Hood was still quite a dangerous adversary at Nashville. Many a Federal operation went very badly when faced with similar advantages. Thomas' plan was a classic envelopment that went well. It was also the first time the Union cavalry was used to overwhelming tactical advantage when Wilson's Spencer-armed 12 thousand rolled them up on the Confederate left. On the Union right, Thomas placed great faith in his African-American troops, who performed admirably under General Stedman. In the center, the day was carried by General MacArthur, father of you-know-who.
This was a classic set-piece battle victory studied in military academies the world over.
Strangely, the author writes of the battle of Nashville as if it were the only battle that took place in that area at that time.
Franklin is one of those forgotten notes in Civil War history. The Southern charge along the Columbia Pike was bigger than Pickett’s charge the year before, and crossed as much open ground. Too boot, it was a dusk/night attack, hastily organized. Hood believed this to be his last chance to beat the Federal Army piecemeal and plunged the Army of Tennessee into an ill-conceived attack strongly opposed by his generals, most notably Nathan Bedford Forrest. 14 of those generals and 55 regimental commanders became casualties at Franklin.
I guess because Franklin ended up in the hands of Hood at the conclusion, somehow, it was considered a Confederate victory.
Beating, even crushing, the crippled Army of Tennessee, just out of the horrendous battle of Franklin, the Federal Army consisting of twice the men, many armed with Henry and Winchester repeating rifles, was not the great feat of marshal prowess the author lets the reader conclude it was.
The NappyOne