‘Hey, J. E. B. Stuart was a pretty good calvary commander!’
Stuart benefitted greatly from Union incompetence in the early years of the war. Once the Army of the Potomac began using their cavalry correctly, he was shown to be okay, but hardly great.
See Brandy Station, which was a huge embarrassment for Lee and Stuart, due in large part to Stuart’s infatuation with impressive grand reviews, designed to get his name in the papers, and himself into bedrooms of fawning young ladies.
Then note that as a result of the embarrassing facts concerning Brandy Station, he made a series of foolish decisions, based on ‘regaining his stature’ which cut him off from Lee during the pivotal Pennsylvania campaign.
The plain truth is if Stuart hadn’t been a long time personal favorite of Robert E Lee BEFORE the Civil War, he would have been courtmartialed and thrown out of the Army of Northern Virginia. As Longstreet, Ewell, Rhodes, Lee’s Chief of Staff, and many many others stated upon his return, and after the war.
You can make the argument that Stuarts ego cost Lee any reasonable chance at a meeting engagement in which he could destroy the Army of the Potomac in the summer of 1863.
Let me just print the few relevant lines from Stuart’s orders. On June 22, he is told by Lee: If you find that he (Hooker) is moving northward and that two brigades can guard the Blue Ridge and take care of your rear, you can move with the other three into Maryland, and take position on General Ewell’s right, place yourself in communication with him, guard his flanks, keep him informed of the enemy’s movement and collect all the supplies you can for the use of the army. One column of General Ewell’s army will probably move toward the Susquehanna by the Emmitsburg route; another by Chambersburg.
Here is Longstreet’s endorsement of the above order: He (Lee) speaks of you leaving via Hopewell Gap and passing by the rear of the enemy. If you can get through by that route, I think you will be less likely to indicate what our plans are than if you should cross to our rear.
On June 23, Lee sends another order. If General Hooker’s army remains inactive, you can leave two brigades to watch him and withdraw with the three others, but should he appear not to be moving northward, I think you had better withdraw this side of the mountain tomorrow night (6/24), cross at Shepherdstown the next day, and move over to Fredericktown. You will, however, be able to judge whether you can pass around the army without hindrance, doing all the damage you can and cross the river east of the mountains. In either case, after crossing the river, you must move on and feel the right of Ewell’s troops, collecting information, provisions, etc.”
Later that night, Stuart receives another communication from Lee. This order is not located in The Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, but details from it appear in both Stuart’s and Lee’s official reports. The copy of the letter is found in Major Henry B. McClellan’s biography of Stuart. McClellan was Stuart’s adjutant.
“The letter suggested that, as the roads leading northward from Shepherdstown and Williamsport were already encumbered by the infantry, the artillery, and the transportation of the army, the delay which would necessarily occur in passing by these would, perhaps be greater than would ensue if General Stuart passed around the enemy’s rear. The letter further informed him that if he chose the later route, General Early would receive instructions to look out for him and endeavor to communicate with him; and York, PA., was designated as the point in the vicinity of which he was expected to hear from Early, and as the possible (if not probable) point of concentration of the army.
I would like to print out part of the orders Stuart left for Beverly Robertson. “As long as the enemy remains in your front in force, unless ordered by General R.E. Lee, Lieutenant General Longstreet, or myself, hold the Gaps with a line of pickets reaching across the Shenandoah by Charlestown to the Potomac. If, in the contingency mentioned, (the enemy moving beyond your reach [or north toward the Potomac]), you withdraw, sweep the Valley clear of what pertains to the army, and cross the Potomac at the different points cross be it.”
In the light of these orders, which can be read in their entirety in The Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, let us analyze Stuart’s orders.
In the Pennsylvania campaign, June 22 was a watershed day. Ewell was beginning his march into Pennsylvania where he was to report back to Lee on whether he could gather enough supplies to sustain the rest of the army. If he could, the First and Third Corps would follow. Stuart advances his plan to circle around the enemy, getting between the Army of the Potomac (AOP) and Washington. In the evening, Lee approves the plan. He relays the order through Longstreet for his approval. Longstreet adds his endorsement and sends the order on to Stuart.
The order is clear. The terminology to pass by the rear of the enemy only means one thing. Stuart is to cross the Bull Run Mountains, go around the Union army, and place his command with Ewell as the Second Corps marches toward the Susquehanna. The Hopewell Gap, mentioned in Longstreet’s letter, is a gap in that small mountain chain.
Stuart is not ordered to keep in communication with Lee. With the AOP between his command and the main body, this type of communication will be virtually impossible. Instead, Stuart is to apprise Ewell of the enemy’s movements. There is no time factor in the order. Lee also gives Stuart detailed instructions on the proper methods of gathering supplies.
In his memoirs, Lee aide Charles Marshall explains that the June 23 order was sent because “General Lee directed me to repeat it” (the June 22 order). Marshall failed to do so. The second set of orders bear no resemblance to the first. They are confusing and contradictory. Whereas, in the first dispatch, Stuart was ordered to pass by the rear of the enemy if he found the AOP marching north, in the second dispatch, he is ordered to do two completely opposite things if he finds the AOP inactive and/or not moving northward.
If the AOP was inactive, Stuart could leave two brigades to watch him (Hooker) and withdraw with the three others. Withdraw where? No place is mentioned. To complicate matters, Stuart is then ordered to withdraw behind the Blue Ridge and cross the Potomac at Shepherdstown if he found the enemy not moving northward. Was there a difference between inactive and not moving northward? Or did they mean the same thing?
How does one reconcile the two conflicting statements in this order and the apparent contradiction between the two orders received little more than 24 hours apart?
If you add to the June 23 order what Lee and Stuart had already discussed, and Lee had already written, the inactive contingency is very similar to what Stuart was previously ordered to do. Take three brigades with him and leave two behind. Another clue was Stuart was still ordered to pass around the enemy and cross the river east of the mountains in either case. Once Stuart passed around the Federal army, he would be east of the Bull Run Mountains. This scenario fits both sets of orders. Stuart was also told it would be best if he did not cross the Potomac until the day after tomorrow or June 25, and then he should do so as quickly as he could. If Stuart was to cross with the main body, would Lee need to give him a specific date?
Stuart is given discretion on whether or not he could pass around the enemy without hindrance. This is the only discretion he is given by Lee. If he thought he could pass by, then he was to do so and damage the enemy all he could.
One more set of orders would reach Stuart late night on the 23rd. These orders seem to clarify what Stuart is supposed to do. He is ordered to place himself with Early, who would be at York, which is also given as the possible concentration point of the army. For the first time, Stuart is given a time frame. He must move on “as speedily as possible.” In direct contradiction to the previous order received that day, Stuart is warned that the roads from Shepherdstown and Williamsport are packed with men, artillery, and trains and passing around the enemy would be quicker. Stuart sends detailed orders to General Beverly Robertson to keep an eye on the enemy and move on the rear and the right of the army as it marches into Pennsylvania. General Imboden’s cavalry command marches with the main body as well. General Jenkins’ and General White’s brigades are with Ewell.
I know this is a long post… (and long posts seldom get read), but I’m hoping you will are still reading. LOL! I would like to take a look at Stuart’s main opponents: Longstreet and Marshall.
In 1896, Longstreet publishes From Manassas to Appomattox. Within the pages, he criticized Stuart severely for disobeying orders and leaving Lee blind.
Longstreet reports that the idea of a cavalry movement around the enemy was first discussed on June 19, and it was determined that Stuart was to withdraw “west of the Blue Ridge and cross the Potomac on its right at Shepherdstown, and make his ride towards Baltimore.” He further explains how the plan was modified by Lee so Stuart could “cross the Potomac with part of his command east of the Blue Ridge,” but the exact location of the crossing was left to Longstreet’s decision. “[…] the extent of authority with me, therefore, was to decide whether the crossing should be made at Point of Rocks (Maryland) or through the Hopewell Gap east of the Union army.”
Longstreet publishes the postscript he added to his June 22 letter to prove he had command decision in the cavalry movement. He writes that the postscript indicated the following: “1) The move along my rear to the crossing at Point of Rocks. 2) My preferred march on my flank to the Shepherdstown crossing. 3) The route indicated by General Lee. All of which General Stuart understood as well as I did. Especially did he know that my orders were that he should ride on the right of my column as originally designed, to the Shepherdstown crossing. Finally, Longstreet wraps up his critique by saying, “Our plans, adopted after deep study, were suddenly given over to gratify the youthful cavalryman's wish for a romantic ride.” Longstreet writes that a move along our rear, which he identifies in his book as the crossing at Point of Rocks, Maryland, would disclose our plans. The rear of the Army of Northern Virginia (ANV) is in the Valley, or west of the Blue Ridge. Point of Rocks is east of the Blue Ridge. Stuart is also east of the Blue Ridge at Rector’s Cross Road. A move to Point of Rocks would not be along the rear but along the front of the army. The only way Stuart, from his present location, could march to the rear of the army was to move into the Valley and cross at Shepherdstown. The very movement Longstreet advised against because it would disclose our plans. His endorsement states and his postscript reiterates that “you had better not leave us, therefore, unless you plan to take the proposed route in rear of the enemy.” The rear of the enemy is via the Hopewell Gap (in the Bull Run Mountains), which is the proposed route of Lee. Stuart headed around the Union army because Lee ordered him to do so, and Longstreet gave his approval.
In 1896, Marshall spoke before Confederate veterans in Washington D.C. He states the purpose of his address was to “correct the impression that has prevailed to some extent that the movement of the cavalry was made by General Lee's orders, and that at a critical moment of the campaign, he (Lee) crossed the Potomac River and moved into Pennsylvania, sending the entire cavalry force of his army upon a useless raid.”
The rest of his speech is a mishmash of events, orders, dispatches, geography, and time constraints. He reads each order and gives a very detailed interpretation of what Lee expected to have happened. After reading the June 22 order, Marshall explains that “the letter from General Lee to General Stuart, however, shows, when it was written, General Lee expected General Stuart would pass with all his cavalry, except two brigades, to the west of the Blue Ridge, and cross the Potomac on that side of the mountains, leaving two brigades in the gaps to guard his rear as long as the enemy threatened to attempt to penetrate through the gap into the Valley.”
Marshall then contradicts himself when explaining the convoluted June 23 order. He tells his audience, the order “leaves Stuart to decide whether he can move around the Federal army in either events mentioned […],”but “it will also be observed that General Stuart was not permitted to make this movement around the enemy’s rear, unless he could pass around the Federal army without hindrance… (emphasis Marshall).
About Stuart’s movements, Marshall says, he “crossed the Potomac east of the army of General Hooker, so as to render it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for him to comply with the repeated injunctions he had received from General Lee to place himself on Ewell’s right as soon as he entered Maryland.” The end result of Stuart’s disobedience was “the army moved very slowly, and there would have been no difficulty, whatever in having the whole of it at Gettysburg by the morning of July 1 had we been aware of the movements of the enemy on the other side of the mountains.” Marshall then blames Stuart for wasting time by collecting supplies, damaging the enemy’s communications, and combating the enemy. All this was in direct violation of his orders.
After carefully reading the June 22 order, Marshall explained to his audience that this dispatch was written because Lee expected Stuart to cross the Potomac west of the Blue Ridge. The Colonel had been in the military long enough to understand the terminology employed in dispatches and orders. It is dishonest to suggest Lee wanted Stuart to cross west of the Blue Ridge when the only way Stuart could obey Lee’s orders was to pass by the rear of the enemy, which was east of the Bull Run Mountains. If, as Marshall stated, Lee expected Stuart to cross west of the Blue Ridge, why did Lee simply order Stuart to do so?
When explaining the confusing June 23 order, Marshall now admits Stuart was to pass by the rear of the enemy. This confession was made so he could charge Stuart of violating the order by not obeying the condition without hindrance. It was not a condition. It was discretion, which Lee entrusted to Stuart. Marshall declared Stuart’s discretion ended at Haymarket when he found the roads clogged with the northward march of the AOP’s Second Corps. Marshall may pontificate in a speech 33 years after the fact that Stuart should have retired west of the Blue Ridge when first hindered at Haymarket, but that was not up to Marshall to decide. Lee left it up to Stuart. He decided he could get through by another route, and he did.
After admitting Stuart was to pass by the rear of the enemy, he now asserts Stuart disobeyed his orders by allowing the Federal army to interpose between his command and Ewell. He also criticizes Stuart for not placing himself on the right of Ewell as soon as he entered Maryland. All of this is highly deceitful. Even though Stuart passed east of the Federal army, he was never cut off from Ewell. Neither could he put his command to the right of Ewell as soon as he entered Maryland. Ewell was not in Maryland. He was in Pennsylvania, which Marshall knew since either he was, most likely, the one who wrote Ewell’s order to move on Harrisburg and capture the city if he could.
Of course there is Lee’s official report that is highly condemning of Stuart. But is it? Charles Marshall wrote two official reports on the campaign, which were signed by Lee. These reports are the seminal works used by historians when analyzing the ANV’s movements. The first report was written on July 31, 1863, and was released to the press before Stuart’s report was forwarded to headquarters. The report detailed the role of the cavalry. “General Stuart was left to guard the passes of the mountains, and to observe the movement of the enemy, whom he was instructed to harass and impede as much as possible should he attempt to cross the Potomac. In that event, General Stuart was directed to move into Maryland, crossing the Potomac east or west of the Blue Ridge, as, in his judgment, should be best, and take position on the right of our column as it advanced.” Again, “No report had been received that the Federal army had cross the Potomac, and the absence of cavalry rendered it impossible to obtain accurate information.” And again: “By the route he (Stuart) pursued, the Federal army was interposed between his command and our main body, preventing any communication with him until his arrival at Carlisle. The march toward Gettysburg was conducted more slowly than it would have been had the movements of the Federal army been known.”
The second report, written on January 20, 1864, included major revisions of Stuart’s role. Instead of marching to the right of the column (implying Longstreet and Hill as they marched to Chambersburg), Stuart had now been ordered to “place himself on the right of General Ewell.” The statement that censured Stuart for placing himself east of the AOP was also removed. The reason for the slow march into Pennsylvania was corrected. The army now marched at a leisurely pace due to the hot weather and “with a view to the comfort of the troops.”
The most condemning statement in the first report did make its way into the final. “The movements of the army prior to the battle of Gettysburg had been much embarrassed (hindered) by the absence of cavalry. As soon as it was known that the enemy had crossed into Maryland, orders were sent to the brigades of Robertson and Jones which had been left to guard the passes of the Blue Ridge to rejoin the army without delay…” This statement is probably the most quoted portion of Lee’s report when proving Stuart was insubordinate. Yet the next few sentences discuss Robertson and Jones. The report says they were recalled from the Valley to join the army at Gettysburg. Why they did not obey their orders and followed the army into Pennsylvania has never been fully explained.
Let me wrap up (finally). Three charges are leveled against Stuart by his critics: “The complaint against Stuart is that the cavalry – the eyes of the army – were improperly absent, (and because of this) the Confederate army was ordered by Lee to Gettysburg and […], ran unexpectantly against the enemy.”
As to the accusation that Stuart was improperly absent, and in light of the orders Stuart received, one question needs to be answered. How is it possible for Stuart to be with Lee on the Potomac and with Ewell on the Susquehanna at the same time? <.b> If you can answer it, then perhaps you can find Stuart guilty of your accusations.
Because I have gone on so long… I will leave your other accusations alone for the time being. I hope anyone interested in Stuart’s role at Gettysburg will take the time to read this cumbersome post.