Posted on 01/25/2017 6:15:48 PM PST by MtnClimber
Historically, carriers have not needed large-caliber (8-inch or larger) guns, as evidenced of the removal of those cruiser-appropriate weapons from both the carriers Lexington (CV-2) and Saratoga (CV-3) not long into WW2. 5-inch/45s were mounted for anti-aircraft defense. The whole of the carrier's offensive power lay in its strike group, and the effectiveness of this ethos is a matter of record.
History has proven that flattops do not need big guns; Big guns need flattops. And while it can be argued that the fast carrier force in WW2 sailed with a phalanx of battleships, cruisers and destroyers as floating antiarcraft screens, I daresay that nobody in our Navy who knew about the existence of the hermaphrodite battleships Ise and Hyuga ever paused to say, "Gee, that looks like a swell idea."
We didn't imitate the class because it made no sense. Just build a carrier that can launch larger deck loads, and build an escort ship that can put up larger walls of flak and other countermeasures.
Regarding fending off drones and RPVs: I think that countermeasures for drones and RPVs (such as as jamming, for example) already exist and do not require an entirely new class of ship to deploy.
The best countermeasure against rail gun projectiles is simply to prevent the enemy from getting within effective range by neutralizing him from a distance. Enter the Carrier Strike Group.
So really, the idea of "hermaphroditizing" battleships only has merit if you want to either (a) hamstring the carrier's deck strike size by adding a bunch of heavy guns, magazines, and crew; or (b) deploy a hamstrung battleship that will be incapable of deploying an air group large enough to be effective.
AS they weren't actually carrying aircraft, that means they were mistaken as what they were in reality.
I like Jimmy Carter’s story on his meeting with Admiral Rickover.
Classic.
Thanks, it has to be around somewhere, too much capability to tear apart or let rust to death.
Thanks for the info on “Herman”
“...Defenses of the sprawling DoD acquisition process are rare. No one likes it ...”
AndyJackson presents many opportunities to reply - rhetorical deployment in attack and defense that might provide diversion and amusement, if he hadn’t misapprehended the meaning of those words so completely.
To say the nation cannot do without the military establishment is not a defense, neither of today’s acquisition process, nor the “military-industrial complex”. It’s a statement about the constraints on what can be done, with what we have, about the problems we face.
AJ has also confused the efficiency of a weapon system with its effectiveness. In this he is not alone; more Americans do so than do not. In isolation, this confusion is bad enough: in action, one uses whatever can be had. And if the need is sufficiently dire, one will use whatever comes to hand. If a pack of wild dogs nips at your heels, you might consider picking up a rock, instead of grousing about the local swordsmith, who priced his wares beyond the width of your wallet.
There is a chance to make things worse. AndyJackson has seized it with both hands, right in tune with most Americans: it’s the conceit that if a weapon system has been acquired for more than some “fair price”, or acquired through actions deemed corrupt, it’s less effective, hence morally unsuited to making any contributions to the common defense.
To prefer morality over effectiveness is to turn the situation on its head. If we fail to survive, our morality (or the lack) has no meaning. And survival is possible only through the use of our weapon systems.
I’d give AndyJackson points for merely recognizing the names John Boyd and Pierre Sprey. But he has committed the same blunder that many in USAF, the wider military establishment, and a frighteningly large number of acquisition system observers, policy wonks, entrepreneurs, and a smattering of other wannabes have: namely, to believe that (1) fighter pilots are the center of the universe, and (2) John Boyd had all the answers.
John Boyd does deserve credit for codifying energy maneuvering theory, but he made the mistake of thinking that he thus had answered all questions, in all endeavors, everywhere, to the end of time. He packaged and sold it; to their lasting discredit, many believed the hype and paid him money to promulgate it. He ended his days as a borderline psychopath, whose own family refused to attend his funeral.
All of which is distressing enough, but Col Boyd’s “acolytes” deemed it their holy mission to keep going. Pierre Sprey is perhaps the last still living: claiming he designed the F-16, and (just a few days ago on some rerun of some documentary purporting to explain “airpower” to the average citizen) the A-10 also. Neither claim is true. But in so doing, he rivals fighter pilots in outsized ego (no mean feat, as anyone who knows any fighter pilots can attest).
There are aspects to air-to-air combat on which John Boyd and possibly even Pierre Sprey may have shed some light, but few realize that they solved nothing more than yesterday’s problems. And only a tiny portion at that: the eyeball-to-eyeball portion of any aerial engagement is only a tiny percentage of the overall activity - a reality evident to everyone except fighter pilots and those under their spell since before 1940.
And one must recall that in the larger context, air superiority - which the fighter weenies pretend they can deliver - is a secondary objective.
I would respond to this utter bullshit by pointing out that one of Col. Boyd's acolytes is Jim Mattis, Trump's new Secretary of Defense a fact that you appear to have missed by a mile.
But your rant is all in defense of an acquisition process that serves best the interests of the bureaucratic classes who man it, in DoD and in the contractor consultancy business surrounding the Beltway.
And, I presume that you are a member that class, since you resort to lies, misrepresentation, slander and innuendo to defend it.
If you want to read about the depredations of this system and how badly it serves the warfighter, one can read Maj. Gen (ret) "Scales on War" a perspective endorsed by Jim Mattis.
This is shear and utter ignorance. Our entire land battle doctrine is based upon establishing and maintaining air dominance over the battle space.
Actually, having written this and the following sentence, I think you are simply a pandering fraud, becaue there is no evidence for that position. What there is evidence for is that his theories of the OODA loop and maneuver warfare became the center of Marine Corps tactical doctrine and formed the basis for the strategy adopted in the first Gulf War - the so-called Hail Mary maneuver.
No one here is arguing that our military does not need the best equipment it can get at reasonable price to defend the country and protect the lives of those who serve. That is not what our defense procurement bureaucracy does though.
The fact is that only a fraction of defense procurement dollars go to the costs of designing, engineering, testing and manufacturing warfighting equipment and far too much is spend on compliance, accountancy, consultancy and other useless overhead costs.
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