That's a discredited thesis.
Grant's strategy was not to sacrifice men, but to turn the tables on Lee by giving him battle consistently: his predecessors (McClellan, Hooker, Meade) were famous for taking as much time as possible between campaigns - dillydallying that allowed Lee time to regroup and take the strategic initiative.
Grant's plan was to hammer at Lee again and again and rob Lee of the extra time that his predecessors had continually given Lee.
In the Overland Campaign - the one in which Grant undeservedly got the "butcher" title - he lost 7,600 killed in 12 major battles or engagements.
In the same period Lee lost 4200 killed - more than half Grant's number, despite the fact that much of these battles were fought with Lee on the defensive.
If one terrible command decision had not been made at Cold Harbor, that number would have been more like 6400 killed for Grant and 4500 killed for Lee.
Lee lost 1700 men killed at Chancellorsville.
In other words, Lee according to a deliberate plan that was masterfully executed lost almost as many men at Chancellorsville as Grant lost at Cold Harbor - which is famous as Grant's worst bloodbath and worst-executed plan.
Another comparison: Gettysburg was Lee's worst disaster. He lost 4700 killed at Gettysburg. That is more than twice as many men as Grant lost at Cold Harbor.
If Grant is to be called a butcher, then he is an apprentice butcher to Lee the master butcher.
You make reference to Sherman's abortive attack at Cheatham Hill in the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain. Sherman launched that assault believing that he had found a thin and breachable point in Johnston's line - the scope of the losses his command sustained in that engagement was completely unanticipated.
A just comparison might be the actions of John Bell Hood, the Confederate commander who made a similar assault at Franklin that cost him almost the identical amount of men killed as the Union endured at Kennesaw Mountain.
Back to the concept of the book. There were many disagreements within the CSA government, the state representatives, and local politicians. They fought over troop deployments, funding, resrouces, etc. CSA management was not exactly united. Anyway, I don't see anything new with this.
W.C. Davis and the Bruce Catton have done a thorough job documenting the dynamics and politics during the formation of the CSA.
Franklin cost the Western Confederate Armies what they could least afford to lose-LEADERSHIP...
The number of Command-level officers killed, Wounded and captured there made it nearly impossible for the South to put together much in the way of Unified and effective commands in the west, after that.
15 out of 28 Confederate Generals were casualties, and 65 field grade officers were lost.