ROOSEVELT CALLS FOR GREATER AID TO BRITAIN AS BEST WAY TO HALT DICTATORS AND AVERT WAR (12/30/40)

Microfilm-New York Times archives, Monterey Public Library | 12/30/40 | Turner Catledge, Robert P. Post, Raymond Daniell, James MacDonald, Herbert L. Matthews

[CougarGA7]

I decided to go ahead and post the entire Bloch memo anyway. It gives a good perspective on what the thinking is at Pearl by this point in time.

[BroJoeK]

CougarGA7: "I decided to go ahead and post the entire Bloch memo anyway."

Thanks.
Searching back through my books, I see that, according to Victor: The Pearl Harbor Myth (p.162) this is not the memo which got Richardson fired.

That one was written on November 28, 1940, and included some unacceptable statements:

Richardson: "I feel that the Fleet must operate on either of two assumptions, i.e.,

1. (a) that we are at peace and no security measures are required or
2. (b) that wartime measures of security must be carried out."

Victor: Richardson "pointed out that current security measures were peacetime measures, taken for training purposes, and he was changing that":

Richardson: "Now, however... in view of your better information and position to evaluate the possibilities, I have come to the conclusion that I must operate on the basis of (b) above.
I enclose a tentative draft of a directive which I plan to issue...
It is bound to result in the curtailment of badly needed basic training of new personnel."

Victor: "In short, he said he was curtailing training to put the fleet on alert.
"That was unacceptable, the letter prompted Richardson's relief from command in January 1941."

Admiral Block was responsible for long-range aerial patrol around Hawaii.
After the attack, Bloch testified:

"I did my utmost to implement my responsibility by demanding patrol planes... but never had any; I never had one."

[CougarGA7]

Though I find Victor’s book to be very poorly written and almost abusive in its misuse of source material I think that he is correct that this shift in policy from training to security was what led to Richardson’s dismissal.

This memo from the 28th was a response to Stark’s newly fueled concerns of the fleet concerning air attack in light of the recent attack by British torpedo planes at Taranto.

In the memo dated 22 November Stark tells Richardson, “Since the Taranto incident my concern for the safety of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor, already great, has become even greater. This concern has to do both with the possible activities on the part of Japanese residents of Hawaii and with the possibilities of attack coming from overseas.”

Stark went on to suggest that “antiaircraft protection can be provided first by units of the Fleet actually in Pearl Harbor with guns ready at all times: by station about the Navy Yard and Army A.A. defense measure including mobile batteries; and possible by utilization of Marine Defense Battalion Antiaircraft Units now available in Pear Harbor areas, or that could be made available. Also by keeping carrier fighter squadrons alerted and ready to go.”

So Richardson’s response appears to be the result of suggestions made by his Chief of Naval Operations. Stark suggested placing A.A. units on board the ships in port on alert as well as the carrier air arm. This would naturally cause a drop off in training for these units since they can’t do both at the same time. So in some respects it is unfortunate that this response by Richardson may have been the final straw (coupled with his disagreement with F.D.R. on keeping the fleet in Hawaii or moving it back to San Diego) that caused F.D.R. to make a change.