No one, and I mean NO ONE may enter your private land, home or out buildings without probable cause, exigent circumstances plain view (i.e. a fire, safety reasons, or a life threatening circumstance.
Evidently, you are not familiar with: Georgia v. Randolph
The Supreme Court Limits the Fourth Amendment’s Consent Doctrine
In Georgia v. Randolph, the Supreme Court ruled that consent to search a residence under the Fourth Amendment was not given when one co-occupant consented but another co-occupant, who was present at the time, refused to consent. The vote was 5 to 3, with Justice Souter writing the opinion for the Court. Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote concurring opinions, the more substantively notable being Breyer’s opinion in which he makes clear that his (critical) vote with the majority rested on the particular circumstances of the case. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented and each wrote separate dissenting opinions, although Scalia joined Roberts’ dissenting opinion as well.
The case is perhaps most surprising because it imposed a limitation on the consent doctrine, which has been applied quite expansively in a largely unbroken series of opinions, often with emphasis on its civic virtue and efficacy. The result in Randoph cut against the weight of lower court authority. Although the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that valid consent had not been given, theirs was a clear minority position; four of the federal circuits, and a majority of state courts that had considered the issue, ruled that consent was valid in similar circumstances.
The Supreme Court had previously decided two cases involving consent to search by real or apparent co-occupants, United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974), and Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990), and in both cases had ruled that consent by the co-occupants eliminated subsequent Fourth Amendment objections to the admission of seized evidence by an occupant who was not immediately present and therefore did not object at the time of the search. Both cases were clearly distinguishable from Randolph because the defendants did not refuse to consent to the search. However, as Roberts notes in dissent, that distinction is not as glaring as might first appear. In Matlock, where the co-occupant consented, Matlock was arrested in the yard of the house that was subsequently searched, and was detained in a police car near the house. Matlock did not refuse consent, but he was not asked. In Rodriguez, where the person who consented was not in fact a co-occupant but the police reasonably believed her claim that she was, the defendant was asleep inside the apartment that was searched. Apparently he could have been awakened and asked to consent, but these steps were not taken.
There was no longer a need to be concerned with his rights as a co-tenant.
There are a lot of funny little peculiarities in this case that the court didn't consider ~ that tell the tale in its entirity. It's a very simple case. Cop answers call. Gets jumped by non tenant.
WOW!
I can dig that one. Can you believe the lawyer got this to the Supreme Court?
They're a regular Legal Fees Machine for the Plaintiff's Bar!
Indiana's cap on malpractice cases has left the lawyers hungry for anything.
The legal sharks would like to live in Illinois but you can't get heart surgery there, or even advice about your heart! Too many suits.