[Sibre Fan]

The cases I cite include the following:

lacked standing to challenge government faith-based initiatives... on the grounds that such initiatives violated the Constitutional/First Amendment prohibition against establishment of religion (Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc.);

lacked standing to challenge an award of state franchise tax...on the grounds that the award violated the Commerce Clause of the Constitution (DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno);

lacked standing to challenge state statute denying counsel...on the grounds that the statute violated the Constitutional rights to due process and equal protection set forth in the 5th and/or 14th Amendments (Kowalski v. Tesmer); .

lacked standing to challenge Line Item Veto Act...on the ground that the Act violated Article I of the Constitution (Raines v. Byrd);

lacked standing to challenge state law recognizing English as official language... on the ground that the state law violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution (Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona);

lacked standing to prevent the government form violating the law in granting tax exemptions... on the grounds that the tax exemption granted to discriminatory schools violated the Constitutional equal protection rights provided by the 14th Amendment(Allen v. Wright);

lacked standing to challenge governmental transfer of property to religious organization... on the grounds that such initiatives violated the Constitutional/First Amendment prohibition against establishment of religion (Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State);

had standing to challenge law limiting liability for nuclear accidents...on the grounds that the law violated the Constitutional Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment (Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc. )

lacked standing to challenge CIA expenditures on the grounds that the expenditures violated Art. I, § 9, cl. 7, of the Constitution. (U. S. v. Richardson,).


In each of these cases (and the rest originally cited), the litigants based their challenge on requirements stated in the Constitution.

As for "some of them are about Taxpayer Standing, something not relevant here", Dr. Taitz disagrees with you and specifically cited Flast v. Cohen, the seminal taxpayer standing case to support their argument asking the Court to expand that ruling to apply to this situation.

Again, in every case that the Court has considered the issue, it has held that a person must have standing to challenge an "act which is in conflict with the actual text of the Constitution. But if you have a single Supreme Court case to support your contention to the contrary, I'd be very interested in reading it.

[plenipotentiary]

“Chief Justice Warren determined that the only critical one in this case was whether there was a “textually demonstrable constitutional commitment” to the House to determine in its sole discretion the qualifications of members.563 In[p.695]order to determine whether there was a textual commitment, the Court reviewed the Constitution, the Convention proceedings, and English and United States legislative practice to ascertain what power had been conferred on the House to judge the qualifications of its members; finding that the Constitution vested the House with power only to look at the qualifications of age, residency, and citizenship, the Court thus decided that in passing on Powell’s conduct and character the House had exceeded the powers committed to it and thus judicial review was not barred by this factor of the political question doctrine.564”

http://www.law.cornell.edu/anncon/html/art3frag27_user.html

Powell v. McCormack

4. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over petitioners’ action. Pp. 395 U. S. 512-516.

(a) The case is one “arising under” the Constitution within the meaning of Art. III, since petitioners’ claims “will be sustained if the Constitution . . . [is] given one construction and will be defeated if it [is] given another.” Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678. Pp. 395 U. S. 513-514.

(b) The district courts are given a broad grant of jurisdiction by 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a), over “all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy . . . arises under the Constitution . . . ,” and, while that grant is not entirely coextensive with Art. III, there is no indication that § 1331(a) was intended to foreclose federal courts from entertaining suits involving the seating of Congressmen. Pp. 395 U. S. 514-516.

5. This litigation is justiciable because the claim presented and the relief sought can be judicially resolved. Pp. 395 U. S. 516-518.

(a) Petitioners’ claim does not lack justiciability on the ground that the House’s duty cannot be judicially determined, since, if petitioners are correct, the House had a duty to seat Powell once it determined that he met the standing qualifications set forth in the Constitution. P. 395 U. S. 517.

(b) The relief sought is susceptible of judicial resolution, since, regardless of the appropriateness of a coercive remedy against House personnel (an issue not here decided), declaratory relief is independently available. Pp. 395 U. S. 517-518.

6. The case does not involve a “political question,” which, under the separation of powers doctrine, would not be justiciable. Pp. 395 U. S. 518-549.

(a) The Court’s examination of relevant historical materials shows at most that Congress’ power under Art. I, § 5, to judge the “Qualifications of its Members” is a “textually demonstrable constitutional commitment . . . to [that] co-ordinate political department of government” (Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 369 U. S. 217) to judge only standing qualifications which are expressly set forth in the Constitution; hence, the House has no power to exclude a member-elect who meets the Constitution’s membership requirements. Pp. 395 U. S. 518-548.

(b) The case does not present a political question in the sense, also urged by respondents, that it would entail a “potentially embarrassing confrontation between coordinate branches” of the Government, since our system of government requires federal courts on occasion to interpret the Constitution differently from other branches. Pp. 395 U. S. 548-549.

7. In judging the qualifications of its members under Art. I, § 5, Congress is limited to the standing qualifications expressly prescribed by the Constitution. P. 395 U. S. 550.

http://supreme.justia.com/us/395/486/index.html