Along your line, I can’t quite remember a great quote from the VA ratifying debates, in a retort to Henry, that he wanted the impossible, all sovereignty to the states yet with adequate powers assigned to a confederate government.
I think there was just such an exchange during the Convention (in fact, likely more than one), but I based my remarks on my reading of Farrand’s Records, which is a record of the Convention debates and associated documents. It is, I believe, superior to Elliot’s Records and can be found at a Library of Congress website. Just enter A Century of Lawmaking in your search engine of choice, and click on Farrand’s Records, all three volumes. Look around while you are at the site. There is a great more to be found.
Another site of interest is The Constitution Society, containing over 150 documents of interest, including:
The Debates in the Several Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, Jonathan Elliot (1836) — A collection of documents, including proceedings of the ratifying state conventions, among which can be found:
THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.
The following relates to our discussion:
Saturday, June 7, 1788
Mr. Corbin speaking:
“The honorable gentleman [Mr. Henry] has objected to the Constitution, on the old worn-out idea that a republican government is best calculated for a small territory. If a republic, sir, cannot be accommodated to an extensive country, let me ask, How small must a country be to suit the genius of republicanism? In what particular extent of country can a republican government exist? If contracted into as small a compass as you please, it must labor under many disadvantages. Too small an extent will render a republic weak, vulnerable, and contemptible. Liberty, in such a petty state, must be on a precarious footing; its existence must depend on the philanthropy and good nature of its neighbors. Too large an extent, it is said, will produce confusion and tyranny. What has been so often deprecated will be removed by this plan. The extent of the United States cannot render this government oppressive. The powers of the general government are only of a general nature, and their object is to protect, defend, and strengthen the United States; but the internal administration of government is left to the state legislatures, who exclusively retain such powers as will give the states the advantages of small republics, without the danger commonly attendant on the weakness of such governments.”
Mr. Corbin continues, offering some points about the meanings of ‘federal’ and ‘confederate,’ demonstrating some of their similarities and their differences.
“There are controversies even about the name of this government. It is denominated by some a federal, by others a consolidated government. The definition given of it by my honorable friend (Mr. Madison) is, in my opinion, accurate. Let me, however, call it by another name — a representative federal republic, as contradistinguished from a confederacy. The former is more wisely constructed than the latter; it places the remedy in the hands which feel the disorder: the other places the remedy in those hands which cause the disorder. The evils that are most complained of in such governments (and with justice) are faction, dissension, and consequent subjection of the minority to the caprice and arbitrary decisions of the majority, who, instead of consulting the interest of the whole community collectively, attend sometimes to partial and local advantages. To avoid this evil is perhaps the great desideratum of republican wisdom; it may be termed the philosopher's stone. Yet, sir, this evil will be avoided by this Constitution: faction will be removed by the system now under consideration, because all the causes which are generally productive of faction are removed. This evil does not take its flight entirely; for were jealousies and divisions entirely at an end, it might produce such lethargy as would ultimately terminate in the destruction of liberty, to the preservation of which, watchfulness is absolutely necessary. It is transferred from the state legislatures to Congress, where it will be more easily controlled. Faction will decrease in proportion to the diminution of counsellors. It is much easier to control it in small than in large bodies. Our state legislature consists of upwards of one hundred and sixty, which is a greater number than Congress will consist of at first. Will not more concord and unanimity exist in one than in thirteen such bodies? Faction will more probably decrease, or be entirely removed, if the interest of a nation be entirely concentrated, than if entirely diversified. If thirteen men agree, there will be no faction. Yet if opposite, and of heterogeneous dispositions, it is impossible that a majority of such clashing minds can ever concur to oppress the minority. It is impossible that this government, which will make us one people, will have a tendency to assimilate our situations, and is admirably calculated to produce harmony and unanimity, can ever admit of an oppressive combination by one part of the Union against the other.”
This is probably not precisely what you had in mind, but it fits, I believe, the general scheme of your thesis.