Too many people make the mistake of concluding that if human minds can grasp more theorems than a consistent formal system like mathematics, then our minds must not be "computer-like" (i.e. not a formal system, or not deterministic).
This was Yourgrau's interpretation of Gödel's position. Whether that's correct as an interpretation of what Gödel really thought, I'm not certain. But, of course, I was only responding to D-fendr's citation of the passage, pointing out that the hypothesis, i.e., that the human mind is capable of grasping all mathematical truths, doesn't appear at all likely. And that's why I wrote this in post #16 (my underlines):
"So, by this argument, we'd have to grasp the complete truth of mathematics (whatever that might mean) in order to conclude that "we, or our minds, are not machines or computers." I was calling into question the likelihood of our being able to grasp the complete truth of mathematics. And, if we can't, it no longer follows (from this argument) that "we, or our minds, are not machines or computers".
As you point out, it's not at all clear that this argument holds water when viewed from a wider perspective.
I was only responding to D-fendr's citation of the passage, pointing out that the hypothesis, i.e., that the human mind is capable of grasping all mathematical truths, doesn't appear at all likely
How about a human mind capable of coming up with the Incompleteness Theorem?
What I'm pointing to is the ability to see the greater context of, transcend, the program and see a meta-program, and on up...