In view of this, Streich thought that yet another attack on the perimeter at present strength would be ineffective and wasteful. Ponath commanding 8th Machine Gun Battalion, was of the same opinion. His men had already suffered many casualties, and in their present position in front of the wire were still exposed to heavy artillery and small-arms fire from the Australians.
Rommel was enraged at what he called the ‘pessimism’ of his senior commanders, and decided to take personal charge of the attack planned for Monday, 14 April.
He promised a ‘concentrated artillery’ strike to back this attack which was to start 18.00 hrs in the dusk. However, the artillery support turned out to be just a few 88mm flak guns, certainly powerful and useful, but being emplaced on the flat rocky ground behind 8th Machine Gun Battalion they were fully exposed, with no cover for the crews; consequently, casualties from enemy fire were so heavy that the guns were largely ineffective. As darkness fell, 8th Machine Gun Battalion under Ponath advanced cautiously and found a gap in the wire which they cleared of mines. Advancing further they saw nobody, but the bridgehead was tenuous and there were a number of sudden attacks in the dark by small Australian raiding parties which caused 40 casualties. Nonetheless Rommel thought the penetration of the perimeter now made a tank attack viable, so he handed operational control back to Streich, but detailed his ADC, Lt Schmidt, to stay as a liaison officer with Streich and keep a “watching brief” on operations.
The tank attack went gravely wrong however. Streich decided to lead the assault from the top of a PzKpfw II, but as he approached the start line in the dark, the tank and Streich’s accompanying Kubelwagen came under artillery and small arms fire from a British patrol. The Kubelwagen and its driver escaped, but the tank was disabled and Streich and Lt Schmidt had to escape on foot and rejoin the action later. The tank attack itself was a rout in a trap cleverly set up by General Morshead.
The bridgehead corridor was under half a mile wide, and the 25 pdrs were placed well back at the end of the corridor, with Portee anti-tank guns (guns on the back of lorries to provide mobility) on each flank, and I RTR on the eastern flank as well. As the German tanks advanced the defenders held fire. Once the Germans were well into the corridor, the British opened up with a withering barrage of 25 pdr fire, followed by fire from the flanks. Under this battering the German 5th Panzer Regiment commander, Oberst Olrich, had no real option but to turn and withdraw, leaving behind 17 of the 36 tanks that had started. This withdrawal in turn left 8th Machine gun battalion exposed. Ponath,his men running out of ammunition---ordered a fighting withdrawal through the gap. As he led his men back he was killed; later he was awarded a posthumous Knight’s Cross for his brave leadership. The battalion by now had only 5 officers and 92 men left having lost over 700 in the previous two weeks of action. With Ponath dead the survivors surrendered to the Australians and the unit was no more.
Rommel blamed both Streich and Olrich for this debacle, and critized them for not securing the flanks, but in truth they had insufficient infantry to have done this-only the much depleted 8th Machine Gun Battalion-and there was virtually no supporting artillery and too few tanks to sustain the assault. Rommel himself certainly lost some’ credibility over this unsuccessful attack (though seemingly not with Hitler), for the wounded Gelleralmajor Kirchheim and other senior officers privately communicated to OKH that continued attacks with DAK at its present low strength would merely deplete and demoralize it further.
21st Panzer Division-Rommel’s Afrika Korps Spearhead-Chris Ellis