Iranian Regime tv Channel One hacked while it was airing Khamenie speech

Iran Update, May 14, 2024

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Coordination Deputy Brig. Gen. Eraj Masjedi said on May 14 that Iran's enmity with Israel will not end until Israel is completely destroyed.[55] Masjedi claimed that Iran can fight Israel and the United States simultaneously. Masjedi stated that it is difficult to use the element of surprise when conducting a direct attack on Israel due to the distance between the two countries.

Iranian media first identified Masjedi as the IRGC Quds Force coordination deputy on May 14.[56] The IRGC Quds Force coordination deputy is the third most senior position within the IRGC Quds Force. Masjedi replaced the former IRGC Quds Force Coordination Deputy Brig. Gen. Mohammad-Hadi Haji-Rahimi who was killed in the April 1 Israeli airstrike in Damascus, Syria.[57] Masjedi served as the Iranian Ambassador to Iraq from 2017-2022. He was also an advisor to IRGC Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani.[58] Masjedi played a “formative role” in the IRGC Quds Force's Iraq policy during his time as the Iranian ambassador to Iraq, according to the US Treasury Department.[59] Masjedi oversaw a program to train and support Iraqi militia groups and “directed” Iraqi groups that were responsible for attacks against US forces. The United States Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Masjedi in October 2020. Masjedi‘s predecessor as IRGC Quds Force coordination deputy, Rahimi, also functioned as the IRGC Quds Force commander for the Palestinian territories.[60]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-14-2024

Iran Update, May 15, 2024

Reuters reported on May 15 that Jordanian security services thwarted an attempt by Iranian-backed militias in Syria to smuggle weapons to a Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood cell in Jordan in late March 2024.[12] Jordanian security services arrested an unspecified number of Jordanians of Palestinian descent who were “members of the Brotherhood cell” and seized a cache of unspecified smuggled weapons, according to two anonymous Jordanian sources. The Brotherhood cell members intended to use the weapons to conduct “acts of sabotage” to destabilize Jordan, according to the sources. The unspecified Jordanian sources also claimed that the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood cell is linked to Hamas’ military wing. An anonymous senior Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood representative claimed that senior Hamas leader Saleh al Arouri—who the Israelis killed in January 2024—recruited the arrested cell members.[13] Hamas denied on May 15 that it planned to stoke instability in Jordan.[14] The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood acknowledged that Jordanian security forces arrested some of its members and that these members possessed smuggled weapons but claimed that Brotherhood leadership did not approve the smuggling of weapons to Jordan.[15] It is nonetheless notable that Iranian-backed militias and a senior Hamas leader were able to recruit and then smuggle weapons to a cell in Jordan.

The Iranian-backed attempt to arm a Muslim Brotherhood cell in Jordan supports CTP-ISW’s previous assessments that Iran is adopting a more confrontational approach towards Jordan in its regional strategy.[16] Jordan has thwarted numerous attempts in recent months by Iran and its partners to smuggle weapons—including Claymore mines, C4 and Semtex explosives, Kalashnikov rifles, and 107mm Katyusha rockets—to the West Bank and Jordan.[17]

Bloomberg reported on May 15 that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s understanding of Iranian “nuclear ambitions” has deteriorated, citing the IAEA Safeguards Implementation Report.[18]. The IAEA released the report to diplomats who will attend the IAEA Board of Governors meeting in Vienna on June 3. The report stated that the IAEA’s understanding of Iran's production and inventory of centrifuges, rotors and bellows, heavy water, and uranium ore concentration has decreased despite an eight percent increase in the number of IAEA inspections in Iran in 2023. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated in the report that there has been little progress in resolving outstanding safeguards issues. Grossi added that the IAEA cannot provide ”assurances about the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program” unless Iran resolves the outstanding safeguards issues. Iran's stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium increased by 145 kilograms in the last quarter.

Grossi separately stated on May 15 that Iranian officials “must stop” normalizing discussions about procuring a nuclear weapon. Some Iranian officials have warned in recent weeks that Iran could change its nuclear doctrine, as CTP-ISW has repeatedly noted.[19] Grossi stated that Iran must “meaningfully engage” with the IAEA so that the IAEA can guarantee that the Iranian nuclear program is exclusively peaceful in nature.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-15-2024

Iran Update, May 16, 2024

Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi claimed on May 16 that the Houthis have attacked international shipping in the Mediterranean Sea in recent days.[1] No evidence to support this claim is currently available. Abdulmalik stated that the Houthis conducted two attacks targeting Israel-affiliated targets in the Mediterranean Sea over the past week without providing further details.[2] The Houthis’ Shahed-136 drone has a range of around 2,500 kilometers and could thus reach the Mediterranean Sea.[3] Abdulmalik's claim comes after the Houthis announced on May 3 that they began a “fourth phase” of escalation by targeting international shipping bound for Israel in the Mediterranean Sea.[4]

Abdulmalik's claim is likely part of the broader effort that the Axis of Resistance is conducting to impose an unofficial blockade on Israel. Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and Bahrain have similarly claimed in recent weeks to have conducted attacks targeting Israeli infrastructure and sites tied to Israeli international trade.[5] It is similarly unclear whether these attacks actually occurred. Iran and its so-called “Axis of Resistance” appear to be operating on the theory that severe economic disruption would compel Israel to accept defeat in the Gaza Strip and that such economic pressure could ultimately collapse the Israeli state. Iranian leaders have said repeatedly in recent months that their theory of how to destroy Israel revolves around stoking fear in Israel in order to catalyze reverse migration away from Israel. Iran has sought to extend its military reach into the Mediterranean Sea as part of this effort, as CTP-ISW has previously reported.[6]

CTP-ISW has previously assessed that the Houthis will likely fail to disrupt trade around the Mediterranean Sea in the same way that they have around the Red Sea.[7] The Houthis have a much more limited suite of capabilities that could reach the Mediterranean Sea. The Houthis also presumably lack a robust targeting capability there, whereas the Iranian Behshad surveillance ship provides targeting intelligence the Houthis around the Bab al Mandeb strait.[8]

Abdulmalik separately called on Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to join the Houthis’ “fourth phase” of escalation in the Mediterranean Sea.[9] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has claimed several attacks on Israeli civilian and military infrastructure along the Israeli coast since December 2023.[10] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq also claimed that it could reach the Mediterranean Sea with a drone similar to the Houthi Samad drone on May 13.[11]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-16-2024

Gangs of Tehran: how Iran takes out its enemies abroad

A sudden escape was also part of the plan to assassinate two of Zeraati’s colleagues in the autumn of 2022. In that case, spies working for the Iranian regime hired a people-smuggler to find gangsters in London willing to kill a former Iran International presenter, Sima Sabet, and a current presenter, Fardad Farahzad, in exchange for $200,000 and a new life, possibly in Iran. The plotters code-named the pair ‘the bride and the groom’ when discussing ways to kill them in order to show critics of the regime that they could be attacked anywhere in the world and ‘at any time’.

Much has been made of Iran's use of proxies abroad, in relation to the escalation of the war in the Middle East: militia groups in Iraq and Syria, Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen. They're all connected to, but not controlled by, Iran. The network has given the Iranian regime the power to act beyond its own borders, giving Tehran plausible deniability when missiles are fired from Yemen at commercial vessels in the Red Sea, for example, or when US military facilities in the region are attacked.

It now appears the same arm's length approach is being deployed against individuals abroad – Tehran’s perceived enemies in London, across Europe and in the US.

Examples include a case revealed in January, when US federal officials said two Canadian members of the Hells Angels biker gang had plotted to kill Iranian dissidents living in Maryland. The Iranian organisers reportedly agreed to pay $350,000 for the job plus a further $20,000 to cover expenses.

Two years ago, the US charged an Iranian man with attempting to hire a hitman to kill John Bolton, a former national security adviser in the Trump administration, for $300,000.

https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/gangs-of-tehran-how-iran-takes-out-its-enemies-abroad/

Iran Update, May 17, 2024

Former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Commander Mohsen Rezaei claimed on May 16 that Iran launched 162 drones, 30 cruise missiles, and 100 ballistic missiles during its April 13 drone and missile attack on Israel.[66] The IDF previously stated on April 14 that Iran launched approximately 170 drones, 30 cruise missiles, and 120 ballistic missiles.[67] Senior Iranian leaders have previously claimed that Iran's April 13 attack was a ”success.”[68] Iranian officials have separately stated that Iran has adopted a new “equation” for confronting Israel under which Iran will retaliate by launching attacks targeting Israel directly from Iranian territory should Israel attack Iran or Iranian targets abroad.[69]

The Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) arrested over 230 individuals on charges of performing “acts of satanism” in Shahriar city, 30 km west of Tehran, on May 16.[70] The arrest included three European citizens.[71] The arrested individuals were accused of wearing satanic symbols on their clothes and bodies, drinking alcohol, and consuming psychedelic substances.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-17-2024

Iran Update, May 18, 2024

CENTCOM reported that the Houthis struck the Wind, a Panamanian-flagged, Greek-owned oil tanker, with one anti-ship ballistic missile in the Red Sea on May 18.[43] The anti-ship ballistic missile impact flooded the tanker, which caused the crew to briefly lose propulsion and steering. CENTCOM added that the tanker “was most recently docked in Russia and was bound for China.” A British maritime security company said that the missile strike also caused a fire on the oil tanker, which was 10 nautical miles off the coast of Mokha.[44] The Houthis have not claimed the attack on the Wind at the time of this writing.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-18-2024

Iran Update, May 19, 2024

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei wields ultimate decision-making authority in Iran, but Raisi still holds significant power within the regime. Raisi is the deputy chairman of the Assembly of Experts, a regime entity constitutionally responsible for monitoring the supreme leader and selecting his successor.[8] Iranians re-elected Raisi to serve as a representative of South Khorasan Province in the Assembly of Experts during the recent March 2024 Assembly of Experts elections.[9] Raisi also holds numerous ex officio positions. He is a member of the Expediency Discernment Council and the chairman of the Supreme National Security Council, Supreme Cultural Revolution Council, and Supreme Cyber Space Council.

Raisi’s death would have serious implications for supreme leader succession. Raisi is considered one of the top contenders—along with Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba Khamenei—to succeed Khamenei as supreme leader. Khamenei appointed Raisi to the position of judiciary chief in 2019 and endorsed Raisi during the August 2021 presidential elections.[10] The next several days have the potential to reshape the immediate and long-term dynamics of the regime, including supreme leader succession. Raisi’s death would ultimately not change the regime’s current trajectory toward more hardline and conservative domestic policies and more aggressive regional policies, however.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-19-2024

Iran International: Raisi: Poorly Educated Cleric Who Blundered into a Failed Presidency

This is the story of a young member of the Death Committee that ordered the execution of around 5,000 political prisoners serving their prison terms in 1988. He loyally served the clerical regime for 45 years and finally was elected President after Ali Khamenei’s men barred most serious rivals from running as candidates.

In 1982, at the age of 22, he became the prosecutor of Hamedan and married Jamileh Alamolhoda, daughter of Ahmad Alamolhoda, the current Friday prayer Imam of Mashhad. At 25, in 1984, Raisi was appointed deputy head of the Revolutionary Court and, in 1988, as deputy prosecutor of Tehran, he joined the Death Committee, which directed the execution of thousands between August and September 1988.

https://www.iranintl.com/en/202405198930

Countless Yemenis kept tuned to TV channels following the news of the crash of the helicopter, which was carrying Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi. After an hours-long search, the Iranian President was declared dead. Other Iranian officials, including Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian, also died in the helicopter crash.

The accident has sparked conflicting reactions in Yemen, where Iran has considerable influence. While many Yemenis consider it a “fair punishment from God”, expressing joy, others displayed sorrow, praying to God to have mercy on those killed in the crash.

Anti-Houthi civilians in Yemen say Iran has played a key role in supporting the Houthi group to launch war on several Yemeni provinces, and the death of Raisi is not causing them any sorrow. Nasser, 34, is originally from Al-Hudayah and lives in Sanaa. He told Sheba Sheba Intelligence that it is only the Ansar Allah (Houthi) group in Yemen that will feel sad about the death of Raisi.

He added, “We have not received any humanitarian aid from Iran since the breakout of the war. However, Iranians have smuggled countless shipments of weapons to Yemen. Such weapons killed Yemenis and contributed to prolonging the war. So, Why should I feel sad if Iran's President died?”

more here https://shebaintelligence.uk/irans-presidents-death-in-helicopter-crash-sparks-conflicting-sentiments-in-yemen

Iran Update, May 20, 2024

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi died in a helicopter crash in northwestern Iran on May 19.[1] His death upends Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s multi-year project of grooming Raisi to become the next supreme leader. Khamenei has invested tremendous energy and time in preparing Raisi in recent years, appointing him to key positions and engineering the presidential election in 2021 to ensure that he won.[2] Raisi’s death is a shock to both the day-to-day management of the Iranian government as well as to Khamenei’s long-term vision for the regime.

There is no obvious top contender to become the next supreme leader since Raisi died. One of Khamenei’s sons, Mojtaba Khamenei, is widely considered a leading candidate. Mojtaba has significant influence in the regime, especially in the internal security apparatus. Though Mojtaba certainly could replace his father, it is premature to say that he is the most likely option. Khamenei and other powerful factions that have supported Raisi for years must now reconsider who they would like to become the next supreme leader. They will not necessarily support Mojtaba. A member of the Assembly of Experts stated in February 2024 that Khamenei opposes hereditary succession, in fact.[3]

The regime must fill several key positions in the coming days and weeks, which could provide insight into how Khamenei and other factions are considering succession since Raisi died. The Assembly of Experts, which is the regime body responsible for monitoring and selecting the supreme leader, is scheduled to elect its leadership board on May 21.[4] That board includes the chairman and deputy chairman, which are both currently vacant. Raisi was the previous deputy chairman. Parliament is similarly scheduled to elect a new speaker on May 27.[5] Iran will also hold a presidential election on June 28.[6]

Khamenei will need to decide whether to interfere in any of these elections’ outcomes to prepare for succession. Any prominent cleric in one of these positions would become a natural contender for supreme leadership even though there is no legal requirement for the supreme leader to hold such offices beforehand. Khamenei could, on the other hand, refrain from making an immediate decision on who he would like to succeed him.

An indicator that Khamenei is positioning an individual to succeed him would be Khamenei allowing a cleric to become the next president or parliament speaker. This indicator would be especially strong if that cleric is in their 60s or 70s. Khamenei would probably avoid supporting a cleric much older, given that they would have a higher risk of dying and triggering another succession crisis sooner.

Iranian Interim President Mohammad Mokhber appointed Ali Bagheri Kani as head of the administration's Foreign Relations Council, making Bagheri Kani the de-facto acting foreign affairs minister, on May 20.[7] Bagheri Kani replaces Hossein Amir Abdollahian, who died alongside Ebrahim Raisi in the helicopter crash in northwestern Iran on May 19.[8] Bagheri Kani will serve in his new position until the next Iranian president enters office. Bagheri Kani has held several key roles in the Iranian regime. He had been most recently the deputy foreign affairs minister for policy and lead negotiator in the nuclear talks since 2021.[9] Bagheri Kani also served as the deputy secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) from 2008 to 2013.[10] The SNSC is comprised of senior military and political officials and responsible for advising the supreme leader on foreign policy and national security.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-20-2024

Iran's Loss Is Turkey's Gain! Akinci UAV, That Located Ebrahim Raisi’s Chopper, Scores 2.5 Million Hits

The Turkish Akinci Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)—aggressively being pitched by Ankara for export—has shot to fame by participating in an unexpected mission. It is following the lead taken by the Turkish TB2 UAV, which demonstrated its lethal combat capability in the Azerbaijan-Armenia war in 2020.

he Turkish Ministry of National Defense announced on Platform X: “Based on the request made by the Iranian authorities through our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, an Akıncı UAV and a night vision Cougar type helicopter were assigned to participate in the search and rescue activities of the crashed helicopter of the President of Iran and his delegation.”

The UAV patrolled the skies of Iran for hours, scanning for potential evidence. In almost no time, the Akinci UAV became the most tracked aircraft in the world, with over 2.5 million people following its movement online and watching the live stream of the drone's operations. According to reports swirling on social media, the drone was at the job for more than seven hours.

The Turkish Bayraktar Akinci drone detected a source of heat early on the morning of May 20 that eventually led to the wreckage of the helicopter carrying the Iranian President. The coordinates of the location were immediately communicated to Iranian officials, and Iran finally found the wreckage.

Following the completion of its designated mission, the Akıncı delineated Turkey's national symbol—a star and crescent — during its flight path above Lake Van (as seen above).

Military watchers on social media believe that the drone has effectively come to represent Turkish pride and the might of the country's defense industrial sector. This was also visible in Turkish military bloggers posting comical memes on social media, glorifying their Akinci drone and mocking Iran.
https://www.eurasiantimes.com/irans-loss-is-turkeys-gain-akinci-uav-that-located/

Today Ayatollah Mohammad Ali Movahedi Kermani was selected as the new chairman of #Iran's Assembly of Experts. He is a spry 93 yo compared with his predecessor Ahmad Jannati who was 97. He has served as a member of the Expediency Council (including as its temporary head), a member of parliament (including as a deputy speaker), interim Friday Prayer Imam of Tehran, and was deputy chairman of the Assembly of Experts.

Notably the first and second deputy chairman are Hashem Hosseini Bushehri and Alireza Arafi. That's another promotion for Arafi through the ranks—Guardian Council membership, leadership role in Assembly of Experts, and head of Iran's Seminaries. He is a candidate to watch as succession nears.

Lastly Abbas Kaabi and Mohsen Araki were named as secretaries of the board of directors. Araki is another candidate to watch as succession nears.

https://x.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/1792866380158504972

Lucky for them, Raisi could not be elected.

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