Iranian hardliners are continuing to normalize discussions about Iran's ability to procure a nuclear weapon. Strategic Foreign Relations Council Chairman Kamal Kharrazi stated during an interview with al Jazeera on May 9 that Iran will have “no choice” but to change its nuclear doctrine if Israel threatens Iran's existence[60] Kharrazi emphasized that Iran has not decided to pursue a nuclear weapon but warned that Iran's “level [61] Kharrazi is a top foreign policy adviser to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Kharrazi’s decision to conduct the interview with al Jazeera suggests that he meant to send this message especially to the Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Kharrazi previously stated that Iran has the “technical means” to make a nuclear weapon but had not decided whether to pursue such a weapon during an interview with al Jazeera in July 2022.[62]
Other senior Iranian officials have similarly discussed openly Iran's ability to produce a nuclear weapon in recent weeks. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Nuclear Security and Protection Corps Commander Brig. Gen. Ahmad Haghtalab announced on April 18 that Iran will change its “nuclear doctrine and policies” if Israel strikes Iran's nuclear facilities.[63] Haghtalab’s statement preceded the Israeli airstrike on April 18 that targeted an Artesh Air Force base in Esfahan City, Esfahan Province, approximately 112 kilometers south of the Natanz Nuclear Complex.[64]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-9-2024
Given that Saudi Arabia in Mar. 2023 struck a normalization deal with Iran, and is in parallel engaged in peace talks with the Houthis, neither Sana’a nor Tehran are likely to strike the Kingdom. However, these conditions can change fast, to Riyadh's detriment.
In 2019 attacks on oil facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais slashed nearly half of Saudi production and about 5% of global supply. While the Houthis claimed the operation, Iran was blamed for the precision strikes, which were said to have been conducted with cruise missiles and drones. In a shock to the Kingdom, the Donald Trump administration did not come to the rescue. This was extremely damaging to Riyadh's confidence in Washington's commitment to its security.
Those turbulent years, coupled with Saudi Arabia's newfound perception that the US was not committed to its security, served as a wake-up call to the Kingdom. Even as Riyadh is now pursuing security guarantees from Washington as part of any normalization deal with Israel, Saudi decision makers understand that they cannot rely on the US to protect their vital oil infrastructure.
Ultimately, it is against this backdrop that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud (MbS) went from referring to Iran's supreme leader as “Hitler” in 2017 to agreeing to hold diplomatic talks with Iranian officials in 2021—ultimately resulting in the 2023 normalization deal with Tehran.
While Saudi Arabia previously was primarily concerned about avoiding becoming a casualty of a Iran-US confrontation, it is now also laboring to stay clear of a wider conflagration between Iran and Israel.
While the Islamic Republic does not intend to target the Kingdom, it can easily blame Israel and the US for forcing it to respond in a way that compromises global trade. Already, Tehran is once again threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz. Meanwhile, the Houthis have expanded the scope of their maritime operations to the Indian Ocean, which vessels carrying Saudi energy exports must traverse. Indeed, while Yanbu and the east-to-west pipeline provide easy passage to European clients, the Kingdom's prime customers remain in Asia. This means that a step such as the closure of the Strait of Hormuz would be catastrophic.
read full paper https://amwaj.media/article/mbs-needs-new-game-plan-as-houthis-iran-flex-naval-power
Iranian hardliners are continuing to discuss Iran's ability to procure a nuclear weapon. A hardline Iranian member of parliament speculated that Iran had developed nuclear weapons in an interview on May 10.[9] Newly-elected Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani told the moderate-aligned Rouydad 24 outlet that Iran had obtained nuclear weapons but had not and would not announce that it had nuclear weapons. Ardestani’s comments were speculative in nature, and he is likely unable to such information in his current role. Ardestani’s comments follow Strategic Foreign Relations Council Chairman Kamal Kharrazi‘s comment in an al Jazeera interview on May 9 that Iran will have “no choice” but to change its nuclear doctrine if Israel threatens Iran's existence.[10] These statements align with International Atomic Energy Agency Chief Rafael Grossi’s May 8 comments that the agency was working ”very hard with [Iran] to prevent [nuclear weaponization] from happening,” suggesting that Iran has already obtained or is close to obtaining the ability to procure nuclear weapons.[11]
These discussions coincide with an April 2024 report that claimed that Iran is attempting to obtain 300 tons of uranium yellowcake from Niger.[12] A French investigative outlet reported on April 30 that Iran and Niger have been negotiating a deal since late 2023 for Iran to provide military drones and surface-to-air missiles in exchange for 300 tons of uranium yellowcake. This quantity is significant given that Iran announced in 2019 that it intended to produce 300 tons of yellowcake per year by 2024. A Nigerien delegation notably traveled to Tehran in January 2024 and signed unspecified agreements with Iranian officials, including Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Gharaei Ashtiani. Ashtiani is responsible for managing the Iranian defense industry, including arms procurement and sales. Niger ended its counterterrorism partnership with the United States in March 2024 after US officials accused Niger of secretly exploring a deal to allow Iran access to Nigerien uranium reserves. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian met with the new Iranian ambassador to Niger on the same day that Niger suspended its counterterrorism cooperation with the United States.
Iranian-Zimbabwean cooperation has also increased in recent weeks amid Iranian hardliner comments about the Iranian nuclear program, as CTP previously reported.[13] Zimbabwe participated in the inaugural Iranian Nuclear Science and Technology Conference, for example, in Esfahan City between May 6-8.[14] The Times claimed in 2013 that Zimbabwe had signed an agreement with Iran to sell materials for Iran's nuclear weapons program, which Zimbabwe has since denied.[15] No further reporting has corroborated The Times’ 2013 report.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-10-2024