[vbmoneyspender]

Reading the opinion, Kagan's dissent was joined by Scalia, Thomas and Kennedy. That's a pretty unusual combination. The reason they dissented is that Section 1519 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act uses the term 'tangible object' rather than the word 'documents.' Applying the plain meaning of the term 'tangible object', the dissenters argued that Section 1519 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act should apply to a fish or any other physical object rather than being restricted to just documents. Kagan, Scalia, Thomas and Kennedy thus believed that the statute applied to the actions at hand. But here is the kicker at the end of the dissent:

Still and all, I tend to think, for the reasons the plurality gives, that §1519 is a bad law—too broad and undifferentiated, with too-high maximum penalties, which give prosecutors too much leverage and sentencers too much discretion. And I’d go further: In those ways, §1519 is unfortunately not an outlier, but an emblem of a deeper pathology in the federal criminal code.

So what the dissenters are doing is here applying Abraham Lincoln's maxim on bad laws - "The best way to get a bad law repealed is to enforce it strictly."

[DiogenesLamp]

So what the dissenters are doing is here applying Abraham Lincoln's maxim on bad laws - "The best way to get a bad law repealed is to enforce it strictly."

That's a tough one. Is there really any hope that the enforcement of this bad law will result in some sort of beneficial change? If not, in the meantime, someone is being horribly damaged by strict application of this law.

Odd to see Thomas and Scalia on the same side as Kagan, and of course, who can predict Kennedy?