Without knowing who wrote that document, I cannot say. The US Supreme Court has use the terms interchangeably, as have other legal sources for hundreds of years.
For example, writing in 1856:
“Before our Revolution, all free persons born within the dominions of the King of Great Britain, whatever their color or complexion, were native-born British subjects — those born out of his allegiance were aliens.”
The normal term used would be Natural Born Subject, not native born.
From Minor:
“These were natives or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners.”
Elk:
“This section contemplates two sources of citizenship, and two sources only: birth and naturalization. The persons declared to be citizens are “all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.” The evident meaning of these last words is not merely subject in some respect or degree to the jurisdiction of the United States, but completely subject to their political jurisdiction and owing them direct and immediate allegiance. And the words relate to the time of birth in the one case, as they do to the time of naturalization in the other. Persons not thus subject to the jurisdiction of the United States at the time of birth cannot become so afterwards except by being naturalized, either individually, as by proceedings under the naturalization acts, or collectively, as by the force of a treaty by which foreign territory is acquired.”
Perkins v Elg cited, with approval, an earlier US AG opinion:
“Young Steinkauler is a native-born American citizen. There is no law of the United States under which his father or any other person can deprive him of his birthright. He can return to America at the age of twenty-one, and in due time, if the people elect, he can become President of the United States; ....”
In 1949:
“No such procedures could strip a natural-born citizen of his birthright or lay him open to such a penalty. I have stated heretofore the reasons why I think the Constitution does not countenance either that deprivation or the ensuing liability to such a punishment for naturalized citizens. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, concurring opinion 320 U.S. 165; Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, dissenting opinion 328 U.S. 675.
***
This case, however, presents squarely the issue whether, beyond any question of burden or weight of proof, the ordinary civil procedures can suffice to take away the naturalized citizen’s status and lay him open to permanent exile, with all the fateful consequences following for himself and his family, often, as in this case, native-born Americans. The question in its narrower aspect is indeed whether those consequences can be inflicted without any proof whatever...
...If, in deference to the Court’s rulings, we are to continue to have two classes of citizens in this country, one secure in their status and the other subject at every moment to its loss by proceedings not applicable to the other class, cf. Schneiderman v. United States, supra, concurring opinion at 320 U.S. 167, Knauer v. United States, supra, dissenting opinion at 328 U.S. 678, I cannot assent to the idea that the ordinary rules of procedure in civil causes afford any standard sufficient to safeguard the status given to naturalized citizens. If citizenship is to be defeasible for naturalized citizens other than by voluntary renunciation or other causes applicable to native-born citizens,”
In 1964:
“We start from the premise that the rights of citizenship of the native born and of the naturalized person are of the same dignity, and are coextensive. The only difference drawn by the Constitution is that only the “natural born” citizen is eligible to be President. Art. II, § 1.”
They aren't used interchageably, although the Minor court comes close, except in that decision, "natives" is defined EXCLUSIVELY as birth in the country to citizen parents.