Posted on 07/30/2009 12:56:51 AM PDT by MissTickly
I don’t think so. Seems like an idea worth looking into.
However, there is law that if both parents are not U. S. Citizens then one’s status as a natural born citizen is in doubt. It is from the Supreme Court when it did address the issue and not statutory law.
Wrong and wrong and wrong. Read the 1874 opinion by the Supreme Court. Why do you persist in this error? Is it ignorance or are you a troll?
This is what I have discovered. If your request was denied, you may revise it and try filing again OR refile it with the Office Of Information in Hawaii. For me, if they don’t respond in 10 days to MY request, I file with the Office of Information, too.
And I believe any questions about that office should be directed to the lt. Gov.
This is what I sent him at ltgov@hawaii.gov:
Dear Lt. Governor Aiona,
Aloha! I have filed a UIPA request with a Hawaiian government agency today. Although I just sent it today, I would like to know the procedure to follow in order to pursue this request should it be denied or go unanswered for 10 days.
I have no confirmation that it was even received—what is a reasonable amount of time to wait for confirmation of receipt according to policy and procedure?
Can you instruct me on that procedure or forward this request to the appropriate person in the Office Of Information, or elsewhere, who can provide me the procedure to follow?
I would also like the email address & phone number for the Director of the Office of Information and address of the Department/Office.
Please reply via email.
Thank you for your help!
Steve—
I would really appreciate if you sent a request exactly like mine. That way we could corroborate the answers and have two paths to go if it is challenged. One, revising it. Or refiling it with the Office of Information.
What do you think? Feel free to say no.
But, I find it odd they flatly refused you but I haven’t gotten anything in response. I see clear differences in the language we each used and think that might be the problem. I have asked again and again for confirmation of receipt. Nothing. I think they have 10 days.
I'm not sure which statement in 1789 that you are referring to. Are you referring to the Naturalization Act of 1790?
If not, please clarify to what you are referring.
If so, please note that the subject is reiterated in the Naturalization Act of 1795:
…the children of citizens of the United States, born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, shall be considered as citizens of the United State…Exact same verbiage.
The author of Marbury, the basis for our interpretation of the separation of powers, John Marshall, knowing there had been some confusion, re-stated. the definition and cited the source, Vattel, explicitly in his decision on The Venus, 1814. No congressional act can alter a provision of the constitution. That is probably the key notion to be come from Marbury.
Honestly, I'm not sure where you're coming from here. Marbury (5 U.S. 137) and The Venus (12 U.S. 253) have nothing to do one with the other. And, as far as I can search on either justia or findlaw, neither have ever been cited as a precedent within a SCOTUS decision involving naturalization, immigration, or citizenship to this day. (I don't have Lexus/Nexus access, so there might be a case that I can't see via the free stuff)
Marbury set up the basis for judicial review of laws to determine their constitutionality, as you alluded in your post. It essentially stated that this clause within the Judiciary Act of 1789 was unconstitutional:
The Supreme Court shall also have appellate jurisdiction from the circuit courts and courts of the several states, in the cases herein after specially provided for; and shall have power to issue writs of prohibition to the district courts, when proceeding as courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and writs of mandamus, in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.Marshall, who wrote the opinion of the court, made the following statement, which was (IMHO) the core of his decision:
The Secretary of State, being a person, holding an office under the authority of the United States, is precisely within the letter of the description, and if this Court is not authorized to issue a writ of mandamus to such an officer, it must be because the law is unconstitutional, and therefore absolutely incapable of conferring the authority and assigning the duties which its words purport to confer and assign.
The Constitution vests the whole judicial power of the United States in one Supreme Court, and such inferior courts as Congress shall, from time to time, ordain and establish. This power is expressly extended to all cases arising under the laws of the United States; and consequently, in some form, may be exercised over the present case, because the right claimed is given by a law of the United States.
In the distribution of this power. it is declared that "The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction."
…
To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction.
Now as to The Venus (12 U. S. 253), you give a lengthy extract:
Here is the citation from The Venus, 12 U.S. (1814):
The whole system of decisions applicable to this subject rests on the law of nations as its base. It is therefore of some importance to inquire how far the writers on that law consider the subjects of one power residing within the territory of another, as retaining their original character or partaking of the character of the nation in which they reside. Vattel, who, though not very full to this point, is more explicit and more satisfactory on it than any other whose work has fallen into my hands, says "The citizens are the members of the civil society; bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to its authority, they equally participate in its advantages. The natives or indigenes are those born in the country of parents who are citizens. Society not being able to subsist and to perpetuate itself but by the children of the citizens, those children naturally follow the condition of their fathers, and succeed to all their rights."
Let's start of from the beginning. You will note that the term "law of nations" is in all lowercase. Had Marshall intended to cite the book written by Vattel as the source, he surely would have capitalized it properly (i.e., "Law of Nations" vice "law of nations"). In fact, if you simply cite "law of nations" in SCOTUS decisions, you will find it cited many times. 99% of the time, the term is not capitalized, but it occasionally is. (For example, United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479)
In fact, do you think that the framers were explicitly talking about Vattel in Article 1, Section 8, when they wrote, To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations?
The law of nations is a concept, essentially talking about "international law." Vattel, himself, defines it as follows:
The Law of Nations is the science which teaches the rights subsisting between nations or states, and the obligations correspondent to those rights.
de Vattel, §3
Marshall, who wrote a partial concurrence to the majority opinion (which was written by Bushrod Washington) did cite Vattel (as did Washington); he also cited Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui, while Washington cited Hugo Grotius extensively writing for the majority of the court. Why?
The answer comes from the nature of the case itself.
This is the case of a vessel which sailed from Great Britain, with a cargo belonging to the respective Claimants, as was contended, before the declaration of war by the United States against Great Britain was or could have been known by the shippers. She sailed from Liverpool on the 4th of July, 1812, under a British license, for the port of New York, and was captured on the 6th of August, 1812, by the American privateer Dolphin, and sent into the district of Massachusetts, where the vessel and cargo were libelled in the District Court.
So naturally, they would have to deal with the law of nations (international law).
The upshot of the case was that the claimants, Lenox, Maitland, Magee, Jones and M'Gregor, had to forfeit the property in question.
For citizenship purposes, though, there was something interesting.
Part of the case was that the claimants were all naturalized citizens who had extensive properties in the US. They went back to Britain for purposes of trade (while the US was at peace with Britain). They shipped the confiscated goods back to the US prior to the outbreak of the war of 1812. Letters of Marque were issued to privateers by the President (with authorization of Congress). Some privateers (the Dolphin) captured the ship, brought it back to Massachusetts, and filed a prize case. The rationale forwarded by the lawyers for the privateers was that the claimants forfeited their naturalized US citizenship when they went back to Great Britain, the land of their birth and, therefore, their property should be considered enemy property as far as the application of Prize Law is concerned.
In developing his rationale for his concurring opinion, Marshall quoted Vattel as part of his rationale in determining whether the claimants would be considered British citizens or US citizens, due to their unique circumstances. Remember the key part of Marshall's opinion that you quoted, It is, therefore, of some importance to enquire how far the writers on that law consider the subjects of one power residing within the territory of another, as retaining their original character, or partaking of the character of the nation in which they reside.
So the context of what Marshall was saying was that their character as natural born British citizens effectively nullified their rights of protections as naturalized US citizens once they returned themselves and domiciled themselves back in Great Britain.
Nowhere in this case did Marshall say that Vattel's definition nullified any of the immigration and naturalization laws on the books at that time, nor did he (either in this case or in Marbury) ever state that a statute couldn't implement a Constitutional clause. In Marbury, he said that a statute couldn't be opposed to a clauses in the Constitution. In this one (Venus), he was silent altogether on that concept.
So what does all of the above have to do with Øbama? Not much at all. And that is the point I was getting at all along.
If you haven't done so already, I encourage you to read the full case, including the pleadings, which is located here (you won't get all of it if you just read the opinions, which is what is cited on the Justia site. If you have already read it, I encourage you to look through it again briefly.
And, please keep my posts on this subject in context: if it can be proven that Øbama was born outside of the United States (or outlying possessions), then, by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, he cannot be a citizen by birth, as his mother did not meet the residency requirements in §301(g) to pass on citizenship to him at birth. Same goal, same end. Just different means to get from point "a" to point "b." I just think that my method would survive in court a lot better than relying on Vattel to nullify the INA (of course, this is in the absence of an authentic Birth Certificate -- as opposed to a certification -- from Hawaii and with a verified, validated, notarized, and authentic Birth Certificate from Mombasa -- or wherever)
So before writing me off as a anti-birther troll, please keep the above in mind. We're going the same way...just taking slightly different paths.
Oh, man did you muff that call.
Marshall’s concurrence in Venus excerpts Vattell at length! Including the exact passage at issue:
Vattel, who, though not very full to this point, is more explicit and more satisfactory on it than any other whose work has fallen into my hands, says
“The citizens are the members of the civil society; bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to its authority, they equally participate in its advantages. The natives or indigenes are those born in the country of parents who are citizens. Society not being able to subsist and to perpetuate itself but by the children of the citizens, those children naturally follow the condition of their fathers, and succeed to all their rights.”
.. and the lengthy excerpt continues.
“Natives or indigenes” is “natives or natural-born citizens” in other translations and “natuerels ou indigenes” in the French.
You are correct that he does not capitalize “law of nations.” But he does indeed to go on to quote Vattel at tlenght.
This indicates that the law of nations is, generally, the Law of Nations, and Vattel is the authority. The generic term is interchangeable with Vattel.
Well that sure is an intesting law.
Would you happen to have the name of that law?
Up until now I was not aware that the word "Doubt" was definitive enough to be used when writing a law.
The child of an alien, if born in the country, is as much a citizen as the natural born child of a citizen, and by operation of the same principle.
Ha! Thanks Plumnz. I had decided that my time could be used to more affect than responding to an obfuscator.
While reading decisions provides glimpses of the history I didn’t study as scientist, I have always been in awe of thinkers who discern the heart of the issue. Vattel, in his chapter, Our Native Country, and Several Things That Relate to It, first defines a Country, and then the two categories of citizenship, citizens and natural born citizens. He explains what most of us know, intuitively (which is why it was called natural law) that a person’s allegiances are most likely to be formed after his parents. That is why swearing allegiance, as in when becoming a naturalized citizen, is good enough for every official of our nation except for the presidency, of whom our founders required a natural born citizen. MarkoMalley clearly wanted to obfuscate the point.
As soon as he raised the Naturalization Act of 1789-1790, the game was clear. In 1790, the authors of the act made a flagrant mistake, defining someone of citizen parents but born on foreign soil as a natural born citizen. It is a ploy used frequently by obfuscators. The Act was corrected in 1795, and the term natural born citizen explicitly removed. Some Obots still claim that proved that citizen and natural born citizen were therefore equivalent.
Misleading claims are always a clue. I wonder what people who protect Obama think there will be left of THEIR liberty if Obama is allowed to succeed?
Then if I muffed that call so bad, maybe you could tell me what Venus was about, what the decision of the court was, and in what context both Justice Washington and Chief Justice Marshall cited Vattel.
On the other hand, again, if I muffed that call so bad, perhaps you could tell me which immigration statute that the court ruled unconstitutional in Venus, because a concept in the statute disagreed with Vattel (or for that matter Burlamaqui or Grotius, who were also cited in the opinion of the court).
Or, if not case, please give me a citation where Vattel is used as the basis for overturning a statute as unconstitutional.
If I muffed that call so bad.
Ping to post #71 on this thread.
Since you did not have the courage to respond to post #66 directly (either to agree or to disagree with its content), you’re welcome to answer the questions I posed in #70.
It might be disheartening, in the heat of debate, not to get an immediate response to your reply. But, to imply a lack of courage because of it, is unfair to the point of being suspicious. The exchange occurred in the middle of the night, in most of the country.
I would agree with you and would not have made the statement to begin with had I not read post #69, responding to post #67. Not the fact that the post was made, but the words that were used in the post.
Notice that the opinion referred to speaks of a “citizen,” not a “natural born citizen.” The two things are distinct. As has been repeatedly pointed out in the actual scholarship and is known to anyone competent who has actually properly researched the issue, the phrase “natural born citizen” would not have been used in Article II had the framers meant “citizen.” The specific phrase “natural born citizen” was used on purpose had a specific meaning at the time. It is true that in the opinion of which you speak its says, as you say, that such a one is as much a “citizen” as one who is a naturally born citizen but it does not say that such a one is a “natural born citizen.” One of the most commonly cited sources of the time for the phrase “natural born citizen,” is Vattel. You should actually learn to do research before calling people out based on error and lack of knowledge and certainly refrain from accusations that are ill founded.
You seem unable to comprehend. It is not a statute it is the best known Supreme Court case dealing with the actual phrase used in Article II. It was decided in 1874. You could learn to research before you launch ill-founded assertions and accusations and look it up. Let me give you a clue. The Constitution means what it says and is law superior to the “written law” as you insist on assuming is “the law.” As most of us understand Congress cannot override the Constitution. Certainly that Congress has not written a law that echoes a phrase and provision in the Constitution, particularly one as specific as the one in question, proves nothing in law.
As far as The Venus, it provides evidence of John Marshall's deference to Vattel, a deference he showed in other decisions bearing upon citizenship. This supports a definining, originalist meaning of "natural-born citizen" as having been inspired by The Law Of Nations, as opposed to British common law.
Agreed. In fact, Vattel was used extensively throughout the formation of the State; however, and this is my point, I don't see that his deference going to the level of ruling a statute unconstitutional based upon the Vattel reference.
Having said that, is the goal of these folks to have §301 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) ruled unconstitutional (using the judicial review principle established in Marbury) because it violates the original intent of the founders (as could be demonstrated using Vattel as a source to show the founders' intent)?
If that is the case, I wish SOMEBODY would just come out and say so. While that is taking a sledgehammer to a gnat (i.e., the fallout of such a ruling would have tremendous and widespread impact on all of our society, perhaps impacting the citizenship status of multiple generations of people), that would be a defensible strategy.
But what I see them doing is trying to cite Vattel in an effort to deny "natural born citizenship" to Øbama, without reference to the constitutionality of the INA §301 or without reference to the status of any other person declared a "natural born citizen" under that law. And that just doesn't make sense at all.
Frankly, they could achieve the same goal by bringing forward a case involving somebody else other than Øbama. For example, if they could identify a person granted citizenship via §301(a)(7) who was hired for a job (where verification of citizenship was required), find an actual natural-born citizen who applied for the job but was not hired, and have the not-hired person sue the employer, the State Department, and the USCIS for accepting and issuing a fraudulent citizenship certificate (citing the unconstitutionality of the INA §301 as the rationale). The effect would be the same, but it would be less politically charged and so might actually receive a better hearing in the courts. Then, once INA §301 was ruled unconstitutional, it would be a simple matter of proving that Øbama wasn't born in the US or possessions (well, simple if the documentation is made available)...at which moment, he would be stripped not only of natural born citizenship, but of citizenship, itself...and, naturally, they would have no choice but to rule him unqualified for any federal office, not just the office of President.
That's the reason why I say to simply apply the INA §301 properly to this situation. In other words, if it could be proven that Øbama was not born in the US or outlying possessions, he couldn't have had citizenship passed on to him, because his mother didn't meet the requirements of the INA §301(a)(7). And, you don't end up with a major constitutional question to resolve at the same time (a particular concern considering the widespread impact that such a ruling would have on society at large...an impact that could significantly color how a SCOTUS decision would be made).
For what it's worth.
Thanks for the lengthy and thoughtful reply. I’m at the office, however, and can’t give it the time and consideration it deserves. I’ll get back to you on this, this evening.
Why are you prattling on about statutes concerning who is naturalized at birth? That’s beside the issue of Article II.
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