government.

Exactly. Jus Soli is monarchical in nature. It is inherently monarchical. Let me give you an idea of what one contemporary thought of it.

Alexander Mcleod, d.d. (1815)

The Constitution is written in terms of the English common law
No it isn't. There is no provision in English law that allows a Republic. English Law is monarchical law, and anything incompatible with monarchy is incompatible with English law.

The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly disagreed with your Law of the Imagination™.

Wong Kim Ark at 169 U.S. 662-63:

In United States v. Rhodes (1866), Mr. Justice Swayne, sitting in the Circuit Court, said: "All persons born in the allegiance of the King are natural-born subjects, and all persons born in the allegiance of the United States are natural-born citizens. Birth and allegiance go together. Such is the rule of the common law, and it is the common law of this country, as well as of England. . . . We find no warrant for the opinion that this great principle of the common law has ever been changed in the United States. It has always obtained here with the same vigor, and subject only to the same exceptions, since as before the Revolution."

Wong Kim Ark at 169 U.S. 658-59:

It thus clearly appears that, by the law of England for the last three centuries, beginning before the settlement of this country and continuing to the present day, aliens, while residing in the dominions possessed by the Crown of England, were within the allegiance, the obedience, the faith or loyalty, the protection, the power, the jurisdiction of the English Sovereign, and therefore every child born in England of alien parents was a natural-born subject unless the child of an ambassador or other diplomatic agent of a foreign State or of an alien enemy in hostile occupation of the place where the child was born.
III. The same rule was in force in all the English Colonies upon this continent down to the time of the Declaration of Independence, and in the United States afterwards, and continued to prevail under the Constitution as originally established. In the early case of The Charming Betsy, (1804) it appears to have been assumed by this court that all persons born in the United States were citizens of the United States, Chief Justice Marshall saying: "Whether a person born within the United States, or becoming a citizen according to the established laws of the country, can divest himself absolutely of that character otherwise than in such manner as may be prescribed by law is a question which it is not necessary at present to decide." 6 U. S. 2 Cranch 64, 6 U. S. 119.
In Inglis v. Sailors' Snug Harbor (1833), 3 Pet. 99, in which the plaintiff was born in the city of New York about the time of the Declaration of Independence, the justices of this court (while differing in opinion upon other points) all agreed that the law of England as to citizenship by birth was the law of the English Colonies in America. Mr. Justice Thompson, speaking for the majority of the court, said: "It is universally admitted, both in the English courts and in those of our own country, that all persons born within the Colonies of North America, whilst subject to the Crown of Great Britain, are natural-born British subjects."

Look at what Pennsylvania did as a matter of historical record.

Acts of the General Assembly of Pennnsylvania, 1777

CHAPTER DCCXXVI.

An ACT to revive and put in force such and so much of the late laws of the province of Pennsylvania, as is judged necessary to be in force in this commonwealth, and to revive and establish the Courts of Justice, and for other purposes therein mentioned.
WHEREAS, by the unconstitutional power claimed by the British King and Parliament over the American colonies, and the cruel and oppressive measures which the said King and Parliament have pursued to establish that power, it became necessary for the colonies to declare themselves free and independent states, which was accordingly done, pursuant to a resolve of the Continental Congress: Whereupon all authority being in any person under the said King consequently ceased, and the laws enacted by his representatives here became of no force or effect, although the same were for the most part suited to the circumstances of the people: And whereas it is absolutely necessary, for the well governing every state, that laws properly adapted to the circumstances of the inhabitants be at all times in force.
II. Be it therefore enacted, and it is hereby enacted, each and every one of the laws or acts of General Assembly, that were in force and binding on the inhabitants of the said province on the fourteenth day of May last, shall be in force from and and binding on the inhabitants of this state from and after the tenth day of February next, as fully and effectually, to all intents and purposes, as if the said laws, and each of them, had been made or enacted by this General Assembly; and all and every person and persons whomsoever are hereby enjoined and required to yield obedience to the said laws, as the case may require until the said laws or acts of General Affembly respectively shall be repealed or altered, or until they expire by their own limitation; and the common law and such of the statute laws of England as have heretofore been in force, are expressly enjoined. Dallas's Reports, pages 57, 58.
No act of Parliament made in England, previously to the settlement of the province of Pennsylvania, was extended here, unless by act of Assembly, adjudications of courts, or eslablished usage Dallas's Reports, pages 67, 74, 75. The common law of England has always been in force in Pennsylvania; but all statutes made since the settlement of the province have no force here, unless the colonies are particularly named. Dallas's Reports, page 67.
[...]

And he can face the consequences when they finally get their hands on him.

Like Edward Snowden?

My argument is not tainted with absurdities. I have spent quite a long time looking for the origins of "natural born citizen", and what I have discovered is that it derives from "natural law."

As this Act of the State of Maryland predates the Constitution, it made Lafayette a natural born citizen and eligible to be President of the United States.

17 Maryland Laws 378 (1784)

CHAP. XII.
An ACT to naturalize major-general the marquis de la Fayette and his heirs male for ever.
WHEREAS the general assembly of Maryland, anxious to perpetuate a name dear to the state, and to recognize the marquis de la Fayette for one of its citizens, who, at the age of nineteen, left his native country, and risked his life in the late revolution; who, on his joining the American army, after being appointed by congress to the rank of major-general, disinterestedly refused the usual rewards of command, and sought only to deserve what he attained, the character of patriot and soldier; who, when appointed to conduct an incursion into Canada, called forth by his prudence and extraordinary discretion the approbation of congress; who, at the head of an army in Virginia, baffled the manœuvres of a distinguished general, and excited the admiration of the oldest commanders; who early attracted the notice and obtained the friendship of the illustrious general Washington; and who laboured and succeeded in raising the honour and the name of the United States of America: Therefore,
II. Be it enacted, by the general assembly of Maryland, That the marquis de la Fayette, and his heirs male for ever, shall be, and they and each of them are hereby deemed, adjudged, and taken to be, natural born citizens of this state, and shall henceforth be entitled to all the immunities, rights and privileges, of natural born citizens thereof, they and every of them conforming to the constitution and laws of this state, in the enjoyment and exercise of such immunities, rights and privileges.

Damn. French Lafayette was made a natural born citizen before the Constitution was Framed or adopted. There just ain't no telling what a sovereign state might do. And, as Maryland did this before the Constitution....

"No person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States, at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President...."

Lafayette was a citizen, nay a natural born citizen, before the adoption of the Constitution. How, in 1784, did those turtles know to use that exact phrase?

The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly disagreed with your Law of the Imagination™.

I don't care if you think so.

And I see you are back to quoting court cases over 100 years after the fact.

Do you not grasp what "hearsay" is?

These courts don't know. They don't have first hand information. Stop paying attention to what people who *DO NOT KNOW* about something, have to say about it.

First sources and first principles are all that lead you to truth.

Like Edward Snowden?

I have little doubt that should the US get their hands on him, he will face consequences.

You don’t even have to have voted in US elections anymore. All male residents (not citizens, not residents with legal status; just any resident) over 18 must register with Selective Service.

So if someone wants to use the draft as a test of the 14th Amendment jurisdiction clause, it’s probably not going to work out the way they hoped.

As this Act of the State of Maryland predates the Constitution, it made Lafayette a natural born citizen and eligible to be President of the United States.

...That the marquis de la Fayette, and his heirs male for ever, shall be, and they and each of them are hereby deemed, adjudged, and taken to be, natural born citizens of this state,...

What befuddles me often is how many people have difficulty comprehending the subtleties of English.

"Deemed" does not mean "is."

"Adjudged" does not mean "is."

"Taken to be" does not mean "is."

All of these words are adoption words.

An adopted child is "deemed, adjudged, and taken to be", a real child of the adopter.

But it isn't the real child of the adopter. It is simply treated like one.

So too is the Marquis de la Fayette and his *MALE* heirs. The very wording acknowledges that they are *NOT*, but that they will be treated as though they were.

Allow me to rewrite your quote so that it actually means what you are trying to claim it means.

That the marquis de la Fayette, and his heirs male for ever,*ARE* natural born citizens of this state

"Deemed, adjudged, and taken to be," mean "lets pretend."

Which is exactly what jus soli is.

It literally isn't. "Common law" and "jus soli" are categorically different things by definition. Elsewise you'd be hard-pressed to explain why Mexico and most modern-day South American countries, despite having no common law tradition, nonetheless practice jus soli.

England and it's derivatives are about the only places in the world that do it the wrong way

Again, not true, as highlighted above with regards to non-English countries in the Americas. Take Mexico for example:

Constitution of Mexico, Article 30 — "The Mexican nationals by birth are: Those born in the Mexican territory, regardless of their parents’ nationality..."

And to call jus soli "the wrong way" is a rather strident take on a difference of opinion; whether a country practices "jus soli" or "jus sanguinus" or some combination thereof is up to them to decide. That you call it "the wrong way" does not matter.

The Colonies immediately rejected English Law and especially monarchical based English law.

Again, not true. *Some* English laws were jettisoned that were deemed incompatible with the new Constitution; a lot more of the common law remained (and some put it down in writing that this was the case).

In the past I have ran across many articles confirming that the early leadership eschewed anything that could be connected to Monarchy, as in jus soli. Here is an official example of it.

This citation from Simon Snyder says no such thing: it literally is requesting that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania examine the current laws in force within the commonwealth, to report to the next Legislature which of these were English statutes, and whether or not said statutes should be incorporated into the commonwealth's own statutes. It says nothing about rejecting the common law (much less jus soli) wholesale.

And I know this has been pointed out to you before (on at least one other thread by Penelope), because this same report of the judges provided a list of English common laws which were recommended to be incorporated, or to not be incorporated. On page 5, the report's preface is quoted as follows: "With respect to English statues enacted since the settlement of Pennsylvania, it has been assumed as a principle, that they do not extend here, unless they have been recognized by our acts of Assembly, or adopted by long continued practice in courts of justice.—Of the latter description there are very few, and those, it is supposed, were introduced from a sense of their evident utility. As English statutes they had no obligatory force, but from long practice they may be considered as incorporated with the law of our country."

The portions I've underlined is the practice of common law by definition.

Also, just as a fun little tidbit: on page 36, one of the English statutes listed as "To be incorporated" is described as follows: "An act to enable his Majesty's natural born subjects to inherit the estates of their ancestors either lineal or collateral, notwithstanding their father or mother were aliens."

Jus Soli is monarchical in nature. It is inherently monarchical.

No it isn't. Birthright citizenship can be practiced regardless of what form a government may take. "Jus soli" definitionally contains no reference to monarchy.

Let me give you an idea of what one contemporary thought of it.

I've noticed a recurring habit of yours to give references without providing actual citations; without that information, you're essentially asking someone to take as reputable the word of a random stranger with the name of Alexander McLeod.

But I've again done the work on your behalf, and tracked it down to Alexander McLeod (a Presbyterian minister whose father was a minister of the Church of Scotland, and one that did not arrive in America until 1792), and his book "A Scriptural View of the Character, Causes, and Ends of the Present War" from 1815.

Notwithstanding that I disagree with his opinions on certain points of logic and philosophy, I'm wondering why exactly we should care about the opinion of a Presbyterian minister who had no actual legislative or judicial role within the government of the United States.

After all, he says the following on page 169 (italics are in the original, underline is emphasis mine): "A nation, it is true, as well as any other body politic, may give pledges, and contract debts; and every member of the body is bound to redeem the pledge, and discharge the obligation, in its true spirit and design: but no man is bound to continue a member, longer than the nature of the connexion itself requires. There is not in the constitution of the body politic any such regulation, as requires every man to abide in the country which gave him birth. It is not necessary to civil society, that such a principle should be recognized: it is not proper that it should: and even if the government should succeed in introducing it expressly into the constitution, the stipulation, as it would be immoral, could not be obligatory."

As far as American law goes, the 14th Amendment outweighs McLeod's opinion. That he considered jus soli immoral is irrelevant.

This citation from Simon Snyder says no such thing: it literally is requesting that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania examine the current laws in force within the commonwealth, to report to the next Legislature which of these were English statutes, and whether or not said statutes should be incorporated into the commonwealth's own statutes. It says nothing about rejecting the common law (much less jus soli) wholesale.

And they did. Jus Soli was tossed out as demonstrated in the book covering their report by William Lewis.

No it isn't. Birthright citizenship can be practiced regardless of what form a government may take. "Jus soli" definitionally contains no reference to monarchy.

You are deceptively conflating "birthright citizenship" with Jus Soli, when the majority of the word uses Jus Sanguinus. Even England uses Jus Sanguinus now.

Jus Soli is monarchist. You can research it yourself, but my days of digging through old books to learn this stuff are mostly over.

I've noticed a recurring habit of yours to give references without providing actual citations; without that information, you're essentially asking someone to take as reputable the word of a random stranger with the name of Alexander McLeod.

I am asking you to take as the *OPINION* of a random stranger a page from a book attributed to him.

I think it proves the point that a lot of people saw Britain's manner of grabbing everyone they could snag as immoral.

Notwithstanding that I disagree with his opinions on certain points of logic and philosophy, I'm wondering why exactly we should care about the opinion of a Presbyterian minister who had no actual legislative or judicial role within the government of the United States.

I guess you are unfamiliar with the concept of "zeit geist"? Well now that I have shown it to you, you are welcome.

As far as American law goes, the 14th Amendment outweighs McLeod's opinion.

This is a deception known as the "Fallacy of false choice."

You present your argument in the form of there being only two choices, one of which is obviously wrong.

You deliberately leave out the fact that McCloud is not being cited as a legal source for "natural born citizen", he is being cited as a reference for how people of that era saw England's use of Jus Soli as monarchical and anti-freedom.

You then offer the 14th amendment as the sole remaining evidence to prove your point, when you have been made aware that this is *NOT* correct, as can be readily seen in the page from the book regarding the report of the Pennsylvania Judges.

One of your biggest deceptions is the claim that man made law can override what is a function of the law of nature.

You are claiming adoption equals birth. A mass naturalization law makes *NO ONE* a "natural citizen." It makes everyone who comes under it's auspices a naturalized at birth citizen.

Real, "natural born citizens" cannot use the 14th amendment. They existed before it did, so it cannot be the definition of them.

You are offering us "trans-citizens", rather than natural citizens.

As men attempt to pretend they are women, so too would you have us believe that by *CALLING* people "natural citizens", they become natural citizens.

They do not.

And they did. Jus Soli was tossed out as demonstrated in the book covering their report by William Lewis.

This is not a citation.

You are deceptively conflating "birthright citizenship" with Jus Soli, when the majority of the word uses Jus Sanguinus. Even England uses Jus Sanguinus now.

There is no deception. Jus soli is commonly referred to as "birthright citizenship" in current parlance, since it is citizenship obtained solely by birth within a country's jurisdiction with no other qualifications. Citizenship obtained because one's birth parents are citizens is more properly called "inherited citizenship".

Jus Soli is monarchist. You can research it yourself, but my days of digging through old books to learn this stuff are mostly over.

You asserted "jus soli" as being inherently linked with the common law; it is not, as seen with civil-law countries where jus soli is nonetheless practiced. You have also asserted "jus soli" is inherently monarchist, even though it is practiced by countries that are not monarchies. You have also characterized "jus soli" as uniquely English, even though there are far more countries in the Americas who practice it despite having no English inheritance.

You are trying to assert historical accidents as being fundamental to the essence of a thing. The bottom line is this: to be considered a citizen by virtue of being born with the jurisdiction of a country does not require said country to be a monarchy; it is a concept which holds with or without monarchy. Period.

I think it proves the point that a lot of people saw Britain's manner of grabbing everyone they could snag as immoral.

The written opinion of one Presbyterian minister = "a lot of people"? (This is also notwithstanding the conflation of criticisms of British impressment — which McLeod was describing based on context — with criticisms of jus soli; these are not one and the same.)

One of your biggest deceptions is the claim that man made law can override what is a function of the law of nature.

Citizenship, I would argue, is not an inherent law of nature, because it is something which exists *outside of nature*; no one is *inherently* a citizen of anything just by virtue of their own existence, since human life is prior in principle before their relations to a nation.

This can be seen just by referring to Alexander McLeod's work cited before, on page 170 (italics in the original): "I readily admit, that there is something in the idea of native country, which is intimately connected with the doctrine of allegiance. It is not, however, the spot of earth, upon which the child is born, that connects him with the national society; but the relation of the child's parents to that society. In the ordinary concerns of life there is no need of such minute distinctions; and there is too little discrimination, exercised by the greater part of men, to be able to understand it. Even statesmen are not always wise; and designing men find it their interest to keep up a confusion of ideas upon important subjects. In the present discussion, nevertheless, it is necessary, that I distinctly state to you the true bond which connects the child with the body politic. It is not the inanimate matter of a piece of land, but the moral relations of his parentage. Let a child be born within the walls of a church, this does not make him a church member; but if the parent or parents be in connexion with the church, so is the offspring. Visible society, as it is provided for in the constitution of human nature, naturally seeks to perpetuate its own existence, by conferring upon children the membership of their parents. Each citizen too is supposed to reserve for his offspring the benefits of society. The Governor of the universe approves of this provision. Thus it is, that the country of the father is that of the child, and not because he happened to be born in its territory."

Now, does it not strike you (contra McLeod's conclusion, but only accepting his premises) that one's relation to society being conditioned according to the relation of one's father cannot be something you possess by nature? What if one's father has disdain for the country he lives in, yet is unwilling to leave; or perhaps one's father has revolutionary ideas regarding the nation he is a citizen of, to the point it would upend the societal order as it stands? Is your citizenship therefore marred or rendered lesser because of the substandard moral relation held by the father?

And so on; suffice to say, of the things which human beings possess by natural right, I would argue in the order of logic that "citizenship" cannot be one of them in either case: in the case of "jus soli", the place of one's birth is an accidental fact of history; in the case of "jus sanguinus", a child cannot claim by right the moral relations of their own parents, as those are something which a child cannot possess of their own volition or will simply because they exist (especially considering a child is incapable of ANY moral relations, properly speaking, before they reach the age of reason).

With that being said, "jus soli" is all-inclusive, and some nations have deemed that to be a fitting course of action (particularly in the case of those who would otherwise be stateless for one reason or another). Others have not, as is within their right to pursue "jus sanguinus" as their default mode of citizenship. Either method can be utilized as a means by which society can perpetuate its own existence.

You are claiming adoption equals birth.

I have claimed no such thing. Put away the straw man.

You are offering us "trans-citizens", rather than natural citizens.

Whether they be citizen by soil or citizen by blood, they still possess all of the rights and privileges of American citizenship at the moment of birth. Nothing "trans" about that.

As men attempt to pretend they are women, so too would you have us believe that by *CALLING* people "natural citizens", they become natural citizens.

This is a categorical error, since men and women differ in kind by reason of biological fact (by nature itself, you could say).

A society, however it governs itself and its inhabitants, are in principle capable of choosing the means by which said inhabitants can be considered citizens, and what conditions may be required for one to be deemed a citizen automatically by reason of birth. This is because citizenship is not a permanent aspect of human nature in the way that sex is.

If you cease to be a citizen of any given country — or even if you refuse to become a citizen at ALL — you do not therefore cease to be human.

And I see you are back to quoting court cases over 100 years after the fact.
Do you not grasp what "hearsay" is?
These courts don't know. They don't have first hand information.

Precedents that stand for over a hundred years do not become weaker precedents but stronger. The U.S. Supreme Court cannot be expected to know what only your Court of the Imagination™ knows. Nobody has first hand information on that but you.

I understand hearsay quite well. It is you who has not a damn clue. It has nothing to do with the contents of a court opinion. Proceeding from your Law of the Imagination™ to real law, hearsay is defined in Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed.

Hearsay. A term appled to that species of testimony given by a witness who relates not what he knows personally, but what others have told him. A statement, other than one by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. fed.R.Evid. 801(c). …

- - - - -

Stop paying attention to what people who *DO NOT KNOW* about something, have to say about it.

Right on.

I have little doubt that should the US get their hands on him, he will face consequences.

I have little doubt neither of us will live long enough to see that happen. The U.S. is without power to demand that Russia surrender a Russian citizen.

You don’t even have to have voted in US elections anymore. All male residents (not citizens, not residents with legal status; just any resident) over 18 must register with Selective Service.

The 1917 Act called for "all male persons" and did not contain language specifically including or excluding aliens.

Conscription Act of May 18, 1917, 40 Stat. 76

https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/llsl//llsl-c65/llsl-c65.pdf#page=95

SEC. 5. That all male persons between the ages of twenty-one and thirty, both inclusive, shall be subject to registration in accordance with regulations to be prescribed by the President; and upon proclamation by the President or other public notice given by him or by his direction stating the time and place of such registration it shall be the duty of all persons of the designated ages, except officers and enlisted men of the Regular Army, the Navy, and the National Guard and Naval Militia while in the service of the United States, to present themselves for and submit to registration under the provisions of this Act; ...

The Selective Service Act of September 16, 1940 contained language specifically including resident aliens. Resident aliens were to register, resident aliens who had expressed an intent to become a citizen were obligated to serve.

54 Stat. 885 (to 897)

https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/llsl//llsl-c76s2-s3/llsl-c76s2-s3.pdf#page=919

Sec. 2. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, every male citizen of the United States, and every male alien residing in the United States, who, on the day or days fixed for the first or any subsequent registration, is between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-six, to present himself for and submit to registration at such time or times and p;ace or places, and in such manner and in such age group or groups, as shall be determined by rules and regulations prescribed hereunder.
Sec. 3. (a) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, every male citizen of the United States, and every male alien residing in the United States who has declared his intention to become such a citizen, between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-six at the time fixed for his registration, shall be liable for training and service in the land or naval forces of the United States. The President is authorized from time to time, whether or not a state of war exists, to select and induct into the land and naval forces of the United States for training and service, in the manner provided in this Act, such number of men as in his judgment is required for such forces in the national interest:

The Selective Service Act of June 24, 1948, 62 Stat. 604

https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/llsl//llsl-c80s2/llsl-c80s2.pdf#page=634

REGISTRATION
SEC. 3. Except as otherwise provided in this title, it shall be the duty of every male citizen of the United States, and every other male person residing in the United States, who, on the day or days fixed for the first or any subsequent registration, is between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six, to present himself for and submit to registration at such time or times and place or places, and in such manner, as shall be determined by proclamation of the President and by rules and regulations prescribed hereunder.
TRAINING AND SERVICE
SEC. 4. (a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, every male citizen of the United States, who is between the ages of nineteen and twenty-six, at the time fixed for his registration, or who attains the age of nineteen after having been required to register pursuant to section 3 of this title, shall be liable for training and service in the armed forces of the United States. Any citizen of a foreign country, who is not deferrable or exempt from training and service under the provisions of this title (other than this subsection), shall be relieved from liability for training and service under this title if, prior to his induction into the armed forces, he has made application to be relieved from such liability in the manner prescribed by and in accordance with rules and regulations prescribed by the President; but any person who makes such application shall thereafter be debarred from becoming a citizen of the United States. The President is authorized from time to time, whether or not a state of war exists, to select and induct into the armed forces of the United States for training and service in the manner provided in this title such number of persons as may be required to provide and maintain the personnel strengths (other than one-year enlistee personnel strengths) of the respective armed forces authorized by section 2 of this title.

What befuddles me often is how many people have difficulty comprehending the subtleties of English.

What befuddles me is how stealthily you made believe that you did not see the part about the usage of the term natural born citizen in 1784, three years before the Constitutional Convention. I take that back. You doing that does not befuddle me at all.

"Deemed, adjudged, and taken to be," mean "lets pretend."

If you say so, but let's check out a more complete quote for full context.

II. Be it enacted, by the general assembly of Maryland, That the marquis de la Fayette, and his heirs male for ever, shall be, and they and each of them are hereby deemed, adjudged, and taken to be, natural born citizens of this state, and shall henceforth be entitled to all the immunities, rights and privileges, of natural born citizens thereof, they and every of them conforming to the constitution and laws of this state, in the enjoyment and exercise of such immunities, rights and privileges.

So, "shall henceforth be entitled to all the immunities, rights and privileges, of natural born citizens thereof, they and every of them conforming to the constitution and laws of this state, in the enjoyment and exercise of such immunities, rights and privileges," means pretend what?

The Naturalization Act of 1790 states,

And the children of citizens of the United States that may be born beyond Sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be considered as natural born Citizens: Provided, that the right of citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers have never been resident in the United States: Provided also, That no person heretofore proscribed by any state, shall be admitted a citizen as aforesaid, except by an act of the legislature of the state in which such person was proscribed.”

Just asking for a friend, does the 1790 Act only state that the government would pretend that such persons are natural born citizens, that such persons are not really natural born citizens, and that such persons (e.g., McCain, Cruz) are not really eligible to be President?

Again, just asking for a friend. Does a naturalization actually create a citizen, or is it just pretend? Did William, John and George actually become a citizens? If they were only became pretend citizens, did their children inherit real or pretend citizenship?

https://archives.lib.state.ma.us/bitstream/handle/2452/104239/1785acts0044.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y

1785. — Chapter 44.
[February Session, ch. 8.]
AN ACT FOR NATURALIZING WILLIAM ERVING, ESQ; AND JOHN DUBALLET.
Whereas William Erving, Esq; and John Duballet, residents in Boston, in the Commonwealth aforesaid, have petitioned the General Court that they may be naturalized, and be thereby entitled to all the rights, liberties and privileges of free citizens of this Commonwealth:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General Court assembled, and by the authority of the same, That the said William Erving and John Duballet, upon their taking the oaths of allegiance and abjuration required by the constitution of this Commonwealth, before two Justices of the Peace, shall be deemed, adjudged and taken to be free citizens of this Commonwealth, to all intents, constructions and purposes, as if they, the said William Erving and John Duballet, had been inhabitants of the territory, now the Commonwealth aforesaid, at the time of making the present form of civil government.
And it is further enacted, That the Justices before whom the same oaths shall be taken, shall return a certificate of the same into the Secretary's office; and the Secretary is hereby directed to record the same in a book to be kept for that purpose.
February 8, 1786.

https://archives.lib.state.ma.us/bitstream/handle/2452/104723/1792acts0048.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y

General Assembly of Massachusetts
179. —Chapter 47.
[January Session, ch. 19.]
AN ACT FOR NATURALIZING GEORGE WILLIAM ERVING.
Whereas George William Erving hath petitioned the General Court that he may be naturalized, & thereby become intitled to all the rights and privilidges of a free Citizen.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General Court assembled and by the authority of the same that the aforesaid George William Erving taking and subscribing the oath of allegiance to this Commonwealth and the oath to support the Constitution of the United States before two Justices of the Peace quorum unus, shall be deemed adjudged and taken to be a free citizen of this Commonwealth and intitled to all the privilidges and immunities of a citizen. And be it further enacted that the Justices before whom the said George William Erving shall take and subscribe the said Oath shall return a certificate of the same into the Secretary's Office that it may be there recorded.
Approved March 9, 1793.

Perhaps the term, shall be deemed adjudged and taken to be may be boiler plate language of naturalization documents, used for years and years. Should all Massachusetts federal candidates and officeholders be investigated to determine if they are real or pretend citizens? Now you have me all befuddled.