Richardson’s most stunning claim was that his superiors specifically vetoed his plan to use newly arrived PBYs to mount aerial patrols to the northwest of Hawaii. Such patrols might well have detected and warned of the approach of the Jap attack force.
Nonetheless, a PBY spotted a Jap midget submarine early in that morning. We were only lucky the Japs didn’t attack our fuel depots.
“Richardson’s most stunning claim was that his superiors specifically vetoed his plan to use newly arrived PBYs to mount aerial patrols to the northwest of Hawaii.”
The story about the PBY patrols is a half truth which misrepresents the circumstances. The Navy had a limited number of PBY aircraft, a limited amount of appropriations to fund the maintenance and operations of those aircraft, and a limited number of operational flight hours allotted to their operations. The task of providing full coverage of all possible approaches to Pearl Harbor some 7 days a week and 24 hours per day for weeks and months on end was well beyond the number of PBY flight hours available to the Navy’s budget for these PBY aircraft and units. Consequently, a decision was made to maintain PBY patrols in what they considered to be the most promising patrol sectors and schedules. Even after the attack on Pearl Harbor occurred, the commanders still were unable to direct the PBY patrols to the correct patrol sectors at the correct times.